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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
CHRISTOPHER JACOB FEDDER, :
:
Appellant :
: No. 1233 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 22, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-55-CR-0000285-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2016
Appellant, Christopher Jacob Fedder, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Snyder County Court of Common Pleas following his
bench convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”) 1 and the
summary offense of vehicular hazard signal lamps.2 Appellant contests the
suppression court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
The suppression court made the following findings of fact:
The police had been dispatched to Routes 11-15 for a
report of a vehicle traveling northbound in the southbound
lanes. While searching for this vehicle, the police observed
[Appellant’s] vehicle stopped on the shoulder in reverse
gear with its backup lights illuminated, the engine running,
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), (c).
2
75 Pa.C.S. § 4305(a).
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and hazard lights not on. The police pulled in behind
[Appellant’s] vehicle and activated their emergency lights.
State Trooper Whitford testified that he activated his
emergency lights for his safety. During this initial contact,
[Appellant] did provide the trooper with his Delaware
driver’s license. During cross-examination, Trooper
Whitford testified that his initial stop behind the
[Appellant’s] vehicle related to the facts that [Appellant]
did not have his hazard lights activated, the dispatch
concerning a car traveling north in a southbound lane, and
an inquiry to determine if [Appellant] was injured or in
need of help. This limited inquiry did not elevate what
began as a mere encounter to an investigatory detention.
Later, the trooper observed bloodshot glassy eyes. He
asked [Appellant] to submit to a PBT [preliminary breath
test], which the defendant refused. Later, [Appellant]
submitted to a blood test which indicated a .196 blood
alcohol level.
Trial Ct. Op., 8/25/15, at 2 (record citations omitted).
We note that Trooper Whitford indicated that upon first encountering
Appellant in his car, he was covered in barbecue sauce from chicken wings.
N.T. Suppression Hr’g, 1/9/15 at 8.3 Therefore, he stated that he could not,
at least initially, smell any alcohol, only “an abundance of barbecue sauce.”
Id. However, once Appellant exited the vehicle, Trooper Whitford began “to
observe the odor of alcohol coming from [Appellant].” Id. at 10. Further,
when he was securing the vehicle, Trooper Whitford also saw two full
unopened cans of beer next to the driver’s seat. Id. at 27. Trooper
Whitford also performed standard field sobriety tests (“SFSTs”) which
indicated that Appellant was intoxicated. Id. at 10. In addition, Appellant
3
Also present that night with Trooper Whitford was Corporal Richy. N.T. at
5.
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admitted to Trooper Whitford that he had been driving the vehicle. Id. at
19.
Appellant, on November 14, 2014, filed an omnibus pretrial motion
seeking, inter alia, suppression of the evidence obtained by the police. The
suppression court held a hearing on Appellant’s omnibus pretrial motion on
January 9, 2015. On that same day, the court issued an order denying
Appellant’s suppression motion. Specifically, the suppression court held that
the interaction between the troopers and Appellant constituted a mere
encounter not requiring reasonable suspicion. In addition, the suppression
court found that probable cause supported Appellant’s arrest.
After Appellant was found guilty on March 25, 2015, the court
sentenced him to eleven days to six months’ imprisonment on June 22,
2015. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On August 25, 2015, the court filed a
responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration.
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
motion to suppress challenging his roadside
detention?
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s
motion to suppress challenging his arrest?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying
his suppression motion because the troopers’ encounter with Appellant
constituted an investigative detention necessitating reasonable suspicion.
Specifically, Appellant emphasizes that the troopers were responding to an
anonymous tip of erratic driving, thus their purposes were by nature
“investigative” and did not constitute a mere welfare check. Therefore,
because the anonymous tip lacked specificity, Appellant argues that his
contact with police constituted an investigative detention made without
probable cause. He particularly points to Trooper Whitford’s testimony,
where he admits that he did not initially smell alcohol emanating from
Appellant, to support his contention that the trooper did not have sufficient
reasonable suspicion to support an investigative detention. In the
alternative, Appellant argues that if the troopers approached his vehicle due
to his failure to utilize his hazard signal lamps, such stop was made without
probable cause. Appellant avers that because the troopers saw his reverse
and brake lights engaged, it was more probable than not that he was
preparing to immediately re-enter the roadway.
Turning to Appellant’s second issue, he contends that the troopers did
not have sufficient probable cause to support his arrest. He argues that the
troopers had no evidence that he had been erratically driving or that he was
substantially impaired due to alcohol consumption. He points to the fact
that his car was stopped when the troopers came into contact with him and
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any SFSTs that he may have failed must be invalidated due to the troopers’
failure to properly administer the tests.
Both of Appellant’s issues concern the suppression court’s denial of his
suppression motion. When considering the trial court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, this Court employs the following standard of review:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in
addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression
motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of
the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the
facts. Thus, the conclusions of the courts below are
subject to [] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted).
It is well-established that “[t]he Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v.
Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 892 (Pa. Super. 2012). In analyzing the
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constitutionality of police-citizen interactions, we look to the nature of the
exchange between an officer and a citizen, which are categorized as follows.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has led to the
development of three categories of interactions
between citizens and the police. The first of these is
a “mere encounter” (or request for information)
which need not be supported by any level of
suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop
or respond. The second, an “investigative detention”
must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it
subjects a suspect to a stop and a period of
detention, but does not involve such coercive
conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent
of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial
detention” must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted).
When analyzing whether police contact constitutes a mere encounter
or an investigatory detention, we employ the following precepts:
To determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level
of an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as
a matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the
person involved. To decide whether a seizure has
occurred, a court must consider all the circumstances
surrounding the encounter to determine whether the
demeanor and conduct of the police would have
communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was
not free to decline the officers’ request or otherwise
terminate the encounter. Thus, the focal point of our
inquiry must be whether, considering the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person innocent of
any crime, would have thought he was being restrained
had he been in the defendant’s shoes.
Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1046-47 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citation omitted) (holding that interaction between the petitioner and police
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was a mere encounter where the petitioner was approached in his parked
car, in a public parking lot, by an officer with his police vehicle headlights
activated).
We also note the following with particular relevancy for the instant case:
In cases where a driver pulls over for an unknown
reason, the officer must not be restrained from
investigating the situation to assess whether help is
needed. If the investigation occurs at night, it is
reasonable for an officer to activate overhead lights to
ensure his or her own safety as well as the safety of the
driver, and to notify passing vehicles of their presence. A
driver’s unusual behavior is enough of a reason for an
officer to stop, assess the situation, and determine
whether the driver is in need of assistance.
Certainly an officer would realize that there might be a
variety of reasons for unusual behavior by a driver which
could include driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. However, merely because the officer considers
drunk driving as one alternative does not mean he is
precluded from trying to aid a citizen if he also thinks the
driver might be in distress.
Commonwealth v. Kendall, 976 A.2d 503, 508-09 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(holding that where the petitioner had been driving slowly prior to coming to
a complete halt in a deserted area, the police officer’s subsequent interaction
constituted a mere encounter because the officer was justified in conducting
a welfare check). In Kendall, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol
emanating from the petitioner and saw an open container of beer in the
petitioner’s vehicle. Id. at 505. There, the petitioner was ultimately
convicted of DUI. Id. at 504.
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Further, the existence of probable cause, in the context of an arrest, is
resolved as follows:
To determine whether probable cause exists, we must
consider whether the facts and circumstances which are
within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the
arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy
information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is
committing a crime.
Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 824 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations omitted). Specifically, in regard to arrests for DUI, we note that
“[p]robable cause exists where the officer has knowledge of sufficient facts
and circumstances to warrant a prudent person to believe that the driver has
been driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.”
Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984, 994 (Pa. Super. 2008).
In the case sub judice, Appellant’s car was stopped along the shoulder
of a highway, with the brake lights engaged and in reverse gear, without the
use of hazard lights. While it is correct that Trooper Whitford was initially
responding to an anonymous tip regarding erratic driving, the trooper also
testified that he approached Appellant’s vehicle to ascertain whether help
was needed. In Collins, we concluded that the officer at issue was justified
in checking on the welfare of the occupants of a legally parked car, which did
not exhibit any outward sign of distress or illegal activity, and that such
contact constituted a mere encounter. See Collins, 950 A.2d 1047-48.
There, we specifically emphasized that a reasonable person who sits in a
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vehicle that is apparently disabled along a highway, would expect an officer
in the vicinity to make a welfare check and would feel free to terminate such
an encounter. Id. Likewise, in the instant case, Appellant’s vehicle was
stopped along a highway with no outward signs of distress, and Trooper
Whitford conducted a proper welfare check from which a reasonable person
would feel free to leave. See Id. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence of
record was sufficient to support the suppression court’s conclusion that the
initial encounter between Trooper Whitford, Corporal Richy, and Appellant
was a mere encounter not requiring reasonable suspicion. See Jones, 121
A.3d at 526-27; Kendall, 976 A.2d at 508-09; Collins, 950 A.2d at 1046-
47. Therefore, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.
In his second issue, Appellant contends that the troopers lacked
probable cause to effectuate his arrest and therefore his suppression motion
was improperly denied. Appellant particularly emphasizes that Trooper
Whitford did not observe Appellant driving erratically, did not initially smell
alcohol emanating from Appellant, and did not “medically prequalify”
Appellant before requiring him to perform SFSTs. However, the record
reflects that Appellant admitted to Trooper Whitford that he had been the
driver of the car in question. N.T. Suppression Hr’g at 10. Trooper Whitford
also initially observed Appellant to have glassy eyes and a disheveled
appearance, as he was covered in barbeque sauce. Id. at 8. Further, upon
Appellant’s exit from the vehicle, the trooper did encounter the strong smell
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of alcohol and observed full containers of alcohol in the car. Id. at 10, 27.
Accordingly, we hold that under the factual circumstances presented, the
troopers had ample evidence to support the belief that they had probable
cause to arrest Appellant for DUI. See Ibrahim, 127 A.3d at 824; Hilliar,
943 A.2d at 994. Therefore, we conclude that the suppression court’s denial
of Appellant’s suppression motion is supported by the record. See Jones,
121 A.3d at 526-27. In light of the foregoing, Appellant’s second issue
must also fail and we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/30/2016
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