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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTOPHER LEWIS
Appellant No. 2669 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 7, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008400-2008
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2016
Appellant, Christopher Lewis, appeals pro se from the August 7, 2013
aggregate judgment of sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment, imposed
after he was found guilty of one count each of possession with intent to
deliver (PWID), intentional possession of a controlled substance, criminal
conspiracy, and criminal use of a communication facility.1 After careful
review, we vacate and remand for resentencing.2
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(a), and
7512a), respectively.
2
On December 22, 2015, this Court granted the Commonwealth’s motion for
an extension of time to file its brief, setting a new deadline of February 17,
2016, with which the Commonwealth did not comply. Superior Court Order,
12/22/15, at 1. On March 7, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a motion for a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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We summarize the relevant procedural history of this case as follows.
On July 16, 2008, the Commonwealth filed an information, charging
Appellant with the above-mentioned offenses, as well as one count of
possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC).3 On March 11, 2011,
Appellant proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which, the trial
court found Appellant guilty of PWID, intentional possession of a controlled
substance, criminal conspiracy, and criminal use of a communication facility.
The trial court found Appellant not guilty of PIC. On June 10, 2011, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to three to eight years’ imprisonment for PWID, a
concurrent sentence of three to eight years’ imprisonment for intentional
possession of a controlled substance, and no further penalty on the
remaining charges.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on
June 27, 2011. The Commonwealth argued that the trial court erred when it
did not impose the mandatory minimum sentence at Section 9712.1 of the
Sentencing Code. We agreed, and on April 23, 2013, this Court vacated the
judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the
trial court erred in failing to apply the mandatory minimum sentence.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
nunc pro tunc extension of time to file its brief until March 21, 2016, which
this Court granted on March 14, 2016. Superior Court Order, 3/14/16, at 1.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth has not filed a brief by the deadline it
requested.
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).
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Commonwealth v. Lewis, 75 A.3d 560 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished
memorandum at 8-9). On remand, the trial court complied with our
mandate and sentenced Appellant, on August 7, 2013, to the mandatory
minimum sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment for PWID, a concurrent
five to ten years’ imprisonment for intentional possession of a controlled
substance, and no further penalty on the remaining charges. On September
6, 2013, Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.4
On appeal, Appellant raises the following four issues for our review.
1. Was the [trial c]ourt’s procedure in
determining if the mandatory minimum
sentence applied improper as this issue must
go before a jury?
2. Did the [trial court] at re-sentencing change or
misapply the convictions for the imposition of
the mandatory minimum sentence?
3. Did the [Commonwealth], at trial, sentencing &
appeal, mislead the [trial] court as to the facts
of the case to apply the mandatory minimum
sentencing statute?
4. Was the evidence which was proven in court,
sufficient for the application of the mandatory
minimum sentencing statute?
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4
Appellant timely filed his concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). It
appears that there is no Rule 1925(a) opinion for this appeal, as the original
trial court judge has retired. In addition, although counsel was initially
appointed for Appellant, on May 20, 2014, we remanded this case for a
hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
At the conclusion of the Grazier hearing, the trial court permitted
Appellant’s request to proceed pro se.
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Appellant’s Brief at 3.
We address only Appellant’s first issue, as it is dispositive of this
appeal. Appellant argues that the imposition of the mandatory minimum
sentence on remand violated his constitutional rights under the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
2151 (2013).5 Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.
At the outset, we note that issues pertaining to
Alleyne go directly to the legality of the sentence.
Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 99 A.3d 116, 123
(Pa. Super. 2014). With this in mind, we begin by
noting our well-settled standard of review. “A
challenge to the legality of a sentence … may be
entertained as long as the reviewing court has
jurisdiction.” Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18
A.3d 1242, 1254 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted). It is also well-established that “[i]f no
statutory authorization exists for a particular
sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to
correction.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 95 A.3d
913, 915 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “An
illegal sentence must be vacated.” Id. “Issues
relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of
law[.] … Our standard of review over such questions
is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Akbar, 91 A.3d 227, 238 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
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5
We note that in the Commonwealth’s prior appeal in this case, we held that
the trial court erred in concluding the Commonwealth had not met its
statutory burden for the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence.
Lewis, supra. At the time of our prior decision, Alleyne had not been
decided and the law at the time was that the Sixth Amendment did not
require mandatory minimum facts to be submitted to a jury and found
beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Harris v. United States, 536
U.S. 545, 563-568 (2002).
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Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748, 750 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 121 A.3d 494 (Pa. 2015).
Consistent with our prior mandate, the trial court imposed mandatory
minimum sentences under Section 9712.1. N.T., 8/7/13, at 7. On June 17,
2013, 55 days after our prior memorandum in this case, the United States
Supreme Court decided Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that “facts that
increase mandatory minimum sentences must be
submitted to the jury” and must be found beyond a
reasonable doubt. Alleyne, supra at 2163.
Alleyne is an extension of the Supreme Court’s line
of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Alleyne, the Court
overruled Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545
(2002), in which the Court had reached the opposite
conclusion, explaining that there is no constitutional
distinction between judicial fact finding which raises
the minimum sentence and that which raises the
maximum sentence.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 994 (Pa. Super. 2014).
“Although Appellant was convicted at a bench trial, under the Due Process
Clause, he was still entitled to have the extra element of the aggravated
offense found by the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to
Alleyne and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).” Cardwell, supra at
751, citing Alleyne, supra at 2156.
In Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc), this Court held that Section 9712.1 was facially unconstitutional. Id.
at 102. As Section 9712.1 is unconstitutional on its face, there is no set of
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circumstances in which the statute can be constitutionally applied. United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987); accord Commonwealth v.
McKown, 79 A.3d 678, 687 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 162
(Pa. 2014). Therefore, because the trial court applied a facially
unconstitutional statute when it resentenced Appellant, the resultant
sentence was illegal.6 See Rivera, supra. As our decision upsets the trial
court’s sentencing scheme, we must vacate the entire judgment of sentence
and remand for resentencing. See generally Commonwealth v. Tanner,
61 A.3d 1043, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court imposed an illegal
sentence when it applied Section 9712.1 to Appellant, notwithstanding our
prior judgment to the contrary. Accordingly, the trial court’s August 7, 2013
judgment of sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing
without consideration of the mandatory minimum provision, consistent with
this memorandum.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
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6
In light of our disposition, Appellant’s remaining challenges to the
mandatory minimum sentences are moot.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/15/2016
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