Com. v. Goslin, A.

J-S22025-16

2016 PA Super 145

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee

v.

ANDREW JOSIAH GOSLIN

Appellant No. 1114 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005761-2014

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

OPINION BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016

Appellant, Andrew Josiah Goslin, appeals pro se from the judgment of

sentence of one year of probation, imposed on June 2, 2015, after the trial

court convicted him of possessing a weapon on school property. 1 After

careful review, we affirm.

Our review of the certified record reveals that on November 19, 2014,

the Commonwealth filed a complaint charging Appellant with possessing a

weapon on school property, after Pennsylvania State Trooper Kendra Kaley

“arrived at Providence Elementary School … to contact Principal Christina M.

McLaughlin about a previous incident at the school.” Affidavit of Probable
____________________________________________

*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 912.
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Cause, 11/19/14. A bench trial convened on June 2, 2015. Ms. McLaughlin

testified that on September 4, 2014, she met with Appellant for the purpose

of an “informal hearing” concerning an incident where Appellant’s son was

found to have possessed a knife on school property. N.T., 6/2/15, at 4-5,

15-18. The purpose of the hearing was to “allow the family and student to

discuss and answer any questions they may have and the school

administration to ask any questions they may have and review the incident

as they know it to have been.” Id. at 5. Ms. McLaughlin testified as follows.

At the hearing, during one point of discussion,
[Appellant] did state that he had a knife and asked if
we would arrest him for having it. At that point, he
forcefully placed it on the table in front of people at
the meeting.

…

I don’t remember whether he was standing or
sitting, but I do remember the words were, I have a
knife, are you going to call the police on me and
then [he] slammed it down on the table in front of
him.

…

There was silence in the room and we allowed
him to sit and calm down, honestly. That was our
hope.

…

At some point after that, he removed it from
the table and put it back in his pocket.

…

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I remember it being a strained meeting. He
had stated – and the reason I say that is because he
seemed very upset that we called the police and had
stated that he didn’t feel it was our right and that he
doesn’t appreciate that.

I felt that at some time, quite honestly, that
his demeanor was threatening. He looked personally
at me and made comments that made me feel that
way, saying that you sent armed police to my house
and that doesn’t go well. I sensed the tone of his
feeling was tense at that meeting.

Id. at 20-22.

On cross-examination, Ms. McLaughlin clarified that Appellant did not

point the knife at anyone, and it was in a “closed state the entire time.” Id.

at 26.

Thereafter, the defense stipulated that Appellant possessed the knife

on school grounds. Id. at 28. Appellant testified that he left work as a

carpenter early to attend the meeting. Id. at 29-30. He also testified that

he carries the knife with him to work and “every day everywhere.” Id. at

30. Appellant further explained as follows.

I carry this knife with me every day because I
use it. I use it at work, I use it to sharpen pencils, I
use it to open tuna cans when my wife forgets to
pack me a tuna can opener. I whittle sticks with my
sons.

…

It occurred to me at the moment, oh, my
goodness, they called the police on my nine-year-old
son for having a whittling knife. I actually have a
pocket knife on me now and am I a criminal as well?

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I grew up in the southern end my whole life. It
never occurred to me that possessing a pocket knife
was a criminal act. It seemed ridiculous.

…

My intention was not to provoke people or to
frighten people.

…

My intention in that moment was to say, this is
ridiculous. I mean, you send the state police to my
home for my nine-year-old son having a whittling
knife.

Id. at 30-32. Appellant indicated that he put the knife away after the

assistant superintendent told him he was “in violation” for having the knife.

Id. at 32.

Following the testimony of Ms. McLaughlin and Appellant, and closing

arguments by counsel, the trial court, in rendering its guilty verdict, gave its

detailed reasoning as follows.

I have reviewed all of the information that was
supplied by counsel pursuant to the closing
arguments in this case.

I have thoroughly reviewed the statute. And
as both sides have I think acknowledged, there is
some confusion, I suppose, with regard to the
language of the statute.

And I’ll say this, [Appellant], I understand your
frustration with this scenario. I can speak for
myself. When I’ve looked at some of the situations
that have arisen with these policies with regard to
weapons on school property, and I’ll agree that it
appears to me that the balance has not been

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properly found yet in terms of what the schools need
to do to adequately protect themselves.

We’ve gone from one extreme back before all
of the rash of unfortunate violent offenses on school
property to something in the far other direction in
terms of what we’ve done, but that’s the
environment in which we live at the moment.

…

My view of the plain reading or the plain language in
the statute is that the defense is there for some
lawful purpose upon which the weapon would be
brought onto the school property, that’s not the
same thing as saying that the weapon wasn’t
brought there for some unlawful purpose.

I see a distinction between those two, and I
guess I would agree with the position the
Commonwealth has taken that that defense is there
for someone to bring a weapon onto the property for
some legitimate reason pursuant to their presence
on the school property, and there are probably lots
of things.

I think in [Appellant’s] case, if [he] had said he
brought the knife that [his] son was accused of
having and it was the basis of the hearing,
[Appellant] brought it from an evidentiary standpoint
for the hearing itself, that to me would be some type
of an example of bringing a weapon onto the
property for lawful purposes.

The hearing was there, it involved that
particular item which the school was alleging was a
weapon, and if you had said the reason you had it
was for that, I could see that’s something that
probably the statute would cover.

But that isn’t the case here. This is a different
weapon. It’s clearly one that’s set forth in the
statute as being prohibited. There isn’t a question

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about you knowing that it was on your person at the
time.

…

The statute is clearly created to prohibit
weapons from being brought onto school property
unless there is a specific reason as carved out in the
statute that they are to be viewed as not violating
this criminal provision, but I don’t think [Appellant’s]
situation falls within one of those reasons.

So based on my view of the statute and the
evidence presented in this case, I do find [Appellant]
guilty of violation Section 912(a) of the Crimes Code.

Id. at 49-52.

On June 2, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a year of

probation. On June 29, 2015, Appellant filed this timely appeal.2 As

Appellant appealed pro se, the trial court convened a Grazier3 hearing on

August 11, 2015, and determined that Appellant was competent to proceed

pro se.

On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review.

Whether the Trial Court erred in appropriately [sic]
applying “lawful purpose” under 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 912(c).

What is the definition of “other lawful purpose?”

Appellant’s Brief at 6.
____________________________________________

2
Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
3
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988).

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In interpreting a statute, our Supreme Court recently provided the

following guidance.

The purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the legislature. 1
Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). In this respect, the language of
the statute is the best indication of this intent;
accordingly, where the words of the statute are clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter is not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
Id., § 1921(b). Only in the event of an ambiguity
may we consider other aspects of the statute and the
statutory process, and may we discern the General
Assembly’s intent by considering, inter alia, the
various factors listed in the Statutory Construction
Act, Id., § 1921(c). See Commonwealth v. Walls,
592 Pa. 557, 926 A.2d 957, 962 (2007).

Commonwealth v. Lynn, 114 A.3d 796, 818 (Pa. 2015).

As noted by both the Commonwealth and the trial court, 1 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1921 provides as follows.

Legislative intent controls

(a) The object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if
possible, to give effect to all its provisions.

(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit.

(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit,
the intention of the General Assembly may be
ascertained by considering, among other
matters:

(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.

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(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.

(3) The mischief to be remedied.

(4) The object to be attained.

(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes
upon the same or similar subjects.

(6) The consequences of a particular
interpretation.

(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.

(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations
of such statute.

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921.

Here, the statute at issue reads as follows.

§ 912. Possession of weapon on school
property

(a) Definition.--Notwithstanding the definition of
“weapon” in section 907 (relating to possessing
instruments of crime), “weapon” for purposes
of this section shall include but not be limited
to any knife, cutting instrument, cutting tool,
nun-chuck stick, firearm, shotgun, rifle and
any other tool, instrument or implement
capable of inflicting serious bodily injury.

(b) Offense defined.--A person commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree if he
possesses a weapon in the buildings of, on the
grounds of, or in any conveyance providing
transportation to or from any elementary or
secondary publicly-funded educational
institution, any elementary or secondary
private school licensed by the Department of
Education or any elementary or secondary
parochial school.

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(c) Defense.--It shall be a defense that the
weapon is possessed and used in conjunction
with a lawful supervised school activity or
course or is possessed for other lawful
purpose.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 912.

At trial, Appellant stipulated that he possessed a weapon on school

property. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 912(a) and (b); N.T., 6/2/15, at 28. He argues,

however, that contrary to the determination of the trial court, he possessed

his knife for “other lawful purpose.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 912(c). Appellant states

“there is a lack of clarity regarding the definition and application of other

lawful purpose,” but asserts that the “vague” term should apply to this case

because he “lawfully possessed the knife without any criminal intent or

action.” Appellant’s Brief at 9, 11.

The Commonwealth counters that the term “other lawful purpose”

must be read in conjunction with the surrounding text, and “a resort to the

rules of statutory construction reveals that the Legislature certainly intended

to criminalize [Appellant’s] conduct.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 5-6. The

Commonwealth posits as follows.

[W]here Section 912(c) says that weapons may be
possessed on school property “in conjunction with a
lawful supervised school activity or course or is
possessed for other lawful purpose,” the phrase
“other lawful purpose” does not mean any lawful
purpose whatsoever. Rather, that “lawful purpose”
must in some way be related to a school activity or
the reason why the individual is on school grounds.

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Only through this interpretation does Section 912
serve the purpose for which it was enacted.

Id. at 13.

In examining what constitutes “other lawful purpose” as stated in 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 912(c), we are presented with a question of first impression.

Recently, this Court determined that Section 912 “is not a strict liability

crime,” and in so concluding, commented that “section 912 can be described

as safeguarding public welfare by prohibiting weapons in or near schools.”

Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1006 (Pa. Super. 2015),

appeal denied, 141 A.3d 490 (Pa. 2016). We further stated, “[t]he statute is

designed to protect students from the presence of weapons where they are

learning.” Id. at 1004. In scrutinizing section 912, we observed that “we

must also consider that the General Assembly does not intend an absurd

result.” Id.

Our commentary in Giordano comports with the Commonwealth’s

argument that Section 912, as a penal statute, is subject to strict

construction, but “does not require that words of a criminal statute be given

their narrowest meaning or that the Legislature’s evident intent be

disregarded.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 6, citing Commonwealth v.

Campbell, 758 A.2d 1231, 1236 (Pa. Super. 2000). The trial court also

quoted Campbell in its statutory construction analysis of Section 912(c).

See Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 3.

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Here, the words “other lawful purpose” in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 912(c) “are

not explicit” as provided in 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c). We thus must “ascertain

and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly” by considering the

eight factors delineated in the statute. Id. Further, because there is a

scarcity of information pertaining to factors (2), (5), (7) and (8), we focus

our analysis on factors (1) the occasion and necessity for the statute, (3) the

mischief to be remedied, (4) the object to be attained, and (6) the

consequences of a particular interpretation.

Collectively, and at their essence, factors (1), (3), (4), and (6) invoke

our public policy of maintaining, and acting to ensure, the safety of those

who inhabit our schools. Hence, the occasion and necessity for the statute,

the mischief to be remedied, the object to be attained, and the

consequences of a particular interpretation, all incorporate the General

Assembly’s paramount objective of improving school safety. The “mischief

to be remedied” and “consequences of a particular interpretation” invoke the

numerous and often notorious instances of school violence which have

occurred nationwide, including Pennsylvania, since the enactment of Section

912 in 1980.

Bearing in mind our Commonwealth’s policy of promoting school

safety, Giordano, supra, we excerpt language from an administrative

action, where a school employee/grievant was dismissed for unintentionally

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bringing a gun onto school property, and the arbitrator reinstated the school

employee/grievant, but commented as follows.

This grievance presents a dilemma of the utmost
importance and sensitivity for the District and the
community at large, as well as for the individuals
involved, including the Grievant and the students ….
The issue of whether this Grievant should be
returned to the classroom cannot be approached
without full recognition and respect accorded to the
motives of the District. The question of weapons in
the schools is one of the utmost gravity. Senseless
violence in schools, involving deadly weapons, is
widely reported. School districts are to be
commended for taking the lead in the prevention of
such tragic incidents.

However, even heroes on the righteous path
sometimes stumble. The truest arrow sometimes
finds an unintended mark. So it is in this case. The
Grievant, based on the evidence produced at the
hearing, is surely not the type of individual
envisioned when the policies to eliminate weapons
from the schools were created. Nevertheless, he has
trespassed on those policies unawares.

In re SHALER (Pa.) AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT and SHALER AREA

EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, PSEA/NEA, 2003 WL 26566386 (Arbitrator

Submitted Award), at 8.

Mindful of the foregoing, we address the “other lawful purpose”

exception promulgated in Section 912(c). Although there is no case law on

point, the Commonwealth Court, in dicta, has stated as follows.4

____________________________________________

4
While the decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this
Court, we may look to them for their persuasive value. See, e.g.,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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We need not address [appellant’s] argument that …
his conduct falls within the exception to Section 912
which states that no crime is committed if [he]
possessed the gun with a lawful purpose. We note,
however, that [his] argument ignores that the
exception to Section 912 only allows the possession
of a firearm “in conjunction with a lawful supervised
school activity or course” (meaning, for example, a
supervised guns awareness program or perhaps a
firearm safety course) or for “[an]other lawful
purpose” (meaning, for example, that an
investigator, or a security guard, or other
person who as part of his or her duties carries
a firearm will not be charged with a crime
under this section even if he or she is
possessing a weapon on school grounds).

Bolden v. Chartiers Valley Sch. Dist., 869 A.2d 1134, 1139 n.7 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2005) (emphasis added).

In addition, we reference the trial court’s compelling commentary in

this case as follows.

[T]he … “lawful purpose” must be related to the
reason why one is on school property. If not, it
would allow anyone to bring a variety of weapons
onto school property so long as the possessor had an
alternate explanation for possessing the weapon.
Such an interpretation would nullify the intent of the
statute by allowing weapons onto school property
with few limitations. The statute would only be
applicable after criminal intent was established, likely
resulting in the usage of the weapon to injure or kill
others. The Legislature did not intend this law to be
contingent on such a tragedy. The legislative intent
of §912 was to ensure that our children and
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)

Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 395 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014),
appeal denied, 104 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2014).

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educators are secure by strictly prohibiting weapons
on school premises, regardless of intent.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 4 (footnote omitted).

Consonant with the above, we agree with the trial court. We

additionally find that Appellant’s argument is obviated by the

Commonwealth’s irrefutable observation that “the phrase ‘other lawful

purpose’ does not mean any lawful purpose whatsoever.” Commonwealth’s

Brief at 13. The facts before us are not disputed. Appellant did not appear

at the school in his capacity as a carpenter, a contractor, an employee, or

someone whose purpose in being at the school justified his possession of the

knife. Rather, Appellant appeared in his capacity as a parent, with no

purpose to possessing the knife on school property. These facts are

underscored by Appellant’s knowledge that he was going to the school to

discuss his son’s suspension for possessing a knife at school. Had Appellant

been at the school in a capacity which necessitated his possession of the

knife, he could avail himself of the “other lawful purpose” defense to

possessing the knife on school property. But that is not the case before us.

If we were to accept Appellant’s interpretation of Section 912(c), we would

be sanctioning the presence of weapons on school property in countless

scenarios. Such sanction would be contrary to the intent of the General

Assembly, which clearly enacted Section 912 to safeguard public welfare by

prohibiting weapons in or near schools. Giordano, supra. We therefore

discern no error by the trial court in convicting Appellant of possessing a

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weapon on school property, and affirm the June 2, 2015 judgment of

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Strassburger joins the opinion.

Judge Dubow files a dissenting opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2016

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