IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0655
Filed June 15, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF C.D.,
Minor Child,
J.P., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Colin J. Witt, District
Associate Judge.
A father appeals the order terminating his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Cole J. Mayer of Masterson, Bottenberg & Eichhorn, L.L.P., Waukee, for
appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Karl Wolle of the State Juvenile Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines, for
minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, JUDGE.
A father appeals1 the juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to
his child, claiming the Department of Human Services (DHS) did not make
reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification with the child, the court improperly
denied the father’s request for a six-month extension, and termination is not in
the best interests of the child due to the closeness of the parent-child bond. We
affirm.
We review de novo proceedings terminating parental rights. See In re
A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014). The three-step statutory framework
governing the termination of parental rights is well-established and need not be
repeated herein. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). The juvenile
court issued a thorough and well-reasoned ruling terminating the father’s parental
rights; we adopt the findings of fact and conclusions of law as our own. The
juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code
section 232.116(1)(h) (2015). On appeal, the father does not challenge this
statutory ground.
A. Reasonable Efforts
The father claims DHS did not make reasonable efforts, pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.102, to help him work toward reunification. Specifically, he
claims DHS did not facilitate visits, did not consider other placements for C.D.,
and failed to provide reasonable efforts to finalize a permanency plan. The State
claims the father has not preserved error on this claim because he raised this
claim for the first time at the termination hearing. We will not review a
1
The mother’s parental rights were also terminated and she does not appeal.
3
reasonable-efforts claim unless it is raised prior to the termination hearing. See
In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Immediately prior to
the termination hearing, the district court held a reasonable efforts hearing and
ruled on the essence of the father’s claim, therefore error has been preserved.
The focus of the requirement for reasonable efforts is on services to
improve parenting. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). “However, it
also includes visitation designed to facilitate reunification while providing
adequate protection for the child.” Id. When a parent is incarcerated, DHS
should supply services that are reasonable under the circumstances. In re S.J.,
620 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).
On this issue, the court reasoned:
If this case began in March 2015 and all the court looked at
were the services to work towards reunification with the parents
thereafter, then the parents would probably be correct. The issues
surrounding placement in 2015 following removal from father were
frustrating as an overall matter. And neither parent has had a visit
with the child since [C.D.] was placed in family foster care in June
2015.
However, this case began not in March 2015 but rather
much earlier—two and a half years earlier—in September 2012.
The entire context matters and must be considered. What
happened after [C.D.] was removed from his father a year ago
cannot be viewed in a vacuum. For two and a half years prior to
that time, DHS provided much more than just reasonable efforts to
support this family. In particular, significant services and patience
and effort were expended to not ever have [C.D.] removed from his
parents and biological family in total. And when considering the
reasonable-efforts challenge and issue in the context of the entire
case, the court has no problem in DENYING the parents’ motion.
Father had many opportunities, especially from March 2015
until August 2015, to engage in community based services
including visits (certainly offered in March and April and May, and
would have been offered had he not been in warrant). He chose
not to comply/participate. From August 2015 until the end of
January 2016, there was significant uncertainty as to whether he
would be in the community. Visits between him and [C.D.], a 3 year
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old, via the jail’s video monitoring service would not have been
appropriate or helpful for [C.D.] and his mental health and wellbeing
on this record given all circumstances.
Upon our de novo review, we agree DHS provided reasonable efforts.
B. Request for Additional Time
The father claims the juvenile court improperly denied his request for
additional time to work toward reunification. Based on his past conduct, the
father has not demonstrated additional time would be beneficial. “The crucial
days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to
face up to their own problems.” In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987).
While the father had custody of C.D., he continued to use methamphetamine,
which led to C.D.’s removal from the father’s care. C.D. tested positive for
methamphetamine at the time of removal. Further, the father’s poor decision
making, as evidenced by his run-ins with law enforcement, including his
whereabouts being unknown for several months and his incarceration, provides
additional support for the denial of his request for an extension. We affirm the
juvenile court’s ruling.
C. Best Interests
The father claims the termination of his parental rights is not in the best
interests of the child as the closeness of the parent-child bond makes termination
improper. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2), (3). In determining the best interests of
the child, we give primary consideration to “the child’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child[ren], and
to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child[ren].”
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See Iowa Code § 232.116(2); P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 37. On these issues, the
juvenile court reasoned:
Turning to the best interest of the child, the overriding and
governing best-interest factor at this time in this case is the need for
finality. The need for permanency. The need for resolution and
certainty. This little boy has endured much. Too much. Some of it
the fault of the undersigned in terms of timely resolution of matters
and need for court records to be developed. [C.D.] can’t endure
more moves, he can’t endure more uncertainty. This Court and the
child welfare system is not good at nor are we well equipped to stay
in the lives of young children in perpetuity. There are some cases
where we have to recognize that our continued systemic
involvement in a child’s life does more harm than good. This is one
of those cases. We need to provide a resolution and bring matters
to an end. This is quite simply the governing factor in this case at
this time.
....
The court has considered whether any of the five permissive
exceptions to the termination statute should govern and cause the
court to deny termination. The court deems that any and all
attachment [C.D.] has with his . . . father should not rule the day. At
this point in time, such does not and cannot outweigh the need for
resolution and for what the court hopes will be permanency in a
committed and loving forever home for [C.D.]
We agree with the juvenile court’s reasoning and find termination is in the
child’s best interests. The court properly declined to find termination was
improper due to the closeness of the parent/child relationship. We affirm the
termination of the father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.