UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LAVELLE EVERT COPELAND, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No. 16-cv-00036 (CRC)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Cousins Lavelle Copeland and Darion Miller seek damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1983
resulting from an allegedly unconstitutional search of their Washington, D.C. home by officers
of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”). In addition to an MPD sergeant and an officer
involved in the search, they have sued the District of Columbia itself, its mayor, an MPD watch
commander, and twelve unknown “John Doe” officers. Defendants have filed a partial motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They
request dismissal of all claims against Mayor Muriel Bowser and Watch Commander Willie
Dandridge on the ground that the Complaint fails to offer any facts personally linking them to the
search. They seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the District because the
Complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to support a finding of municipal liability. And they
seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims against Sergeant Kevin Harding and
Officer Daniel Flinn on the ground that they are duplicative of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
claims. As explained briefly below, the Court will grant the motion.
I. Background
Copeland and Miller allege that around midnight on June 2, 2015, a team of armed
“tactical police” officers arrived at their home in Southeast Washington, detained them in
handcuffs for two hours in view of their neighbors, and proceeded to search their home without a
warrant. After an initial search proved fruitless, according to Plaintiffs, the police informed them
that they were looking for a shotgun and then used false pretenses to procure their consent for a
second search of the home. The subsequent search revealed an unused shotgun located in an
upstairs bedroom, which Plaintiffs contend was legally purchased in Maryland. Plaintiffs filed
suit in the D.C. Superior Court under 18 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants timely removed the case to this Court
and have filed the present motion to dismiss.
II. Discussion
A. Claims Against Mayor Bowser and Commander Dandridge
The Complaint names Mayor Bowser and Commander Dandridge as defendants in their
personal capacities. The only allegation in the Complaint against Mayor Bowser, however, is
that she is the “head” of the District government. Pls.’ Compl. ¶ 11. The only allegation against
Commander Dandridge is that he “has in his possession the full names and badge numbers” of
the twelve John Doe officers. Id. Neither allegation suggests any personal involvement in the
relevant events, let alone wrongdoing, by either defendant. Nor can either defendant be held
vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677 (2009). As a result, the Court will dismiss all claims against Mayor Bowser and
Commander Dandridge.
B. Municipal Liability Against the District of Columbia
Plaintiffs seek to hold the District of Columbia liable for the actions of the officers who
conducted the search based on the alleged existence of a “policy and practice” of conducting
improper warrantless searches and the MPD’s failure to train and supervise its officers. See
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (holding that a
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municipality may be sued under § 1983 “when execution of [its] policy or custom . . . inflicts the
injury” alleged). Yet the Complaint fails to identify any specific policy, practice, or lack of
training that resulted in Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. To the contrary, Plaintiffs concede that the
MPD has “an established pattern, policy, and practice of training its officers not to engage in
highly intrusive, dangerous, and demeaning warrantless searches.” Compl ¶ 18 (emphasis
added). Plaintiffs’ conclusory (and inconsistent) allegations fall far short of the requirements for
pleading municipal liability under § 1983. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823
(1985) (noting that municipal-liability claims require specific factual connections between
constitutional harms and the policies that allegedly give rise to them, because otherwise virtually
any allegation of harm inflicted by a municipal official would satisfy Monell). The Court will
therefore grant the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the District.
C. Fifth Amendment Claims Against Sergeant Harding and Officer Flinn
Plaintiffs claim that the search of their home and their attendant treatment violated both
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Yet the constitutionality of searches like the one alleged in
the Complaint is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth. See Elkins v.
Dist. of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“‘Where a particular Amendment
provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of
governmental behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of [Fifth Amendment]
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’”) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). As a result, Defendants are
correct that Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim against Sergeant Harding and Officer Flinn is
duplicative. The Court will accordingly grant the motion to dismiss this claim against both
defendants.
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D. Leave to Amend
In their opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs request leave to amend
their Complaint to remedy any pleading deficiencies. As Defendants observe, however,
Plaintiffs have failed to include a copy of their proposed amended complaint as required by
Local Civil Rule 7(i). The Court will therefore deny the request for leave to amend. While most
if not all of the deficiencies would appear incurable based on the underlying facts alleged in
current Complaint, the Court will nonetheless dismiss the claims discussed above without
prejudice and would consider a properly filed motion for leave to amend.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that [4] Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
Date: May 13, 2016
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