IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-1195
Filed: 17 May 2016
Cumberland County, Nos. 08-JT-151 and 11-JT-61
IN THE MATTER OF: C.A.D. and B.E.R. (Minor Juveniles)
Appeal by Respondent-Mother from a permanency planning order entered 20
March 2014, and an order terminating her parental rights entered 9 July 2015 by
Judge Edward A. Pone in Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 13 April 2016.
Staff Attorney Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee for Cumberland County Department
of Social Services.
Mary McCullers Reece for Respondent-Mother.
Matthew D. Wunsche for Guardian ad Litem.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Respondent-Mother Tabitha Nicole Rogers (“Respondent”) appeals following
an order terminating her parental rights to her minor children “Beth” and “Charlie.”1
1 Pseudonyms have been used to protect the minor children. N.C. App. Rule 3.1(b). In an
effort to highlight the conduct of the adults in this case, the Court has not used pseudonyms to protect
the adults because they were not “under the age of eighteen at the time of the proceedings in the trial
division . . . .” See Id.
IN RE: C.A.D., B.E.R.
Opinion of the Court
We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Respondent’s
parental rights to serve Beth’s and Charlie’s best interests.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Since 2002, the Cumberland County Department of Social Services (“DSS”)
visited Respondent’s home over nine times for child protective service referrals. She
is the biological mother of four children, “Richard,” Beth, “Oliver” (now deceased), and
Charlie.2 Samuel Nolan is Beth’s legal father. Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis is
Respondent’s boyfriend and Charlie’s putative father. Cory Bavousett is Richard’s
father and Christopher Morrison is Richard’s putative father. Oliver’s biological
father is unidentified in the record.
Respondent lives in a two-bedroom single-wide trailer with her three children
Oliver, Beth, and Richard, her parents Marjorie Rogers and Graham Rogers, Jr. ( the
“maternal grandparents”), her boyfriend Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis, and her brother
Graham Rogers III. She is unemployed. Charlie had not yet been born into this
environment. On 18 March 2008, social worker Yvette Jordan (Cumberland County
DSS) visited the home to investigate a referral, which came from a 911 call from a
member of this household.
Ms. Jordan walked into “clutter, disarray and squalor” that engulfed the
residents. Oliver, Richard’s and Beth’s ten-month-old baby brother, lain dead, his
2 Richard, the eldest, was born in 2002. Beth was born in 2005. Oliver was born in 2007.
Charlie was born in 2008.
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Opinion of the Court
body decomposing “for an undetermined period of time.” Bruises distorted his face,
chest, arms, and legs. A sore left the flesh of his arm open and exposed. His skin was
purple and lifeless, “slippage indicat[ed] he had been dead for a period of time.” When
asked about Oliver’s death, Tabitha Rogers, Graham Rogers III, Marjorie Rogers,
Graham Rogers Jr., and Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis, could not, or would not, give an
explanation. The trial court heard allegations Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis had
harmed Oliver. After an autopsy on Oliver’s body, the examiner determined “there
were total inconsistencies between the adults’ statements and the time [of Oliver’s
death.”]
The home was “infested with roaches, had dirty diapers on the floor . . . piles
of dirty clothes . . . one baby’s bottle containing a dark liquid substance . . . [and] [t]he
home smelled of urine and had a strong animal smell as well.” “There was very little
food in the home, [and] there was no food or formula for [Oliver] in the home.”
Beth, then three years old, was “covered in dirt and she had a strong urine
smell on her body.” Scratches painted her legs, feet, and face. She was dressed unfit
for the March weather. When taken to the hospital for her injuries, Beth “had to be
bathed before the doctor could examine her.”
Her five-year-old brother, Richard, wore disturbing injuries. Richard “had a
rash under his left arm and a healing gash on top o[f] his head.” When asked about
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Opinion of the Court
the gash, Richard “replied that he could not talk about it.” Like Beth, doctors had to
bathe him before he could be examined.
The record discloses no criminal charges filed in this matter.
On the day after Ms. Jordan’s visitation, DSS filed a verified juvenile petition
alleging Beth and Richard were abused, neglected, and dependent. Cumberland
County District Court Judge Edward A. Pone immediately ordered non-secure
custody of the juveniles and placed them into foster care and therapy. While in foster
care, the children evidenced “significant [] developmental delays.”
On 5 August 2008, Judge Pone adjudicated Beth and Richard as “neglected”
and dismissed the allegations of abuse and dependency. Judge Pone found “[r]eturn
of the juveniles to the Respondent[] would be contrary to the welfare and best interest
of the juveniles in as much as additional services are needed.” Judge Pone found
Beth’s and Richard’s home “an injurious environment,” and the family “has a long
history of involvement with Child Protective Services,” and it was “imperative” for
the children to reside in a clean and safe environment.
To achieve this end, Judge Pone ordered Respondent to enroll in parenting
classes, and put the children in continued therapy and foster care. The record shows
Respondent “by and through her counsel, admitted and stipulated that the juveniles
were neglected.” The record does not disclose what party, if any, recommended the
children be reunified with Respondent and/or the maternal grandparents.
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IN RE: C.A.D., B.E.R.
Opinion of the Court
Notwithstanding this lack, Judge Pone statutorily set the permanent plan as
reunification with Respondent. See In re L.M.T., A.M.T., 367 N.C. 165, 167, 752
S.E.2d 453, 455 (2013) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(b) (2011)). DSS devised “a
plan of structure for the family” which included intensive in-home services.
In September 2008, Respondent gave birth to her fourth child, Charlie. On 21
November 2008, Judge Pone ordered Beth and Richard to be transitioned back into
the home with Respondent and the maternal grandparents. The record does not
disclose what party advocated for this transition. Judge Pone ordered the family to
participate in intensive in-home services and therapy, and set the following
boundaries recommended by Richard’s therapist:
a. [Richard] should have his own bed and space and
preferably his own bedroom;
b. [Richard] should sleep by himself in his own bed;
c. [Richard] should not sleep with “Mr. and Mrs. Rogers.”
d. The caregivers should not possess or access pornography
in the home or on the property where [Richard] resides.
e. The caregivers should maintain personal boundaries
when in the presence of [Richard] by always being fully
clothed i.e. underwear, pants, bra and shirts.
f. [Richard] should not be responsible for the care giving or
disciplining of any children including his siblings i.e.
diaper changing, carrying, etc. . . .
h. [Richard] should have no contact with [Brian Phillip
“Tank” Davis] by phone, in person, by written
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Opinion of the Court
correspondence, or by seeing pictures. . . .
o. Ms. Tabitha Rogers should receive psychoeducation . . . .
q. Graham and Marjorie Rogers should receive
psychoeducation . . . .
On 18 August 2009, Judge Pone gave Respondent and the maternal
grandparents joint legal and physical custody of Beth and Richard, with Respondent
having primary custody. Judge Pone found, “it would be inappropriate to enter any
type of visitation order as to Samuel Nolan or Brian ‘Tank’ Davis. In fact, the Court
specifically finds that any visitation with the Respondent Brian “Tank” Davis would
be contrary to the welfare and best interest of the juveniles.” Accordingly, Judge Pone
ordered, “[t]here shall be absolutely no contact allowed with [Brian Phillip “Tank”
Davis] and either of the juveniles, most specifically [Richard]. That a violation of this
[no contact] shall be considered as direct contempt of the Court and will be punishable
by incarceration for the maximum period allowed by law.”
On 3 February 2011, DSS visited Respondent’s home after receiving another
child protective service referral. Social worker, Lakendrick Smith, visited the home,
where DSS had found Oliver’s dead body decomposing some three years prior.
During his investigation, Mr. Smith found bugs and dirty dishes throughout
the trailer. Mr. Smith learned Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis had violated the trial
court’s no-contact order and lived at the trailer, where he fought pit bulls in front of
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IN RE: C.A.D., B.E.R.
Opinion of the Court
Beth, Richard, and Charlie. Beth, now five years old, was mature enough to describe
the adult conduct in her home environment. She told DSS the following:
8. [Mommy and Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis] make their
own cigarettes and those cigarettes smell funny. [] [T]hey
call it weed. That weed looks brown and they get it out of
a clear plastic bag. [They] smoke weed. . . .
10. [Richard] touched [me] in [my] private area. [He] sits
on [my] face when [I’m] in the bed and he doesn’t have any
clothes on.
11. [Richard] touches [my] private area between [my] legs
when [I] ha[ve] [my] clothes on and [I] always tell[] on him
and [] [Mommy] says “go back to bed.”
12. [My] daddy (Brian “Tank” Davis) has dogs (pit bulls),
and the dogs hurt each other sometimes. [T]he dogs, Macy
and Hooch got in a fight and Macy has a lot of stitches.
13. [] “[M]ommy gets hurt because daddy [Brian Phillip
“Tank” Davis] hits [M]ommy” and [I] see[] [it]. [I] “beat[]
daddy [Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis] up when he hits []
[M]ommy and he just throws [me] down on the bed.”
Respondent denied she and Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis engaged in any domestic
violence. Respondent denied using marijuana, though she “stated she couldn’t pass
a drug test and she had last used marijuana about fifteen days [prior].” Graham
Rogers, Jr. and Marjorie Rogers still lived at the home while this was happening.
On 4 February 2011, DSS obtained non-secured custody of Beth, Richard, and
Charlie, and filed a verified juvenile petition alleging the children were neglected and
dependent. DSS alleged the home environment was injurious to the children and
that all of the adults had violated the trial court’s order.
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Opinion of the Court
On 7 February 2011, DSS filed a motion for show cause and contempt to have
the trial court hold Respondent in contempt for violating the no-contact order. On 13
December 2011, DSS voluntarily dismissed the motion for contempt in exchange for
the following stipulations from Respondent and the maternal grandparents:
The parties agree to the following stipulation:
Neglect Based on: improper supervision and injurious
environment[;]
Dependency Based on: inability to care for the juveniles
and lack of an appropriate alternative child care plan.
As a factual basis for the above stipulation, the parties
agree and consent to the following . . . .
3. The parties admit that Brian “Tank” Davis was allowed
contact with the juveniles in violation of the Court’s
previous order(s).
4. That Tabitha Rogers admits to having a continuing
relationship with Brian “Tank” Davis between
approximately August 3, 2009, and approximately
February 4, 2011, wherein she allowed her children [Beth,
Richard, and Charlie] to be around him on a regular and
continuing basis.
5. That Graham and Marjorie Rogers were aware of
Tabitha Rogers’ continued relationship with Brian “Tank”
Davis and that the juveniles . . . were around him on a
regular and continuing basis.
6. The juvenile [Beth] has reported that her “mommy gets
hurt because daddy hits mommy” and she sees this. She
reports that she “beats her daddy up when he hits her
mommy and he just throws her down on the bed.”
7. [The home] was found to be in a disarray and in an
unsafe condition for the juveniles to live in . . . .
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IN RE: C.A.D., B.E.R.
Opinion of the Court
9. That disclosures from the juveniles have indicated that
sexually inappropriate behavior occurred.
10. That Tabitha Rogers admits to the regular use of
marijuana between August 3, 2009, and February 4, 2011.
11. That [Richard] was prescribed various necessary
medications . . . [and he] was out of his prescribed
medications and Tabitha Rogers had not consistently
followed through with his necessary mental health
treatment.
Judge Pone held hearings for the adjudication and disposition of Beth, Charlie,
and Richard on 13 and 15 December 2011. The parties stipulated that the children
were neglected and the home environment was “injurious to their welfare.” Judge
Pone adjudicated the children as neglected and dependent and placed them into foster
care. Judge Pone set the matter for permanency planning review on 1 February 2012.
The court system and DSS made “extraordinary efforts” to reunify the children
with Respondent and the maternal grandparents, but they did not utilize the
resources and opportunities given to them. Judge Pone set the permanent plan as
reunification with Respondent and the maternal grandparents and ordered
Respondent to complete a psychological evaluation and parenting assessment. Judge
Pone ordered DSS to continue providing foster care for the children.
While her children were in foster care, Respondent moved from her parents’
trailer into Brian Phillip “Tank” Davis’ motel room. At a 7 March 2013 hearing,
Respondent told the trial court she wanted the maternal grandparents to have legal
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Opinion of the Court
and physical custody of the children, as well as guardianship. The guardian ad litem
“highly opposed” this. Judge Pone noted the history of court intervention in the case
and stated, “once [DSS’s] and the [trial] Court’s involvement ceased, the same issues
resurfaced.” Judge Pone found it was contrary to the children’s best interests to
return them to Respondent or the maternal grandparents and ordered DSS to take
legal and physical custody of the children. Judge Pone changed the permanent plan
to custody with court approved caretakers concurrent with adoption. The maternal
grandparents did not appeal this permanency plan.
On 30 June 2014, DSS filed a petition to terminate Respondent’s parental
rights, and the rights of the uninvolved fathers. Due to the trial court’s scheduling
conflicts, Richard was dismissed from the termination of parental rights petition on
11 March 2015, and his case was set for resolution on a future date.
While the termination of parental rights matter was pending, North Carolina
Child Protective Services opened an adverse investigation into Beth’s and Charlie’s
temporary foster parents who were probable adoptive parents. The result of this
investigation left Beth and Charlie with no proposed adoptive parent at the
termination of parental rights hearing.
The parties were heard on the termination of parental rights petition 23–27
February 2015 and 27 March 2015. Judge Pone found the following inter alia:
THE COURT, AFTER REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE,
RECORD, SWORN TESTIMONY AND ARGUMENTS
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Opinion of the Court
PRESENTED, MAKES THE FOLLOWING FINDING, BY
CLEAR, COGENT, AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE:
66. [T]his was, and has always been, much more than a
case of a dirty house. This time, there was domestic
violence witnessed by [Beth] between the Respondents and
she was able to describe substance abuse and drug and
alcohol use by the Respondents. The Respondent Mother
admitted regular drug use between August 3, 2009 and
February 4, 2011. . . .
93. Clearly, the Respondents neglected the juveniles—both
in 2008 and again in 2011. There has not been any
substantial change in circumstances. The likelihood of
neglect recurring is great. The juveniles were neglected
and brought into care in 2008; they were returned home
and in 2011 they returned neglected. It is clear that there
is a substantial likelihood of the repetition of the neglect
should the juveniles be returned home.
94. The Respondents have significant instability. Today,
they say they have been stable in the current [address] for
twelve (12) months. Yet, sheriff’s deputies tried to locate
the Respondent Mother at this address on two (2) separate
occasions without success in the child support matter. . . .
101. The Respondent Mother has been less than candid
with this Court at various time[s] throughout these
proceedings . . . .
105. At [the] time [of the 18 March 2008 DSS petition], the
juvenile [Oliver] had died in the home, and the home was
in a deplorable and toxic condition. There were
considerable questions surrounding the death of the
juvenile; questions that still linger today. The Court,
however, moved forward; over a period of time, and by
August 3, 2009, the juveniles had been returned to the
Respondent Mother and the maternal grandparents to
what was believed to be a safe and nurturing environment.
...
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Opinion of the Court
108. Each of the Respondents has acted in a manner that
is inconsistent with the constitutionally protected status as
a parent, and none of the Respondents is a fit or proper
person for the care, custody, and control of the juveniles.
Each of these Respondents have abdicated their
requirements as parents. . . .
117. Moreover, this Court is not satisfied that there has
been any fundamental change in the family culture which
led to two (2) adjudications of neglect, and the death of one
juvenile since 2008.
118. This Court does not have a crystal ball; no one can
predict every detail in the future. However, the history in
this case clearly indicates the likelihood of neglect being
repeated should the juveniles be returned. The risk of such
neglect is extraordinarily high.
119. The Court took a chance in 2009. Services were
provided and the plan of reunification was implemented,
only to have the juveniles returned in approximately
eighteen (18) months. The fact is, the conditions are likely
to have reverted much sooner than that. [Brian Phillip
“Tank” Davis] had resumed his contact in, by his own
testimony, a couple of months and the environment
returned to being injurious and hazardous.
120. The Respondents . . . have demonstrated a pattern of
failing to provide appropriate care and supervision for the
juveniles; it is highly probable that such neglect would be
repeated if custody of the juveniles were returned to any of
the Respondents. . . .
128. To this date, none of the adults charged with caring
for these children, including the Respondents, have offered
any plausible explanation as to how—with at least four
adults in the home—the juvenile [Oliver] died and had
started to decompose without any of them knowing it. It is
beyond this Court’s comprehension.
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Opinion of the Court
DISPOSITIONAL FINDINGS
3. The juveniles are of tender years. [Beth] . . . is currently
ten (10) years old, and [Charlie] . . . is currently six (6) years
old.
4. The likelihood of adoption for the juveniles is good. . . .
The testimony provided is that the juveniles behaviorally
are very good. . . .
5. That a termination of parental rights will assist in the
accomplishment of the permanent plan; the permanent
plan has been set to adoption and terminating the parental
rights of the Respondents will be necessary in achieving
that plan. . . .
6. There is a minimal bond between [Charlie] and the
Respondents. [He] was removed from the home of the
Respondents at an early age, and has been in foster care
since that time. [Beth] remains very bonded to the
Respondent Mother, and loves the Respondent Mother
dearly. . . .
7. That at this time, there is not a proposed adoptive
parent. The previous placement providers now have an
open CPS investigation; this was a tragic turn of events.
Those circumstances were unforeseeable. The Court has
received this information for the first time on this date.
8. The juveniles are in a very tragic situation. That it is
clear the juveniles were seriously neglected by the
Respondents; the juvenile [Beth] on two occasions now.
The Respondents woefully failed these juveniles. The
conditions which led to removal were not alleviated.
9. These juveniles, tragically, have now been failed again,
by a system wherein things are not perfect. Just as the
Court was unable to foresee the reinstitution of neglect
following the 2009 reunification with the Respondents, no
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Opinion of the Court
one was able to foresee the current situation with the
former placement providers. . . .
12. Even absent a current approved adoptive parent, these
juveniles deserve an opportunity to move forward as best
they can, and it is therefore in the juveniles’ best interests
that the parental rights of the Respondents be terminated.
Judge Pone found it was in Beth’s and Charlie’s best interests to terminate
Respondent’s parental rights and awarded DSS custody of the children for placement
in foster care. Respondent timely filed her notice of appeal 10 July 2015.
II. Standard of Review
“This Court reviews an order that ceases reunification efforts to determine
whether the trial court made appropriate findings, whether the findings are based
upon credible evidence, whether the findings of fact support the trial court’s
conclusions, and whether the trial court abused its discretion with respect to
disposition.” In re C.M., 183 N.C. App. 207, 213, 644 S.E.2d 588, 594 (2007). “‘An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is so arbitrary that it could
not have been the result of a reasoned decision.’” In re N.G., 186 N.C. App. 1, 10-11,
650 S.E.2d 45, 51 (2007) (quoting In re Robinson, 151 N.C. App. 733, 737, 567 S.E.2d
227, 229 (2002)), aff’d per curiam, 362 N.C. 229, 657 S.E.2d 355 (2008).
“The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the
findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether
these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law. We then consider, based on
the grounds found for termination, whether the trial court abused its discretion in
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Opinion of the Court
finding termination to be in the best interest of the child.” In re Shepard, 162 N.C.
App. 215, 221-22, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc. review
denied sub nom. See also In re D.S., 358 N.C. 543, 599 S.E.2d 42 (2004).
III. Analysis
First, Respondent contends the trial court erred in ceasing reunification efforts
in its 20 March 2013 permanency plan because the children should have been placed
with the maternal grandparents. Second, Respondent contends the trial court abused
its discretion in terminating her parental rights because the findings do not support
the conclusions of law. We disagree.
When a trial court orders DSS to take non-secure custody of a juvenile as part
of a permanency plan, the trial court must make findings that: (1) the juvenile’s
continuation or return to the home is contrary to their health and safety; (2) the
county DSS office has made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for placement of
the juvenile; and (3) shall specify that the juvenile’s placement and care is DSS’s
responsibility and that DSS shall provide or arrange for foster care or other
placement, unless the court orders a specific placement. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-507(a)
(2015).
Respondent does not contend the trial court failed to make these findings or
abused its discretion in making adoption the permanency plan. Rather, Respondent
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Opinion of the Court
contends the “maternal grandparents offered a safe, loving home, [and] the trial
court’s permanent plan of adoption or placement with a non-relative was error.”
“Only a ‘party aggrieved’ may appeal from an order or judgment of the trial
division.” Culton v. Culton, 327 N.C. 624, 625, 398 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1990) (quoting
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-271) (citations omitted). “An aggrieved party is one whose rights
have been directly and injuriously affected by the action of the court.” Culton, 327
N.C. at 625–26, 398 S.E.2d at 324–25 (citations omitted). Here, the maternal
grandparents have not appealed the trial court’s permanency plan. They do not
complain of the court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law, and they do not complain
they were injuriously affected by the trial court’s decision to pursue adoption.
Respondent cannot claim an injury on their behalf. Therefore, she has no standing
to raise her first claim.
Presuming that Respondent could assert standing, the clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence shows Beth’s and Charlie’s health and safety were endangered
by Respondent, the maternal grandparents, and the home they lived in together. We
hold the trial court made findings based upon credible evidence and the findings
support the trial court’s conclusions. We hold the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in choosing adoption for the permanency plan.
Second, we review the termination of Respondent’s parental rights. After a
trial court finds that one or more grounds for terminating parental rights exists, the
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Opinion of the Court
court must determine if terminating parental rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2015). To determine the best interests of the child, the
court must consider the following criteria:
(1) The age of the juvenile.
(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.
(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in
the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.
(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and
the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other
permanent placement.
(6) Any relevant consideration.
Id. While the trial court must consider all of these factors, it is only required to make
written findings regarding the relevant factors. See In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217,
221–22, 753 S.E.2d 732, 735 (2014).
Respondent contends the trial court should have awarded the maternal
grandparents custody of Beth and Charlie in an effort to keep the family together.
Our Court has held, “[a] trial court may, but is not required to, consider the
availability of a relative during the dispositional phase of a hearing to terminate
parental rights.” In re M.M., 200 N.C. App. 248, 684 S.E.2d 463 (2009), disc. review
denied, 364 N.C. 241, 698 S.E.2d 401 (2010) (citation omitted). Therefore,
Respondent’s contention is not determinative of this matter.
It is well settled that the child’s best interests are paramount to the parent’s
interests when the two are in conflict. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1100(3) (2015); see also
In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984) (“As we stated in
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Opinion of the Court
Wilson v. Wilson, 269 N.C. 676, 678, 153 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1967), “[t]he welfare or best
interest of the child is always to be treated as the paramount consideration to which
even parental love must yield . . . .”).
Here, the trial court considered all six of the section 7B-1100(a) factors and the
possibility of placing Beth and Charlie with the maternal grandparents. The trial
court’s written findings show careful reflection upon all of these factors, and the
history of neglect that Beth and Charlie faced in the home with Respondent and the
maternal grandparents. Despite Respondent’s contentions, Beth’s and Charlie’s best
interests have not been served by their maternal grandparents. Like Respondent,
the maternal grandparents repeatedly failed to meet Beth’s, Charlie’s, and Richard’s
needs, and created a home environment where a child, Oliver, died and decomposed
for some time, without any explanation from the four adults living in the home. The
record also shows Respondent stipulated to Beth’s and Charlie’s neglect multiple
times, and admitted violating court orders.
Accordingly, we hold the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence, and the findings support the conclusions of law. We
hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Respondent’s parental
rights to serve the best interests of Beth and Charlie. We observe this just result took
almost seven years to achieve since the death of Oliver, a tragic delay.
IV. Conclusion
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Opinion of the Court
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
Judge CALABRIA and TYSON concur.
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