J-S52038-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID ALLEN BURROWS
Appellant No. 332 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on January 29, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-25-CR-0003203-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and WECHT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2015
David Allen Burrows appeals his January 29, 2015 judgment of
sentence. Burrows’ counsel, appointed for appellate purposes after Burrows’
trial counsel was granted leave to withdraw at Burrows’ request, has filed a
petition to withdraw as counsel, together with an “Anders/Santiago brief.”1
Burrows’ counsel has satisfied the Anders/Santiago requirements. We
agree with counsel that Burrows has no meritorious issues to pursue on
appeal. Consequently, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw, and we
affirm Burrows’ judgment of sentence.
____________________________________________
1
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009). In Santiago, our Supreme Court
developed certain rules to ensure compliance with the principles underlying
Anders. Thus, this Court commonly refers to briefs filed thereunder as
“Anders/Santiago briefs.”
J-S52038-15
On or about October 1, 2013, Detective Jon Reddinger of the Erie
County Detectives Bureau of the Erie County District Attorney’s Office,
assigned to the Erie County Elder Abuse Task Force, filed a criminal
complaint with a sworn affidavit of probable cause against Burrows. In
relevant part, the affidavit related the events underlying Burrows’ charges as
follows:
Anne Brasington closed her PNC bank account on 10/10/2012 by
obtaining a cashier’s check for $9,334.61 to herself. This check
was then endorsed by Ms. Brasington and Burrows and then
deposited into Burrows’ personal PNC checking account. Three
checks were written from Burrows’ checking account. One for
$2,250 to Burrows and one for $6,334.61 to ABC Auto, which is
Burrows’ business. The third was to [Burrows] for $144. [Nick
Monocello, an adult protective services worker for Greater Erie
Community Action Committee (“GECAC”),] provided
documentation of Ms. Brasington’s account and surveillance
photos of Burrows and Ms. Brasington in the bank at the time of
the transaction. At the time of this allegation PNC had no
documentation that Burrows had power of attorney over
Brasington’s affair or was her guardian.
On 2/4/2013 the Erie Police responded to Ms. Brasington’s
residence where [she] had a complaint that someone had taken
her car and she believed it was Burrows. A check of PENNDOT
records show that Burrows, while using a power of attorney, sold
the car to himself on 12/31/2012 and then sold it to another
person on 2/4/2013 for $2500.00.
On 7/28/2013 another [report of need (“RON”)] was received
after the Wesleyville Police Department went to the residence of
Burrows from which Ms. Brasington called 911. Ms. Brasington
state[d] that Burrows kept her locked in the house and that he
was stealing her money. GECAC did another inquiry of Ms.
Brasington’s account and provided the findings to your affiant.
During the investigation of the RON the following was
discovered.
-2-
J-S52038-15
On 7/3/2013 Burrows brought a notary to the nursing home that
Ms. Brasington was in and obtained a power of attorney
document despite the nursing home’s concern regarding
Ms. Brasington’s mental capacity. On 7/23/2013 Burrows moved
Ms. Brasington into his residence at 3002 Rose Avenue in
Wesleyville.
On 7/10/2013 the first suspicious activity happened in Ms.
Brasington’s PNC banking accounts. Burrows, using his power of
attorney, transferred $2,500.00 from Ms. Brasington’s savings to
her checking. Burrows did this three more times. On 7/11/2013
Burrows transferred $2,161.37 from savings to checking. On
7/15/2013 Burrows transferred $2,500.00 from savings to
checking. On 7/16/2013 Burrows transferred $2,500.00 from
savings to checking. Finally on 7/18/2013 Burrows withdrew
$5,000.06 from Ms. Brasington’s savings account (closing the
account) and deposited it into Brasington’s checking account.
Burrows closed Ms. Brasington’s saving account 8 days from the
first report of activity.
Subsequently, Burrows wrote a check for $7,500 on 7/16/2013
to his business, ABC Auto, and two checks to himself, one for
$3,500.00 on 7/17/2013 and one for $700.00 on 7/25/2013. On
7/23/2013 Burrows made a cash withdrawal from
Ms. Brasington’s checking account for $4,201.05. Burrows
obtained $15,901.05 out of Ms. Brasington’s account in 7 days.
On the same day Ms. Brasington moved into 3002 Rose Ave.,
July 23, 2013, Burrows wrote a check to himself for $2,637.45
with the note on the check “Taxes 3002 Rose Ave.” and paid the
2012 taxes on 3002 Rose Avenue on 7/25/2013[,] where
Ms. Brasington had lived for two days at the time of the
payment. $2,673.45 was the cost of the taxes for Rose Ave.
for 2012.
On 7/19/2013 a [$3,300] check was written from the account
where the $3,500 check was deposited to Andy’s Equipment with
a note on the check “Pizza Oven & Donut Case.”
Affidavit of Probable Cause. 10/1/2013, at 1-2 (minor modifications to
grammar and nomenclature for clarity).
Burrows counsel provides the following account of this case:
-3-
J-S52038-15
On October 1, 2013, the Commonwealth charged [Burrows] with
one count of Theft by Deception, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3922(a)(1) [count
1]; six counts of Theft by Unlawful Taking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a)
[counts 2-6 and 9]; one count of Dealing in Proceeds of Unlawful
Activities, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5111 [count 7]; and one count of
Misapplication of Entrusted Property and Property of Government
or Financial Institutions[,] 18 Pa.C.S. § 4113(a) [count 8].
These charges stemmed from allegations that, from October 10,
2012[,] through July 25, 2013, [Burrows] stole funds from an
elderly, incompetent victim under the guise that he was caring
for her, and used those stolen funds to purchase personal items
through various sham accounts [that] he had opened.
****
In its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth presented the testimony
of a number of witnesses, including Monocello, an investigator
for GECAC on allegations of abuse, abandonment, and
exploitation of older adults 60 and above. Notes of Testimony
Day 1, 11/12/2014 (“N.T.1.”), at 45.[2] He further testified
regarding the gathering of records for investigations, specifically
for [Ms.] Brasington. Id. at 46.
Mr. Monocello testified that [Ms. Brasington] claimed that
thousands of dollars had been stolen. Id. at 47. Thereafter[,]
he contacted [Detective Reddinger] of the Erie County District
Attorney’s Office.
Next, Detective Reddinger testified regarding checks that
[Burrows] wrote from [the] victim’s checking account and
deposited into four (4) claimed [personal and] business accounts
of [Burrows]. Id. at 63. . . .
The next called witness was Vickie Wurst, Branch Service
Manager, First Niagara Bank. Id. at 93. Ms. Wurst identified
Ms. Brasington’s account and David Burrows[’] signature as
Power of Attorney as well as previously identified checks. Id.
at 98. . . .
____________________________________________
2
The trial spanned November 12, 13, and 14, 2014. For ease of
reference, citations of trial testimony for each of the three days will be
denoted, N.T.1, N.T.2, and N.T.3, respectively.
-4-
J-S52038-15
The Commonwealth then called Barbara J. Stevenson, a security
officer for PNC Bank. Id. at 104. She simply identified
[Burrows’] signature and business accounts as well as the
amounts deposited there in which [sic] corresponded with
previous checks signed by David Burrows as Power of Attorney
out of [Ms.] Brasington’s account.
****
Carol McEwen was the next witness called by the
Commonwealth. N.T.2 at 11. Ms. McEwen was a Social Services
Director at Twinbrook Medical Center during June and July of
2013. Id. at 11. Twinbrook is a skilled nursing home.
Part of her duties include assessing patients who enter the
facility. Id. at 12. Part of that assessment is mental and
cognitive assessment. Id. at 12.
Ms. McEwen assessed [Ms. Brasington] on July 1, 2013. Id.
at 14. Her assessment concluded that . . . Ms. Brasington[] fell
into the severe range of the [sic] cognitive impairment. Id.
at 16. This meant that Ms. Brasington suffered significant
memory difficulties and that her judgment and decision[-
]making skills would be fairly limited as well. She wouldn’t have
a full understanding of situations to make appropriate decisions.
Id. at 16. . . .
The Commonwealth next called Steven Letzelter, Director of
[the] Bureau of Revenue and Tax Claim[s], County of Erie. Id.
at 32. He identified a tax payment made by [Burrows] on July
25, 2013[,] for $2,673.45. Id. at 33. This payment was made
and the property assessed to Carmen Himes, 3002 Rose Avenue,
Erie, PA[,] 16510. Id. at 34.
The Commonwealth then called John Hecker, a clinical
psychologist to testify. Id. at 36. Dr. Hecker recited his
[curriculum vitae] with no objection.
Dr. Hecker examined [Ms.] Brasington in June of 2013. Id.
at 43. His opinion [was] that there was delirium, a very likely
underlying dementia[,] and that it had been going on for some
time. She was clearly not able . . . to make decisions for
herself. Id. at 54. Dr. Hecker further opined that
Ms. Brasington did not have the cognitive capacity to make [the
decision to sign a power of attorney] on July 3, 2013[,] which
would have been two (2) weeks after he saw her. Id. at 55-58.
-5-
J-S52038-15
Finally, the Commonwealth called [a]ttorney and [p]rofessor
Ronald Costen. Id. at 73. He was offered and accepted by the
[c]ourt as an expert in the field of law on the issue of [p]owers
of [a]ttorney.
Professor Costen stated that before he can write a [p]ower of
[a]ttorney he has to determine from a legal point of view that
[the person conferring such power is not legally incapacitated].
Id. at 85. Professor Costen then reviewed the documents
relating to the Power of Attorney executed by [Ms.] Brasington
and by [Burrows]. Id. at 86-87.
He then reviewed the opinion by Dr. Hecker after reviewing all
the documents before arriving at an opinion. Id. at 91. Next he
reviewed how the assets had been managed by [Burrows]. Id.
at 92. Finally, Professor Costen found that the Power of
Attorney was ineffective in that it granted no authority to
[Burrows] to do anything. Id. at 100. [Professor] Costen
opined that [all] the transactions based upon his review were
unlawful. Id. at 101. At the conclusion of Professor Costen’s
testimony the Commonwealth rested.
Anders/Santiago Brief at 6-11 (citations modified).
Following deliberations, the jury found Burrows guilty of counts two
through four (theft by unlawful taking, exceeding $2,000); count five (theft
by unlawful taking, between $200 and $2,000);3 count seven (dealing in
proceeds of unlawful activities), and count eight (misapplication of entrusted
property and property of government or financial institutions). See N.T.3
at 115-16.4 On January 29, 2015, the trial court sentenced Burrows to
____________________________________________
3
Theft of greater than $2,000 constitutes a felony of the third degree.
Theft of between $200 and $2,000 is a misdemeanor of the first degree.
See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3903(a.1) and (b), respectively.
4
An earlier trial of Burrows resulted in a mistrial. For the retrial now at
issue, the Commonwealth withdrew counts one, six, and nine.
-6-
J-S52038-15
eighteen months to ten years’ state incarceration for dealing in proceeds of
unlawful activities, a sentence corresponding to the upper bound of the
standard range for that offense. The court sentenced him on the remaining
counts, the standard range for each of which included total confinement of
varying durations, to concurrent periods of probation, the longest sentence
among those being seven years. See N.T. Sentencing, 1/29/2015, at 22-24.
Thus, Burrows’ aggregate sentence was eighteen months to ten years’
incarceration, to run concurrently with seven years’ probation. The court
also imposed restitution of $15,901.05 and costs of prosecution. On the
same day, the trial court granted trial counsel’s motion to withdraw as
counsel for Burrows at Burrows’ request.
On February 25, 2015, newly-appointed counsel timely filed a notice of
appeal. On the same day, the trial court entered an order directing Burrows
to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In lieu of such a statement, on March 11, 2015, counsel
filed a statement indicating that he intended to file an Anders/Santiago
brief asserting the absence of any non-frivolous issues to pursue on appeal.
On March 12, 2015, instead of filing an opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a),
the trial court entered an order determining that no opinion was required
due to counsel’s indication that he intended to proceed under Anders.
Because counsel for Burrows proceeds pursuant to Anders and
Santiago, this Court first must pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw
before reviewing the merits of the issues proposed by Burrows’ counsel.
-7-
J-S52038-15
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
banc). Prior to withdrawing as counsel under Anders, counsel must file a
brief that meets the requirements established by our Supreme Court in
Santiago. Pursuant thereto, the brief must provide the following
information:
(1) a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) reference to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to
the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his client.
Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the client of his rights to
“(1) retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal;
or (3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s
attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”
Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007);
see Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Finally, to facilitate our review of counsel’s satisfaction of his obligations, he
must attach to his petition to withdraw the letter that he transmitted to his
-8-
J-S52038-15
client. See Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa.
Super. 2005).
Our review of counsel’s petition to withdraw and the accompanying
brief demonstrates that counsel has satisfied Santiago’s requirements.
Counsel has provided a procedural history detailing the events relevant to
this appeal with appropriate citations to the record. Brief for Burrows at 6-
11. Counsel also has articulated Burrows’ potential arguments and has
analyzed them with appropriate citations to the record and case law.
Ultimately, counsel has concluded that Burrows has no non-frivolous issues
to raise on appeal.
Counsel also has sent Burrows a letter informing him that he identified
no meritorious issues to pursue on appeal; that counsel filed an application
to withdraw as Burrows’ counsel; and that Burrows was entitled to find new
counsel or proceed pro se. Counsel has attached the letter to his petition to
withdraw, as required by Millisock. Accordingly, counsel has complied with
Santiago’s technical requirements. See Millisock, 873 A.2d at 751.
Before ruling upon counsel’s motion to withdraw, however, we also
must independently review the record, beginning with the claims Burrows
wants this Court to review. Counsel has identified three such issues:
1. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to
sustain Burrows’ conviction[s] for . . . theft by unlawful taking?
2. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to
sustain Burrows’ conviction for dealing in proceeds of unlawful
activities?
-9-
J-S52038-15
3. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to
sustain Burrows’ conviction for misapplication of entrusted
property and property of government or financial institutions?
Id. at 5.
All of Burrows’ potential issues concern the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain his convictions. Our standard of review of challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled:
The standard we apply . . . is whether viewing all the evidence
admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict[-]
winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to
find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder[’s]. . . . [T]he facts
and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[trier] of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
Thus, we first must consider whether there is a non-frivolous challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence as to any of the counts in question.
A person is guilty of theft by unlawful taking “if he unlawfully takes, or
exercises unlawful control over, moveable property of another with intent to
- 10 -
J-S52038-15
deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). A theft by unlawful taking may
occur when the offender misappropriates the assets of another party. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. McCullough, 86 A.3d 896, 899 (Pa. Super. 2014).
As noted by the trial court during its charge to the jury, the four
convictions for theft by unlawful taking concerned his alleged theft of
$7,500, $3,500, $4,201.65, and $700 from Ms. Brasington. The first $7,000
took the form of a check written by Burrows from Ms. Brasington’s account
to Burrows’ business, ABC Auto. $3,500 and $700 were transferred by
separate checks that Burrows wrote to himself and deposited in an account
in his name. And finally, Burrows personally withdrew $4,201.65 in cash
from Ms. Brasington’s account.
In the context of a sufficiency challenge, we must review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict-winner. At
trial, Detective Reddinger reviewed bank records admitted into evidence.
These included a canceled check for $7,500 drawn upon Ms. Brasington’s
First Niagara account and made out to ABC Auto, signed “David Burrows,
Power of Attorney,” and deposited in ABC Auto’s PNC account. N.T.1 at 64,
72-73.5 Detective Reddinger also identified a $3,500 check that was drawn
from Ms. Brasington’s First Niagara checking account, signed “David
____________________________________________
5
A representative of First Niagara bank confirmed that, at all relevant
times, they had a form on file purporting to reflect that Burrows had power
of attorney for Ms. Brasington’s account. N.T.1 at 97-98.
- 11 -
J-S52038-15
Burrows, POA,” and made out to Burrows. Id. at 64, 73-74. Detective
Reddinger also identified a $700 check, signed “David Burrows POA” and
made out to Burrows, along with a deposit ticket to Burrows’ personal
account for that check. Id. at 65, 75-76. Detective Reddinger also
identified a checking withdrawal slip for a cash withdrawal of $4201.05 from
Ms. Brasington’s account, signed “David Burrows POA.” Id. at 74-75. Each
of these transactions happened within three weeks of Ms. Brasington’s
execution of the form purporting to grant Burrows power of attorney over
her affairs on July 3, 2013.
Detective Reddinger testified that the deposited funds, $7,500 made
out to ABC Auto, and $4,200 (i.e., the $3,500 and $700 checks) made out to
David Burrows, were deposited, respectively, in ABC Auto’s PNC account and
Burrows’ PNC account.6 From there, similar amounts were then transferred
by check to one or more other accounts in Burrows’ name. Id. at 76.7
Detective Reddinger further testified that, in the course of his investigation,
which included the execution of a search warrant upon Burrows’ residence,
where Ms. Brasington also resided toward the end of the time period during
____________________________________________
6
A representative for PNC bank confirmed that Burrows had deposited
the checks for $7,500 and $3,500 into his ABC Auto and personal PNC
accounts, respectively. N.T.1 at 107-09. She was not asked about the $700
check.
7
Numerous deposits into, and withdrawals from, Northwest Bank
accounts in ABC Auto’s and Burrows’ names on or near the same dates were
confirmed by a Northwest representative. N.T.1 at 116-19.
- 12 -
J-S52038-15
which these transactions occurred, he found no documents accounting for
any of these transactions.
Carol McEwen, a social worker employed by Twinbrook skilled nursing
home, testified that she conducted a mandatory cognitive assessment of
Ms. Brasington on July 1, 2013, two days before Ms. Brasington executed
the power of attorney. Ms. McEwen testified that Ms. Brasington had scored
in the severe range of cognitive impairment. See N.T.2 at 12-16.
Ms. McEwen further testified that this entailed “significant memory
difficulties,” and indicated that Ms. Brasington’s “decision-making skills
would be fairly limited as well, that she wouldn’t have full understanding of
situations to make appropriate decisions,” including matters as
straightforward as whether to wear boots on a snowy day and whether she
had taken her medication. Her recommendation for someone so impaired,
as it was for Ms. Brasington, would be to maintain twenty-four-hour
supervision. Id. at 16-17. Ms. McEwen also testified that she had multiple
conversations with Burrows, and explained to him the results of
Ms. Brasington’s cognitive exam and the recommended degree of
supervision. Id. at 18-19.
John Hecker, Ph.D., a clinical psychologist whom the court admitted as
an expert witness, testified to a clinical encounter with Ms. Brasington on
June 19, 2013, at UPMC Hamot Medical Center. Ms. Brasington’s attending
physician asked him to conduct a psychological assessment after
Ms. Brasington arrived at the hospital in a confused state. Id. at 44.
- 13 -
J-S52038-15
Dr. Hecker testified at length as to the results of a detailed assessment that
he performed on that occasion. Id. at 45-54. At that time, he concluded
that Ms. Brasington was suffering from acute delirium, with a high likelihood
of underlying dementia. Id. at 53-54. He further testified that, at least on
that occasion, “she was clearly not able to make decisions for herself.” Id.
at 54. He further testified that he did not believe that Ms. Brasington would
have had the capacity knowingly to execute a power of attorney on July 3,
2013. Id. at 55, 58.
This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, clearly sufficed to establish that, with regard to each of the
transactions identified by Detective Reddinger, Burrows was guilty of theft
by unlawful taking. The checks in question were executed pursuant to a
power of attorney that Burrows obtained during a period when experts
opined that Ms. Brasington lacked capacity to make responsible decisions
regarding important affairs. They were made out either to Burrows or his
business entity. They were deposited into Burrows’ accounts and then
transferred in whole or in part into other bank accounts in the name of
Burrows or ABC Auto. No records existed to substantiate that the funds had
been disposed of to Ms. Brasington’s benefit. Given this evidence, we agree
with counsel that no non-frivolous challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the four asserted counts of theft by unlawful taking
could be asserted.
- 14 -
J-S52038-15
We turn now to the remaining charges. Dealing in proceeds of illegal
activities occurs when “the person conducts a financial transaction . . . with
knowledge that the property involved, including stolen or illegally obtained
property, represents the proceeds of unlawful activity, the person acts with
the intent to promote the carrying on of the unlawful activity.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 5111(a). A person commits the crime of misapplication of entrusted
property and property of government or financial institutions when “he
applies or disposes of property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary,
or property of the government or of a financial institution, in a manner which
he knows is unlawful and involves substantial risk of loss or detriment to the
owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit the property was
entrusted.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4113(a).
We find that no non-frivolous challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence could be raised to either of these charges. The evidence recited
above, which is by no means exhaustive of the inculpating evidence
presented at trial, provided an ample evidentiary basis, both direct and
circumstantial, upon which a jury reasonably could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Burrows committed each of these crimes.
Consequently, based upon our independent review of the record, we agree
with counsel that no non-frivolous challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain any of the charges of which Burrows was convicted could
be raised on appeal. Furthermore, in reviewing the trial record, we observe
no other non-frivolous issues that Burrows could raise on appeal.
- 15 -
J-S52038-15
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw as counsel
granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/12/2015
- 16 -