IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1787
Filed December 23, 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF T.B.,
Minor Child,
S.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cherokee County, Mary L. Timko,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in
2011. AFFIRMED.
Theresa Rachel of Deck Law, Sioux City, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Lesley Rynell of Public Defender’s Office, Sioux City, attorney and
guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in
2011. She contends (1) the district court should not have denied her motion to
dismiss the termination petition based on the State’s failure to have her served
with process, (2) the State failed to prove the grounds for termination cited by the
district court, and (3) termination was not in the child’s best interests.
I. Motion to Dismiss
The mother moved to dismiss the termination petition because she was
not personally served with process. See Iowa Code § 232.112(3) (2015)
(requiring personal service of termination petition or service by restricted certified
mail, not less than seven days prior to the termination hearing). The district court
denied the motion after noting the mother was present for the termination hearing
and had filed a designation of exhibits and witnesses. On appeal, the mother
challenges this ruling, but not on the basis of the State’s failure to comply with
the statutory methods of service. She argues the petition should have been
dismissed for failure to state a claim:
Evidence at trial demonstrated [she] had gained the necessary
parenting and life management skills to now parent [the child]
fulltime. [She] was mentally, financially, and physically
capable . . . to have [the child] returned to her fulltime care.
This articulation of her argument is identical to her second contention, which we
will proceed to address.
II. Evidence Supporting Grounds for Termination
The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to several
statutory provisions. We may affirm if we find clear and convincing evidence to
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support any of the grounds cited by the juvenile court. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d
63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). We are persuaded section 232.116(1)(h) was
satisfied. This provision requires proof of several elements, including proof the
child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody.
Our de novo review of the record reveals the following facts. The Department
of Human Services became involved with the family in 2012 after discovering that
the child’s father severely abused the child’s sibling. The mother did not report
the incident to authorities. In the ensuing years, the department provided a
variety of reunification services and returned the child to the mother’s care
several times. Each time, the mother had difficulty attending to the child’s
physical and emotional needs.
The district court summarized the situation as follows:
A review of the record and testimony at the termination of
parental rights hearing clearly and convincingly show that [the
mother] was given above and beyond every reasonable effort
available to reunify with [the child]. Early on, [the child] and his
sister, [], were placed with their mother on a trial home visit. That
placement did not last. [The children] were placed back into foster
care. Monumental efforts were again initiated to work toward
reunification. Still, evidence to reunify was not forthcoming.
Despite the lack of real, sustained progress, the children were
returned to [the mother], with little to no benefit being seen to [the
children]. Finally, instead of removing the children from [the
mother’s] care yet again, [the mother] was given yet another
opportunity to maintain [the children] in her care by being allowed to
move with the children to the state of Oklahoma to reside with
relatives.
This move[] proved to be harmful to both children and only
further delayed permanency for these siblings. . . . [The mother’s]
grandmother, [], with whom the children were living, reported
significant concerns about [the child’s] behaviors and [the mother’s]
behaviors toward [the grandmother] and the children. The social
worker from Oklahoma who was overseeing the placement . . . had
such significant concerns about the children that a request was
made to bring the children back to Iowa. The children were brought
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back and services were again initiated to assist [the mother] in
remedying her lack of parenting skills when she arrived back in
Iowa about a month later. All the while, [the child’s] behaviors were
becoming increasingly difficult, out-of-control, and at times,
impossible to handle.
As the situation became more and more dysfunctional, an
effort was made to try and salvage whatever relationship was
present between [the child] and [the mother]. . . . As the evidence
demonstrates, . . . [the mother] was unable to parent [the child] and
[the child’s] behaviors continued to spiral downward.
....
The court finds that [the mother] has been unable to
demonstrate an ability to adequately parent [the child], keep him
safe, and recognize danger situations into which she has placed
him or into which the child finds himself without her intervention.
The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support these findings. No
useful purpose would be served by providing an extensive summary of this
evidence. It is sufficient to cite the department case manager’s testimony of
“ongoing concerns with parenting [and] safety of [the child] . . . if he was in [the
mother’s] care full time.” Even a service provider who supervised several visits
and who spoke positively about the mother’s interactions with the child, saw a
need for continued supervision.
We recognize the child’s numerous moves from foster home to foster
home may have contributed to his disruptive behaviors. But the mother was
afforded multiple opportunities to end this cycle and reassume a full-time
parenting role. Her lack of success in implementing the skills she learned
warranted termination of her parental rights.
III. Best Interests
Termination must be in the child’s best interests. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33,
39-40 (Iowa 2010); Iowa Code § 232.116(2). While mother and child shared a
bond, the bond was often a toxic one. By the mother’s own admission, the child
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hit her and acted aggressively towards her until shortly before the termination
hearing. Because she could not manage these behaviors, termination was in the
child’s best interests.
AFFIRMED.