MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jul 28 2016, 8:39 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey E. Stratman Gregory F. Zoeller
Aurora, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Steusloff, July 28, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
69A01-1603-CR-591
v. Appeal from the Ripley Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sharp,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Special Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
69C01-1407-FC-27
69C01-1203-FC-10
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 1 of 9
Statement of the Case
[1] In this consolidated appeal, Michael Steusloff (“Steusloff”) appeals his sentence
for Class C felony failure to register as a sex offender1 in one cause and the
revocation of his probation in another cause. Steusloff argues that his six-year
sentence is inappropriate and that the trial court abused its discretion by
ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence.
Concluding that Steusloff has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate
and finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm his sentence and the revocation of
his probation.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
1. Whether Steusloff’s sentence is inappropriate.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Steusloff to
serve his previously suspended sentence.
Facts
[3] In March 2012, the State charged Steusloff in cause number 69C01-1203-FC-
010 (“FC-010”), with Class C felony failure to register as a sex offender and
alleged that he was an habitual offender. In February 2013, Steusloff pled
guilty, was convicted of Class D felony failure to register as a sex offender, and
the State dismissed the habitual offender allegation. Under that cause, Steusloff
1
IND. CODE § 11-8-8-17.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 2 of 9
was sentenced to three (3) years, with six (6) months executed in the Indiana
Department of Correction, and two-and-a-half (2 ½) years suspended to
probation.
[4] On June 19, 2014, the State filed a Petition for Probation Violation, alleging
that Steusloff: (1) moved and failed to report his new address; (2) failed to pay
probation fees; and (3) failed to pay drug testing fees. The State subsequently
amended its petition and alleged that Steusloff had been charged with Class C
felony failure to register as a sex offender under cause number 69C01-1407-FC-
027 (“FC-027.”)
[5] On January 19, 2016, Steusloff entered an open guilty plea to his Class C failure
to register as a sex offender in FC-027. He also admitted that he had violated
the terms of his probation in FC-010. Thereafter, the trial court held a
combined sentencing and probation revocation hearing. During this hearing,
the trial court found Steusloff’s extensive criminal history, the nature and
circumstance of the crime, and the fact that Steusloff was on probation at the
time he committed the new offense to be aggravating factors. The court noted
that Steusloff’s criminal history included Class C felony sexual misconduct with
a minor and two prior convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. The
trial court, however, found Steusloff’s failure to comply with sex offender
registry rules the most compelling aggravating factor.
[6] Although the trial court noted Steusloff’s improved conduct while incarcerated
and his guilty plea without a plea agreement as mitigating factors, it determined
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 3 of 9
that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Thereafter, the
trial court imposed a six (6) year executed sentence for Steusloff’s Class C
felony failure to register as a sex offender in cause number FC-027. In cause
FC-010, the trial court revoked Steusloff’s probation and ordered him to serve
the remaining five hundred ninety-four (594) days of his previously suspended
sentence. The trial court ordered the FC-010 and FC-027 sentences to be served
consecutively in the Department of Correction. Steusloff now appeals.
Decision
[7] Steusloff argues that: (1) his sentence in FC-027 is inappropriate; and (2) the
trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his
previously suspended sentence in FC-010. We discuss each of his arguments in
turn.
1. Inappropriate Sentence
[8] Steusloff first argues that his six-year sentence for his Class C felony failure to
register as a sex offender in cause FC-027 is inappropriate.2 He requests this
Court to “review and correct his sentence, and for all other relief just and
proper in the premises.” (Steusloff’s Br. 11).
2
Steusloff also attempts to challenge whether his previously imposed sentence from his probation revocation
in cause FC-010 is inappropriate. We note, however, that Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is not the correct
standard when reviewing a sentence imposed for a probation violation. See Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184,
188 (Ind. 2007).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 4 of 9
[9] This Court may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). The
defendant has the burden of proving that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress
v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). The principal role of Rule 7(B)
review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some guiding
principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing
statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Whether a sentence is inappropriate
ultimately turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,
the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a
given case.” Id. at 1224.
[10] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that
the advisory sentence “is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081.
At the time of Steusloff’s offense, a Class C felony failure to register as a sex
offender carried a sentencing range of two (2) to eight (8) years, with an
advisory sentence of four (4) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6.
[11] As to the nature of Steusloff’s offense, the record reveals that Steusloff, who
was required to register as a sex offender, moved to Kansas, some seven
hundred miles away from his home address, without notifying his probation
officer. Once in Kansas, Steusloff still did not register as required. Steusloff’s
offense was made worse by the fact that he was on probation for the same
crime. Steusloff attempts to downplay the nature of his offense by claiming that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 5 of 9
he was “not sure he was still required to register . . . and that he had a lot on his
mind . . . [making] it difficult to track the date his registry requirement ended.”
(Steusloff’s Br. 8). Based on his prior encounters with the sex offender registry
requirements, we are not persuaded by this argument. Steusloff further argues
that given the nature of his offense, there is no evidence indicating that any
victim was harmed. We disagree. As explained by the trial court, “[t]he
purpose of the sex offender registry is to put the community on notice of an
individual living or working in their area that has been convicted of a restorable
sex offense. Essentially, the registry is used as a tool to enhance the safety of a
community.” (Tr. 42-43).
[12] Turning to Steusloff’s character, we see from the record that Steusloff has a
criminal history including the following convictions: seven Class A
misdemeanor convictions for conversion, driving while suspended, possession
of marijuana and paraphernalia; two Class B misdemeanor convictions for
reckless driving and reckless possession of paraphernalia; three Class C felony
convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor, failure to register as a sex
offender, and forgery; one Class D felony conviction for failure to register as a
sex offender; and an Ohio felony theft conviction. Steusloff also has eight
probation violations.
[13] Steusloff contends that his character should be viewed favorably because his
attitude has changed since his initial hearing and because he pled guilty. The
trial court considered Steusloff’s character as a mitigating factor during
sentencing, noting that Steusloff had “been a model prisoner . . . and ha[d] been
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 6 of 9
able to maintain a good status even while being housed with individuals that
the jail would determine to be problematic.” (Tr. 43). In regard to his guilty
plea, he argues that he “received little, if any, benefit of his plea of guilty and
admission to the probation violation” because the trial court “did not seem to
place significant weight on this [mitigating] factor.” (Steusloff’s Br. 10). The
trial court, however, factored Steusloff’s guilty plea as a mitigating factor during
its sentencing. We will not review the trial court’s determinations regarding the
weight applied to these mitigators. See Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.
2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007).
[14] Steusloff has not persuaded us that his six-year sentence for Class C felony
failure to register as a sex offender is inappropriate. We, therefore, affirm the
trial court’s sentence.
2. Abuse of Discretion
[15] Steusloff admits that he violated the terms of his probation by committing a
new crime, and he does not challenge the revocation of his probation. Instead,
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve all
594 days of his previously suspended sentence upon the revocation of his
probation.
[16] Once a trial court has determined that a condition of probation has been
violated, the trial court may impose one of the following:
(1) continue the person on probation, with or without modifying
or enlarging the conditions;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 7 of 9
(2) extend the person’s probationary period for not more than
one (1) year beyond the original probationary period;
(3) order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that “[o]nce a
trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than
incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to
proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188. “If this discretion were not afforded to
trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges
might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. We review
a trial court’s probation revocation for an abuse of discretion. Sanders v. State,
825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion
occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court or when the court misinterprets the
law. Id.
[17] There is ample basis for the trial court’s decision to order Steusloff to serve his
previously suspended sentence. Steusloff violated probation based on his
failure to register as a sex offender, the same offense for which he was on
probation. Furthermore, the record reveals that Steusloff has an extensive
criminal history, including sexual misconduct with a minor, and, now, three
convictions for failing to register as a sex offender. Additionally, Steusloff has
accumulated eight prior probation violations during the course of his criminal
history. In fact, during its sentencing hearing, the trial court found Steusloff’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 8 of 9
continued disregard for the rules of the sex offender registry compelling in
ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence. We are not
convinced by Steusloff’s argument that the court abused its discretion by
ordering him to serve the remainder of his previously suspended sentence. As
such, we affirm the trial court’s order that Steusloff serve his previously
suspended sentence.
[18] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Riley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 69A01-1603-CR-591| July 28, 2016 Page 9 of 9