J. E03006/16
2017 PA Super 38
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
ANDREW JOSIAH GOSLIN, :
:
Appellant : No. 1114 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 2, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division No(s): CP-36-CR-0005761-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, PANELLA, LAZARUS, OTT, STABILE,
DUBOW, MOULTON, and RANSOM, JJ.
OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 16, 2017
Appellant, Andrew Josiah Goslin, appeals from the Judgment of
Sentence entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas on June
2, 2015. Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of one
count of Possession of Weapon on School Property, a first-degree
misdemeanor. 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(b). After reviewing the record and
applicable law, we vacate Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence and order a new
trial on the ground that the trial court erred in not properly interpreting and
applying the plain language of the statutory defense to Possession of
Weapon on School Property. 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c).
Factual and Procedural History
On August 28, 2014, Appellant’s son was suspended from elementary
school for three days for bringing a knife to school. On September 4, 2014,
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at 2:45 PM, Appellant and his wife attended a meeting at the school to
discuss the disciplinary action with school administrators. N.T., 6/2/15, at
19. Appellant arrived at the meeting directly from his job as a carpenter.
N.T. at 29-31.
When Appellant arrived at the conference, he had in his pocket a 3-4
inch pocketknife that he uses not only at work as a carpenter, but also to
sharpen pencils, whittle sticks with his sons, and “open tuna cans when my
wife forgets to pack me a tuna can opener.” Id. at 26, 30-31.
During the meeting, Appellant removed the knife from his pocket and
placed it forcefully on a conference table around which the meeting
attendees were seated and asked whether he would be arrested. Id. at 20,
31-32.
Following the meeting, on September 14, 2014, the police charged
Appellant with Possession of Weapon on School Property as well as
Terroristic Threats with Intent to Terrorize Another.1 The trial court
dismissed the latter charge on December 9, 2014.
The court held a bench trial on June 2, 2015 on the charge of
Possession of Weapon on School Property and rejected Appellant’s defense
that he had the pocketknife on school property “for other lawful purpose[s]”
because the ostensible lawful purposes were not related to school activities.
The trial court found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to one year of
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1).
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probation. Appellant timely appealed.2 Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Issues on Appeal
Appellant raises the following issues for review, which we have
reordered for ease of disposition:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed
an error of law, or violated constitutional rights of
Appellant by finding that the defense of “other lawful
purpose” in 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c) did not apply to
[Appellant] when:
A. The plain statutory language precludes
[Appellant’s] conviction;
B. The General Assembly’s intent, as
demonstrated by the [l]egislative [d]ebate, was not
to criminalize [Appellant’s] conduct;
C. Article I, Section 21 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution and the Second Amendment of the
Constitution protect [Appellant’s] conduct; and
D. In the alternative, the statutory language is so
vague and[,] therefore, insufficient to establish
criminal culpability.
2
While represented by counsel, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal and Rule
1925(b) Statement pro se. On July 31, 2015, this Court directed the trial
court to hold a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d
81 (Pa. 1988), to determine whether Appellant wished to proceed pro se, or
to petition for the appointment of new counsel. The trial court held a
Grazier hearing on August 11, 2015, after which it approved Appellant’s
request to represent himself. Appellant obtained counsel after this Court
granted his request for reargument before an en banc panel.
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2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed
an error of law or violated constitutional rights of Appellant
by convicting [Appellant] when the record establishes that:
A. He did not have the requisite mens rea as
established by this Court’s recent decision in
Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1006
(Pa. Super. 2015), since he did not act “intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly;” and
B. In the alternative, [Appellant’s] belief that his
conduct is a mistake of fact that precludes his
conviction.
Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.
Legal Analysis
In his first issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by
improperly interpreting the defense to the charge of Possession of Weapon
on School Property. Appellant argues that, in light of the plain language of
Section 912(c), the trial court erred by limiting its interpretation of “other
lawful purpose[s]” to require that the “lawful purpose must be related to the
reason why one is on school property.” Trial Ct. Op., 9/15/15, at 4.
Appellant avers that, contrary to the trial court’s holding, Section
912(c) provides a defendant with a defense of possessing a weapon for
“other lawful purpose[s],” and this defense is not contingent upon the
defendant’s possessing the weapon in connection with a school activity.
Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant specifically argues that he came to the
school conference straight from work, and uses the pocketknife at work as a
carpenter, thus, he possessed the pocketknife for “lawful purpose[s].” Id.
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at 19, 22. Appellant concludes that the trial court should have accepted the
defense that Appellant possessed the knife at the school conference for
other lawful purposes and found him not guilty of Possession of Weapon on
School Property. 18 Pa.C.S. § 912(c).
Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our standard of
review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1162 (Pa. 2009). “In all matters involving statutory
interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et
seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and construction of
statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly.” Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d at 1166 (citation
omitted).
Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best indication of
legislative intent. Id. We will only look beyond the plain language of the
statute when words are unclear or ambiguous, or the plain meaning would
lead to “a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1
Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute,
if the language is clear, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning.
Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 2013).
In this case, the statutory language at issue provides:
(c) Defense.—It shall be a defense that the weapon is
possessed and used in conjunction with a lawful supervised
school activity or course or is possessed for other
lawful purpose.
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18 Pa.C.S. 912(c) (emphasis added).
The trial court first concluded that the language of Section 912(c) is
vague. After construing the language according to the canons of statutory
construction, including engaging in an analysis of legislative intent, the trial
court interpreted Section 912(c) to require that the other lawful purpose for
which a defendant possessed a weapon on school property “must be related
to the reason why one is on school property.” Trial Ct. Op., at 2-4. We
disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the language of Section 912(c)
is vague.
Rather, we conclude that, in order to ascertain the meaning of Section
912(c), we need not look beyond its plain language. The plain meaning of
Section 912(c) provides two separate defenses: possessing and using a
weapon on school property “in conjunction with a lawful supervised school
activity” as well as possessing “for other lawful purpose.” At issue here is
whether Appellant possessed the pocketknife “for other lawful purpose.”
While we cannot turn to a dictionary to ascertain the plain or ordinary
meaning of the phrase “other lawful purpose,” we can analyze the
component parts to determine the phrase’s definition. Something that is
“other” is “distinct from the one or those first mentioned or understood,” or
is “additional.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1598 (1986).
A “lawful” act is one that is “allowed or permitted by law.” Id. at 1279. And
last, a “purpose” is “something that one sets before himself as an object to
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be attained,” “an end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure,
exertion, or operation,” or “an object, effect, or result aimed at, intended, or
attained.” Id. at 1847. Accordingly, for purposes of the instant case, the
plain meaning of the phrase “other lawful purpose” is an aim or goal
different from, or in addition to, an aim or goal described in the first clause
of Section 912(c), i.e., in conjunction with “a lawful supervised school
activity or course.” The second clause of this subsection, thus, serves as a
catchall provision.
Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the “other lawful purpose”
language does not restrict the defense provided in Section 912(c). Instead,
the phrase does just the opposite: it expands the defense to include any
additional or different lawful reason not otherwise mentioned in the first
clause of Section 912(c), regardless of whether it is school-related.3 To
conclude otherwise, would make “possessed for other lawful purpose”
redundant with “possessed and used in association with a lawful supervised
school activity or course.”
We conclude that the language of Section 912(c), though broad, is
unambiguous, and that Appellant possessed his pocketknife on school
3
The parties do not argue, and the trial court did not assert, that Appellant’s
possession of a pocketknife for use in his profession as a carpenter, or to
open cans of tuna fish, is not a lawful purpose.
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grounds for “other lawful purpose.” Therefore, we vacate Appellant’s
Judgment of Sentence and order a new trial.4
Because Appellant’s first issue on appeal is dispositive, we need not
address Appellant’s other issue.
Judgment of Sentence vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/16/2017
4
Although we are concerned about individuals possessing weapons on
school property, we are bound by the broad defense that the legislature has
provided defendants in such cases. We would urge the legislature to review
this language to ensure that the legislature’s view has not changed since it
enacted this defense in 1980.
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