IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-2226
Filed February 20, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF C.W.,
Minor Child,
D.W., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Karen Kaufman Salic,
District Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to a child.
AFFIRMED.
William P. Baresel of Prichard Law Office, PC, Charles City, for appellant
father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith Lamberti, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Cynthia Schuknecht of Noah, Smith, Schuknecht & Sloter, P.L.C., Charles
City, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Mullins, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to a child, born in
2006.1 He contends the department of human services failed to make reasonable
efforts towards reunification.
The district court terminated the father’s parental rights pursuant to three
statutory provisions. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(d), (e), (f) (2018). All three
implicate the reasonable-efforts requirement, but we will focus on section
232.116(1)(f). See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012) (“When the
juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we
may affirm the juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the
record.”).
Section 232.116(1)(f) requires proof of several elements, including proof the
child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody. “The State must show reasonable
efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care
of a parent.” In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017) (quoting In re C.B., 611
N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000)). “The reasonable efforts concept would broadly
include a visitation arrangement designed to facilitate reunification while protecting
the child from the harm responsible for the removal.” Id. (quoting In re M.B., 553
N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996)).
Our de novo review of the record reveals the following facts. The
department became involved with the child after receiving information that the
father sexually abused him. Following an investigation, the department issued a
1
Custody of the child was placed with the mother. She is not involved in the appeal.
3
founded child-abuse report naming the father as the perpetrator. The child was
subsequently adjudicated in need of assistance.
At the time of adjudication, the district court ordered the father “to submit to
a psycho-social evaluation and follow all treatment recommendations.” A
department employee made arrangements for the evaluation, allowing the father
to choose between two dates. The father responded that he was unsure whether
he could get off work. The caseworker advised him to find out as soon as possible.
Four months later, the father had yet to provide the department with a response.
The district court ordered the department to reschedule the evaluation “once
Father initiates contact with the [d]epartment.” Five months later, the department
caseworker reported that she rescheduled the evaluation several times and the
father was a “no show.” She confirmed the father did “not participate[] in services.”
The district court again ordered the father to submit to an evaluation. The
father appeared for the first of a two-part session approximately one year after he
was first ordered to do so.
The department received a psycho-sexual evaluation report two months
before the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. The evaluator opined that the
father was “a risk to children in general.” He suggested “[t]he best way to move
forward . . . is to ask [the father] to complete a polygraph (lie detector test).” The
evaluator also recommended that the father engage in individual counseling and
visits between father and child “continue to be fully supervised.”
The department caseworker immediately contacted the father and arranged
for six counseling sessions. She also advised the father to contact the child’s
therapist to arrange supervised visits.
4
The father reached out to the counselor a month before the termination
hearing. The counselor informed him she did not supervise visits, and she
expressed an unwillingness to engage in family therapy sessions until the father
actively participated in several individual therapy sessions.
Given the father’s belated interest in pursuing reunification services, the
department employee opined that the father was “merely going through the
motions.” At the termination hearing, the department employee reiterated that the
father “just simply does not have any interest in taking any accountability for what
we’re involved for.”
On our de novo review, we conclude the department satisfied its
reasonable-efforts mandate. We affirm the termination of the father’s parental
rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f).
AFFIRMED.