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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10132
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-22066-KMW
BILLY CYPRESS, JOHNSON BILLIE,
ETHEL HUGGINS, BETTY CLAY,
GREG KELLY, AGNES BRADY,
EDNA TIGERTAIL, NINA BILLIE,
EVELYN CYPRESS, PRISCILLA BUSTER,
LUTHER TIGER, JAMES CLAY,
MARY KELLY, AUDREY CLAY,
HEATHER CYPRESS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_______________________
(March 23, 2016)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges, and ROBRENO, * District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises out of a dispute between sixteen members of the
Miccosukee Tribe of Florida (the “Tribe members”) and the United States, the U.S.
Department of the Interior, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and the
Secretaries of the Treasury and of the Interior (collectively, “the Government”).
The Tribe members seek declaratory relief to avoid paying federal income taxes on
distributions, including gaming proceeds, paid out of the Tribe’s trust account. The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
finding that the United States had not waived sovereign immunity for suits brought
by individual Tribe members. The Tribe members now appeal the dismissal.
We agree with the district court that the Government did not waive
sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this
matter.
I. BACKGROUND
Since 1990, the Miccosukee Tribe has operated gaming activities in Dade
County, Florida, and the Tribe currently imposes a “7.75% assessment on gaming
and other resort revenues.” The proceeds of this assessment are deposited into a
*
The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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“tribal trust account of distributable tribal revenues,” which the Tribal Government
disburses “to sustain[] tribal members in their existing communities.” The trust
account also includes proceeds from the “fuel tax on the Tribe’s fueling station”
and “income from tribal leases, licenses, and enterprises on other tribal trust
lands.”
In 2005, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began investigating the
Miccosukee Tribe’s and its members’ compliance with federal tax laws governing
the treatment of tribal revenue and disbursement from tribal gaming activity.
In their Complaint, the Tribe members sought a declaratory judgment that
any taxes levied on the Tribe’s payments to them violate various statutory and
treaty provisions that govern the Tribe’s relationship with the United States. They
asserted that the Miccosukee Reserved Area Act (MRAA), 16 U.S.C. § 410 note,
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702, each contain a
waiver of sovereign immunity applicable to their claims.
The Government filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
and specifically that the Tribe members failed to identify a valid waiver of
sovereign immunity permitting their claims against the United States.
After a hearing, the district court granted the Government’s motion. The
district court determined that the Tribe members failed to “establish[] an explicit
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waiver of sovereign immunity.” The district court explained that the waiver of
sovereign immunity in the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
expressly excludes tax matters. The district court also rejected the Tribe members’
reliance on the MRAA, “which principally addressed the relationship between the
Miccosukee Tribe’s land and Everglades National Park.” The district court
concluded that although the MRAA authorizes claims by the Tribe against the
Government, the MRAA does not unequivocally express a waiver of sovereign
immunity for suits by individual Tribe members. The district court explained that
even if the MRAA could be construed to permit suits by individual Tribe members,
Plaintiffs had not shown that their claims “arise from any violation of the MRAA,
which makes no reference to, provision for or mention of taxes of any kind.”
Finally, the district court found that the APA’s waiver of sovereign immunity was
inapplicable to this case.
Further, the district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint
to include additional information about potential harm, because amendment
“would not cure the fundamental defects in the Complaint.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets,
Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013). When determining whether the
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plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, we are to
take the allegations in the complaint as true. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of
Augusta–Richmond Cty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).
We review the district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend a pleading for
abuse of discretion, but we exercise de novo review as to the underlying legal
conclusion that amending the complaint would be futile. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v.
Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
The district court correctly dismissed this case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because the Tribe members did not identify a waiver of sovereign
immunity applicable to their claims in this case. By its plain language, the waiver
of sovereign immunity in the MRAA extends only to actions brought by the
Miccosukee Tribe itself, not individual Tribe members. Further, the APA is not an
independent source for judicial review as to the claims in this case.
By way of background, while an Indian tribe is “not a taxable entity” and
tribal income is generally exempt from federal income tax statutes, it is well settled
that an Indian generally is subject to the same income tax and employment tax
obligations as any other United States citizen unless a treaty, federal statute, or
other law provides otherwise, regardless of whether the Indian is a tribal council
member or officer. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55; see also Squire v.
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Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956) (“[I]n ordinary affairs of life, not governed by
treaties or remedial legislation, [Indians] are subject to the payment of income
taxes as are other citizens.”).
It is also well settled that the United States, as a sovereign entity, is immune
from suit unless it consents to be sued. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608
(1990). Where the United States consents to be sued, “the terms of its consent to be
sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)). A waiver of sovereign
immunity by the United States “cannot be implied but must be unequivocally
expressed.” United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). Further, the terms “upon
which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed.” Soriano v.
United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957). In construing a waiver of sovereign
immunity, courts “must be careful not to interpret it in a manner that would ‘extend
the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.’” Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 118 (1979)).
The primary jurisdictional statute governing judicial review of federal tax
decisions is 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a). Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662
F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2011). This subsection provides, in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
United States Court of Federal Claims, of:
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(1) [a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery
of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have
been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the
internal-revenue laws[.]
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a).
Congress, however, has expressly excluded from judicial review certain
types of federal tax disputes. See Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at 1188–89. Two
statutes circumscribing judicial review are the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and DJA.
The AIA provides that, except for a few enumerated statutory exceptions, “[n]o
suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person
against whom such tax was assessed.” 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). Similarly, the DJA,
which generally authorizes courts to issue declaratory judgments as a remedy,
excludes federal tax matters from its remedial scheme. Christian Coal., 662 F.3d at
1188–89 (citing Raulerson v. United States, 786 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.7 (11th Cir.
1986)).
The Tribe members claim on appeal that the MRAA and the APA gave the
district court jurisdiction over their claims. We consider each of these statutory
schemes in turn and find that neither contains a waiver of sovereign immunity
extending to the claims in this case.
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A. The MRAA
First, the Tribe Members claim that the MRAA contains a waiver of
sovereign immunity that affords the district court subject matter jurisdiction in this
case. The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida is a federally recognized Indian
Tribe. The Tribe previously resided within what is now the Everglades National
Park pursuant to a special use permit from the National Park Service. In 1998,
Congress enacted the MRAA “[t]o replace the special use permit with a legal
framework under which the Tribe c[ould] live permanently and govern the Tribe’s
own affairs in a modern community within the Park.” Pub. L. No. 105-313, § 3(1),
112 Stat. 2964, 2965 (1998). The MRAA provides that the Miccosukee Reserved
Area is to be considered Indian country and treated as a federally recognized
Indian reservation. §§ 5(a)(3), 5(c), 112 Stat. at 2966. Section 5 of the Act,
regarding Tribal rights and authority on the Miccosukee Reserved Area, provides
that the Tribe shall “make laws and apply those laws in the [Miccosukee Reserved
Area] as though the [Miccosukee Reserved Area] were a Federal Indian
Reservation.” § 5(a)(3), 112 Stat. at 2966. To aid in its enforcement, the MRAA
contains an express waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States. It provides
that “[t]he Tribe may bring a civil action in the United States district court for the
district in which the [Miccosukee Reserved Area] is located to enjoin the United
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States from violating any provision of this Act.” § 8(i)(2), 112 Stat. at 2973
(emphasis added).
The Tribe members maintain that when the United States waived sovereign
immunity for claims brought by “the Tribe” to enforce the MRAA, it also waived
sovereign immunity for claims brought by individual members of the Tribe. This
argument presents a question of statutory interpretation, which is answered by the
plain language of the statute.
We begin any statutory interpretation analysis with the statute’s text. United
States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2015). Where the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, we “presume that Congress said what it meant
and meant what it said.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1250 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (en
banc)). In such circumstances, our inquiry is complete. Chafin, 808 F.3d at 1270.
Here, the MRAA defines “Tribe” as “the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Florida, a tribe of American Indians recognized by the United State and organized
under section 16 of the Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 987; 25 U.S.C. 476), and
recognized by the State of Florida pursuant to chapter 285, Florida Statutes.”
§ 4(10), 112 Stat. at 2966. Therefore, by its plain language, the MRAA’s definition
of “Tribe” does not include individual tribal members.
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Of course, “because the ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or
phrases may only become evident when placed in context,’” the Court will “read
them ‘in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.’” Chafin, 808 F.3d at 1271 (quoting King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2489 (2015)). But even considering the context of the term “Tribe” in the overall
statutory scheme does not aid the Tribe members’ argument.
Several references to “the Tribe and its members” exist elsewhere in the
MRAA, but not in the provision authorizing suit against the United States. For
example, the Act provides that the Miccosukee Reserved Area should be treated
“as a federally recognized Indian reservation solely for purposes of . . . the
eligibility of the Tribe and its members for any Federal health, education,
employment, economic assistance, revenue sharing, or social welfare programs or
any other similar federal program for which Indians are eligible . . . .” § 5(c)(2)(B),
112 Stat. at 2966 (emphasis added). Another provision states that “[n]othing in this
Act shall authorize the Tribe or members or agents of the Tribe to interfere with
any Federal employee, agent, officer, or official in the performance of official
duties.” § 8(b)(2), 112 Stat. at 2971 (emphasis added). A third provision says that
“[i]n the event the Secretary exercises the authority granted the Secretary under
paragraph (2), the United States shall be liable to the Tribe or the members of the
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Tribe” for certain relocation costs and losses. § 8(e)(3), 112 Stat. at 2972
(emphasis added).
Two conclusions can be drawn from these three separate provisions of the
MRAA referencing both “the Tribe” and “its members.” First, Congress’s use of
the “Tribe” and “its members” in other MRAA provisions indicates that Congress
could have expressly provided a right of action against the United States by both
“the Tribe” and “its members” in the waiver of sovereign immunity if it so chose.
See, e.g., Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014) (“We have often
noted that when ‘Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another’ . . . this Court ‘presume[s]’ that Congress intended a
difference in meaning.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). Second, Congress’s references to both “the Tribe”
and “its members” in the disjunctive (“or”) indicates that the two are distinct units.
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“Canons of construction
ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate
meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise.”); United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d
1464, 1472 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that separating terms “by the disjunctive word
‘or[]’ strongly indicat[es] that Congress construed the two to be separate and
distinct”).
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In the end, “[s]tatutory language is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation.” Chafin, 808 F.3d at 1271 (alteration in
original) (quoting Med. Transp. Mgmt. v. Comm’r, 506 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.
2007)). Here, the Government waived its sovereign immunity only with respect to
suits brought by the “Tribe.” This term is not susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation, so it is unambiguous. The Government did not waive its
sovereign immunity in the MRAA as to claims brought by individual Tribe
members.
The Tribe members contend that this plain language approach is incorrect
because “treaties, statutes and agreements must be interpreted as the Indians
understood them.” In support of their argument, the Tribe members explain that
“Miccosukee” literally means “us” or “me” in their native language, and therefore
they believe that “rights accorded to the ‘Tribe’ conferred individual rights on the
Plaintiffs, as well as the Tribe.” However, the rule of construction favoring the
Indians’ interpretation applies only where the statutory or treaty language is
ambiguous. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
619 F.3d 1289, 1303 n.22 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We also reject the Tribe’s request for
us to apply the rule of construction that ambiguous statutes must be read in the
Indians’ favor because the Omnibus Act is an unambiguous statute.”).
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Likewise, the Tribe members ask us to consider another statutory scheme,
the 1997 Miccosukee Settlement Act (the “1997 Act”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1750–1750e,
in pari materia with the MRAA. They claim that the district court improperly
overlooked the 1997 Act, which was enacted contemporaneously with the MRAA
and concerned certain land to be held in trust by the United States for the use and
benefit of the Miccosukee Tribe after the Tribe lost land in a transfer to the Florida
Department of Transportation. See 25 U.S.C. § 1750 (listing congressional findings
spawning the 1997 Act). However, we need not employ the in pari materia
doctrine here, because we have concluded that the MRAA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity is unambiguous. See Ala. Educ. Ass’n v. State Superintendent of Educ.,
746 F.3d 1135, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[c]ourts generally turn to
an in pari materia analysis to resolve a statutory ambiguity and to ascertain
legislative intent”).
And, finally, the Tribe members point to McClanahan v. State Tax
Commission of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), for the proposition that “when
Congress has legislated on Indian matters, it has, most often, dealt with the tribes
as collective entities. But those entities are, after all, composed of individual
Indians, and the legislation confers individual rights.” Id. at 181. This general
principle is inapplicable where Congress has made plain that the waiver of
sovereign immunity in the MRAA does not encompass claims by individual Tribe
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members. Reading the MRAA’s waiver to confer individual rights to tribe
members would thereby “extend the waiver beyond that which Congress
intended.” Block, 461 U.S. at 287 (quoting Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 118).
B. The APA
The Tribe members proffer a second source of waiver of sovereign
immunity: the APA. Section 702 of the APA states that “[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action” may bring an action against the United States if
the person seeks “relief other than money damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The Supreme
Court has stated that this statute “waives the Government’s immunity from actions
seeking relief ‘other than money damages.’” Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc.,
525 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1999). However, § 701 of the APA states that the APA
“applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that statutes
preclude judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). And § 702 itself provides that
“[n]othing herein . . . affects other limitations on judicial review.” Id. § 702.
Because the AIA, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), and the DJA, see Christian Coal., 662 F.3d
at 1188–89, precluded the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the Tribe
members’ suit, the APA cannot provide a cause of action in this case. See Fostvedt
v. United States, 978 F.2d 1201, 1203–04 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that
“[section] 702 of the APA does not override the limitations of the Anti–Injunction
Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act”); Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d 531,
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537 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Even if the Anti-Injunction Act is not a grant of consent to
suit under clause 2 of the exception to § 702, however, it still is an ‘other limitation
on judicial review,’ under clause 1 of the exception. The Anti-Injunction Act is
therefore a jurisdictional bar.”); Smith v. Booth, 823 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“[W]e find that section 702 does not aid the plaintiffs because the Anti-Injunction
Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act bar judicial review of plaintiffs’ claims.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we find that the district court properly dismissed this action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, we need not reach the Tribe members’ other
arguments concerning the Tax Anti-Injunction Act, I.R.C. § 7421(a), and the tax
exception to the DJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). We also need not consider their
argument that the district court should have permitted them to amend their
complaint, because amendment could not have cured the jurisdictional
deficiencies. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.
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