Albert D. Moustakis v. State of Wisconsin Department of Justice

2016 WI 42

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2014AP1853
COMPLETE TITLE: Albert D. Moustakis,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice,
Defendant-Respondent,
Steven M. Lucareli,
Intervenor.

REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Reported at 364 Wis. 2d 740, 869 N.W.2d 788)
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published)
PDC. No: 2015 WI App 63

OPINION FILED: May 20, 2016
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: February 4, 2016

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Lincoln
JUDGE: Jay R. Tlusty

JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs and dissents, joined
by ZIEGLER, J. and GABLEMAN, J.
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
by Benjamin J. Krautkramer and Swid Law Offices, LLC, Mosinee,
and oral argument by Scott A. Swid.

For the defendant-respondent, the cause was argued by Brian
Keenan, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was
Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.
 2016 WI 42
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2014AP1853
(L.C. No. 2014CV41)

STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT

Albert D. Moustakis,

Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,

v.
FILED
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice,
MAY 20, 2016
Defendant-Respondent,
Diane M. Fremgen
Steven M. Lucareli, Clerk of Supreme Court

Intervenor.

REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals Affirmed and

cause remanded.

¶1 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. This is a review of a

published decision of the court of appeals, Moustakis v.

Wisconsin Department of Justice, 2015 WI App 63, 364

Wis. 2d 740, 869 N.W.2d 788, affirming an order of the Circuit

Court for Lincoln County, Jay R. Tlusty, Judge.

¶2 The circuit court dismissed an action brought by Vilas
County District Attorney Albert Moustakis under Wis. Stat.
 No. 2014AP1853

§ 19.356(4) (2013-14)1 seeking to restrain the Wisconsin

Department of Justice from releasing records pertaining to

Moustakis in response to a public records request by The

Lakeland Times, a newspaper located in Minocqua, Wisconsin. The

court of appeals affirmed the order of the circuit court.

¶3 This review raises a single question that was well-

stated by the court of appeals: Is a district attorney an

"employee" as that term is used in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.

and defined in § 19.32(1bg) such that the district attorney may

maintain an action for notice and pre-release judicial review of

records under § 19.356(4)?2

1
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated.
2
Moustakis v. Wis. DOJ, 2015 WI App 63, ¶11, 364
Wis. 2d 740, 869 N.W.2d 788.

The parties and the circuit court and court of appeals
framed the issue presented as a question of standing, that is,
does Moustakis have standing to bring his action? Phrasing the
issue as one of standing is asking, as we do, whether Moustakis
falls within the ambit of the provisions of the public records
law granting a record subject notice of the decision of an
authority to provide a requester access to records and pre-
release judicial review of the decision to provide access. See
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J.
221, 236 (1988) ("'When a plaintiff seeks standing on the basis
that an interest is protected by statute, the question whether
that interest is legally protected for standing purposes is the
same as the question whether plaintiff (assuming his or her
factual allegations are true) has a claim on the merits.'")
(quoting Stephen G. Breyer & Richard B. Stewart, Administrative
Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases 1094 (2d
ed. 1985) (footnote omitted)).

(continued)
2
 No. 2014AP1853

¶4 To answer this question, we take the same approach as

the court of appeals and the parties, namely, we analyze the

interconnecting provisions of the public records law, Wis. Stat.

§§ 19.21-.39, and apply them to the fact situation at hand. The

Wisconsin public records law is not always easy to read or

decipher. Multiple provisions of the public records law cross-

reference each other. Nevertheless, by analyzing the public

records law step by step, we can resolve the present case. To

enable easier reference to the text of the public records law as

we discuss the cross-references, we have attached the text of

the relevant statutes and constitutional provisions as Appendix

A.

¶5 After analyzing the public records law and the

parties' arguments, we conclude, as did the court of appeals,

that a district attorney holds a state public office and is not

an "employee" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1bg) and

19.356(2)(a)1. Because the records at issue do not fall within

In other words, whether Moustakis fits within the group of
individuals to whom the public records law grants notice and an
opportunity for pre-release judicial review is a matter of
statutory interpretation. Standing and statutory interpretation
are distinct and should not be conflated. In the instant case,
it is easier to frame the issue as a matter of statutory
interpretation rather than as a matter of standing. See
Wisconsin's Envt'l Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 69
Wis. 2d 1, 11, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975) (describing cases resolved
"on the notion that the statute relied upon by the person
seeking review did not give legal recognition to the interest
asserted" as "rest[ing] upon statutory interpretation rather
than the law of standing itself.").

3
 No. 2014AP1853

the narrow exception to the general rule that a "record subject"

is not entitled to notice or pre-release judicial review of the

decision of an authority to provide access to records pertaining

to that record subject, Moustakis may not maintain an action

under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4) to restrain the Department of

Justice from providing The Lakeland Times access to the

requested records.

¶6 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals and the circuit court's order dismissing Moustakis's

action under the Wisconsin public records law.

¶7 We remand the cause to the circuit court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion to consider Moustakis's

amended complaint alleging two additional causes of action, the

first seeking a writ of mandamus and the second asserting a

challenge to the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 19.356. The

circuit court stayed proceedings on these two causes of action,3

and these two causes of action are not at issue in this court.4

I
¶8 For purposes of this review, the facts and procedural

history are not in dispute.

¶9 In July 2013, The Lakeland Times sent a public records

request to the Department of Justice regarding Moustakis. The

3
This court granted Moustakis's petition for review but did
not grant Moustakis's petition that the court accept an original
action to decide the second and third causes of action.
4
Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶7 n.5.

4
 No. 2014AP1853

request sought records of any "complaints or investigations

regarding Vilas County District Attorney Al Moustakis" and

records "regarding any investigation of [Moustakis's] conduct or

handling of cases while district attorney." The request also

sought "information related to complaints and investigations

regarding Mr. Moustakis that were completed or ended without any

action taken against him[,]" as well as "any communications

between Mr. Moustakis and [Department of Justice] since he took

office in 1995."

¶10 The public records custodian of the Department of

Justice referred the request to the Department's Division of

Criminal Investigation and Division of Legal Services to prepare

a response. The staff collected and reviewed the responsive

documents and made numerous redactions. The public records

custodian approved the proposed response for release. The

response contained records relating to complaints against

Moustakis that the Department of Justice ultimately found to be

unsubstantiated.
¶11 The public records custodian at the Department of

Justice left Moustakis a telephone message advising him that the

Department would be releasing records responsive to The Lakeland

Times' public records request. The Department also mailed a

copy of the approved response to Moustakis.

¶12 Moustakis received the redacted records from the

Department of Justice on or about March 5, 2014, more than seven

months after The Lakeland Times made its public records request.
The Lakeland Times did not receive the redacted records at the
5
 No. 2014AP1853

same time that Moustakis received them. The Department asserts

that it provided Moustakis with notice and a copy of the

response as a professional courtesy and that it was not required

to do so by law.5

¶13 Moustakis notified the Department of Justice (through

his counsel) of his intent to seek judicial review of the

Department's decision to release the requested records. On

March 10, 2014, Moustakis filed this action under Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(4) to enjoin the Department from releasing the records

at issue.

¶14 The Department moved to dismiss the action, arguing,

as we explained above, that Moustakis was not an "employee" as

that term is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and that, as a

result, Moustakis may not maintain an action under § 19.356(4)

to restrain the Department from providing access to the records

relating to him that are responsive to The Lakeland Times'

public records request.

5
The Department of Justice appears to argue it was not
required to provide notice to Moustakis under Wis. Stat.
§ 19.356(2)(a)1. Other statutory notice requirements exist.
See Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a)-(b). Moustakis relies on Wis.
Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) to bolster his interpretation of
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. and the definition of "employee" in
Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg). He sometimes seems to assert that he
should have received notice under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and
(b) and an opportunity to augment the record. Moustakis's basic
and repeated position, however, is that he does not want release
of the records at all. We address these claims more fully in
¶¶50-62.

6
 No. 2014AP1853

¶15 The circuit court dismissed Moustakis's action on July

1, 2014, about one year after The Lakeland Times made its public

records request to the Department of Justice, concluding that

Moustakis was not an employee as defined in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg) and as a result may not maintain an action under

§ 19.356(4). The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's

order dismissing the action. Moustakis sought review in this

court.

II

¶16 The interpretation and application of statutes present

questions of law that this court determines independently of the

circuit court and court of appeals while benefiting from the

analyses of these courts. Journal Times v. Police & Fire

Comm'rs Bd., 2015 WI 56, ¶42, 362 Wis. 2d 577, 866 N.W.2d 563.

¶17 To determine the meaning of a statute, we look to the

language of the statute. Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010

WI 86, ¶49, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177. "Each word should

be looked at so as not to render any portion of the statute
superfluous." Hubbard v. Messer, 2003 WI 145, ¶9, 267

Wis. 2d 92, 673 N.W.2d 676 (note with citations omitted).

¶18 "[A]scertaining plain meaning requires us to do more

than focus on a single, isolated sentence or portion of a

sentence." Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 2006 WI 89,

¶12, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 (citation and quotation

marks omitted). Instead, "[w]e consider the meaning of words in

the context in which they appear." Force ex rel. Welcenbach v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 WI 82, ¶30, 356 Wis. 2d 582, 850
7
 No. 2014AP1853

N.W.2d 866. "We favor an interpretation that fulfills the

statute's purpose." State v. Hanson, 2012 WI 4, ¶17, 338

Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390 (citation omitted).

III

¶19 We adopt the organization, statutory analysis,

reasoning, and, at times, language of the decision of the court

of appeals in our interpretation of the public records law and

application of the law to the parties' arguments. The court of

appeals organized its analysis of the statutes as follows, and

so do we:

A. The public records law embodies the fundamental concept

in Wisconsin of transparent government. This concept

guides our interpretation of the provisions of the public

record law.6

B. The general rule is that no "authority" is required to

notify a record subject prior to providing to a requester

access to a record containing information pertaining to

that record subject. Wis. Stat. § 19.356(1).
Furthermore, "no person is entitled to judicial review of

the decision of an authority to provide a requester with

access to a record." § 19.356(1). The public records

law contains an exception to this general rule for three

narrow categories of records. § 19.356(2)(a)1.-3. If

the record at issue falls in one of these three narrow

6
See infra, ¶¶21-23; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶12-13.

8
 No. 2014AP1853

categories of records, a "record subject" may maintain an

action under § 19.356(4) seeking a court order to

restrain the authority from providing access to the

requested record.7

C. The only one of these three exceptions that Moustakis

claims pertains to him is the one set forth in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(2)(a)1. This provision applies to certain

records pertaining to an "employee." The application of

§ 19.356(2)(a)1. to Moustakis's records turns on whether

Moustakis is an "employee," as defined in § 19.32(1bg).

1. Moustakis is not an employee within the first part

of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg).8 He holds the elective office of

Vilas County District Attorney.

2. Moustakis is not an employee within the second part

of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg). Moustakis, as Vilas County District

Attorney, is not "employed by an employer other than
an authority."9

D. Interpreting the definition of "employee" in the public

records law as excluding a state public office does not

7
See infra, ¶¶24-28; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶13-14.
8
See infra, ¶¶34-36; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶15-17.
9
See infra, ¶¶37-49; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶18-20.

9
 No. 2014AP1853

render the term "employee" used in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(9)(a) mere surplusage.10

¶20 Thus, because the records at issue do not fall within

the narrow category described in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.,

Moustakis may not maintain an action under § 19.356(4) seeking a

court order restraining the Department of Justice from providing

access to the requested record.11

A

¶21 We begin with the following legislative declaration:

"Except as otherwise provided by law, any requester has a right

to inspect any record." Wis. Stat. § 19.35(1)(a).

¶22 The legislature has explicitly stated the public

policy as follows: "[I]t is . . . the public policy of this

state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible

information regarding the affairs of government and the official

acts of those officers and employees who represent them." Wis.

Stat. § 19.31.

¶23 In light of this policy, the legislature has stated
that the public records law "shall be construed in every

instance with a presumption of complete public access,

consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The

denial of public access generally is contrary to the public

10
See infra, ¶¶50-59; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶21-23.
11
See infra, ¶¶60-61; Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶¶13-15.

10
 No. 2014AP1853

interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied."

Wis. Stat. § 19.31.12

B

¶24 Under the public records law, the general rule is that

a record subject is not entitled to notice prior to an

"authority" granting a requester access to a record containing

information pertaining to the "record subject." Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(1).13 Furthermore, subject to three narrow exceptions,

"no person is entitled to judicial review of the decision of an

authority to provide a requester with access to a record."

§ 19.356(1).

12
Moustakis argues that public policy does not favor the
release of the uncorroborated or untrue accusations contained in
the records at issue. The public policy declared by the
legislature, however, favors disclosure as a general rule,
rather than nondisclosure.

The parties acknowledge that the Department of Justice
sought to balance "the public interest in disclosure against the
public interest in non-disclosure" when deciding whether to
release the records at issue and redacted materials from the
record. See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of Admin.,
2009 WI 79, ¶56, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (discussing the
balancing test). Because we conclude that Moustakis is not
entitled to pre-release judicial review of the records at issue
and we do not have the records at issue (that is, we have
neither the original records nor the redacted records), we do
not review the Department's decision to release the redacted
records.
13
Some records that are subject to disclosure contain
"personally identifiable information" about certain individuals.
These individuals are known as "record subjects." Wis. Stat.
§ 19.32(2g).

11
 No. 2014AP1853

¶25 The legislature excluded three narrow categories of

records from these general rules that no authority is required

to notify a record subject prior to providing to a requester

access to a record containing information pertaining to that

record subject and that no person is entitled to judicial review

of the decision of an authority to provide a requester with

access to a record. See Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.-3.

¶26 An "authority"14 intending to release records falling

within one of these three narrow categories of records must

provide notice to the record subject before releasing the

records and the record subject has the opportunity to seek pre-

release judicial review. Wis. Stat. §§ 19.356(2)(a), 19.356(4).

The record subject may commence an action (within the time

specified in the public records law) seeking a court order "to

14
An "authority" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1) as
follows:

"Authority" means any of the following having custody
of a record: a state or local office, elective
official, agency, board, commission, committee,
council, department or public body corporate and
politic created by the constitution or by any law,
ordinance, rule or order; a governmental or quasi-
governmental corporation except for the Bradley center
sports and entertainment corporation; a special
purpose district; any court of law; the assembly or
senate; a nonprofit corporation which receives more
than 50% of its funds from a county or a municipality,
as defined in s. 59.001 (3), and which provides
services related to public health or safety to the
county or municipality; a university police department
under s. 175.42; or a formally constituted subunit of
any of the foregoing.

12
 No. 2014AP1853

restrain the authority from providing access to the requested

record." Wis. Stat. § 19.356(3), (4).

¶27 The three exceptions granting rights to a record

subject are set forth in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1., 2., and 3.

These three provisions were intended to limit this court's

holdings in Woznicki v. Erickson, 202 Wis. 2d 178, 549

N.W.2d 699 (1996), and Milwaukee Teachers' Education Ass'n v.

Milwaukee Board of School Directors, 227 Wis. 2d 779, 596

N.W.2d 403 (1999).15 In Woznicki and Milwaukee Teachers, this

court held that public employees were entitled to notice and to

seek pre-release judicial review of the response to records

requests pertaining to them.16 By enacting § 19.356(2)(a)1., 2.,

and 3., the legislature sought to limit the rights afforded by

these cases "only to a defined set of records pertaining to

employees residing in Wisconsin." 2003 Wis. Act. 47, Joint

Legis. Council Prefatory Note.17
15
See Local 2489, AFSCME v. Rock Cnty., 2004 WI App 210,
¶2, 277 Wis. 2d 208, 689 N.W.2d 644 (stating that 2003 Wis. Act
47 was enacted in response to Woznicki v. Erickson, 202
Wis. 2d 178, 549 N.W.2d 699 (1996), and Milwaukee Teachers'
Education Ass'n v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors, 227
Wis. 2d 779, 596 N.W.2d 403 (1999)).
16
See Milwaukee Teachers, 227 Wis. 2d at 797-98; Woznicki,
202 Wis. 2d at 195.
17
The court of appeals refers to the Prefatory Note to 2003
Wis. Act 47 by the Joint Legislative Council's Special Committee
on Review of the Open Records Law as confirming the court of
appeals' interpretation of the public records law. Legislative
history may be consulted to confirm a plain meaning
interpretation. Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89,
¶14, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258.

13
 No. 2014AP1853

¶28 Thus, the exceptions in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.,

2., and 3. are the only instances in which a record subject has

a statutory right to receive notice and seek pre-release

judicial review of a response to a public records request.

C

¶29 Moustakis asserts that the records at issue fall into

one of these three narrow exceptions, namely, Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(2)(a)1., that he is thus entitled to notice and pre-

release judicial review of the records pertaining to him, and

that he may commence an action seeking a court order to restrain

the Department of Justice from providing access to the requested

records. This exception, § 19.356(2)(a)1., applies to a record

"containing information relating to an employee that is created

or kept by the authority and that is the result of an

investigation into a disciplinary matter involving the employee

or possible employment-related violation by the

employee . . . ." Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. (emphasis added).

¶30 The application of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. to
Moustakis's records turns on whether Moustakis is an "employee"

for purposes of that provision.

¶31 "Employee" is defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) as

"any individual who is employed by an authority, other than an

individual holding local public office or a state public office,

or any individual who is employed by an employer other than an

authority" (emphasis added).

¶32 Thus, Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) creates two categories
of employees: Individuals who are employed by an "authority"——a
14
 No. 2014AP1853

category narrowed by the limiting clause excluding persons

holding local public office or a state public office as

employees——and those who are employed by an employer other than

an "authority."

¶33 As we previously stated, "authority" is defined in the

public records law. See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1). The definition

of "authority" includes a vast number of governmental entities

"having custody of a record," including, as relevant here, "a

state or local office."

1

¶34 Moustakis concedes, as he must, that he holds a state

office and that he is not an "employee" of an authority under

the first part of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg) that explicitly excludes from the definition of

"employee" an individual holding a "state public office."

¶35 Analyzing the definition of "state public office" in

the public records law, we agree with Moustakis that he is not

an "employee" under the first part of the definition of
"employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg). An individual is

excluded as an employee under § 19.32(1bg) if he or she holds a

"state public office." A "state public office" is defined in

§ 19.32(4). This provision reveals that a "state public office"

has the meaning given in § 19.42(13) (with exceptions not

relevant in the instant case). Reading § 19.42(13), we learn

that "state public office" includes "all positions identified

under s. 20.923(2) . . . ." Section 20.923(2) contains a list
of "constitutional officers and other elected state officials."
15
 No. 2014AP1853

Within that list, section 20.923(2)(j) refers specifically to "a

district attorney."

¶36 Moustakis, the Vilas County District Attorney, is thus

the holder of a "state public office" and does not qualify as an

"employee" under the first part of the definition of "employee"

set forth in § 19.32(1bg).

2

¶37 Even though Moustakis holds a state public office, he

argues that he nevertheless qualifies as an "employee" under the

second part of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg). According to Moustakis, he is "employed by an

employer other than an authority," namely, he is employed by the

State of Wisconsin.

¶38 In Moustakis's view, the definition of "employee" in

Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) is disjunctive and the two parts are not

connected. Thus, even if Moustakis is not an "employee" under

the first part of the definition of employee in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg), he argues that he is an "employee" under the
second part of that definition.

¶39 Specifically, Moustakis asserts that he is not an

"employee" of the Vilas County District Attorney's office, which

is identified as an "authority" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1).

Moustakis contends he works in the office of the district

attorney but that the indicia of employment demonstrate that he

does not work for that office. He asserts that he works for the

State of Wisconsin. The State of Wisconsin is not specifically
mentioned in the definition of "authority." See Wis. Stat.
16
 No. 2014AP1853

§ 19.32(1).

¶40 Moustakis reasons that because he is employed by the

State of Wisconsin, which is not specifically identified as an

"authority" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1), he is an "employee"

under the second part of the definition of employee in

§ 19.32(1bg). He claims he is thus employed by an employer

other than an "authority."

¶41 Moustakis's interpretation of the second part of the

definition of "employee" is unpersuasive for several reasons.

¶42 Moustakis argues that he is an "employee" of the State

of Wisconsin by relying on the Black's Law Dictionary's

definition of "employer." The word "employer" is not defined in

the public records law. Black's Law Dictionary defines

"employer" as "one who controls and directs a worker . . . and

who pays the worker's salary or wages."18 Moustakis reasons that

because no person within the Vilas County District Attorney's

Office has the capacity to direct, control, or pay him, his

employer is the State of Wisconsin rather than his elective
office.

¶43 A significant difficulty with Moustakis's argument is

that although the statutory definition of "authority" does not

explicitly include the State, the statutory definition of

18
The complete Black's Law Dictionary definition of
"employer" is: "A person, company, or organization for whom
someone works; esp., one who controls and directs a worker under
an express or implied contract of hire and who pays the worker's
salary or wages." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

17
 No. 2014AP1853

"authority" does include a "state or local office" and "an

elective official." See Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1). A district

attorney in Wisconsin is a "state office" and a district

attorney is also an elective official.

¶44 Moustakis tries to distinguish between holding a state

public office and being employed by that office. He points out

that his employment derives from the Wisconsin constitution, as

well as the salary-fixing statutes that classify him as holding

a "state public office."19 As a result, he concludes that he is

an "employee" of the State of Wisconsin.

¶45 We agree with the court of appeals that Moustakis's

distinction between holding a state public office and being

employed by a state public office is unsupported by law, creates

confusion, is contrary to any reasonable reading of the public

records law, and is unpersuasive:

The distinction Moustakis seeks to draw
between "holding" a state public office and
being "employed" by a state public office is
entirely of his making. Moustakis is a
district attorney, which, as we have
indicated, is a "state public office" under
the statutes Moustakis cites. A state
office is an "authority" as that term is
defined in § 19.32(1), and, but for the
exclusionary clause in Wis. Stat.
§ 19.32(1bg), Moustakis would qualify as an
"employee" under the first category as an
"employee" employed by an "authority." That

19
Moustakis cites Wisconsin Constitution Article VI,
Section 4; Wis. Stat. § 19.32(4); Wis. Stat. § 19.42(13)(c); and
Wis. Stat. § 20.923(2)(j) to buttress his claim that he is an
"employee" of the State of Wisconsin.

18
 No. 2014AP1853

Moustakis would otherwise qualify as an
"employee" of an "authority" means that he
cannot also be employed by "an employer
other than an authority." Moustakis's
contrived argument fails to account for the
straightforward notion that he both holds
the state office of district attorney and is
an employee of that office; the two
capacities are not mutually exclusive.
Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶20.

¶46 In sum, Moustakis contends that he holds a "state

public office" and that under the second part of the definition
of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) he is an employee of

the State of Wisconsin, which is not mentioned in the definition

of "authority."

¶47 We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that

Moustakis is not an employee under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg).

Under a plain reading of the text of the first part of the

definition of "employee" under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg),

Moustakis qualifies as an employee of an authority.

¶48 Because Moustakis is an employee of an authority under

the text of the first part of the definition of "employee" in

Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg), Moustakis cannot be an individual
employed by an employer other than an authority under the second

part of the definition of "employee." The two parts of the

definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) are

interconnected. Although Moustakis is excluded from the first

part of the definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg)

by the statutory language excluding an individual holding a

19
 No. 2014AP1853

state public office as an employee,20 the first part of the

definition of "employee" makes clear that Moustakis is not an

individual employed by an employer other than an authority.

Accordingly, Moustakis is not employed by an employer other than

an authority under the second part of the definition of

"employee" in § 19.32(1bg).

¶49 We agree with the Department of Justice that the plain

language, context, structure, and the interrelated provisions of

the public records law all show that Moustakis is employed by an

"authority" and that he is not an employee under Wis. Stat.

§ 19.31(1bg).

D

¶50 Moustakis argues that interpreting the term "employee"

in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) to exclude anyone holding a "state

public office," would render the term "employee" in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(9) mere surplusage.

¶51 We disagree with Moustakis. Interpreting the

definition of "employee" in the public records law to exclude
individuals holding "state public office" does not render the

term "employee" as used in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) mere

surplusage.

20
Because we decide the instant case based on the
definition of "employee," we need not, and do not, address the
Department of Justice's argument that the documents at issue
were not the result of an investigation into a disciplinary
matter involving the employee and therefore do not fit within
Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1.

20
 No. 2014AP1853

¶52 Section 19.356(9) states (with emphasis added):

(a) Except as otherwise authorized or required by
statute, if an authority decides under s. 19.35
to permit access to a record containing
information relating to a record subject who is
an officer or employee of the authority holding a
local public office or a state public office, the
authority shall, before permitting access and
within 3 days after making the decision to permit
access, serve written notice of that decision on
the record subject, either by certified mail or
by personally serving the notice on the record
subject. The notice shall briefly describe the
requested record and include a description of the
rights of the record subject under par. (b).

(b) Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under
par. (a), a record subject may augment the record
to be release with written comments and
documentation selected by the record subject.
Except as otherwise authorized or required by
statute, the authority under par. (a) shall
release the record as augmented by the record
subject.
¶53 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) create a notice

requirement distinct from the notice provided for in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(2)(a)1. Under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b), when

an authority decides to permit access to a record containing
information relating to "a record subject who is an officer or

employee of the authority holding a local public office or state

public office, the authority shall" provide written notice to

the record subject and an opportunity to augment the record to

be released.

¶54 Moustakis sometimes seems to assert that he should

have received notice under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) and
an opportunity to augment the record. Moustakis's basic and

21
 No. 2014AP1853

repeated position, however, is that he does not want release of

the records at all. Moustakis relies on Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b) chiefly to bolster his argument that he

is an "employee" as defined in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and that

none of the records at issue should be released.

¶55 Moustakis reasons that, based on the language of Wis.

Stat. § 19.356(9)(a), the term "employee" in the statutes must

include some individuals holding state public office. Moustakis

asserts that under the usual rules of statutory interpretation,

the statutory definition of "employee" in § 19.32(1bg) should be

read into § 19.356(9)(a). According to Moustakis, if "employee"

as defined in § 19.32(1bg) does not include an individual who

holds state or local public office, the term "employee" in Wis.

Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) has no meaning.

¶56 Moustakis's reasoning has superficial appeal. But, as

the court of appeals noted, Moustakis's attempt to insert the

definition of the term "employee" into Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a)

"creates a befuddling mess of that statute."21
¶57 We agree with the court of appeals' interpretation of

Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a). The court of appeals' approach

appropriately harmonizes both statutes. The use of the word

"employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9) does not change the proper

interpretation of that term in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1bg) and

19.356(2)(a)1.

21
Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶23.

22
 No. 2014AP1853

¶58 The phrase in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) referring to

"a record subject who is an officer or employee of the authority

holding a local public office or a state public office" is

intended to be read as a restrictive clause modifying the term

"record subject."22 Thus, an individual who is not an "employee"

under Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) may still qualify as an "officer

or employee of the authority holding a local public office or

state public office" under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a).

¶59 The court of appeals explains Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(9)(a) as follows:

[W]e conclude the phrase "who is an officer or
employee of the authority holding a local record [sic]
office or state public office" was intended to be read
as one restrictive clause modifying the term "record
subject" in § 19.356(9)(a). Contrary to Moustakis's
argument, this interpretation of § 19.356(9)(a), which
is based on a straightforward, common sense reading of
that statute, is fully consistent with § 19.32(1bg) in
that both statutes recognize there are individuals who
are employed by an "authority" and who also hold a
local or state public office. In this sense, an
individual who is not an "employee" under § 19.32(1bg)
may nonetheless qualify as an "officer or employee of
the authority holding a local public office or state
public office" under § 19.356(9)(a).23
¶60 This interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) is

consistent with Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and construes each

provision in a manner that serves each provision's purpose.

Accordingly, we conclude that the inclusion of the term

22
Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶23.
23
Moustakis, 364 Wis. 2d 740, ¶23.

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 No. 2014AP1853

"employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) does not alter the

definition of "employee" in Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg).

¶61 Moustakis sometimes appears to argue that the

Department of Justice violated his rights to notice and an

opportunity to augment the record under Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b). Moustakis does not ask, however, for

any relief for any violation of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and

(b). Aside from Moustakis's argument about the relationship

between Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b) and the definition of

"employee" in Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32(1bg) and 19.356(2)(a)1.,

Moustakis's limited discussion of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and

(b) may be read as part of his claim that Wis. Stat. § 19.356,

as interpreted by the Department of Justice, is

unconstitutional. That claim remains pending in the circuit

court.

¶62 Moustakis's focus in this court is on pre-release

judicial review under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(2)(a)1. and (4) of the

Department of Justice's decision to provide records responsive
to The Lakeland Times' request. Moustakis's goal in this court

is an order restraining the Department of Justice from providing

access to the requested records. Considering the arguments of

the parties, we need not and do not address Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b) further.

* * * *

¶63 After analyzing the public records law and the

parties' arguments, we conclude, as did the court of appeals,
that a district attorney holds a state public office and is not
24
 No. 2014AP1853

an "employee" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 19.32(1bg) and

19.356(2)(a)1. Because the records at issue do not fall within

the narrow exception to the general rule that a "record subject"

is not entitled to notice or pre-release judicial review of the

decision of an authority to provide access to records pertaining

to that record subject, Moustakis may not maintain an action

under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4) to restrain the Department of

Justice from providing The Lakeland Times access to the

requested records.

¶64 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of

appeals and the circuit court's order dismissing Moustakis's

action under the Wisconsin public records law. We remand the

cause for further proceedings.

By the Court.–The decision of the court of appeals is

affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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 No. 2014AP1853

APPENDIX A: Relevant Statutes and Wisconsin Constitutional

Provisions

Wis. Stat. § 19.31 – Declaration of policy. In recognition of
the fact that a representative government is dependent upon
an informed electorate, it is declared to be the public
policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the
greatest possible information regarding the affairs of
government and the official acts of those officers and
employees who represent them. Further, providing persons
with such information is declared to be an essential
function of a representative government and an integral
part of the routine duties of officers and employees whose
responsibility it is to provide such information. To that
end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every
instance with a presumption of complete public access,
consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The
denial of public access generally is contrary to the public
interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be
denied.

Wis. Stat. § 19.32 – Definitions. As used in ss. 19.32 to
19.39:

(1) "Authority" means any of the following having custody
of a record: a state or local office, elective
official, agency, board, commission, committee,
council, department or public body corporate and
politic created by the constitution or by any law,
ordinance, rule or order; a governmental or quasi-
governmental corporation except for the Bradley
center sports and entertainment corporation; a
special purpose district; any court of law; the
assembly or senate; a nonprofit corporation which
receives more than 50% of its funds from a county or
a municipality, as defined in s. 59.001(3), and which
provides services related to public health or safety
to the county or municipality; a university police
department under s. 175.42; or a formally constituted
subunit of any of the foregoing.

. . . .

(1bg) "Employee" means any individual who is employed by an
authority, other than an individual holding local
public office or a state public office, or any

26
 No. 2014AP1853

individual who is employed by an employer other than
an authority.

. . . .

(2) "Record" means any material on which written, drawn,
printed, spoken, visual, or electromagnetic
information or electronically generated or stored data
is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form
or characteristics, which has been created or is being
kept by an authority. "Record" includes, but is not
limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps,
charts, photographs, films, recordings, tapes, optical
disks, and any other medium on which electronically
generated or stored data is recorded or preserved.
"Record" does not include drafts, notes, preliminary
computations and like materials prepared for the
originator's personal use or prepared by the
originator in the name of a person for whom the
originator is working; materials which are purely the
personal property of the custodian and have no
relation to his or her office; materials to which
access is limited by copyright, patent or bequest; and
published materials in the possession of an authority
other than a public library which are available for
sale, or which are available for inspection at a
public library.

(2g) "Record subject" means an individual about whom
personally identifiable information is contained in a
record.

. . . .

(4) "State public office" has the meaning given in s.
19.42(13), but does not include a position identified
in s. 20.923(6)(f) to (gm).
Wis. Stat. § 19.35 Access to records; fees.
(1) RIGHT TO INSPECTION. (a) Except as otherwise provided by
law, any requester has a right to inspect any record.
Substantive common law principles construing the right
to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall
remain in effect. The exemptions to the requirement
of a governmental body to meet in open session under
s. 19.85 are indicative of public policy, but may be
used as grounds for denying public access to a record

27
 No. 2014AP1853

only if the authority or legal custodian under s.
19.33 makes a specific demonstration that there is a
need to restrict public access at the time that the
request to inspect or copy the record is made.

. . . .

Wis. Stat. § 19.356 – Notice to record subject; right of action

(1) Except as authorized in this section or as otherwise
provided by statute, no authority is required to
notify a record subject prior to providing to a
requester access to a record containing information
pertaining to that record subject, and no person is
entitled to judicial review of the decision of an
authority to provide a requester with access to a
record.

(2) (a) Except as provided in pars. (b) to (d) and as
otherwise authorized or required by statute, if an
authority decides under s. 19.35 to permit access to a
record specified in this paragraph, the authority
shall, before permitting access and within 3 days
after making the decision to permit access, serve
written notice of that decision on any record subject
to whom the record pertains, either by certified mail
or by personally serving the notice on the record
subject. The notice shall briefly describe the
requested record and include a description of the
rights of the record subject under subs. (3) and (4).
This paragraph applies only to the following records:

1. A record containing information relating to an
employee that is created or kept by the
authority and that is the result of an
investigation into a disciplinary matter
involving the employee or possible employment-
related violation by the employee of a statute,
ordinance, rule, regulation, or policy of the
employee's employer.

2. A record obtained by the authority through a
subpoena or search warrant.

3. A record prepared by an employer other than an
authority, if that record contains information

28
 No. 2014AP1853

relating to an employee of that employer,
unless the employee authorizes the authority to
provide access to that information.

(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to an authority who
provides access to a record pertaining to an
employee to the employee who is the subject of
the record or to his or her representative to the
extent required under s. 103.13 or to a
recognized or certified collective bargaining
representative to the extent required to fulfill
a duty to bargain or pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement under ch. 111.

(c) Paragraph (a) does not apply to access to a
record produced in relation to a function
specified in s. 106.54 or 230.45 or subch. II of
ch. 111 if the record is provided by an authority
having responsibility for that function.

(d) Paragraph (a) does not apply to the transfer of a
record by the administrator of an educational
agency to the state superintendent of public
instruction under s. 115.31(3)(a).

(3) Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under sub.
(2)(a), a record subject may provide written
notification to the authority of his or her intent to
seek a court order restraining the authority from
providing access to the requested record.

(4) Within 10 days after receipt of a notice under sub.
(2)(a), a record subject may commence an action
seeking a court order to restrain the authority from
providing access to the requested record. If a record
subject commences such an action, the record subject
shall name the authority as a defendant.
Notwithstanding s. 803.09, the requester may intervene
in the action as a matter of right. If the requester
does not intervene in the action, the authority shall
notify the requester of the results of the proceedings
under this subsection and sub. (5).

(5) An authority shall not provide access to a requested
record within 12 days of sending a notice pertaining
to that record under sub. (2)(a). In addition, if the
record subject commences an action under sub. (4), the

29
 No. 2014AP1853

authority shall not provide access to the requested
record during pendency of the action. If the record
subject appeals or petitions for review of a decision
of the court or the time for appeal or petition for
review of a decision adverse to the record subject has
not expired, the authority shall not provide access to
the requested record until any appeal is decided,
until the period for appealing or petitioning for
review expires, until a petition for review is denied,
or until the authority receives written notice from
the record subject that an appeal or petition for
review will not be filed, whichever occurs first.

(6) The court, in an action commenced under sub. (4), may
restrain the authority from providing access to the
requested record. The court shall apply substantive
common law principles construing the right to inspect,
copy, or receive copies of records in making its
decision.

(7) The court, in an action commenced under sub. (4),
shall issue a decision within 10 days after the filing
of the summons and complaint and proof of service of
the summons and complaint upon the defendant, unless a
party demonstrates cause for extension of this period.
In any event, the court shall issue a decision within
30 days after those filings are complete.

(8) If a party appeals a decision of the court under sub.
(7), the court of appeals shall grant precedence to
the appeal over all other matters not accorded similar
precedence by law. An appeal shall be taken within
the time period specified in s. 808.04(1m).

(9) (a) Except as otherwise authorized or required
by statute, if an authority decides under s.
19.35 to permit access to a record containing
information relating to a record subject who is
an officer or employee of the authority holding a
local public office or a state public office, the
authority shall, before permitting access and
within 3 days after making the decision to permit
access, serve written notice of that decision on
the record subject, either by certified mail or
by personally serving the notice on the record
subject. The notice shall briefly describe the

30
 No. 2014AP1853

requested record and include a description of the
rights of the record subject under par. (b).

(b) Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under
par. (a), a record subject may augment the record
to be released with written comments and
documentation selected by the record subject.
Except as otherwise authorized or required by
statute, the authority under par. (a) shall
release the record as augmented by the record
subject.

Wis. Stat. § 19.42 – Definitions. In this subchapter [code of
ethics for public officials and employees]:

. . . .

(13) "State public office" means:

. . . .

(c) All positions identified under s. 20.923(2), (4),
(4g), (6)(f) to (h), (7), and (8) to (10), except
clerical positions.

Wis. Stat. § 20.923 - Statutory salaries. The purpose of this
section is to establish a consistent and equitable salary
setting mechanism for all elected officials, appointed state
agency heads, division administrators and other executive-level
unclassified positions. All such positions shall be subject to
the same basic salary establishment, implementation,
modification, administrative control and application procedures.
The salary-setting mechanism contained in this section shall be
directed to establishing salaries that are determined on a
comprehensive systematic basis, bear equitable relationship to
each other and to the salaries of classified service
subordinates, and be reviewed and established with the same
frequency as those of state employees in the classified service.

. . . .

(2) CONSTITUTIONAL OFFICERS AND OTHER ELECTED STATE OFFICIALS.

. . . .

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 No. 2014AP1853

(j) The annual salary of a district attorney shall be
set under s. 978.12.

Wis. Const. Article VI, Section 4 – County officers; election,
terms, removal; vacancies. SECTION 4.

(1) (a) Except as provided in pars. (b) and (c) and sub.
(2), coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys,
and all other elected county officers, except judicial
officers, sheriffs, and chief executive officers,
shall be chosen by the electors of the respective
counties once in every 2 years.

....

(c) Beginning with the first general election at which the
president is elected which occurs after the
ratification of this paragraph, district attorneys,
registers of deeds, county clerks, and treasurers
shall be chosen by the electors of the respective
counties, or by the electors of all of the respective
counties comprising each combination of counties
combined by the legislature for that purpose, for the
term of 4 years and surveyors in counties in which the
office of surveyor is filled by election shall be
chosen by the electors of the respective counties, or
by the electors of all of the respective counties
comprising each combination of counties combined by
the legislature for that purpose, for the term of 4
years.

. . . .

(5) All vacancies in the offices of coroner, register of
deeds or district attorney shall be filled by
appointment. The person appointed to fill a vacancy
shall hold office only for the unexpired portion of
the term to which appointed and until a successor
shall be elected and qualified.

. . . .

32
 No. 2014AP1853.pdr

¶65 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (concurring in part,

dissenting in part). I concur with the conclusion of the

majority opinion that the questions presented are questions of

statutory interpretation, not of standing.1 I also concur that

Albert D. Moustakis, the Vilas County District Attorney, is not

an employee within the definition set out in Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg), although I do not agree with all of the majority

opinion's reasoning upon which its statutory interpretation is

based.

¶66 I dissent because the majority opinion chooses not to

address obligations of the Department of Justice (DOJ) under

Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b), which must be met prior to

release of the public records that the Lakeland Times seeks.2

Nothing in the record shows that Moustakis received the notice

required by § 19.356(9)(a), and without notice sufficient to

satisfy § 19.356(9)(a) and (b), the DOJ is without statutory

authority to release records that are at issue here.

Accordingly, I would reinstate Moustakis's action under the
public records law that the circuit court dismissed, and I

respectfully concur in part and dissent in part from the

majority opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

¶67 The majority opinion ably narrates the factual

background for the case before us; therefore, I will set out

1
Majority op., ¶3 n.2.
2
Id., ¶¶53, 60-61.

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 No. 2014AP1853.pdr

only those facts necessary to enable the reader to follow my

discussion below.

¶68 Although the record is far from clear, apparently an

allegation was made that Moustakis was not properly carrying out

the functions of his office as Vilas County District Attorney.

The DOJ investigated the allegation and determined it was

without merit. The Lakeland Times newspaper made a public

records request of the DOJ asking for records that relate to the

DOJ's investigation.

¶69 Moustakis believes he has rights relative to the

release of the DOJ's records of the investigation pursuant to

various subsections of Wis. Stat. § 19.356. The DOJ does not

agree. Accordingly, Moustakis filed this action to enforce what

he believes are his statutory rights relative to the requested

records.3 The circuit court agreed with the DOJ, and dismissed

Moustakis's claims under Wisconsin's public records law. The

court of appeals affirmed.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review

¶70 In order to answer the questions presented but

unaddressed by the majority opinion, I interpret and apply Wis.

Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) and (b). Statutory interpretation and

application present questions of law that we decide

independently, while benefitting from the discussions of the

3
Moustakis subsequently amended his complaint to assert
constitutional and common law rights. Those claims remain in
the circuit court and are not part of this review.

2
 No. 2014AP1853.pdr

court of appeals and the circuit court. State v. Hanson, 2012

WI 4, ¶14, 338 Wis. 2d 243, 808 N.W.2d 390.

B. Statutory Interpretation

¶71 Moustakis contends that "[a]t the barest of minimums,

the court system must have standing to address the failure of a

custodian to provide a Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9) notice where

applicable prior to the release of a record."4 The DOJ has

asserted that it is not required to provide Moustakis with

notice under § 19.356(9)(a) because he "is not entitled to

invoke 19.356."5

¶72 Statutory interpretation begins with the plain meaning

of the words chosen by the legislature. Wis. Indus. Energy

Group, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 2012 WI 89, ¶15, 342

Wis. 2d 576, 819 N.W.2d 240. If their meaning is plain, we

apply that meaning and go no further. Kalal v. Circuit Court

for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d

110. However, if a statute is "'capable of being understood by

reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses', then
the statute is ambiguous." Watton v. Hegerty, 2008 WI 74, ¶15,

311 Wis. 2d 52, 751 N.W.2d 369 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633,

¶47).

¶73 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356(9) is my focus. It states in

relevant part:

4
Br. of Pl.-Appellant-Pet'r at 19.
5
Tr. of April 3, 2014 Proceedings at 17.

3
 No. 2014AP1853.pdr

(a) Except as otherwise authorized or required by
statute, if an authority decides under s. 19.35 to
permit access to a record containing information
relating to a record subject who is an officer . . .
holding a local public office or a state public
office, the authority shall, before permitting access
and within 3 days after making the decision to permit
access, serve written notice of that decision on the
record subject . . . . The notice shall briefly
describe the requested record and include a
description of the rights of the record subject under
par. (b).

(b) Within 5 days after receipt of a notice under
par. (a), a record subject may augment the record to
be released with written comments and documentation
selected by the record subject. Except as otherwise
authorized or required by statute, the authority under
par. (a) shall release the record as augmented by the
record subject.
¶74 The DOJ agrees that Moustakis is an officer holding

state public office. However, the DOJ asserts that Moustakis

has no right to prior notice of an impending release of public

records. The DOJ asserts that it gave Moustakis prior notice

simply as a "courtesy."6

¶75 Wisconsin Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) is not an example of

artful drafting, which has generated part of Moustakis's

argument that he is an employee within the meaning of Wis. Stat.

§ 19.32(1bg). However, the application of § 19.356(9)(a) in

regard to notice requirements for the case before us is plain.

This is so in part because Moustakis is the Vilas County

District Attorney and in part because the DOJ has the records

under consideration. Therefore, Moustakis comes within the

plain meaning of § 19.356(9)(a), which describes an "officer

6
Id.

4
 No. 2014AP1853.pdr

. . . holding . . . a state public office," and the DOJ comes

within "the authority" in possession of the public records at

issue.

¶76 In regard to notice, the plain meaning of Wis. Stat.

§ 19.356(9)(a) imposes statutory obligations that the DOJ must

meet before it can release public records that relate to this

record subject (Moustakis) who is an "officer" who holds "state

office."

¶77 For example, Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a)'s directive

which begins as: "[T]he authority shall, before permitting

access . . . serve written notice of that decision on the record

subject," imposes affirmative obligations on the DOJ prior to

release of these public records. Id. First, the DOJ must give

Moustakis written notice. Id. Second, the notice must be given

three days prior to release of the records. Id. Third, notice

must be served on Moustakis either by certified mail or personal

service. Id. Fourth, the written notice must briefly describe

the records at issue. Id. Fifth, the written notice must
inform Moustakis that he has five days after "receipt of a

notice" in which to exercise his right to augment the records.

Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(b). Sixth, the DOJ must explain that

Moustakis may augment the records with "written comments and

documentation" of his choice. Id. And finally, if Moustakis

augments the records, the notice must provide that the DOJ shall

release the records as augmented by Moustakis. Id.

¶78 "Wisconsin has a long history of holding public
employees accountable through providing complete public access

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to records that will assist in the public's review." Schill v.

Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶212, 327 Wis. 2d 572, 786

N.W.2d 177 (Roggensack, J., dissenting). I dissented in Schill

because the lead opinion and the concurrence prevented access to

emails that teachers received on work computers during work time

in contravention to Wisconsin's tradition of open government.

Id., ¶211.

¶79 The notice of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a) promotes open

government. It increases transparency in regard to actions

taken in the course of governmental business because it permits

both sides of a concern to be placed before the public. The

§ 19.356(9)(a) notice is also an important aspect of fundamental

fairness to public officers, who serve the people of Wisconsin.

Dismissal of Moustakis's public records action stands in the way

of both policies, which are supportive of good government.

Accordingly, I would hold that the records at issue here cannot

be released at this time due to the DOJ's failure to fulfill its

statutory obligations related to the release of the records to
Lakeland Times.

III. CONCLUSION

¶80 I dissent because the majority opinion chooses not to

address obligations of the DOJ under Wis. Stat. § 19.356(9)(a)

and (b), which must be met prior to release of the public

records that the Lakeland Times seeks. Nothing in the record

shows that Moustakis received the notice required by

§ 19.356(9)(a), and without notice sufficient to satisfy
§ 19.356(9)(a) and (b), the DOJ is without statutory authority

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to release records that are at issue here. Accordingly, I would

reinstate Moustakis's action under the public records law that

the circuit court dismissed, and I respectfully concur in part

and dissent in part from the majority opinion.

¶81 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE

KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this

concurrence/dissent.

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