United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 18, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30244
Summary Calendar
DEBBIE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CYTEC INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL,
Defendants,
PAPER, ALLIED-INDUSTRIAL, CHEMICAL AND
ENERGY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION,
AFL-CIO-CIC, LOCAL 4-447,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(2:04-CV-761)
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Before JONES, WIENER, and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Debbie Williams appeals from the district
court’s grant of Defendant-Appellee’s (“the Union”) motion for
summary judgment, as a result of which Williams’s claim against the
Union for breach of its duty of fair representation under the Labor
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),1 the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”),2 and the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (“LMRDA”).3 We affirm.
The factual background of this case is well and fully set
forth in the district court’s Order and Reasons filed January 14,
2005. Against her Union, Williams first asserted a claim under §
301(a) of the LMRA. The district court granted the Union’s motion
for summary judgment on the ground that Williams’s claim under the
LMRA was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations of
six months. The court correctly cited Barrett v. Ebasco
Constructors, Inc.4 for the proposition that the statutory period
begins to run “when the plaintiff either knew or should have known
of the injury itself, i.e., the breach of duty of fair
representation, rather than of its manifestations.”
Williams testified unequivocally that she filed her EEOC
charge on April 11, 2003, because she had realized the previous
month that her union grievance “wasn’t going any further,” and that
she “felt the Union wasn’t prepared to do any more with the
grievance.” This determination by Williams was grounded in the
fact that the training class that sits at that vortex of this
1
29 U.S.C. § 1985.
2
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
3
29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a), 529.
4
868 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir. 1989).
2
controversy had been made available to Williams and was taken by
her on April 8, 2003. Despite the vigorous argument of counsel for
Williams, the district court found —— and we agree —— that
Williams’s testimony constitutes her concession that she knew or
should have known no later than April 11, 2003, that the Union was
not going to pursue her grievance. Taking that as the outside
date, the statute of limitations on this claim ran no later than
October 11, 2003. The fact that Williams was contacted by a Union
representative approximately a year later and that her grievance
was formally rejected by vote of the Union’s members after that
does not change the fact to which she testified regarding her
knowledge. As such post-hoc facts cannot, as the district court
observed, breathe life back into her prescribed claim, it was time
barred.
The district court also correctly dismissed Williams’s
complaint under the LMRDA because, as a matter of law, she could
not assert a claim under that statute. Properly relying on
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Assn. Local Union No. 6,5
the district court noted the limited scope of the LMRDA’s
prohibition of fining, suspending, expelling, or otherwise
disciplining union members for exercising their rights secured by
the Act. The court relied on one of its recent opinions grounded
5
493 U.S. 67, 91 (1989).
3
in Breininger6 to reject Williams’s claim as not implicating
“discipline” within the meaning of the LMRDA. Given the vote of
the Union membership against censure or any other punishment of
Williams, she was not fined, suspended, expelled, or “otherwise
disciplined.” In this reasoning, the district court was also
correct.
For the foregoing reasons, as more fully set forth in the
aforesaid Order and Reasons of the district court, its grant of
summary judgment dismissing with prejudice Williams’s claims
against the Union for breach of its duty of fair representation
under the LMRA, the NLRA, and the LMRDA is, in all respects,
AFFIRMED.
6
Hebert v. General Truckdrivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers, Local 270, No. 03-1744, 204WL1597144 at *4 (E.D.La. Jul.
16, 2004)(“A local union’s action or inaction in processing a
grievance is not ‘discipline’ or punishment within the meaning of
the [LMRDA]”).
4