MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be Feb 16 2016, 7:12 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ryan H. Cassman Eric J. Benner
Cathy M. Brownson Laurie D. Johnson
Coots, Henke & Wheeler, P.C. Richards, Boje, Pickering, Benner &
Carmel, Indiana Becker
Noblesville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re The Marriage Of: February 16, 2016
Thomas Todd Reynolds, Court of Appeals Case No.
29A04-1505-DR-265
Appellant-Petitioner,
Appeal from the Hamilton
v. Superior Court
The Honorable William J.
Tricia Reynolds, Hughes, Judge
The Honorable David K. Najjar,
Appellee-Respondent. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
29D03-0904-DR-515
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Thomas Todd Reynolds (“Father”) appeals from the trial court’s order finding
him in contempt. We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On January 8, 2010, the court entered a decree of dissolution which dissolved
the marriage of Father and Tricia Reynolds (“Mother”) and ordered that Father
pay child support of $351 per week. Section 3.1 of the decree provided in part:
For tax years 2010 and thereafter so long as he has a support
obligation, [Father], upon written request from [Mother], shall
make available for inspection, at the office of his counsel, or
another mutually agreed upon location, his 1040 and all
supporting schedules, W-2s, 1099s, and K-1s. Provided,
however, at the time [Mother’s] counsel reviews [Father’s] 1040,
[Father’s] counsel shall be provided a copy of [Mother’s] 1040
and all support schedules, W-2s, 1099s, and K-1s.
Appellant’s Appendix at 30.
[3] In an Agreed Order of Modification, signed by the court on March 12, 2013,
and file-stamped on March 13, 2013, the court ordered that Father pay child
support of fifty-one dollars per week through the Indiana State Central
Collection Unit (“ISCCU”), and also that:
In addition to the weekly child support obligation set forth above,
Father shall also pay to Mother as child support 38% of 12% of
the gross amount of all income he receives over and above
$61,233.00 annually, and $15,305.00 quarterly.[1] This shall be
1
The trial court included a footnote here which provided:
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reconciled quarterly, and annually following the fourth quarter.
Quarterly payments shall be paid directly to Mother rather than
through the ISCCU. Father shall pay this income to Mother
within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the quarter. The first
applicable quarter is the first quarter of 2013, January-March.
Father shall also concurrently provide documentation of his
income and calculation to Mother, including, the means by
which the payment was calculated.
Appellee’s Appendix at 1-2.
[4] In March 2014, Mother served a request for production of documents on Father
requesting copies of income tax returns for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013
including W-2s, 1099s, and other documentation illustrative of Father’s income
for those years from all sources, evidence of Father’s year-to-date income
received from all sources, evidence of the cost of health insurance attributable to
the parties and their children, if any, and certain other financial documents. In
May 2014, Mother’s counsel sent a letter to Father’s counsel stating that it had
been almost two months from the discovery request and he had not yet received
a response.
This is the ratio suggested by the guidelines, less the ratio of parenting time credit Father
receives on the attached worksheet. Per the attached worksheet the line 4/line 3 ratio is
12%. Per the attached worksheet, Father’s support obligation is reduced by his parenting
time credit by 72%, or in other words, as a result of the parenting time credit on line 7 of
the worksheet he pays 38% of child support obligation recommended on line 6. As an
example, if Father earns $161,233.00, beyond his weekly support amount he would owe
Mother $4,560.00 = [($l00,000 * .12) * .38].
Appellee’s Appendix at 1 n.1.
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[5] On June 5, 2014, Mother filed a motion to compel discovery stating that the
documents requested had not been received and that Father should be held
accountable for attorney fees incurred by Mother in making the motion. On
June 13, 2014, the court granted Mother’s motion to compel, ordered Father to
respond to the request for production of documents by June 16, 2014, and
scheduled a compliance hearing for July 22, 2014, which was later rescheduled
for August 5, 2014. On July 22, 2014, Father filed a motion for a protective
order prohibiting Mother from independently contacting his employer.2 On
August 5, 2014, the court held a hearing3 and issued an order stating that, “[a]s
there is no petition before the court for modification or contempt, the court
finds that both parties’ motions regarding discovery shall be denied as moot.”
Appellant’s Appendix at 46.
[6] On August 8, 2014, Mother filed a Verified Motion for Rule to Show Cause
requesting the court to order Father to appear and show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt of the court’s orders. Mother’s motion for rule to
show cause alleged in part that pursuant to the dissolution decree, Father is
obligated to provide his tax returns, W-2s, 1099s, K-1s, and other appropriate
financial documentation upon the request of Mother; that Father willfully and
knowingly failed and/or refused to comply with the dissolution decree and the
agreed order of modification; that Mother had specifically requested Father’s
2
The record does not include a copy of this motion.
3
The record does not include the transcript of this hearing.
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income documentation and had provided him with a detailed request for
production of documents; that Father had refused to provide that
documentation in spite of the fact there were two current court orders obligating
him to do so; and Father should be ordered to pay her attorney fees.
[7] On November 17, 2014, Mother filed a motion to compel discovery which
stated that, on or about August 13, 2014, Father was served with her request for
production of documents,4 which again requested copies of Father’s income tax
returns for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 including W-2s, 1099s, and other
documentation illustrative of Father’s income for those years from all sources;
that on or about October 27, 2014, the parties met at the office of Father’s
counsel to inspect certain documents requested in the request for production of
documents;5 and that, on or about October 28, 2014, counsel for Mother sent
Father’s counsel a letter outlining the documents which still had not been
produced. Mother also argued that Father should be held accountable for her
attorney fees. The October 28, 2014 letter by Mother’s counsel attached to the
4
This request for production of documents appears to be identical to the Mother’s March 2014 request for
production of documents.
5
Mother’s Exhibit A includes an email message sent on the morning of October 13, 2014, from Father’s
counsel to Mother’s counsel stating that he was looking for a response to the question of what Father was in
contempt for not providing and that the decree set forth that the parties would exchange their documents at
counsel’s office for inspection. The exhibit includes a reply email message sent the afternoon of October 13,
2014, from Mother’s counsel to Father’s counsel stating that as discussed several times before Mother was
missing Father’s 1040 tax returns as well as all supporting schedules, K-1s, 1099s, and the other documents
listed in the request for production of documents, and that hopefully those would be provided to Mother at
the inspection which was tentatively scheduled for October 24, 2014 and later rescheduled for October 27,
2014.
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motion to compel stated in part “[t]hank you very much for meeting us to
exchange documents on October 27, 2014” and:
Tax returns were viewed in person at [Father’s counsel’s] office
on 10/28/14 [sic]. Not provided were the W-2, K-1’s or and
1099’s for the 2011 and 2012 returns. No tax return provided for
2013, and only a partial K-1. Still need to receive the full and
complete W-2’s, K-1’s, 1099’s, or other evidence of income for the tax
years 2011, 2012, and 2013, along with the full state and federal 2013
tax return.
Id. at 56.
[8] On December 16, 2014, the court held a hearing. Counsel for Mother argued in
part that the motion for rule to show cause was filed based on Father’s refusal
to comply with the dissolution decree and the agreed order of modification and
that Mother had made numerous attempts to obtain information. Mother’s
counsel stated that a time for inspection of documents was scheduled and
ultimately took place on October 27, 2014, that he met at the office of Father’s
counsel, that “what we were provided was two pages from the partnership K-1
for [Father’s] law firm, no supporting schedules, we had nothing signed, we had
numbers indicating income and expenses, nothing supporting what those
expenses are,” and that “[m]y client believes that some personal expenses are
included in that, things like a $900.00 a month car payment, other things that
benefit [Father] personally, but as we stand here today with all of this activity
we still haven’t be[en] given access to those schedules which we[’]re entitled
to.” Transcript at 6-7. Mother’s counsel further argued that, while it was mid-
December 2014, Father had not filed his 2013 taxes yet and that he had
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“nothing with any reliability, nothing that is official to provide us with
information with regard to what his income is for 2013.” Id. at 7. Mother’s
counsel asked the court to assist Mother in obtaining the information she had
been seeking for months, and presented an exhibit showing Mother had
incurred $5,565 in attorney fees in her effort to obtain the documents to which
she was clearly entitled under the decree and the agreed order of modification.
Her counsel requested the court to compel Father to provide his income
information, to find Father in contempt, and to award Mother attorney fees,
and argued that “[i]t shouldn’t be this hard to get what the parties worked so
hard to negotiate for in their agreement and here we are going through all of
this to get that information.” Id. at 9.
[9] Counsel for Father argued that the motion for rule to show cause was filed on
August 8, 2014, prior to the motion to compel discovery, that the inspection
was not discussed until he suggested it in October 2014, that the first attempted
inspection occurred on October 24, 2014, that Mother did not bring her
documents, and that a second inspection was scheduled. Father’s counsel
argued that he did not hear at the inspection that there was a problem with the
documents he produced, and that the agreed modification order “requires very
specifically in addition to weekly child support [F]ather[’]s going to pay bonus
support, gross over gross” and that “[w]ell, [Father] unfortunately has not
exceeded his quarterly amounts so he has not owed any bonus income.” Id. at
14. His counsel stated that Father provided the quarterly documentation on
which his bonus income would have been calculated and provided his firm’s
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profit receipts, his distributions, and his K-1 for 2013, and that, at the
inspection, Father provided the 2013 K-1 and 2010 through 2012 tax returns.
He requested the court to deny the rule to show cause, to dismiss the motion to
compel, and to consider awarding attorney fees in favor of Father. In response,
Mother’s counsel argued that he still had not heard when he would receive
legitimate information for 2013, that Mother is entitled to specific documents
and schedules, which she has not received, and that the quarterly information
provided by Father was totally unreliable with much of it blacked out or
redacted.
[10] The court entered an order dated December 16, 2014, and file-stamped
December 18, 2014, which noted in part that Section 3.1 of the dissolution
decree provided that Father would make available for inspection, upon written
request by Mother, his tax information, including any 1040, W-2, 1099, or K-1
forms and supporting schedules, that Father was obligated to make such
information available from tax year 2010 and each year thereafter as long as he
had an obligation to provide financial support for the minor child, and that
Mother’s position was that Father failed to comply with the court’s orders
requiring him to provide such information to her. The court’s order further
provided in part:
5. An inspection of documents relating to [Father’s] tax
information was made in October, but did not include
certain tax information from tax years 2013, 2012 and
2011.
*****
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8. The Court finds that [Father] has failed to abide by the
orders of the Court. The [dissolution decree] does not
provide that [Mother] is only entitled to request [Father’s]
tax returns and supporting information from only the
immediately past tax year. She is entitled to inspect such
information from tax year 2010 and forward, upon written
request, and upon supplying [Father] with copies of her
corresponding tax information. While the Court does not
find that this provision exposes [Father] to harassment of
repeated requests for the same information, the Court does
not find that [Mother] is limited in her request to only
inspecting the past year’s information. [Father] did not
make such information available to [Mother] for
inspection, and is therefore in contempt.
*****
10. As a sanction for his contempt, the Court will order
[Father] to provide to [Mother’s] counsel within thirty (30)
days, copies of his federal and state income tax returns and
supporting documentation, including 1040 forms, all
supporting schedules, W-2 forms, 1099 forms, K-1 forms,
and Indiana income tax returns for tax years 2011 through
2013. [Father] shall also provide copies of any forms
submitted to the Internal Revenue Service or the Indiana
Department of Revenue to request an extension to file
income tax returns, if any have been filed, for tax years
2011 through 2013. [Father] shall further be ordered to
provide copies of any and all W-2, 1099 or K-1 forms for
tax year 2014 to [Mother] not later than February 15,
2015.
11. As a further sanction for his contempt, the Court will
Order [Father] to fully respond to [Mother’s] request for
production of documents within thirty (30) days of this
Order.
12. As a final sanction for his contempt, the Court will Order
[Father] to pay a portion of [Mother’s] attorney fees, in the
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amount of $3,000 within forty-five (45) days of this Order.
Any amount which remains unpaid shall be entered as a
judgment against [Father] and in favor of [Mother’s]
counsel.
Appellant’s Appendix at 21-22. Father filed a Consolidated Motion to Correct
Errors or, in the Alternative, Motion for Relief under Trial Rule 60(B) and
Request for Hearing, and following a hearing the court denied his motion.
Discussion
[11] The issue is whether the court abused its discretion in finding Father in
contempt. Whether a party is in contempt of court is a matter within the trial
court’s discretion. J.M. v. D.A., 935 N.E.2d 1235, 1243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),
reh’g denied.
[12] Father contends in part that the trial court did not issue a rule to show cause,
that he did not willfully violate the terms of the dissolution decree, and that
Mother’s motion for rule to show cause did not provide him with proper notice
under the contempt statutes. Mother argues in part that, at the time of the
inspection, Father did not provide all of the tax documents required by the
dissolution decree, that Father waived any argument regarding notice of the
contempt allegations as he failed to raise the issue below, and that he had notice
of the accusations against him and an opportunity to be heard.
[13] Contempt of court involves disobedience of a court order which undermines the
court’s authority, justice, and dignity. Henderson v. Henderson, 919 N.E.2d 1207,
1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). There are two types of contempt: direct and
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indirect. Id. Direct contempt involves actions occurring near the court that
interfere with the business of the court and of which the judge has personal
knowledge. Id. Contempt is indirect if it involves actions outside the trial
court’s personal knowledge. Id. “Willful disobedience of any lawfully entered
court order of which the offender had notice is indirect contempt.” Id.
[14] The trial court here found Father to be in contempt of the dissolution order.
Generally, a person who willfully disobeys any order lawfully issued by any
court of record or by the proper officer of the court is guilty of indirect
contempt. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1). As such, this case involves
indirect contempt. See id.
[15] Indirect contempt proceedings require an array of due process protections,
including notice and the opportunity to be heard, and these protections are set
forth at Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5.6 Id. at 1210-1211. If no rule to show cause is
6
Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5 provides:
(a) In all cases of indirect contempts, the person charged with indirect contempt is
entitled:
(1) before answering the charge; or
(2) being punished for the contempt;
to be served with a rule of the court against which the contempt was alleged to
have been committed.
(b) The rule to show cause must:
(1) clearly and distinctly set forth the facts that are alleged to constitute the
contempt;
(2) specify the time and place of the facts with reasonable certainty, as to
inform the defendant of the nature and circumstances of the charge
against the defendant; and
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issued in compliance with this statute, a court may lack the authority to hold a
person in contempt. In re Paternity of J.T.I., 875 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007). Strict compliance with the rule to show cause statute may be excused if
it is clear the alleged contemnor nevertheless had clear notice of the accusations
against him or her, for example because he or she received a copy of an original
contempt information that contained detailed factual allegations, or if he or she
appears at the contempt hearing and admits to the factual basis for a contempt
finding. Id.
[16] We have also held:
It lies within the inherent power of the trial court to fashion an
appropriate punishment for the disobedience of its order.
Macintosh v. Macintosh, 749 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
trans. denied. Unlike criminal indirect contempt, the primary
objective of a civil contempt proceeding is not to punish the
contemnor but to coerce action for the benefit of the aggrieved
party. Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 905 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), trans. denied . . . . “Nevertheless, a contempt order
which neither coerces compliance with a court order or
compensates the aggrieved party for loss, and does not offer an
(3) specify a time and place at which the defendant is required to show
cause, in the court, why the defendant should not be attached and
punished for such contempt.
(c) The court shall, on proper showing, extend the time provided under subsection
(b)(3) to give the defendant a reasonable and just opportunity to be purged of the
contempt.
(d) A rule provided for under subsection (b) may not issue until the facts alleged to
constitute the contempt have been:
(1) brought to the knowledge of the court by an information; and
(2) duly verified by the oath of affirmation of some officers of the court or
other responsible person.
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opportunity for the recalcitrant party to purge himself, may not
be imposed in a civil contempt proceeding.” Flash [v. Holtsclaw],
789 N.E.2d [955, 959 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied].
In re Paternity of M.F., 956 N.E.2d 1157, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing In re
Paternity of M.P.M.W., 908 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)).
[17] In this case, the court did not issue a rule to show cause in accordance with Ind.
Code § 34-47-3-5. Following the filing of a Mother’s motion for a rule to show
cause in August 2014 and motion to compel discovery in November 2014, a
hearing was held on December 16, 2014. However, the record is devoid of any
order issued by the court prior to the hearing ordering Father to show cause
why he should not be attached and punished for contempt at a specific time and
place in court, per Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5(b)(3), which is mandated by the
statute. Moreover, “[t]o avoid being purely punitive, a contempt order must
offer an opportunity for the recalcitrant party to purge himself or herself of the
contempt.” In re Paternity of M.F., 956 N.E.2d at 1164 (citing Henderson, 919
N.E.2d at 1212 n.3). The court’s December 16, 2014 order did not indicate the
manner in which Father could purge himself of the contempt. See Henderson,
919 N.E.2d at 1212 n.3 (noting one problem with the court’s contempt order
was that it did not indicate the manner in which the husband could purge
himself of the contempt).
[18] Based upon the lack of a rule to show cause from the court in accordance with
Ind. Code § 34-47-3-5 as well as the lack of an opportunity in the December
2014 order for Father to purge himself of any finding of contempt, we reverse
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the trial court’s order finding Father in contempt. See In re Paternity of M.F., 956
N.E.2d at 1164-1165 (holding that the court’s order did not indicate the manner
in which the mother could purge herself of the contempt and that the court
abused its discretion in finding her in contempt); Henderson, 919 N.E.2d at
1210-1212 (reversing finding of contempt and noting that the court’s order did
not indicate how the appellant could purge himself of the contempt); In re
Paternity of M.P.M.W., 908 N.E.2d at 1210 (noting that, unlike a contempt
sanction conditioned on the payment of money or the accomplishment of a
single task, the contempt sentence could not be purged). Further, to the extent
the court ordered Father to pay attorney fees as a sanction for contempt, we
reverse that order as well. See In re Paternity of M.F., 956 N.E.2d at 1165.
Conclusion
[19] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order finding Father in
contempt.
[20] Reversed.
Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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