North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1468

NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP; ROSANELL
EATON; EMMANUEL BAPTIST CHURCH; BETHEL A. BAPTIST CHURCH;
COVENANT PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH; BARBEE’S CHAPEL MISSIONARY
BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.; ARMENTA EATON; CAROLYN COLEMAN;
JOCELYN FERGUSON-KELLY; FAITH JACKSON; MARY PERRY, MARIA
TERESA UNGER PALMER,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

and

JOHN DOE 1; JANE DOE 1; JOHN DOE 2; JANE DOE 2; JOHN DOE 3;
JANE DOE 3; NEW OXLEY HILL BAPTIST CHURCH; CLINTON
TABERNACLE AME ZION CHURCH; BAHEEYAH MADANY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PATRICK L. MCCRORY, in his official capacity as Governor of
the State of North Carolina; KIM WESTBROOK STRACH, in her
official capacity as a member of the State Board of
Elections; JOSHUA B. HOWARD, in his official capacity as a
member of the State Board of Elections; RHONDA K. AMOROSO,
in her official capacity as a member of the State Board of
Elections; JOSHUA D. MALCOLM, in his official capacity as a
member of the State Board of Elections; PAUL J. FOLEY, in
his official capacity as a member of the State Board of
Elections; MAJA KRICKER, in her official capacity as a
member of the State Board of Elections; JAMES BAKER, in his
official capacity as a member of the North Carolina State
Board of Elections,

Defendants - Appellees.

----------------------------
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER; STACEY STITT; MARIA
DIAZ; ROBERT GUNDRUM; MISTY TAYLOR; SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION; DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA; UNC CENTER
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS; PEARLEIN REVELS; LOUISE MITCHELL; ERIC
LOCKLEAR; ANITA HAMMONDS BLANKS,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

JUDICIAL WATCH, INCORPORATED; ALLIED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION;
THOM TILLIS; LINDSEY GRAHAM; TED CRUZ; MIKE LEE; JUDICIAL
EDUCATION PROJECT; LAWYERS DEMOCRACY FUND; MOUNTAIN STATES
LEGAL FOUNDATION; AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS UNION; STATE OF
INDIANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF
ARKANSAS; STATE OF GEORGIA; STATE OF KANSAS; STATE OF
MICHIGAN; STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA; STATE OF OHIO; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF
WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION;
CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY; PROJECT 21,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

No. 16-1469

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA; NORTH CAROLINA A.
PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE; UNIFOUR ONESTOP COLLABORATIVE;
COMMON CAUSE NORTH CAROLINA; GOLDIE WELLS; KAY BRANDON;
OCTAVIA RAINEY; SARA STOHLER; HUGH STOHLER,

Plaintiffs,

CHARLES M. GRAY; ASGOD BARRANTES; MARY-WREN RITCHIE,

Intervenors/Plaintiffs,

and

LOUIS M. DUKE; JOSUE E. BERDUO; NANCY J. LUND; BRIAN M.
MILLER; BECKY HURLEY MOCK; LYNNE M. WALTER; EBONY N. WEST,

Intervenors/Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

2
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; JOSHUA B. HOWARD, in his official
capacity as a member of the State Board of Elections; RHONDA
K. AMOROSO, in her official capacity as a member of the
State Board of Elections; JOSHUA D. MALCOLM, in his official
capacity as a member of the State Board of Elections; PAUL
J. FOLEY, in his official capacity as a member of the State
Board of Elections; MAJA KRICKER, in her official capacity
as a member of the State Board of Elections; PATRICK L.
MCCRORY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State
of North Carolina,

Defendants - Appellees.

----------------------------

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER; STACEY STITT; MARIA
DIAZ; ROBERT GUNDRUM; MISTY TAYLOR; SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION; DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA; UNC CENTER
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS; PEARLEIN REVELS; LOUISE MITCHELL; ERIC
LOCKLEAR; ANITA HAMMONDS BLANKS,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

JUDICIAL WATCH, INCORPORATED; ALLIED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION;
THOM TILLIS; LINDSEY GRAHAM; TED CRUZ; MIKE LEE; JUDICIAL
EDUCATION PROJECT; LAWYERS DEMOCRACY FUND; MOUNTAIN STATES
LEGAL FOUNDATION; AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS UNION; STATE OF
INDIANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF
ARKANSAS; STATE OF GEORGIA; STATE OF KANSAS; STATE OF
MICHIGAN; STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA; STATE OF OHIO; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF
WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION;
CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY; PROJECT 21,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

No. 16-1474

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA; NORTH CAROLINA A.
PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE; UNIFOUR ONESTOP COLLABORATIVE;
COMMON CAUSE NORTH CAROLINA; GOLDIE WELLS; KAY BRANDON;
OCTAVIA RAINEY; SARA STOHLER; HUGH STOHLER,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

3
 and

LOUIS M. DUKE; CHARLES M. GRAY; ASGOD BARRANTES; JOSUE E.
BERDUO; BRIAN M. MILLER; NANCY J. LUND; BECKY HURLEY MOCK;
MARY-WREN RITCHIE; LYNNE M. WALTER; EBONY N. WEST,

Intervenors/Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; JOSHUA B. HOWARD, in his official
capacity as a member of the State Board of Elections; RHONDA
K. AMOROSO, in her official capacity as a member of the
State Board of Elections; JOSHUA D. MALCOLM, in his official
capacity as a member of the State Board of Elections; PAUL
J. FOLEY, in his official capacity as a member of the State
Board of Elections; MAJA KRICKER, in her official capacity
as a member of the State Board of Elections; PATRICK L.
MCCRORY, in his official capacity as Governor of the State
of North Carolina,

Defendants - Appellees.

----------------------------

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER; STACEY STITT; MARIA
DIAZ; ROBERT GUNDRUM; MISTY TAYLOR; SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION; DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA; UNC CENTER
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS; PEARLEIN REVELS; LOUISE MITCHELL; ERIC
LOCKLEAR; ANITA HAMMONDS BLANKS,

Amici Supporting Appellants,

JUDICIAL WATCH, INCORPORATED; ALLIED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION;
THOM TILLIS; LINDSEY GRAHAM; TED CRUZ; MIKE LEE; JUDICIAL
EDUCATION PROJECT; LAWYERS DEMOCRACY FUND; MOUNTAIN STATES
LEGAL FOUNDATION; AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS UNION; STATE OF
INDIANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF
ARKANSAS; STATE OF GEORGIA; STATE OF KANSAS; STATE OF
MICHIGAN; STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA; STATE OF OHIO; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF
WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION;
CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY; PROJECT 21,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

4
 No. 16-1529

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF
ELECTIONS; KIM WESTBROOK STRACH,

Defendants - Appellees,

and

CHRISTINA KELLEY GALLEGOS-MERRILL; JUDICIAL WATCH,
INCORPORATED,

Intervenors/Defendants.

----------------------------

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER; STACEY STITT; MARIA
DIAZ; ROBERT GUNDRUM; MISTY TAYLOR; SERVICE EMPLOYEES
INTERNATIONAL UNION; DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA; UNC CENTER
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS; PEARLEIN REVELS; LOUISE MITCHELL; ERIC
LOCKLEAR; ANITA HAMMONDS BLANKS,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

JUDICIAL WATCH, INCORPORATED; ALLIED EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION;
THOM TILLIS; LINDSEY GRAHAM; TED CRUZ; MIKE LEE; JUDICIAL
EDUCATION PROJECT; LAWYERS DEMOCRACY FUND; MOUNTAIN STATES
LEGAL FOUNDATION; AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS UNION; STATE OF
INDIANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ARIZONA; STATE OF
ARKANSAS; STATE OF GEORGIA; STATE OF KANSAS; STATE OF
MICHIGAN; STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA; STATE OF OHIO; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF
WEST VIRGINIA; STATE OF WISCONSIN; PACIFIC LEGAL FOUNDATION;
CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY; PROJECT 21,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

5
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:13-cv-00658-TDS-JEP; 1:13-cv-00660-TDS-JEP;
1:13-cv-00861-TDS-JEP)

Argued: June 21, 2016 Decided: July 29, 2016

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote
the opinion for the court, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd
joined except as to Part V.B. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion for
the court as to Part V.B., in which Judge Floyd joined. Judge
Motz wrote a separate dissenting opinion as to Part V.B.

ARGUED: Anna Marks Baldwin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C.; Penda D. Hair, ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
Washington, D.C.; Allison Jean Riggs, SOUTHERN COALITION FOR
SOCIAL JUSTICE, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellants. Thomas
A. Farr, OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, PC, Raleigh,
North Carolina; Alexander McClure Peters, NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Denise D. Lieberman, Donita Judge, Caitlin Swain,
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, Washington, D.C.; Irving Joyner, Cary,
North Carolina; Adam Stein, TIN FULTON WALKER & OWEN, PLLC,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Daniel T. Donovan, Bridget K.
O’Connor, K. Winn Allen, Michael A. Glick, Ronald K. Anguas,
Jr., Madelyn A. Morris, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellants North Carolina State Conference of Branches of
the NAACP, Rosanell Eaton, Emmanuel Baptist Church, Bethel A.
Baptist Church, Covenant Presbyterian Church, Barbee’s Chapel
Missionary Baptist Church, Inc., Armenta Eaton, Carolyn Coleman,
Jocelyn Ferguson-Kelly, Faith Jackson, Mary Perry, and Maria
Teresa Unger Palmer. Edwin M. Speas, John O’Hale, Caroline P.
Mackie, POYNER SPRUILL LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Joshua L.
Kaul, Madison, Wisconsin, Marc E. Elias, Bruce V. Spiva,
Elisabeth C. Frost, Amanda Callais, Washington, D.C., Abha
Khanna, PERKINS COIE LLP, Seattle, Washington, for Appellants
Louis M. Duke, Josue E. Berduo, Nancy J. Lund, Brian M. Miller,
Becky Hurley Mock, Lynne M. Walter, and Ebony N. West. Dale E.
Ho, Julie A. Ebenstein, Sophia Lin Lakin, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, INC., New York, New York;
Christopher Brook, ACLU OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL FOUNDATION,

6
Raleigh, North Carolina; Anita S. Earls, George Eppsteiner,
SOUTHERN COALITION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE, Durham, North Carolina
for Appellants League of Women Voters of North Carolina, North
Carolina A. Philip Randolph Institute, Unifour Onestop
Collaborative, Common Cause North Carolina, Goldie Wells, Kay
Brandon, Octavia Rainey, Sara Stohler, and Hugh Stohler. Ripley
Rand, United States Attorney for the Middle District of North
Carolina, Gill P. Beck, Special Assistant United States Attorney
for the Middle District of North Carolina, Gregory B. Friel,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Justin Levitt, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Diana K. Flynn, Christine H. Ku,
Civil Rights Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant United States of America. L.
Gray Geddie, Jr., Phillip J. Strach, Michael D. McKnight,
OGLETREE DEAKINS NASH SMOAK & STEWART, PC, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellees State of North Carolina and North
Carolina State Board of Elections; Karl S. Bowers, Jr., BOWERS
LAW OFFICE LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, Robert C. Stephens,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee Patrick L. McCrory. Elizabeth B. Wydra,
Brianne J. Gorod, David H. Gans, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Constitutional
Accountability Center. Claire Prestel, Ryan E. Griffin, JAMES &
HOFFMAN, P.C., Washington, D.C.; Mary Joyce Carlson, Washington,
D.C.; Judith A. Scott, Lauren Bonds, Katherine Roberson-Young,
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, Washington, D.C., for
Amici Stacey Stitt, Maria Diaz, Robert Gundrum, Misty Taylor,
and Service Employees International Union. Mark R. Sigmon,
SIGMON LAW, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Amicus Democracy
North Carolina. Mark Dorosin, Elizabeth Haddix, Brent Ducharme,
UNC CENTER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for
Amicus UNC Center for Civil Rights. Jeanette Wolfley, Assistant
Professor, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO SCHOOL OF LAW, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, Arnold Locklear, LOCKLEAR, JACOBS, HUNT & BROOKS,
Pembroke, North Carolina for Amici Pearlein Revels, Louise
Mitchell, Eric Locklear, and Anita Hammonds Blanks. Bradley J.
Schlozman, HINKLE LAW FIRM LLC, Wichita, Kansas; Chris Fedeli,
Lauren M. Burke, JUDICIAL WATCH, INC., Washington, D.C.; H.
Christopher Coates, LAW OFFICE OF H. CHRISTOPHER COATES,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Amici Judicial Watch, Inc. and
Allied Educational Foundation. Michael A. Carvin, Anthony J.
Dick, Stephen A. Vaden, JONES DAY, Washington, D.C., for Amici
Senators Thom Tillis, Lindsey Graham, Ted Cruz, Mike Lee, and
the Judicial Education Project. Maya M. Noronha, Trevor M.
Stanley, E. Mark Braden, Richard B. Raile, BAKER & HOSTETLER
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Lawyers Democracy Fund.
Joshua P. Thompson, Christopher M. Kieser, PACIFIC LEGAL

7
FOUNDATION, Sacramento, California, for Amici Pacific Legal
Foundation, Center for Equal Opportunity, and Project 21.
Steven J. Lechner, MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, Lakewood,
Colorado, for Amicus Mountain States Legal Foundation. Joseph
A. Vanderhulst, PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, Plainfield,
Indiana, for Amicus American Civil Rights Union. Gregory F.
Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Thomas M. Fisher,
Solicitor General, Winston Lin, Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Indianapolis, Indiana; Luther
Strange, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ALABAMA, Montgomery, Alabama; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona;
Leslie Rutledge, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF ARKANSAS, Little Rock, Arkansas; Sam Olens, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF GEORGIA, Atlanta,
Georgia; Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF KANSAS, Topeka, Kansas; Bill Schuette, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MICHIGAN, Lansing,
Michigan; Wayne Stenehjem, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH DAKOTA, Bismarck, North Dakota;
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF OHIO, Columbus, Ohio; E. Scott Pruitt, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OKLAHOMA, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma; Alan Wilson, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina; Ken Paxton,
Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,
Austin, Texas; Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia;
Brad D. Schimel, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF WISCONSIN, Madison, Wisconsin, for Amici States of
Indiana, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.

8
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, writing for the court except
as to Part V.B.:

These consolidated cases challenge provisions of a recently

enacted North Carolina election law. The district court

rejected contentions that the challenged provisions violate the

Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-

Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. In evaluating the massive

record in this case, the court issued extensive factual

findings. We appreciate and commend the court on its

thoroughness. The record evidence provides substantial support

for many of its findings; indeed, many rest on uncontested

facts. But, for some of its findings, we must conclude that the

district court fundamentally erred. In holding that the

legislature did not enact the challenged provisions with

discriminatory intent, the court seems to have missed the forest

in carefully surveying the many trees. This failure of

perspective led the court to ignore critical facts bearing on

legislative intent, including the inextricable link between race

and politics in North Carolina.

Voting in many areas of North Carolina is racially

polarized. That is, “the race of voters correlates with the

selection of a certain candidate or candidates.” Thornburg v.

Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 62 (1986) (discussing North Carolina). In

Gingles and other cases brought under the Voting Rights Act, the

9
Supreme Court has explained that polarization renders minority

voters uniquely vulnerable to the inevitable tendency of elected

officials to entrench themselves by targeting groups unlikely to

vote for them. In North Carolina, restriction of voting

mechanisms and procedures that most heavily affect African

Americans will predictably redound to the benefit of one

political party and to the disadvantage of the other. As the

evidence in the record makes clear, that is what happened here.

After years of preclearance and expansion of voting access,

by 2013 African American registration and turnout rates had

finally reached near-parity with white registration and turnout

rates. African Americans were poised to act as a major

electoral force. But, on the day after the Supreme Court issued

Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), eliminating

preclearance obligations, a leader of the party that newly

dominated the legislature (and the party that rarely enjoyed

African American support) announced an intention to enact what

he characterized as an “omnibus” election law. Before enacting

that law, the legislature requested data on the use, by race, of

a number of voting practices. Upon receipt of the race data,

the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted voting

and registration in five different ways, all of which

disproportionately affected African Americans.

10
 In response to claims that intentional racial

discrimination animated its action, the State offered only

meager justifications. Although the new provisions target

African Americans with almost surgical precision, they

constitute inapt remedies for the problems assertedly justifying

them and, in fact, impose cures for problems that did not exist.

Thus the asserted justifications cannot and do not conceal the

State’s true motivation. “In essence,” as in League of United

Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 440

(2006), “the State took away [minority voters’] opportunity

because [they] were about to exercise it.” As in LULAC, “[t]his

bears the mark of intentional discrimination.” Id.

Faced with this record, we can only conclude that the North

Carolina General Assembly enacted the challenged provisions of

the law with discriminatory intent. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment of the district court to the contrary and remand with

instructions to enjoin the challenged provisions of the law.

I.

“The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary

measures to address an extraordinary problem.” Shelby Cty., 133

S. Ct. at 2618. Although the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit racial

discrimination in the regulation of elections, state

11
legislatures have too often found facially race-neutral ways to

deny African Americans access to the franchise. See id. at

2619; Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994) (noting

“the demonstrated ingenuity of state and local governments in

hobbling minority voting power” as “jurisdictions have

substantially moved from direct, over[t] impediments to the

right to vote to more sophisticated devices” (alteration in

original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

To remedy this problem, Congress enacted the Voting Rights

Act. In its current form, § 2 of the Act provides:

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color . . . .

52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012) (formerly 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)).

In addition to this general statutory prohibition on racial

discrimination, Congress identified particular jurisdictions

“covered” by § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Shelby Cty., 133

S. Ct. at 2619. Covered jurisdictions were those that, as of

1972, had maintained suspect prerequisites to voting, like

literacy tests, and had less than 50% voter registration or

turnout. Id. at 2619-20. Forty North Carolina jurisdictions

were covered under the Act. 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2016). As a

result, whenever the North Carolina legislature sought to change

12
the procedures or qualifications for voting statewide or in

those jurisdictions, it first had to seek “preclearance” with

the United States Department of Justice. In doing so, the State

had to demonstrate that a change had neither the purpose nor

effect of “diminishing the ability of any citizens” to vote “on

account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012) (formerly

42 U.S.C. § 1973c).

During the period in which North Carolina jurisdictions

were covered by § 5, African American electoral participation

dramatically improved. In particular, between 2000 and 2012,

when the law provided for the voting mechanisms at issue here

and did not require photo ID, African American voter

registration swelled by 51.1%. J.A. 804 1 (compared to an

increase of 15.8% for white voters). African American turnout

similarly surged, from 41.9% in 2000 to 71.5% in 2008 and 68.5%

in 2012. J.A. 1196-97. Not coincidentally, during this period

North Carolina emerged as a swing state in national elections.

Then, in late June 2013, the Supreme Court issued its

opinion in Shelby County. In it, the Court invalidated the

preclearance coverage formula, finding it based on outdated

data. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. Consequently, as of

that date, North Carolina no longer needed to preclear changes

1Citations to “J.A. __” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
by the parties in this appeal.

13
in its election laws. As the district court found, the day

after the Supreme Court issued Shelby County, the “Republican

Chairman of the [Senate] Rules Committee[] publicly stated, ‘I

think we’ll have an omnibus bill coming out’ and . . . that the

Senate would move ahead with the ‘full bill.’” N.C. State Conf.

of the NAACP v. McCrory, 2016 WL 1650774, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Apr.

25, 2016). The legislature then swiftly expanded an essentially

single-issue bill into omnibus legislation, enacting it as

Session Law (“SL”) 2013-381. 2

In this one statute, the North Carolina legislature imposed

a number of voting restrictions. The law required in-person

voters to show certain photo IDs, beginning in 2016, which

African Americans disproportionately lacked, and eliminated or

reduced registration and voting access tools that African

Americans disproportionately used. Id. at *9-10, *37, *123,

*127, *131. Moreover, as the district court found, prior to

enactment of SL 2013-381, the legislature requested and received

racial data as to usage of the practices changed by the proposed

law. Id. at *136-38.

2
The parties and the district court sometimes identify the
law at issue in this case as House Bill or HB 589, the initial
bill that originated in the House of the North Carolina General
Assembly. That bill was amended in the North Carolina Senate
and then enacted as SL 2013-381. See H.B. 589, 2013 Gen.
Assemb. (N.C. 2013); 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381.

14
 This data showed that African Americans disproportionately

lacked the most common kind of photo ID, those issued by the

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Id. The pre-Shelby County

version of SL 2013-381 provided that all government-issued IDs,

even many that had been expired, would satisfy the requirement

as an alternative to DMV-issued photo IDs. J.A. 2114-15. After

Shelby County, with race data in hand, the legislature amended

the bill to exclude many of the alternative photo IDs used by

African Americans. Id. at *142; J.A. 2291-92. As amended, the

bill retained only the kinds of IDs that white North Carolinians

were more likely to possess. Id.; J.A. 3653, 2115, 2292.

The district court found that, prior to enactment of SL

2013-381, legislators also requested data as to the racial

breakdown of early voting usage. Id. at *136-37. Early voting

allows any registered voter to complete an absentee application

and ballot at the same time, in person, in advance of Election

Day. Id. at *4-5. Early voting thus increases opportunities to

vote for those who have difficulty getting to their polling

place on Election Day.

The racial data provided to the legislators revealed that

African Americans disproportionately used early voting in both

2008 and 2012. Id. at *136-38; see also id. at *48 n.74 (trial

evidence showing that 60.36% and 64.01% of African Americans

voted early in 2008 and 2012, respectively, compared to 44.47%

15
and 49.39% of whites). In particular, African Americans

disproportionately used the first seven days of early voting.

Id. After receipt of this racial data, the General Assembly

amended the bill to eliminate the first week of early voting,

shortening the total early voting period from seventeen to ten

days. Id. at *15, *136. As a result, SL 2013-381 also

eliminated one of two “souls-to-the-polls” Sundays in which

African American churches provided transportation to voters.

Id. at *55.

The district court found that legislators similarly

requested data as to the racial makeup of same-day registrants.

Id. at *137. Prior to SL 2013-381, same-day registration

allowed eligible North Carolinians to register in person at an

early voting site at the same time as casting their ballots.

Id. at *6. Same-day registration provided opportunities for

those as yet unable to register, as well as those who had ended

up in the “incomplete registration queue” after previously

attempting to register. Id. at *65. Same-day registration also

provided an easy avenue to re-register for those who moved

frequently, and allowed those with low literacy skills or other

difficulty completing a registration form to receive personal

assistance from poll workers. See id.

The legislature’s racial data demonstrated that, as the

district court found, “it is indisputable that African American

16
voters disproportionately used [same-day registration] when it

was available.” Id. at *61. The district court further found

that African American registration applications constituted a

disproportionate percentage of the incomplete registration

queue. Id. at *65. And the court found that African Americans

“are more likely to move between counties,” and thus “are more

likely to need to re-register.” Id. As evidenced by the types

of errors that placed many African American applications in the

incomplete queue, id. at *65, *123 & n.26, in-person assistance

likely would disproportionately benefit African Americans.

SL 2013-381 eliminated same-day registration. Id. at *15.

Legislators additionally requested a racial breakdown of

provisional voting, including out-of-precinct voting. Id. at

*136-37. Out-of-precinct voting required the Board of Elections

in each county to count the provisional ballot of an Election

Day voter who appeared at the wrong precinct, but in the correct

county, for all of the ballot items for which the voter was

eligible to vote. Id. at *5-6. This provision assisted those

who moved frequently, or who mistook a voting site as being in

their correct precinct.

The district court found that the racial data revealed that

African Americans disproportionately voted provisionally. Id.

at *137. In fact, the General Assembly that had originally

enacted the out-of-precinct voting legislation had specifically

17
found that “of those registered voters who happened to vote

provisional ballots outside their resident precincts” in 2004,

“a disproportionately high percentage were African American.”

Id. at *138. With SL 2013-381, the General Assembly altogether

eliminated out-of-precinct voting. Id. at *15.

African Americans also disproportionately used

preregistration. Id. at *69. Preregistration permitted 16- and

17-year-olds, when obtaining driver’s licenses or attending

mandatory high school registration drives, to identify

themselves and indicate their intent to vote. Id. at *7, *68.

This allowed County Boards of Elections to verify eligibility

and automatically register eligible citizens once they reached

eighteen. Id. at *7. Although preregistration increased

turnout among young adult voters, SL 2013-381 eliminated it.

Id. at *15, *69. 3

The district court found that not only did SL 2013-381

eliminate or restrict these voting mechanisms used

disproportionately by African Americans, and require IDs that

African Americans disproportionately lacked, but also that

African Americans were more likely to “experience socioeconomic

3SL 2013-381 also contained many provisions that did not
restrict access to voting or registration and thus are not
subject to challenge here. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774,
at *9. Of course, as explained below, our holding regarding
discriminatory intent applies only to the law’s challenged
portions.

18
factors that may hinder their political participation.” Id. at

*89. This is so, the district court explained, because in North

Carolina, African Americans are “disproportionately likely to

move, be poor, less educated, have less access to

transportation, and experience poor health.” Id. at *89.

Nevertheless, over protest by many legislators and members

of the public, the General Assembly quickly ratified SL 2013-381

by strict party-line votes. Id. at *9-13. The Governor, who

was of the same political party as the party that controlled the

General Assembly, promptly signed the bill into law on August

12, 2013. Id. at *13.

That same day, the League of Women Voters, along with

numerous other organizations and individuals, filed suit. Id.

at *16. These Plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions on early

voting and elimination of same-day registration and out-of-

precinct voting were motivated by discriminatory intent in

violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and

Fifteenth Amendments; that these provisions had a discriminatory

result in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and that

these provisions burdened the right to vote generally, in

contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.

Also that same day, the North Carolina State Conference of

the NAACP, in conjunction with several other organizations and

individuals, filed a separate action. Id. They alleged that

19
the photo ID requirement and the provisions challenged by the

League of Women Voters produced discriminatory results under § 2

and demonstrated intentional discrimination in violation of the

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Id. Soon thereafter, the

United States also filed suit, challenging the same provisions

as discriminatory in both purpose and result in violation of § 2

of the Voting Rights Act. Id. Finally, a group of “young

voters” intervened, alleging that these same provisions violated

their rights under the Fourteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.

Id. 4 The district court consolidated the cases. Id.

Ahead of the 2014 midterm general election, Plaintiffs

moved for a preliminary injunction of several provisions of the

law. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 997 F. Supp.

2d 322, 339 (M.D.N.C. 2014). The district court denied the

motion. Id. at 383. On appeal, we reversed in part, remanding

the case with instructions to issue an order staying the

elimination of same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting.

League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina (LWV), 769 F.3d

224, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2014).

Over the dissent of two Justices, the Supreme Court stayed

our injunction mandate on October 8, 2014, pending its decision

4
The complaints also challenged a few other provisions of
SL 2013-381 that are not challenged on appeal and so not
discussed here. See, e.g., J.A. 16448.

20
on certiorari. See North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of

N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.). On April 6, 2015, the Supreme

Court denied certiorari. See North Carolina v. League of Women

Voters of N.C., 135 S.Ct. 1735 (2015) (mem.). This denial

automatically reinstituted the preliminary injunction, restoring

same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting pending the

outcome of trial in this case. North Carolina v. League of

Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. at 6.

That consolidated trial was scheduled to begin on July 13,

2015. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *18. However, on

June 18, 2015, the General Assembly ratified House Bill 836,

enacted as Session Law (“SL”) 2015-103. Id. at *13, *18. This

new law amended the photo ID requirement by permitting a voter

without acceptable ID to cast a provisional ballot if he

completed a declaration stating that he had a reasonable

impediment to acquiring acceptable photo ID (“the reasonable

impediment exception”). Id. at *13. Given this enactment, the

district court bifurcated trial of the case. Id. at *18.

Beginning in July 2015, the court conducted a trial on the

challenges to all of the provisions except the photo ID

requirement. Id. In January 2016, the court conducted a

separate trial on the photo ID requirement, as modified by the

reasonable impediment exception. Id.

21
 On April 25, 2016, the district court entered judgment

against the Plaintiffs on all of their claims as to all of the

challenged provisions. Id. at *171. The court found no

discriminatory results under § 2, no discriminatory intent under

§ 2 or the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, no undue burden

on the right to vote generally under the Fourteenth Amendment,

and no violation of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. See id. at

*133-34, *148, *164, *167. At the same time, acknowledging the

imminent June primary election, the court temporarily extended

the preliminary injunction of same-day registration and out-of-

precinct voting through that election. Id. at *167. The photo

ID requirement went into effect as scheduled for the first time

in the March 2016 primary election, and was again in effect

during the June primary election. Id. at *19, *171.

Plaintiffs timely noted this appeal. J.A. 24967, 24970,

24976, 24980. They also requested that we stay the district

court’s mandate and extend the preliminary injunction, which we

did pending our decision in this case. Order Extending the

Existing Stay, No. 16-1468 (Dkt. No. 122).

On appeal, Plaintiffs reiterate their attacks on the photo

ID requirement, the reduction in days of early voting, and the

elimination of same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting,

and preregistration, alleging discrimination against African

Americans and Hispanics. Because the record evidence is limited

22
regarding Hispanics, we confine our analysis to African

Americans. We hold that the challenged provisions of SL 2013-

381 were enacted with racially discriminatory intent in

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. We need not and do

not reach Plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

II.

A.

An appellate court can reverse a district court’s factual

findings only if clearly erroneous. United States v. U.S.

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). This standard applies to

the ultimate factual question of a legislature’s discriminatory

motivation. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287-88

(1982); Hunt v. Cromartie (Cromartie I), 526 U.S. 541, 549

(1999). Such a finding is clearly erroneous if review of the

entire record leaves the appellate court “with the definite and

firm conviction that the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s key findings are

mistaken.” Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234,

243 (2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

This is especially so when “the key evidence consisted primarily

of documents and expert testimony” and “[c]redibility

evaluations played a minor role.” Id.

23
 Moreover, if “the record permits only one resolution of the

factual issue” of discriminatory purpose, then an appellate

court need not remand the case to the district court. Pullman-

Standard, at 292; see Cromartie II, 532 U.S. at 257 (reversing,

without remanding, three-judge court’s factual finding that

racial intent predominated in creation of challenged

redistricting plan); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229

(1985) (affirming Court of Appeals’ reversal without remand

where district court’s finding of no discriminatory purpose was

clearly erroneous); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S.

526, 534, 542 (1979) (affirming Court of Appeals’ reversal of

finding of no intentional discrimination with remand only to

enter remedy order).

In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing

Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Supreme Court

addressed a claim that racially discriminatory intent motivated

a facially neutral governmental action. The Court recognized

that a facially neutral law, like the one at issue here, can be

motivated by invidious racial discrimination. Id. at 264-66.

If discriminatorily motivated, such laws are just as abhorrent,

and just as unconstitutional, as laws that expressly

discriminate on the basis of race. Id.; Washington v. Davis,

426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).

24
 When considering whether discriminatory intent motivates a

facially neutral law, a court must undertake a “sensitive

inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent

as may be available.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.

Challengers need not show that discriminatory purpose was the

“sole[]” or even a “primary” motive for the legislation, just

that it was “a motivating factor.” Id. at 265-66 (emphasis

added). Discriminatory purpose “may often be inferred from the

totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is

true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another.”

Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. But the ultimate question remains: did

the legislature enact a law “because of,” and not “in spite of,”

its discriminatory effect. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442

U.S. 256, 279 (1979).

In Arlington Heights, the Court set forth a nonexhaustive

list of factors to consider in making this sensitive inquiry.

These include: “[t]he historical background of the [challenged]

decision”; “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the

challenged decision”; “[d]epartures from normal procedural

sequence”; the legislative history of the decision; and of

course, the disproportionate “impact of the official action --

whether it bears more heavily on one race than another.”

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-67 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

25
 In instructing courts to consider the broader context

surrounding the passage of legislation, the Court has recognized

that “[o]utright admissions of impermissible racial motivation

are infrequent and plaintiffs often must rely upon other

evidence.” Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 553. In a vote denial case

such as the one here, where the plaintiffs allege that the

legislature imposed barriers to minority voting, this holistic

approach is particularly important, for “[d]iscrimination today

is more subtle than the visible methods used in 1965.” H.R.

Rep. No. 109-478, at 6 (2006), as reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N.

618, 620. Even “second-generation barriers” to voting, while

facially race neutral, may nonetheless be motivated by

impermissible racial discrimination. Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at

2635 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (cataloguing ways in which

facially neutral voting laws continued to discriminate against

minorities even after passage of Voting Rights Act).

“Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a

‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind enactment of the

law, the burden shifts to the law’s defenders to demonstrate

that the law would have been enacted without this factor.”

Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228. When determining if this burden has

been met, courts must be mindful that “racial discrimination is

not just another competing consideration.” Arlington Heights,

429 U.S. at 265-66. For this reason, the judicial deference

26
accorded to legislators when “balancing numerous competing

considerations” is “no longer justified.” Id. Instead, courts

must scrutinize the legislature’s actual non-racial motivations

to determine whether they alone can justify the legislature’s

choices. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,

458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (describing “inquiry into the actual

purposes underlying a statutory scheme” that classified based on

gender (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If

a court finds that a statute is unconstitutional, it can enjoin

the law. See, e.g., Hunter, 471 U.S. at 231; Anderson v.

Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 404 (1964).

B.

In the context of a § 2 discriminatory intent analysis, one

of the critical background facts of which a court must take

notice is whether voting is racially polarized. Indeed, to

prevail in a case alleging discriminatory dilution of minority

voting strength under § 2, a plaintiff must prove this fact as a

threshold showing. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51, 56, 62. Racial

polarization “refers to the situation where different races

. . . vote in blocs for different candidates.” Id. at 62. This

legal concept “incorporates neither causation nor intent”

regarding voter preferences, for “[i]t is the difference between

the choices made by blacks and whites -- not the reasons for

27
that difference -- that results” in the opportunity for

discriminatory laws to have their intended political effect.

Id. at 62-63.

While the Supreme Court has expressed hope that “racially

polarized voting is waning,” it has at the same time recognized

that “racial discrimination and racially polarized voting are

not ancient history.” Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25

(2009). In fact, recent scholarship suggests that, in the years

following President Obama’s election in 2008, areas of the

country formerly subject to § 5 preclearance have seen an

increase in racially polarized voting. See Stephen

Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional

Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential

Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of Section 5 of

the Voting Rights Act, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 205, 206 (2013).

Further, “[t]his gap is not the result of mere partisanship, for

even when controlling for partisan identification, race is a

statistically significant predictor of vote choice, especially

in the covered jurisdictions.” Id.

Racially polarized voting is not, in and of itself,

evidence of racial discrimination. But it does provide an

incentive for intentional discrimination in the regulation of

elections. In reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act in 2006,

Congress recognized that “[t]he potential for discrimination in

28
environments characterized by racially polarized voting is

great.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 35. This discrimination can

take many forms. One common way it has surfaced is in

challenges centered on vote dilution, where “manipulation of

district lines can dilute the voting strength of politically

cohesive minority group members.” De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1007

(emphasis added); see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146,

153-54 (1993). It is the political cohesiveness of the minority

groups that provides the political payoff for legislators who

seek to dilute or limit the minority vote.

The Supreme Court squarely confronted this connection in

LULAC. There, the record evidence revealed racially polarized

voting, such that 92% of Latinos voted against an incumbent of a

particular party, whereas 88% of non-Latinos voted for him. 548

U.S. at 427. The Court explained how this racial polarization

provided the impetus for the discriminatory vote dilution

legislation at issue in that case: “In old District 23 the

increase in Latino voter registration and overall population,

the concomitant rise in Latino voting power in each successive

election, the near-victory of the Latino candidate of choice in

2002, and the resulting threat to the” incumbent representative

motivated the controlling party to dilute the minority vote.

Id. at 428 (citation omitted). Although the Court grounded its

holding on the § 2 results test, which does not require proof of

29
intentional discrimination, the Court noted that the challenged

legislation bore “the mark of intentional discrimination.” Id.

at 440.

The LULAC Court addressed a claim of vote dilution, but its

recognition that racially polarized voting may motivate

politicians to entrench themselves through discriminatory

election laws applies with equal force in the vote denial

context. Indeed, it applies perhaps even more powerfully in

cases like that at hand, where the State has restricted access

to the franchise. This is so because, unlike in redistricting,

where states may consider race and partisanship to a certain

extent, see, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995),

legislatures cannot restrict voting access on the basis of race.

(Nor, we note, can legislatures restrict access to the franchise

based on the desire to benefit a certain political party. See

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792-93 (1983).)

Using race as a proxy for party may be an effective way to

win an election. But intentionally targeting a particular

race’s access to the franchise because its members vote for a

particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes

discriminatory purpose. This is so even absent any evidence of

race-based hatred and despite the obvious political dynamics. A

state legislature acting on such a motivation engages in

30
intentional racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.

III.

With these principles in mind, we turn to their application

in the case at hand.

A.

Arlington Heights directs us to consider “[t]he historical

background of the decision” challenged as racially

discriminatory. 429 U.S. at 267. Examination of North

Carolina’s history of race discrimination and recent patterns of

official discrimination, combined with the racial polarization

of politics in the state, seems particularly relevant in this

inquiry. The district court erred in ignoring or minimizing

these facts.

Unquestionably, North Carolina has a long history of race

discrimination generally and race-based vote suppression in

particular. Although we recognize its limited weight, see

Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628-29, North Carolina’s pre-1965

history of pernicious discrimination informs our inquiry. For

“[i]t was in the South that slavery was upheld by law until

uprooted by the Civil War, that the reign of Jim Crow denied

African–Americans the most basic freedoms, and that state and

31
local governments worked tirelessly to disenfranchise citizens

on the basis of race.” Id. at 2628.

While it is of course true that “history did not end in

1965,” id., it is equally true that SL 2013-381 imposes the

first meaningful restrictions on voting access since that date

-- and a comprehensive set of restrictions at that. Due to this

fact, and because the legislation came into being literally

within days of North Carolina’s release from the preclearance

requirements of the Voting Rights Act, that long-ago history

bears more heavily here than it might otherwise. Failure to so

recognize would risk allowing that troubled history to “pick[]

up where it left off in 1965” to the detriment of African

American voters in North Carolina. LWV, 769 F.3d at 242.

In considering Plaintiffs’ discriminatory results claim

under § 2, the district court expressly and properly recognized

the State’s “shameful” history of “past discrimination.” N.C.

State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *83-86. But the court

inexplicably failed to grapple with that history in its analysis

of Plaintiffs’ discriminatory intent claim. Rather, when

assessing the intent claim, the court’s analysis on the point

consisted solely of the finding that “there is little evidence

of official discrimination since the 1980s,” accompanied by a

footnote dismissing examples of more recent official

discrimination. See id. at *143.

32
 That finding is clearly erroneous. The record is replete

with evidence of instances since the 1980s in which the North

Carolina legislature has attempted to suppress and dilute the

voting rights of African Americans. In some of these instances,

the Department of Justice or federal courts have determined that

the North Carolina General Assembly acted with discriminatory

intent, “reveal[ing] a series of official actions taken for

invidious purposes.” Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. In

others, the Department of Justice or courts have found that the

General Assembly’s action produced discriminatory results. The

latter evidence, of course, proves less about discriminatory

intent than the former, but it is informative. A historical

pattern of laws producing discriminatory results provides

important context for determining whether the same

decisionmaking body has also enacted a law with discriminatory

purpose. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, No. 14-41127, 2016 WL

3923868 (5th Cir. July 20, 2016) (en banc) (considering as

relevant, in intentional discrimination analysis of voter ID

law, DOJ letters and previous court cases about results and

intent).

The record reveals that, within the time period that the

district court found free of “official discrimination” (1980 to

2013), the Department of Justice issued over fifty objection

letters to proposed election law changes in North Carolina --

33
including several since 2000 -- because the State had failed to

prove the proposed changes would have no discriminatory purpose

or effect. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Voting

Determination Letters for North Carolina (DOJ Letters) (Aug. 7,

2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-determination-letters-

north-carolina; see also Regents of the Univ. of California v.

Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978) (referring to objections of the

Department of Justice under § 5 as “administrative finding[s] of

discrimination”). 5 Twenty-seven of those letters objected to

laws that either originated in the General Assembly or

originated with local officials and were approved by the General

Assembly. See DOJ Letters.

5
Most recently, the Department of Justice objected to a law
the General Assembly enacted in 2011, Session Law (“SL”) 2011-
174. That statute changed the method of election for the school
board in Pitt County, North Carolina by reducing the number of
members and adding an at-large seat. See Letter from Thomas E.
Perez, Assistant Att’y General, Dept. of Just., to Robert T.
Sonnenberg, In-house Counsel, Pitt Cty. Sch. (Apr. 30, 2012), at
1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/05/3
0/l_120430.pdf. The Department of Justice conducted an
Arlington Heights analysis and declined to preclear the
retrogressive law. Id. at 1-4. Key facts in the discriminatory
intent analysis included: that “[t]he county’s elections are
generally racially polarized,” that “African Americans have
never elected a candidate of choice to a county-wide office,”
that “Pitt County has a history of challenges to at-large
positions under the Voting Rights Act,” that the process for
enacting the law represented “a complete departure from the
normal procedures,” and that the “discriminatory effect was not
necessary to achieve the stated goal” of the law. Id. at 2-4.

34
 During the same period, private plaintiffs brought fifty-

five successful cases under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. J.A.

1260; Anita S. Earls et al., Voting Rights in North Carolina:

1982-2006, 17 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 577 (2008). Ten

cases ended in judicial decisions finding that electoral schemes

in counties and municipalities across the state had the effect

of discriminating against minority voters. See, e.g., Ward v.

Columbus Cty., 782 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D.N.C. 1991); Johnson v.

Halifax Cty., 594 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (granting

preliminary injunction). Forty-five cases were settled

favorably for plaintiffs out of court or through consent degrees

that altered the challenged voting laws. See, e.g., Daniels v.

Martin Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs., No. 4:89-cv-00137 (E.D.N.C. 1992);

Hall v. Kennedy, No. 3:88-cv-00117 (E.D.N.C. 1989); Montgomery

Cty. Branch of the NAACP v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections,

No. 3:90-cv-00027 (M.D.N.C. 1990). On several occasions, the

United States intervened in cases or filed suit independently.

See, e.g., United States v. Anson Bd. of Educ., No. 3:93-cv-

00210 (W.D.N.C. 1994); United States v. Granville Cty. Bd. of

Educ., No. 5:87-cv-00353 (E.D.N.C. 1989); United States v.

Lenoir Cty., No. 87-105-cv-84 (E.D.N.C. 1987).

And, of course, the case in which the Supreme Court

announced the standard governing § 2 results claims -- Thornburg

v. Gingles -- was brought by a class of African American

35
citizens in North Carolina challenging a statewide redistricting

plan. 478 U.S. at 35. There the Supreme Court affirmed

findings by the district court that each challenged district

exhibited “racially polarized voting,” and held that “the legacy

of official discrimination in voting matters, education,

housing, employment, and health services . . . acted in concert

with the multimember districting scheme to impair the ability”

of African American voters to “participate equally in the

political process.” Id. at 80.

And only a few months ago (just weeks before the district

court issued its opinion in the case at hand), a three-judge

court addressed a redistricting plan adopted by the same General

Assembly that enacted SL 2013-381. Harris v. McCrory, No. 1:13-

CV-949, 2016 WL 482052, at *1-2 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 5, 2016), prob.

juris. noted, __ S. Ct. __, No. 15-1262, 2016 WL 1435913 (June

27, 2016). The court held that race was the predominant motive

in drawing two congressional districts, in violation of the

Equal Protection Clause. Id. at *1-2, *17 & n.9. Contrary to

the district court’s suggestion, see N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL

1650774, at *143 n.223, a holding that a legislature

impermissibly relied on race certainly provides relevant

evidence as to whether race motivated other election legislation

passed by the same legislature.

36
 The district court failed to take into account these cases

and their important takeaway: that state officials continued in

their efforts to restrict or dilute African American voting

strength well after 1980 and up to the present day. Only the

robust protections of § 5 and suits by private plaintiffs under

§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act prevented those efforts from

succeeding. These cases also highlight the manner in which race

and party are inexorably linked in North Carolina. This fact

constitutes a critical -- perhaps the most critical -- piece of

historical evidence here. The district court failed to

recognize this linkage, leading it to accept “politics as usual”

as a justification for many of the changes in SL 2013-381. But

that cannot be accepted where politics as usual translates into

race-based discrimination.

As it did with the history of racial discrimination, the

district court again recognized this reality when analyzing

whether SL 2013-381 had a discriminatory result, but not when

analyzing whether it was motivated by discriminatory intent. In

its results analysis, the court noted that racially polarized

voting between African Americans and whites remains prevalent in

North Carolina. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *86-87.

Indeed, at trial the State admitted as much. Id. at *86. As

one of the State’s experts conceded, “in North Carolina,

African-American race is a better predictor for voting

37
Democratic than party registration.” J.A. 21400. For example,

in North Carolina, 85% of African American voters voted for John

Kerry in 2004, and 95% voted for President Obama in 2008. N.C.

State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *86. In comparison, in those

elections, only 27% of white North Carolinians voted for John

Kerry, and only 35% for President Obama. Id.

Thus, whether the General Assembly knew the exact numbers,

it certainly knew that African American voters were highly

likely, and that white voters were unlikely, to vote for

Democrats. And it knew that, in recent years, African Americans

had begun registering and voting in unprecedented numbers.

Indeed, much of the recent success of Democratic candidates in

North Carolina resulted from African American voters overcoming

historical barriers and making their voices heard to a degree

unmatched in modern history.

Despite this, the district court took no issue with one of

the legislature’s stated purposes in enacting SL 2013-381 -- to

“mov[e] the law back to the way it was.” N.C. State Conf., 2016

WL 1650774, at *111. Rather, the court apparently regarded this

as entirely appropriate. The court noted repeatedly that the

voting mechanisms that SL 2013-381 restricts or eliminates were

ratified “relatively recently,” “almost entirely along party

lines,” when “Democrats controlled” the legislature; and that

SL 2013-381 was similarly ratified “along party lines” after

38
“Republicans gained . . . control of both houses.” Id. at *2-7,

*12.

Thus, the district court apparently considered SL 2013-381

simply an appropriate means for one party to counter recent

success by another party. We recognize that elections have

consequences, but winning an election does not empower anyone in

any party to engage in purposeful racial discrimination. When a

legislature dominated by one party has dismantled barriers to

African American access to the franchise, even if done to gain

votes, “politics as usual” does not allow a legislature

dominated by the other party to re-erect those barriers.

The record evidence is clear that this is exactly what was

done here. For example, the State argued before the district

court that the General Assembly enacted changes to early voting

laws to avoid “political gamesmanship” with respect to the hours

and locations of early voting centers. J.A. 22348. As

“evidence of justifications” for the changes to early voting,

the State offered purported inconsistencies in voting hours

across counties, including the fact that only some counties had

decided to offer Sunday voting. Id. The State then elaborated

on its justification, explaining that “[c]ounties with Sunday

voting in 2014 were disproportionately black” and

“disproportionately Democratic.” J.A. 22348-49. In response,

SL 2013-381 did away with one of the two days of Sunday voting.

39
See N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *15. Thus, in what

comes as close to a smoking gun as we are likely to see in

modern times, the State’s very justification for a challenged

statute hinges explicitly on race -- specifically its concern

that African Americans, who had overwhelmingly voted for

Democrats, had too much access to the franchise. 6

These contextual facts, which reveal the powerful

undercurrents influencing North Carolina politics, must be

considered in determining why the General Assembly enacted SL

2013-381. Indeed, the law’s purpose cannot be properly

understood without these considerations. The record makes clear

that the historical origin of the challenged provisions in this

statute is not the innocuous back-and-forth of routine partisan

struggle that the State suggests and that the district court

accepted. Rather, the General Assembly enacted them in the

immediate aftermath of unprecedented African American voter

participation in a state with a troubled racial history and

racially polarized voting. The district court clearly erred in

ignoring or dismissing this historical background evidence, all

of which supports a finding of discriminatory intent.

6
Of course, state legislators also cannot impermissibly
dilute or deny the votes of opponent political parties, see
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793 -- as this same General Assembly was
found to have done earlier this year. See Raleigh Wake Citizens
Ass’n v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 16-1270, 2016 WL
3568147 (4th Cir. July 1, 2016).

40
 B.

Arlington Heights also instructs us to consider the

“specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged

decision.” 429 U.S. at 267. In doing so, a court must consider

“[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence,” which may

demonstrate “that improper purposes are playing a role.” Id.

The sequential facts found by the district court are undeniably

accurate. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *8-13. Indeed,

they are undisputed. Id. And they are devastating. The record

shows that, immediately after Shelby County, the General

Assembly vastly expanded an earlier photo ID bill and rushed

through the legislative process the most restrictive voting

legislation seen in North Carolina since enactment of the Voting

Rights Act of 1965. Id. The district court erred in refusing

to draw the obvious inference that this sequence of events

signals discriminatory intent.

The district court found that prior to Shelby County,

SL 2013-381 numbered only sixteen pages and contained none of

the challenged provisions, with the exception of a much less

restrictive photo ID requirement. Id. at *8, *143-44. As the

court further found, this pre-Shelby County bill was afforded

more than three weeks of debate in public hearings and almost

three more weeks of debate in the House. Id. at *8. For this

version of the bill, there was some bipartisan support: “[f]ive

41
House Democrats joined all present Republicans in voting for the

voter-ID bill.” Id.

The district court found that SL 2013-381 passed its first

read in the Senate on April 25, 2013, where it remained in the

Senate Rules Committee. Id. At that time, the Supreme Court

had heard argument in Shelby County, but had issued no opinion.

Id. “So,” as the district court found, “the bill sat.” Id.

For the next two months, no public debates were had, no public

amendments made, and no action taken on the bill.

Then, on June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its

opinion in Shelby County. Id. at *9. The very next day, the

Chairman of the Senate Rules Committee proclaimed that the

legislature “would now move ahead with the full bill,” which he

recognized would be “omnibus” legislation. Id. at *9. After

that announcement, no further public debate or action occurred

for almost a month. Id. As the district court explained, “[i]t

was not until July 23 . . . that an expanded bill, including the

election changes challenged in this case, was released.” Id. at

*144.

The new bill -- now fifty-seven pages in length -- targeted

four voting and registration mechanisms, which had previously

expanded access to the franchise, and provided a much more

stringent photo ID provision. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381.

Post-Shelby County, the change in accepted photo IDs is of

42
particular note: the new ID provision retained only those types

of photo ID disproportionately held by whites and excluded those

disproportionately held by African Americans. N.C. State Conf.,

2016 WL 1650774, at *37, *142. The district court specifically

found that “the removal of public assistance IDs” in particular

was “suspect,” because “a reasonable legislator [would be] aware

of the socioeconomic disparities endured by African Americans

[and] could have surmised that African Americans would be more

likely to possess this form of ID.” Id. at *142.

Moreover, after the General Assembly finally revealed the

expanded SL 2013-381 to the public, the legislature rushed it

through the legislative process. The new SL 2013-381 moved

through the General Assembly in three days: one day for a

public hearing, two days in the Senate, and two hours in the

House. Id. at *9-12. The House Democrats who supported the

pre-Shelby County bill now opposed it. Id. at *12. The House

voted on concurrence in the Senate’s version, rather than

sending the bill to a committee. Id. at *12. This meant that

the House had no opportunity to offer its own amendments before

the up-or-down vote on the legislation; that vote proceeded on

strict party lines. Id.; see J.A. 1299; N.C. H.R. Rules 43.2,

43.3, 44. The Governor, of the same party as the proponents of

the bill, then signed the bill into law. N.C. State Conf., 2016

WL 1650774, at *13. This hurried pace, of course, strongly

43
suggests an attempt to avoid in-depth scrutiny. See, e.g.,

Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *12 (noting as suspicious voter ID

law’s “three-day passage through the Senate”). Indeed, neither

this legislature -- nor, as far as we can tell, any other

legislature in the Country -- has ever done so much, so fast, to

restrict access to the franchise.

The district court erred in accepting the State’s efforts

to cast this suspicious narrative in an innocuous light. To do

so, the court focused on certain minor facts instead of

acknowledging the whole picture. For example, although the

court specifically found the above facts, it dismissed

Plaintiffs’ argument that this sequence of events demonstrated

unusual legislative speed because the legislature “acted within

all [of its] procedural rules.” N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL

1650774, at *145. But, of course, a legislature need not break

its own rules to engage in unusual procedures. Even just

compared to the process afforded the pre-Shelby County bill, the

process for the “full bill” was, to say the very least, abrupt.

Similarly, the district court accused Plaintiffs of

“ignor[ing] the extensive debate and consideration the initial

voter-ID bill received in the spring.” Id. at *146. But

because the pre-Shelby County bill did not contain any of the

provisions challenged here, that debate hardly seems probative.

The district court also quoted one senator who opposed the new

44
“full bill” as saying that the legislators had “a good and

thorough debate.” Id. at *12, *145. We note, however, that

many more legislators expressed dismay at the rushed process.

Id. at *145. Indeed, as the court itself noted, “[s]everal

Democratic senators characterized the bill as voter suppression

of minorities. Others characterized the bill as partisan.” Id.

at *12 (citations omitted). Republican senators “strongly

denied such claims,” while at the same time linking the bill to

partisan goals: that “the bill reversed past practices that

Democrats passed to favor themselves.” Id.

Finally, the district court dismissed the expanded law’s

proximity to the Shelby County decision as above suspicion. The

Court found that the General Assembly “would not have been

unreasonable” to wait until after Shelby County to consider the

“full bill” because it could have concluded that the provisions

of the “full bill” were “simply not worth the administrative and

financial cost” of preclearance. Id. at *144. Although desire

to avoid the hassle of the preclearance process could, in

another case, justify a decision to await the outcome in Shelby

County, that inference is not persuasive in this case. For

here, the General Assembly did not simply wait to enact changes

to its election laws that might require the administrative

hassle of, but likely would pass, preclearance. Rather, after

Shelby County it moved forward with what it acknowledged was an

45
omnibus bill that restricted voting mechanisms it knew were used

disproportionately by African Americans, id. at *148, and so

likely would not have passed preclearance. And, after Shelby

County, the legislature substantially changed the one provision

that it had fully debated before. As noted above, the General

Assembly completely revised the list of acceptable photo IDs,

removing from the list the IDs held disproportionately by

African Americans, but retaining those disproportionately held

by whites. Id. at *37, *142. This fact alone undermines the

possibility that the post-Shelby County timing was merely to

avoid the administrative costs.

Instead, this sequence of events -- the General Assembly’s

eagerness to, at the historic moment of Shelby County’s

issuance, rush through the legislative process the most

restrictive voting law North Carolina has seen since the era of

Jim Crow -- bespeaks a certain purpose. Although this factor,

as with the other Arlington Heights factors, is not dispositive

on its own, it provides another compelling piece of the puzzle

of the General Assembly’s motivation.

C.

Arlington Heights also recognizes that the legislative

history leading to a challenged provision “may be highly

relevant, especially where there are contemporaneous statements

by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings,

46
or reports.” 429 U.S. at 268. Above, we have discussed much of

what can be gleaned from the legislative history of SL 2013-381

in the sequence of events leading up to its enactment.

No minutes of meetings about SL 2013-381 exist. And, as

the Supreme Court has recognized, testimony as to the purpose of

challenged legislation “frequently will be barred by

[legislative] privilege.” Id. That is the case here. See N.C.

State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *71 n.124. The district court

was correct to note that statements from only a few legislators,

or those made by legislators after the fact, are of limited

value. See id. at 146; Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 485-86

(2010); Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228. 7

7 Some of the statements by those supporting the legislation
included a Republican precinct chairman who testified before the
House Rules Committee that the photo ID requirement would
“disenfranchise some of [Democrats’] special voting blocks
[sic],” and that “that within itself is the reason for the photo
voter ID, period, end of discussion.” See J.A. 1313-14; Yelton
testimony, Transcript of Public Hearing of the North Carolina
General Assembly, House Elections Committee (Apr. 10, 2013) at
51. Responding to the outcry over the law after its enactment,
the same witness later said publicly: “If [SL 2013-381] hurts
the whites so be it. If it hurts a bunch of lazy blacks that
want the government to give them everything, so be it.” See
J.A. 1313-14; Joe Coscarelli, Don Yelton, GOP Precinct Chair,
Delivers Most Baldly Racist Daily Show Interview of All Time,
New York Magazine, Oct. 24, 2013. These statements do not prove
that any member of the General Assembly necessarily acted with
discriminatory intent. But the sheer outrageousness of these
public statements by a party leader does provide some evidence
of the racial and partisan political environment in which the
General Assembly enacted the law.

47
 We do find worthy of discussion, however, the General

Assembly’s requests for and use of race data in connection with

SL 2013-381. As explained in detail above, prior to and during

the limited debate on the expanded omnibus bill, members of the

General Assembly requested and received a breakdown by race of

DMV-issued ID ownership, absentee voting, early voting, same-day

registration, and provisional voting (which includes out-of-

precinct voting). N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *136-

38, *148; J.A. 1628-29, 1637, 1640-41, 1782-97, 3084-3119.

This data revealed that African Americans

disproportionately used early voting, same-day registration, and

out-of-precinct voting, and disproportionately lacked DMV-issued

ID. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *148; J.A. 1782-97,

3084-3119. Not only that, it also revealed that African

Americans did not disproportionately use absentee voting; whites

did. J.A. 1796-97, 3744-47. SL 2013-381 drastically restricted

all of these other forms of access to the franchise, but

exempted absentee voting from the photo ID requirement. In sum,

relying on this racial data, the General Assembly enacted

legislation restricting all -- and only -- practices

disproportionately used by African Americans. When juxtaposed

against the unpersuasive non-racial explanations the State

proffered for the specific choices it made, discussed in more

48
detail below, we cannot ignore the choices the General Assembly

made with this data in hand.

D.

Finally, Arlington Heights instructs that courts also

consider the “impact of the official action” -- that is, whether

“it bears more heavily on one race than another.” 429 U.S. at

266 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court

expressly found that “African Americans disproportionately used”

the removed voting mechanisms and disproportionately lacked DMV-

issued photo ID. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *37,

*136. Nevertheless, the court concluded that this

“disproportionate[] use[]” did not “significantly favor a

finding of discriminatory purpose.” Id. at *143. In doing so,

the court clearly erred. Apparently, the district court

believed that the disproportionate impact of the new legislation

“depends on the options remaining” after enactment of the

legislation. Id. at *136. Arlington Heights requires nothing

of the kind.

The Arlington Heights Court recognized that “[t]he impact

of [a governmental] decision” not to rezone for low-income

housing “bear[s] more heavily on racial minorities.” 429 U.S.

at 269. In concluding that the zoning decision had a

disproportionate impact, the Court explained that “[m]inorities

constitute[d] 18% of the Chicago area population, and 40% of the

49
income groups said to be eligible for” the low-income housing.

Id. The Court did not require those minority plaintiffs to show

that the Chicago area as a whole lacked low-income housing or

that the plaintiffs had no other housing options. Instead, it

was sufficient that the zoning decision excluded them from a

particular area. Id. at 260, 265-66, 269; see also City of

Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 110, 126 (1981) (indicating

that closing a street used primarily by African Americans had a

disproportionate impact, even though “the extent of the

inconvenience [was] not great”).

Thus, the standard the district court used to measure

impact required too much in the context of an intentional

discrimination claim. When plaintiffs contend that a law was

motivated by discriminatory intent, proof of disproportionate

impact is not “the sole touchstone” of the claim. Davis, 426

U.S. at 242. Rather, plaintiffs asserting such claims must

offer other evidence that establishes discriminatory intent in

the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 239-42. Showing

disproportionate impact, even if not overwhelming impact,

suffices to establish one of the circumstances evidencing

discriminatory intent. 8

8Interpreting Arlington Heights to require a more onerous
impact showing would eliminate the distinction between
discriminatory results claims under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act
(Continued)
50
 Accordingly, the district court’s findings that African

Americans disproportionately used each of the removed

mechanisms, as well as disproportionately lacked the photo ID

required by SL 2013-381, if supported by the evidence,

establishes sufficient disproportionate impact for an Arlington

Heights analysis. As outlined above, the record evidence

provides abundant support for that holding.

Moreover, the district court also clearly erred in finding

that the cumulative impact of the challenged provisions of SL

2013-381 does not bear more heavily on African Americans. See

Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 607-08 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring) (“A panoply of regulations, each apparently

defensible when considered alone, may nevertheless have the

combined effect of severely restricting participation and

competition.”). For example, the photo ID requirement

inevitably increases the steps required to vote, and so slows

the process. The early voting provision reduced the number of

days in which citizens can vote, resulting in more voters voting

and discriminatory intent claims under § 2 and the Constitution.
When plaintiffs contend that a law has a discriminatory result
under § 2, they need prove only impact. In that context, of
course plaintiffs must make a greater showing of
disproportionate impact. Otherwise, plaintiffs could prevail in
any and every case in which they proved any impact.

51
on Election Day. 9 Together, these produce longer lines at the

polls on Election Day, and absent out-of-precinct voting,

prospective Election Day voters may wait in these longer lines

only to discover that they have gone to the wrong precinct and

are unable to travel to their correct precincts. Thus,

cumulatively, the panoply of restrictions results in greater

disenfranchisement than any of the law’s provisions

individually.

The district court discounted the claim that these

provisions burden African Americans, citing the fact that

similar election laws exist or have survived challenges in other

states. See, e.g., N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *45,

*139 (photo ID), *46 (early voting), *57 (same-day

registration), *66 (out-of-precinct voting), *69

(preregistration). But the sheer number of restrictive

9
The State unpersuasively contends that SL 2013-381’s “same
hours” provision leaves the opportunity to vote early
“materially the same as the early voting opportunities before
the bill was enacted,” despite the reduction in early voting
days. State Br. 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
same hours provision requires counties to offer the same number
of aggregate hours of early voting in midterm and presidential
elections as they did in the comparable 2010 midterm or 2012
presidential elections. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at
*11. A critical problem with the State’s argument is that the
law provided that any county could waive out of this
requirement, and, in 2014, about 30% of the counties did waive
out of the requirement. See J.A. 9541-44. Moreover, longer
lines during the reduced number of days in which citizens can
vote would necessitate opening new polling sites and placing
them in high-demand locations; the law does not require either.

52
provisions in SL 2013-381 distinguishes this case from others.

See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,

185 (2008) (challenging only a photo ID requirement); Hunter,

471 U.S. at 223 (challenging only a felon and misdemeanant

disenfranchisement law); Veasey, 2016 WL 3923868, at *1

(challenging only a photo ID requirement). Moreover, removing

voting tools that have been disproportionately used by African

Americans meaningfully differs from not initially implementing

such tools. Cf. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,

665 (1966) (“[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate,

lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

The district court also erred in suggesting that Plaintiffs

had to prove that the challenged provisions prevented African

Americans from voting at the same levels they had in the past.

No law implicated here -- neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor

§ 2 -- requires such an onerous showing. Emblematic of this

error is the almost dispositive weight the court gave to the

fact that African American aggregate turnout increased by 1.8%

in the 2014 midterm election as compared to the 2010 midterm

election. See N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *18, *122,

*132. In addition to being beyond the scope of disproportionate

impact analysis under Arlington Heights, several factors counsel

against such an inference.

53
 First, as the Supreme Court has explained, courts should

not place much evidentiary weight on any one election. See

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 74-77 (noting that the results of multiple

elections are more probative than the result of a single

election, particularly one held during pending litigation).

This is especially true for midterm elections. As the State’s

own expert testified, fewer citizens vote in midterm elections,

and those that do are more likely to be better educated, repeat

voters with greater economic resources. J.A. 23801-02; cf.

League of Women Voters of North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. at 6-7

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that midterm primary

elections are “highly sensitive to factors likely to vary from

election to election,” more so than presidential elections).

Moreover, although aggregate African American turnout

increased by 1.8% in 2014, many African American votes went

uncounted. As the district court found, African Americans

disproportionately cast provisional out-of-precinct ballots,

which would have been counted absent SL 2013-381. See N.C.

State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *63. And thousands of African

Americans were disenfranchised because they registered during

what would have been the same-day registration period but

because of SL 2013-381 could not then vote. See id. at *67.

Furthermore, the district court failed to acknowledge that a

1.8% increase in voting actually represents a significant

54
decrease in the rate of change. For example, in the prior four-

year period, African American midterm voting had increased by

12.2%. J.A. 1197.

In sum, while the district court recognized the undisputed

facts as to the impact of the challenged provisions of SL 2013-

381, it simply refused to acknowledge their import. The court

concluded its analysis by remarking that these provisions simply

eliminated a system “preferred” by African Americans as “more

convenient.” N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *170. But

as the court itself found elsewhere in its opinion, “African

Americans . . . in North Carolina are disproportionately likely

to move, be poor, less educated, have less access to

transportation, and experience poor health.” Id. at *89.

These socioeconomic disparities establish that no mere

“preference” led African Americans to disproportionately use

early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting, and

preregistration. Nor does preference lead African Americans to

disproportionately lack acceptable photo ID. Yet the district

court refused to make the inference that undeniably flows from

the disparities it found many African Americans in North

Carolina experienced. Registration and voting tools may be a

simple “preference” for many white North Carolinians, but for

many African Americans, they are a necessity.

55
 E.

In sum, assessment of the Arlington Heights factors

requires the conclusion that, at least in part, discriminatory

racial intent motivated the enactment of the challenged

provisions in SL 2013-381. The district court clearly erred in

holding otherwise. In large part, this error resulted from the

court’s consideration of each piece of evidence in a vacuum,

rather than engaging in the totality of the circumstances

analysis required by Arlington Heights. Any individual piece of

evidence can seem innocuous when viewed alone, but gains an

entirely different meaning when considered in context.

Our conclusion does not mean, and we do not suggest, that

any member of the General Assembly harbored racial hatred or

animosity toward any minority group. But the totality of the

circumstances -- North Carolina’s history of voting

discrimination; the surge in African American voting; the

legislature’s knowledge that African Americans voting translated

into support for one party; and the swift elimination of the

tools African Americans had used to vote and imposition of a new

barrier at the first opportunity to do so -- cumulatively and

unmistakably reveal that the General Assembly used SL 2013-381

to entrench itself. It did so by targeting voters who, based on

race, were unlikely to vote for the majority party. Even if

done for partisan ends, that constituted racial discrimination.

56
 IV.

Because Plaintiffs have established race as a factor that

motivated enactment of the challenged provisions of SL 2013-381,

the burden now “shifts to the law’s defenders to demonstrate

that the law would have been enacted without this factor.”

Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 271

n.21. 10 Once the burden shifts, a court must carefully

scrutinize a state’s non-racial motivations to determine whether

they alone can explain enactment of the challenged law.

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. “[J]udicial deference”

to the legislature’s stated justifications “is no longer

justified.” Id.

A court assesses whether a law would have been enacted

without a racially discriminatory motive by considering the

substantiality of the state’s proffered non-racial interest and

how well the law furthers that interest. See Hunter, 471 U.S.

at 228-33; see also Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819

F.3d 581, 614 (2d Cir. 2016) (considering “whether [non-racial]

concerns were sufficiently strong to cancel out any

10
We note that at least one of our sister circuits has
rejected the second step of this inquiry as inappropriate for
intent claims under § 2. See Askew v. City of Rome, 127 F.3d
1355, 1373 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is not a defense under the
Voting Rights Act that the same action would have been taken
regardless of the racial motive.”).

57
discriminatory animus” after shifting the burden under Arlington

Heights in a Fair Housing Act claim).

Given a state’s interest in the fair administration of its

elections, a rational justification can be imagined for many

election laws, including some of the challenged provisions here.

But a court must be mindful of the number, character, and scope

of the modifications enacted together in a single challenged law

like SL 2013-381. Only then can a court determine whether a

legislature would have enacted that law regardless of its impact

on African American voters.

In this case, despite finding that race was not a

motivating factor for enactment of the challenged provisions of

SL 2013-381, the district court addressed the State’s

justifications for each provision at length. N.C. State Conf.,

2016 WL 1650774, at *96-116, *147. The court did so, however,

through a rational-basis-like lens. For example, the court

found the General Assembly’s decision to eliminate same-day

registration “not unreasonable,” and found “at least plausible”

the reasons offered for excluding student IDs from the list of

qualifying IDs. Id. at *108, *142. But, of course, a finding

that legislative justifications are “plausible” and “not

unreasonable” is a far cry from a finding that a particular law

would have been enacted without considerations of race. As the

Supreme Court has made clear, such deference in that inquiry is

58
wholly inappropriate. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66

(explaining that because “racial discrimination is not just

another competing consideration,” a court must do much more than

review for “arbitrariness or irrationality”).

Accordingly, the ultimate findings of the district court

regarding the compelling nature of the State’s interests are

clearly erroneous. Typically, that fact would recommend remand.

But we need not remand where the record provides “a complete

understanding” of the merits, Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551,

1555 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted), and

“permits only one resolution of the factual issue,” Pullman-

Standard, 456 U.S. at 292. See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.

35, 45 (1975) (declining to remand where Court “doubt[ed] that

such action . . . would add anything essential to the

determination of the merits”). After a total of four weeks of

trial, the district court entered a 479-page order based on more

than 25,000 pages of evidence. N.C. State Conf., 2016

WL 1650774, at *2. Although the court erred with respect to the

appropriate degree of deference due to the State’s proffered

justifications, that error affected only its ultimate finding

regarding their persuasive weight; it did not affect the court’s

extensive foundational findings regarding those justifications.

These foundational findings as to justifications for SL

2013-381 provide a more than sufficient basis for our review of

59
that law. For we are satisfied that this record is “complete,”

indeed as “complete” as could ever reasonably be expected, and

that remand would accomplish little. Tejada, 941 F.2d at 1555;

see Withrow, 421 U.S. at 45. And, after painstaking review of

the record, we must also conclude that it “permits only one

resolution of the factual issue.” Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at

292. The record evidence plainly establishes race as a “but-

for” cause of SL 2013-381. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232.

In enacting the photo ID requirement, the General Assembly

stated that it sought to combat voter fraud and promote public

confidence in the electoral system. See 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws

381. These interests echo those the Crawford Court held

justified a photo ID requirement in Indiana. 553 U.S. at 194-

97. The State relies heavily on that holding. But that

reliance is misplaced because of the fundamental differences

between Crawford and this case.

The challengers in Crawford did not even allege intentional

race discrimination. Rather, they mounted a facial attack on a

photo ID requirement as unduly burdensome on the right to vote

generally. The Crawford Court conducted an “Anderson-Burdick”

analysis, balancing the burden of a law on voters against the

state’s interests, and concluded that the photo ID requirement

“impose[d] only a limited burden on voters’ rights.” Crawford,

553 U.S. at 202-03 (internal quotation marks omitted). Given

60
that limited burden, the Court deferred to the Indiana

legislature’s choice of how to best serve its legitimate

interests. See id. at 194-97, 203.

That deference does not apply here because the evidence in

this case establishes that, at least in part, race motivated the

North Carolina legislature. Thus, we do not ask whether the

State has an interest in preventing voter fraud -- it does -- or

whether a photo ID requirement constitutes one way to serve that

interest -- it may -- but whether the legislature would have

enacted SL 2013-381’s photo ID requirement if it had no

disproportionate impact on African American voters. The record

evidence establishes that it would not have.

The photo ID requirement here is both too restrictive and

not restrictive enough to effectively prevent voter fraud; “[i]t

is at once too narrow and too broad.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.

620, 633 (1996); see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 805 (rejecting

election law as “both too broad and too narrow”). First, the

photo ID requirement, which applies only to in-person voting and

not to absentee voting, is too narrow to combat fraud. On the

one hand, the State has failed to identify even a single

individual who has ever been charged with committing in-person

voter fraud in North Carolina. See J.A. 6802. On the other,

the General Assembly did have evidence of alleged cases of mail-

in absentee voter fraud. J.A. 1678, 6802. Notably, the

61
legislature also had evidence that absentee voting was not

disproportionately used by African Americans; indeed, whites

disproportionately used absentee voting. J.A. 1796-97. The

General Assembly then exempted absentee voting from the photo ID

requirement. 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381, pt. 4. This was so even

though members of the General Assembly had proposed amendments

to require photo ID for absentee voting, N.C. Gen. Assemb.

Proposed Amend. No. A2, H589-AST-50 [v.2] (April 24, 2013), and

the bipartisan State Board of Elections 11 specifically requested

that the General Assembly remedy the potential for mail-in

absentee voter fraud and expressed no concern about in-person

voter fraud, J.A. 1678.

The photo ID requirement is also too broad, enacting

seemingly irrational restrictions unrelated to the goal of

combating fraud. This overbreadth is most stark in the General

Assembly’s decision to exclude as acceptable identification all

forms of state-issued ID disproportionately held by African

Americans. See N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *142. The

State has offered little evidence justifying these exclusions.

11
The North Carolina State Board of Elections is the state
agency responsible for administering the elections process and
overseeing campaign finance disclosure. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-
19 (2016); see also About Us, North Carolina State Board of
Elections, http://www.ncsbe.gov/about-us (last visited July 25,
2016). The Board is composed of five members appointed by the
Governor, three of which belong to the same party as the
Governor. See N.C. Gen. Stat § 163-19.

62
Review of the record further undermines the contention that the

exclusions are tied to concerns of voter fraud. This is so

because voters who lack qualifying ID under SL 2013-381 may

apply for a free voter card using two of the very same forms of

ID excluded by the law. See N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774,

at *26. Thus, forms of state-issued IDs the General Assembly

deemed insufficient to prove a voter’s identity on Election Day

are sufficient if shown during a separate process to a separate

state official. In this way, SL 2013-381 elevates form over

function, creating hoops through which certain citizens must

jump with little discernable gain in deterrence of voter fraud. 12

The State’s proffered justifications regarding restrictions

on early voting similarly fail. The State contends that one

purpose of SL 2013-381’s reduction in early voting days was to

correct inconsistencies among counties in the locations and

hours of early voting centers. J.A. 3325; 22348-50. See, e.g.,

J.A. 3325 (senator supporting the law: “what we’re trying to do

is put some consistency into the process and allow for the

12Tellingly, as discussed above, it was only after Shelby
County that the General Assembly removed these IDs, retaining as
acceptable ID only those disproportionately held by whites.
N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *142. Further, the
General Assembly had before it recommendations from the State
Board of Elections that the law include some of the excluded
IDs. J.A. 6866, 7392. Thus, the record evidence indicates that
the General Assembly’s decision in the wake of Shelby County to
exclude certain IDs had less to do with combating fraud, and
more to do with the race of the ID holders.

63
facilities to be similarly treated in one county as in being

[sic] all the counties”). In some minor ways, SL 2013-381 does

achieve consistency in the availability of early voting within

each county. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-227.2(g) (mandating the

same days and hours within counties).

But the record does not offer support for the view that SL

2013-381 actually achieved consistency in early voting among the

various counties. For example, while the State contends that it

meant to eliminate inconsistencies between counties in the

availability of Sunday early voting, see, e.g., J.A. 12997-98;

20943-44; 22348-49, SL 2013-381 offers no fix for that. Rather,

it permits the Board of Elections of each county to determine,

in the Board’s discretion, whether to provide Sunday hours

during early voting. See J.A. 3325 (senator supporting the law:

“[the law] still leaves the county the choice of opening on a

Sunday or not opening on Sunday”); cf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-

227.2(f) (“A county board may conduct [early voting] during

evenings or on weekends . . . .” (emphasis added)). Moreover,

as discussed above, the State explicitly and problematically

linked these “inconsistencies” in Sunday early voting to race

and party. J.A. 22348-49.

In other ways, the challenged provision actually promotes

inconsistency in the availability of early voting across North

Carolina. SL 2013-381 mandates that County Boards of Elections

64
offer at least the same number of aggregate hours of early

voting as offered in 2010 for future non-presidential elections

and as offered in 2012 for future presidential elections. See

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-227.2(g2). If, as the State asserts, the

2010 and 2012 elections saw great disparities in voting hours

across county lines, SL 2013-381 in effect codifies those

inconsistencies by requiring those same county-specific hours

for all future elections.

Moreover, in its quest for “consistency” in the

availability of early voting, the General Assembly again

disregarded the recommendations of the State Board of Elections.

The Board counseled that, although reducing the number of days

of early voting might ease administrative burdens for lower

turnout elections, doing so for high-turnout elections would

mean that “North Carolina voters’ needs will not be

accommodated.” J.A. 1700. The Board explained that reducing

early voting days would mean that “traffic will be increased on

Election Day, increasing demands for personnel, voting equipment

and other supplies, and resulting in likely increases to the

cost of elections.” J.A. 1700; see also J.A. 1870-72 (reducing

early voting days, according to one County Board of Elections,

would lead to “increased costs, longer lines, increased wait

times, understaffed sites, staff burn-out leading to mistakes,

65
and inadequate polling places; or, in a worst case scenario, all

of these problems together”).

Concerning same-day registration, the State justifies its

elimination as a means to avoid administrative burdens that

arise when verifying the addresses of those who register at the

very end of the early voting period. These concerns are real.

Even so, the complete elimination of same-day registration

hardly constitutes a remedy carefully drawn to accomplish the

State’s objectives. The General Assembly had before it

alternative proposals that would have remedied the problem

without abolishing the popular program. J.A. 1533-34; 6827-28.

The State Board of Elections had reported that same-day

registration “was a success.” J.A. 1529. The Board

acknowledged some of the conflicts between same-day registration

and mail verification, J.A. 1533-34, but clarified that “same

day registration does not result in the registration of voters

who are any less qualified or eligible to vote than” traditional

registrants, J.A. 6826, and that “undeliverable verification

mailings were not caused by the nature of same day

registration,” J.A. 6827. Indeed, over 97% of same-day

registrants passed the mail verification process. J.A. 6826.

The State Board of Elections believed this number would have

been higher had some counties not delayed the mail verification

process in violation of the law. J.A. 6826-28.

66
 Again, the General Assembly ignored this advice. In other

circumstances we would defer to the prerogative of a legislature

to choose among competing policy proposals. But, in the broader

context of SL 2013-381’s multiple restrictions on voting

mechanisms disproportionately used by African Americans, we

conclude that the General Assembly would not have eliminated

same-day registration entirely but-for its disproportionate

impact on African Americans.

Turning to the elimination of out-of-precinct voting, the

State initially contended that the provision was justified to

“move[] the law back to the way it was”; i.e., the way it was

before it was broadened to facilitate greater participation in

the franchise by minority voters. J.A. 3307. Recognizing the

weakness of that justification, during the litigation of this

case, the State asserted that the General Assembly abolished

out-of-precinct voting to “permit[] election officials to

conduct elections in a timely and efficient manner.” J.A.

22328. Such post hoc rationalizations during litigation provide

little evidence as to the actual motivations of the legislature.

See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 730 (analyzing whether

the State’s recited justification was “the actual purpose”

(emphasis added)); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533

(1996) (“The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or

invented post hoc in response to litigation.”).

67
 Finally, the General Assembly’s elimination of

preregistration provides yet another troubling mismatch with its

proffered justifications. Here, the record makes clear that the

General Assembly contrived a problem in order to impose a

solution. According to the State, the preregistration system

was too confusing for young voters. SL 2013-381 thus sought, in

the words of a sponsor of the law, to “offer some clarity and

some certainty as to when” a “young person is eligible to vote,”

by eliminating preregistration altogether. J.A. 3317. 13 But, as

the district court itself noted, that explanation does not hold

water. The court found that “pre-registration’s removal []

ma[d]e registration more complex” and prone to confusion. N.C.

State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *116 (emphasis added).

In sum, the array of electoral “reforms” the General

Assembly pursued in SL 2013-381 were not tailored to achieve its

purported justifications, a number of which were in all events

insubstantial. In many ways, the challenged provisions in SL

2013-381 constitute solutions in search of a problem. The only

clear factor linking these various “reforms” is their impact on

13 Strangely, the main evidence regarding this asserted
confusion appears to be a single senator’s testimony regarding
the experience of his high-school-aged son. See J.A. 3317
(senator indicating his son was confused about when to vote with
pre-registration). But even that testimony does not coherently
identify the problem that the law sought to remedy. See J.A.
3335 (same senator indicating his son was not confused about
when to vote under pre-SL 2013-381 law).

68
African American voters. The record thus makes obvious that the

“problem” the majority in the General Assembly sought to remedy

was emerging support for the minority party. Identifying and

restricting the ways African Americans vote was an easy and

effective way to do so. We therefore must conclude that race

constituted a but-for cause of SL 2013-381, in violation of the

Constitutional and statutory prohibitions on intentional

discrimination.

V.

As relief in this case, Plaintiffs ask that we declare the

challenged provisions in SL 2013-381 unconstitutional and

violative of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and that we

permanently enjoin each provision. They further ask that we

exercise our authority pursuant to § 3 of the Voting Rights Act

to authorize federal poll observers and place North Carolina

under preclearance. These requests raise issues of severability

and the proper scope of any equitable remedy. We address each

in turn.

A.

When discriminatory intent impermissibly motivates the

passage of a law, a court may remedy the injury -- the impact of

the legislation -- by invalidating the law. See, e.g., Hunter,

471 U.S. at 231; Anderson, 375 U.S. at 400-04. If a court finds

69
only part of the law unconstitutional, it may sever the

offending provision and leave the inoffensive portion of the law

intact. Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1996). State

law governs our severability analysis. Id. In North Carolina,

severability turns on whether the legislature intended that the

law be severable, Pope v. Easley, 556 S.E.2d 265, 268 (N.C.

2001), and whether provisions are “so interrelated and mutually

dependent” on others that they “cannot be enforced without

reference to another,” Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 481 S.E.2d 8, 9

(N.C. 1997).

We have held that discriminatory intent motivated only the

enactment of the challenged provisions of SL 2013-381. As an

omnibus bill, SL 2013-381 contains many other provisions not

subject to challenge here. We sever the challenged provisions

from the remainder of the law because it contains a severability

clause, see 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 381 § 60.1, to which we defer

under North Carolina law. Pope, 556 S.E.2d at 268. Further,

the remainder of the law “can[] be enforced without” the

challenged provisions. Fulton Corp., 481 S.E.2d at 9.

Therefore, we enjoin only the challenged provisions of SL 2013-

381 regarding photo ID, early voting, same-day registration,

out-of-precinct voting, and preregistration.

70
WYNN, Circuit Judge, with whom FLOYD, Circuit Judge, joins,
writing for the court as to Part V.B.:

B.

As to the appropriate remedy for the challenged provisions,

“once a plaintiff has established the violation of a

constitutional or statutory right in the civil rights area,

. . . court[s] ha[ve] broad and flexible equitable powers to

fashion a remedy that will fully correct past wrongs.” Smith v.

Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1068 (4th Cir. 1982); see Green

v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437–39 (1968) (explaining that

once a court rules that an official act purposefully

discriminates, the “racial discrimination [must] be eliminated

root and branch”). In other words, courts are tasked with

shaping “[a] remedial decree . . . to place persons” who have

been harmed by an unconstitutional provision “in ‘the position

they would have occupied in the absence of [discrimination].’”

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 (last alteration in original) (quoting

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977)).

The Supreme Court has established that official actions

motivated by discriminatory intent “ha[ve] no legitimacy at all

under our Constitution or under the [Voting Rights Act].” City

of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378 (1975). Thus,

the proper remedy for a legal provision enacted with

discriminatory intent is invalidation. See id. at 378–79

71
(“[Official actions] animated by [a discriminatory] purpose have

no credentials whatsoever; for [a]cts generally lawful may

become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end.” (last

alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see

also Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229, 231–33 (affirming the invalidation

of a state constitutional provision because it was adopted with

the intent of disenfranchising African Americans); Washington v.

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 466, 470–71, 487 (1982)

(affirming a permanent injunction of a state initiative that was

motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose); Anderson, 375

U.S. at 403–04 (indicating that the purposefully discriminatory

use of race in a challenged law was “sufficient to make it

invalid”). Notably, the Supreme Court has invalidated a state

constitutional provision enacted with discriminatory intent even

when its “more blatantly discriminatory” portions had since been

removed. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232–33.

Moreover, the fact that the General Assembly later amended

one of the challenged provisions does not change our conclusion

that invalidation of each provision is the appropriate remedy in

this case. Specifically, in 2015, the General Assembly enacted

SL 2015-103, which amended the photo ID requirement and added

the reasonable impediment exception. See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws

103 § 8 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 163-82.8, 163-166.13,

163-166.15, 163-182.1B, 163-227.2). Our dissenting colleague

72
contends that even though we all agree that 1) the General

Assembly unconstitutionally enacted the photo ID requirement

with racially discriminatory intent, and 2) the remedy for an

unconstitutional law must completely cure the harm wrought by

the prior law, we should remand for the district court to

consider whether the reasonable impediment exception has

rendered our injunction of that provision unnecessary. But,

even if the State were able to demonstrate that the amendment

lessens the discriminatory effect of the photo ID requirement,

it would not relieve us of our obligation to grant a complete

remedy in this case. That remedy must reflect our finding that

the challenged provisions were motivated by an impermissible

discriminatory intent and must ensure that those provisions do

not impose any lingering burden on African American voters. We

cannot discern any basis upon which this record reflects that

the reasonable impediment exception amendment fully cures the

harm from the photo ID provision. Thus, remand is not

necessary.

While remedies short of invalidation may be appropriate if

a provision violates the Voting Rights Act only because of its

discriminatory effect, laws passed with discriminatory intent

inflict a broader injury and cannot stand. See Veasey, 2016 WL

3923868, at *36, *36 n.66 (distinguishing between the proper

remedy for a law enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose

73
and the more flexible range of remedies that should be

considered if the law has only a discriminatory effect).

Here, the amendment creating the reasonable impediment

exception does not invalidate or repeal the photo ID

requirement. It therefore falls short of the remedy that the

Supreme Court has consistently applied in cases of this nature.

Significantly, the burden rests on the State to prove that

its proposed remedy completely cures the harm in this case. See

Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 (noting that the defendant “was

obliged to show that its remedial proposal ‘directly address[ed]

and relate[d] to’ the violation” (alterations in original)

(quoting Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282)); Green, 391 U.S. at 439

(placing the burden on the defendant to prove that its plan

would effectively cure the violation). Here, nothing in this

record shows that the reasonable impediment exception ensures

that the photo ID law no longer imposes any lingering burden on

African American voters. To the contrary, the record

establishes that the reasonable impediment exception amendment

does not so fundamentally alter the photo ID requirement as to

eradicate its impact or otherwise “eliminate the taint from a

law that was originally enacted with discriminatory intent.”

Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir.

2005) (en banc).

74
 For example, the record shows that under the reasonable

impediment exception, if an in-person voter cannot present a

qualifying form of photo ID -- which “African Americans are more

likely to lack” -- the voter must undertake a multi-step

process. N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *37. First, the

voter must complete and sign a form declaring that a reasonable

impediment prevented her from obtaining such a photo ID, and

identifying that impediment. 14 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-166.15. In

addition, the voter must present one of several alternative

types of identification required by the exception. Id. § 163-

166.15(c). Then, the voter may fill out a provisional ballot,

which is subject to challenge by any registered voter in the

county. Id. § 163-182.1B. On its face, this amendment does not

fully eliminate the burden imposed by the photo ID requirement.

Rather, it requires voters to take affirmative steps to justify

to the state why they failed to comply with a provision that we

have declared was enacted with racially discriminatory intent

and is unconstitutional.

In sum, the State did not carry its burden at trial to

prove that the reasonable impediment exception amendment

14 While declaring that a reasonable impediment
“prevent[ed]” her from obtaining an acceptable photo ID, the
voter must heed the form’s warning that “fraudulently or falsely
completing this form is a Class I felony” under North Carolina
law. J.A. 10368.

75
completely cures the harm in this case, nor could it given the

requirements of the reasonable impediment exception as enacted

by the General Assembly. Accordingly, to fully cure the harm

imposed by the impermissible enactment of SL 2013-381, we

permanently enjoin all of the challenged provisions, including

the photo ID provision.

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, writing for the court:

C.

As to the other requested relief, we decline to impose any

of the discretionary additional relief available under § 3 of

the Voting Rights Act, including imposing poll observers during

elections and subjecting North Carolina to ongoing preclearance

requirements. See 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a), (c) (formerly 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973a). Such remedies “[are] rarely used” and are not

necessary here in light of our injunction. Conway Sch. Dist. v.

Wilhoit, 854 F. Supp. 1430, 1442 (E.D. Ark. 1994).

To be clear, our injunction does not freeze North Carolina

election law in place as it is today. Neither the Fourteenth

Amendment nor § 2 of the Voting Rights Act binds the State’s

hands in such a way. The North Carolina legislature has

authority under the Constitution to determine the “times,

places, and manner” of its elections. U.S. Const. art. I § 4.

In exercising that power, it cannot be that states must forever

76
tip-toe around certain voting provisions disproportionately used

by minorities. Our holding, and the injunction we issue

pursuant to it, does not require that. If in the future the

General Assembly finds that legitimate justifications counsel

modification of its election laws, then the General Assembly can

certainly so act. Of course, legitimate justifications do not

include a desire to suppress African American voting strength.

***

It is beyond dispute that “voting is of the most

fundamental significance under our constitutional

structure.” Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers

Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979). For “[n]o right is more

precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the

election of those who make the laws under which, as good

citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are

illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v.

Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). We thus take seriously, as the

Constitution demands, any infringement on this right. We cannot

ignore the record evidence that, because of race, the

legislature enacted one of the largest restrictions of the

franchise in modern North Carolina history.

We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.

We remand the case for entry of an order enjoining the

77
implementation of SL 2013-381’s photo ID requirement and changes

to early voting, same-day registration, out-of-precinct voting,

and preregistration.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

78
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting as to Part V.B.:

We have held that in 2013, the General Assembly, acting

with discriminatory intent, enacted a photo ID requirement to

become effective in 2016. But in 2015, before the requirement

ever went into effect, the legislature significantly amended the

law. North Carolina recently held two elections in which the

photo ID requirement, as amended, was in effect. The record,

however, contains no evidence as to how the amended voter ID

requirement affected voting in North Carolina. In view of these

facts and Supreme Court precedent as to the propriety of

injunctive relief, I believe we should act cautiously.

The Supreme Court has explained that “[a]n injunction is a

matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success

on the merits as a matter of course.” Winter v. Natural Res.

Defense Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008); see also Weinberger

v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). Given the “inherent

limitation upon federal judicial authority,” a court’s charge is

only to “cure the condition that offends the Constitution.”

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

If interim events have “cured the condition,” id., and a

defendant carries its “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the

wrong will not be repeated, a court will properly deny an

injunction of the abandoned practice. United States v. W.T.

79
Grant, 345 U.S. 894, 896-97 (1953); see Kohl by Kohl v.

Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 865 F.2d 930, 934 (8th Cir. 1989) (“A

change in circumstances can destroy the need for an

injunction.”). Thus, a defendant’s voluntary cessation of an

unconstitutional practice or amendment of an unconstitutional

law fundamentally bears “on the question of whether a court

should exercise its power to enjoin” the practice or law. City

of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288-89

(1982).

The remedy for an unconstitutional law must completely cure

the harm wrought by the prior law. But, a superseding statute

can have that effect. See id. And, where a governmental body

has already taken adequate steps to remedy an unconstitutional

law, courts “generally decline to add . . . a judicial remedy to

the heap.” Winzler, 681 F.3d at 1211; cf. A. L. Mechling Barge

Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 331 (1961) (“[S]ound

discretion withholds the remedy where it appears that a

challenged ‘continuing practice’ is, at the moment adjudication

is sought, undergoing significant modification so that its

ultimate form cannot be confidently predicted.”).

In 2015, two years after the enactment of the photo ID

requirement, but prior to its implementation, the General

Assembly added the reasonable impediment exception to the photo

ID requirement. See 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 103 § 8. The

80
exception provides that a voter without qualifying photo ID may

cast a provisional ballot after declaring under penalty of

perjury that he or she “suffer[s] from a reasonable impediment

that prevents [him] from obtaining acceptable photo

identification.” N.C. State Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *36

(internal quotation marks omitted). No party in this case

suggests that the legislature acted with discriminatory intent

when it enacted the reasonable impediment exception.

The majority maintains, however, that the reasonable

impediment exception does not fully remedy the impact of the

photo ID requirement. Perhaps not. But, by its terms, the

exception totally excuses the discriminatory photo ID

requirement. 1 Of course, in practice, it may not do so. But on

this record, I believe we cannot assess whether, or to what

extent, the reasonable impediment exception cures the

unconstitutional 2013 photo ID requirement.

1Recently, a court considering a similar reasonable
impediment exception suggested that the exception could remedy
an otherwise problematic photo ID requirement. See South
Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35-38 (D.D.C.
2012). In South Carolina, a three-judge panel precleared a
photo ID requirement with a reasonable impediment exception
after finding that it would not “disproportionately and
materially burden racial minorities” as compared to the then-
existing identification requirement. Id. at 38. Here, North
Carolina’s reasonable impediment exception “is effectively a
codification of th[at] three-judge panel’s holding.” N.C. State
Conf., 2016 WL 1650774, at *12. See also Veasey v. Abbott,
Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-193 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2016).

81
 Because the district court failed to find discriminatory

intent, it did not consider whether any unconstitutional effect

survived the 2015 amendment. Instead, it focused on whether the

law, as amended in 2015, burdened voters enough to sustain

claims under a § 2 results or an Anderson-Burdick analysis. Id.

at *122, *156. Of course, this is not the standard that

controls or the findings that bear on whether a court should

enjoin an unconstitutional racially discriminatory, but

subsequently amended, law. 2

Moreover, additional information now exists that goes

directly to this inquiry. For after trial in this case, the

State implemented the reasonable impediment exception in primary

elections in March and June of 2016. The parties and amici in

this case have urged on us anecdotal extra-record information

concerning the implementation of the exception during the March

election. For example, Amicus supporting the Plaintiffs reports

that, in the March 2016 primary election, poll workers gave

reasonable-impediment voters incorrect ballots and County Boards

2
This contrasts with our ability to assess, without remand,
whether the State demonstrated that SL 2013-381 would have been
enacted without considerations of race. See supra, Part IV.
Although the district court did not shift the burden to the
State under Arlington Heights, it had already made extensive
findings of the relevant foundational facts regarding the
State’s proffered justifications. We lack the equivalent
findings regarding what discriminatory impact less than a
“material burden” may survive the reasonable impediment
exception.

82
of Elections were inconsistent about what they deemed a

“reasonable” impediment. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Democracy

North Carolina in Support of Appellants at 8-32, N.C. State

Conf., ___ F.3d ___ (4th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-1468). In response,

the State maintains that “the vast majority” of these criticisms

“are inaccurate or misleading,” in part because Amicus completed

its report before the State conducted its final vote count.

Appellee’s Resp. in Opp’n. to Mot. for Stay of J. and Inj.

Pending Appeal at 3-5, N.C. State Conf., ___ F.3d ___ (4th Cir.

2016) (No. 16-1468). Of course, these submissions as to the

March election do not constitute evidence and we cannot consider

them as such. Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Servs. for the

Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 n.3 (1986). And for the June election,

we do not even have anecdotal information.

Thus, we are faced with a statute enacted with racially

discriminatory intent, amended before ever implemented in a way

that may remedy that harm, and a record incomplete in more than

one respect. Given these facts, I would only temporarily enjoin

the photo ID requirement and remand the case to the district

court to determine if, in practice, the exception fully remedies

the discriminatory requirement or if a permanent injunction is

necessary. In my view, this approach is that most faithful to

Supreme Court teaching as to injunctive relief.

83