MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 20 2016, 10:37 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew D. Anglemeyer Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Larisha Lee, May 20, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1509-CR-1335
v. Appeal from Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William J. Nelson
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
49G18-1407-F6-36667
Mathias, Judge.
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[1] Larisha Lee (“Larisha”)1 was convicted in Marion Superior Court for Level 6
Felony operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are suspended.
Larisha appeals and argues that her conviction is not supported by sufficient
evidence and that the State did not establish the corpus delicti.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On July 23, 2014, the Indiana State Police received a call that an Acura had
broken down on the I-465 exit ramp onto Crawfordsville Road and that the
driver had requested help. Tr. p. 6. At the caller’s request, Trooper Jordan Hall
(“Trooper Hall”) was dispatched to transport the driver off of the interstate. Id.
At trial, Larisha admitted that she was the caller. Id. at 38.
[4] Trooper Hall arrived at the scene at 11:37 p.m., and he saw Larisha standing
outside of the vehicle. Id. at 6-8. Larisha was the only person near the car, and
the ignition was off. Id. at 8, 15. Larisha informed Trooper Hall that she was
driving the car when it had broken down and that she did not know what was
wrong with it. Id. at 8-9, 19. Trooper Hall did not attempt to start the car. Id. at
15.
[5] Larisha did not indicate that anyone was with her or that anyone was coming
to help her, so Trooper Hall offered Larisha a ride to the gas station down the
1
The trial transcript sometimes refers to Larisha as “Lakisha.”
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street. Id. at 8, 13. Before they left, Trooper Hall asked for her identification
because she would be riding in the front seat. Id. Larisha replied that she did not
have identification but that her name was Tameko Lee (“Tameko”).2 Id.
[6] Trooper Hall ran a search for “Tameko Lee” through the Indiana BMV, NCIC,
and IDACS. Id. at 9. He found a photo of Tameko, which did not match the
woman standing in front of him. Id. at 9-10. He asked her to verify her social
security number, and she correctly provided Tameko’s social security number.
Id. at 10.
[7] Trooper Hall then noticed that the vehicle’s license plate was expired, so he ran
the license plate number through the system. Id. Larisha was the vehicle’s
registered owner. Id. at 10. Further, the search result yielded a picture of
Larisha, despite the fact that she was claiming to be Tameko.3 Id. at 10. The
search also revealed that Larisha was a Habitual Traffic Violator (“HTV”).
[8] Shortly after making these discoveries, Trooper Hall arrested Larisha and
placed her in handcuffs. Id. at 11-13. Larisha’s car was then towed from the
scene. Id. at 19.
2
Tameko is Larisha’s sister. Id. at 23.
3
Trooper Hall also recovered cards in Larisha’s purse with the name “Larisha Lee” on them. He testified at
trial that they were not official government identification cards, but he could not remember the exact type of
card. Id. at 11-12.
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[9] Larisha was charged with Level 6 felony operating a motor vehicle while
driving privileges are suspended on July 24, 2014. She was convicted as charged
at a bench trial held on August 18, 2015, and sentenced to 545 days with four
days of credit time, with the remainder of her sentence suspended to probation.
Additionally, Larisha’s driving privileges were suspended for life.
[10] Larisha now appeals, claiming that the State produced insufficient evidence to
support her conviction and that the State did not establish the corpus delicti for
the crime. Specifically, Larisha argues that the State presented insufficient
evidence that she “operated” the vehicle and that the State did not establish the
corpus delicti of such operation beyond Larisha’s admission that she was the
driver.
Standard of Review
[11] When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the
evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Chappell v. State, 966 N.E.2d
124, 129 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126
(Ind. 2005)), trans denied. Rather, we recognize the exclusive province of the
trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence and we consider only the
probative evidence supporting the conviction and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from
which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the
defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the
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judgment will not be disturbed. Baumgartner v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1131, 1137
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Discussion and Decision
[12] To convict Larisha of operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are
suspended, the State was required to prove that she “operat[ed] a motor
vehicle” while knowing that her driver’s license was suspended. Ind. Code § 19-
30-10-16(a). The appellant only challenges whether the State proved that
Larisha “operated” the vehicle.4
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[13] The Indiana Code defines “operate” as “to navigate or otherwise be in actual
physical control of a vehicle.” Ind. Code § 9-13-2-117.5(a); West v. State, 2
N.E.3d 872, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In determining whether an individual
“operated” a vehicle, the court considers a nonexclusive list of factors: (1) the
location of the vehicle when discovered; (2) whether the vehicle was moving
when discovered; (3) whether the defendant was observed operating the vehicle
before discovered; and (4) the position of the automatic transmission. Id. at 251-
52. The court should also consider “any evidence that leads to a reasonable
inference” of operation. Id.
4
Larisha stipulated at trial that she knew she was a HTV. Id. at 38; Appellant’s Br. p. 14.
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[14] In support of her argument, Larisha relies on Johnson v. State. 518 N.E.2d 1127
(Ind. Ct. App. 1988). In Johnson, a police officer investigated a vehicle parked
on the side of the road. Id. at 1127. Johnson was in the driver’s seat and
demonstrated that he could not start the car. Id. He claimed that he had not
been driving the car and was just waiting for a tow, and two witnesses
corroborated his story at trial. Id. Importantly, the vehicle was inoperable. The
court reversed Johnson’s conviction for operating a motor vehicle while
suspended, holding that the State produced insufficient evidence that Johnson
“operated” the vehicle. Id.
[15] Larisha agues the State failed to present evidence that the vehicle was operable.
Further, the ignition was off when Trooper Hall arrived at the scene, and
Trooper Hall never saw Larisha driving.
[16] However, Larisha admitted twice that she was the driver—when she called for
assistance and when she told Trooper Hall what happened. Even beyond her
admission, the State presented additional evidence that Larisha was driving the
vehicle. The car was registered to Larisha, the car was located on an I-465 exit
ramp, Larisha was the only one near the car, and Larisha never indicated that
anyone else was with her or coming to help her. Larisha’s arguments are simply
a request to reweigh the evidence, which is outside this court’s province. See
Chappell, 966 N.E.2d at 129.
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Corpus Delicti
[17] Larisha argues that the State did not present independent evidence to establish
the corpus delicti, i.e., evidence that Larisha operated the vehicle independent of
her confession.
[18] “Proof of the corpus delicti means proof that the specific crime charged has
actually been committed by someone.” Cherry v. State, 971 N.E.2d 726, 730
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Weida v. State, 693 N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998)).
For a confession to be admitted into evidence, the State must
establish the corpus delicti. The purpose for requiring proof of the
corpus delicti is to prevent the admission of a defendant's
confession to a crime that never occurred. The State is not
required to prove the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt,
but must present independent evidence from which an inference
may be drawn that a crime was committed. The corpus delicti
need not be established prior to admission of the confession so
long as the totality of independent evidence presented at trial
establishes it. The corpus delicti may be established by
circumstantial evidence.
Id. at 730-31 (quoting Weida, 693 N.E.2d at 600) (internal citations omitted).
[19] To support her argument, Larisha offers her testimony and Tameko’s
testimony. At trial, Larisha claimed that that her sister, Tameko, was driving
her home from work when the car broke down. Larisha contends that Tameko
had walked to the gas station to get help before Trooper Hall arrived. Larisha
did not mention that Tameko was getting help because Trooper Hall “never
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asked [her] that” and they “never got to that part.” Tr. p. 42. Finally, Larisha
gave Tameko’s name to Trooper Hall for towing purposes. Id. at 41.
[20] The State, however, presented independent evidence from which a reasonable
inference can be drawn that Larisha was operating the vehicle. The car was
registered to Larisha; the car was located on an I-465 exit ramp; Larisha was
the only one near the car; and Larisha never indicated that anyone else was
with her or coming to help her. These facts are certainly sufficient to establish
the corpus delicti. When considered in conjunction with her confession, the
evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she operated
the vehicle.
Conclusion
[21] For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to convict
Larisha of operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are suspended and
that the State established the corpus delicti.
[22] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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