IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA15-1173
Filed: 19 July 2016
Gaston County, No. 13CRS050737
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
RICO LAMAR BARNES, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 1 June 2015 by Judge Robert T.
Sumner in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 30 March
2016.
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General Yvonne B.
Ricci, for the State.
Linda B. Weisel for the Defendant.
DILLON, Judge.
Rico Lamar Barnes (“Defendant”) entered an Alford plea to the offense of
possession with intent to manufacture, sell, and deliver cocaine and received a
suspended sentence. Defendant reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s denial
of his motion to suppress.
I. Background
In January 2013, Defendant visited his cousin Territon Lewis at Mr. Lewis’
home. At the time, both men were on supervised probation. During Defendant’s visit,
STATE V. BARNES
Opinion of the Court
Mr. Lewis’ parole officer arrived to conduct a search of the residence. City police
officers accompanied the parole officer to provide security during the search. Upon
entering the residence, the parole officer found Defendant and recognized him as a
probationer, which Defendant confirmed. The officer advised Defendant that he was
also subject to the warrantless search because of his probation status, and then placed
Defendant in handcuffs “for officer safety.” Both Defendant and Mr. Lewis were
placed in chairs on the front porch of the residence while officers conducted a search
of the residence. Defendant and Mr. Lewis were kept on the porch of the residence,
in handcuffs, for approximately forty-five (45) minutes to one hour.
During the search of Mr. Lewis’ residence, the parole officer discovered a black
leather jacket with what appeared to be crack cocaine concealed in a cigarette pack
inside a pocket. After removing the substance from the jacket, the officer stepped
onto the porch and asked Defendant and Mr. Lewis who the jacket belonged to.
Defendant responded that the jacket was his. The officer then advised Defendant of
what she had found inside the jacket, and Defendant stated that he had borrowed the
jacket from someone else.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to manufacture, sell, and
deliver cocaine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements made to the
parole officer, arguing that the officer failed to advise him of his Miranda rights. The
trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that although
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Opinion of the Court
Defendant was handcuffed during the questioning, he was not “in custody” for
purposes of Miranda. Defendant entered an Alford plea, reserving his right to appeal
the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
II. Analysis
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied Defendant’s
motion to suppress his statements to the parole officer by concluding that Defendant
was not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. Although Defendant was in handcuffs,
we hold that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court correctly
concluded that Defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda when he
made the statements. Therefore, we affirm.1
Both the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution
protect a person’s privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See U.S. Const.
amend. V; N.C. Const. art. 1 § 23. Regarding this privilege, in its landmark Miranda
decision, the United States Supreme Court established the rule that statements
obtained from a defendant through interrogation while the defendant is in custody
are inadmissible when the defendant has not first been informed of his constitutional
rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (emphasis added). As our own
1Whether someone is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda is a “mixed question of law and
fact.” State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391, 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004). Defendant acknowledges in his
brief that “virtually all of the operative facts in this case are uncontested.” As a result, these facts are
binding on appeal, State v. Brown, 199 N.C. App. 253, 256-57, 681 S.E.2d 460, 463 (2009), and our
review is limited to whether the trial court’s conclusions of law are legally accurate and “reflect a
correct application of law to the facts found.” Garcia, 358 N.C. at 391, 597 S.E.2d at 733.
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Opinion of the Court
Supreme Court has explained, “the initial inquiry in determining whether Miranda
warnings were required is whether an individual was ‘in custody.’” State v.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 337, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). Therefore, our inquiry,
here, is whether Defendant was “in custody” for purposes of Miranda.
Whether an individual is “in custody” depends on the context. “Not all
restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda.”
Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). For instance, a prisoner is certainly
“in custody” in a general sense; however, a prisoner serving his term is not always “in
custody” for Miranda purposes. Id. at 1191 (stating that “service of a term of
imprisonment, without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda custody”). In sum,
the term “in custody” for Miranda purposes, “is a term of art that specifies
circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Id.
at 1189.
Our Supreme Court has explained that a person is “in custody” for purposes of
Miranda “when it is apparent from the totality of the circumstances that there is a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with
formal arrest.” Garcia, 358 N.C. at 396, 597 S.E.2d at 736. See California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (citing State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 340, 543 S.E.2d
823, 828 (2001)) (internal marks and citations omitted). And this determination must
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Opinion of the Court
be made from the point of view of an objectionably reasonable person in the suspect’s
position, described by our Supreme Court as follows:
[T]he United States Supreme Court has stressed that the
initial determination of custody depends on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective
views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the
person being questioned. Unless they are communicated
or otherwise manifested to the person being questioned, an
officer’s evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect
the objective circumstances of an interrogation or
interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda custody
inquiry . . . . [An officer’s] unarticulated plan has no
bearing on the question [of] whether a suspect was in
custody at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is
how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have
understood his situation.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 341-42, 543 S.E.2d at 829 (emphasis added).
In the present case, Defendant was clearly restrained when questioned about
the jacket. He was seated on his cousin’s front porch in handcuffs. And our Supreme
Court has recognized that being handcuffed is a circumstance “supporting an
objective showing that one is ‘in custody[.]’” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d
at 828. Although, as the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[d]etermining
whether an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the
first step in the analysis, not the last. Not all restraints on freedom of movement
amount to custody for purposes of Miranda.” Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable
person in Defendant’s situation, though in handcuffs, would not believe his restraint
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Opinion of the Court
rose to a level of restraint associated with a formal arrest. See Buchanan, 353 N.C.
at 339-40, 543 S.E.2d at 828. The regular conditions of probation in North Carolina
include the requirement that a probationer “[s]ubmit at reasonable times to
warrantless searches by a probation officer of the probationer’s person and of the
probationer’s vehicle and premises while the probationer is present, for purposes
directly related to the probation supervision.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(b)(13)
(2015). During the search of Mr. Lewis’ residence, Defendant was informed by law
enforcement officers that he would be placed in handcuffs for the purpose of officer
safety. He was never informed, at any point, that his detention would not be
temporary. Further, as a probationer subject to random searches as a condition of
probation, Defendant would objectively understand the purpose of the restraints and
the fact that the period of restraint was for a temporary duration. Indeed, at the
hearing on his motion to dismiss, Defendant testified that at the time of the search
of Mr. Lewis’ residence, he had been on probation for about two years. Defendant
also testified that at the time he was placed on probation, the court explained to him
the conditions of probation, including the possibility that he or his residence could be
subject to warrantless searches. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)
(holding that a probationer who is required to meet with his parole officer and answer
questions is not “in custody” for Miranda purposes even though his freedom of
movement is curtailed during the questioning).
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Opinion of the Court
We believe this case is distinguishable from State v. Johnston, cited by
Defendant, in which we held that a defendant was “in custody” for purposes of
Miranda where the defendant was handcuffed. State v. Johnston, 154 N.C. App. 500,
503, 572 S.E.2d 438, 441 (2002). In that case, the officers told the defendant that he
was in “secure custody” rather than under arrest. Our Court, however, concluded
that “a reasonable person [in the defendant’s] circumstances would believe that he
was under arrest.” Id. Specifically, in that case, not only was the defendant
handcuffed, he was also ordered out of the vehicle at gunpoint and placed in the back
of a police car where he was interrogated. In the present case, though, Defendant
was not ordered at gunpoint to submit to handcuffs and he was allowed to remain on
the front porch of his cousin’s residence rather than forced into the back of a police
vehicle.
Defendant argues that the purpose of Defendant’s custody changed after
officers discovered the jacket and suspected contraband, as evidenced by the
testimony of an officer that “the purpose of [her conduct] was to determine who [the
jacket] and the contraband belonged to.” Defendant contends that this entitled him
to Miranda protections. However, Miranda is limited to custodial interrogations.
Where the indicia of formal arrest are absent, the fact that “police have identified the
person interviewed as a suspect and that the interview was designed to produce
incriminating responses from the person are not relevant in assessing whether that
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person was in custody for Miranda purposes.” In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 248, 675
S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009).
III. Conclusion
Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that Defendant
was on probation during the search of Mr. Lewis’ residence, we conclude that
Defendant was not subjected to a formal arrest or a restraint on his freedom of
movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. Therefore, we agree with the
trial court that Defendant was not “in custody” for purposes of Miranda. Accordingly,
the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. We note that our
decision does not stand for the proposition that a person on probation is never entitled
to the protections of Miranda. See Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426.
AFFIRMED.
Judges CALABRIA and DIETZ concur.
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