MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Aug 12 2016, 9:14 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Darren Bedwell Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
David A. Martin, August 12, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1509-CR-1357
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Peggy R. Hart,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Commissioner.
The Honorable Shatrese M.
Flowers, Judge.
Trial Court Cause No.
49G20-1405-FA-22457
Altice, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Following a bench trial, David Martin was convicted of a number of drug and
firearm offenses. On appeal, Martin argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful warrantless
entry into his home.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] Shortly after midnight on March 27, 2013, Officer Patrick Bragg of the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was on patrol when a vehicle
travelling southbound down an alley caught his attention. Officer Bragg
followed the vehicle down the alley and saw it pull up next to a garage. At that
time, Officer Bragg saw a man coming around the corner of the garage toward
the parked vehicle. The man took off running when he saw Officer Bragg.
Officer Bragg called for another officer in the area to pursue the man and then
approached the occupants of the parked vehicle. The driver identified himself
as David Petty and told Officer Bragg that he and his passenger had been
dropping off a woman they knew as Dee Dee at the house. According to Petty,
as Dee Dee exited the car, two men came out of the house. One of the men
took off running after seeing Officer Bragg, and the other man “chased” Dee
Dee into the house through the back door. Transcript at 90. Petty told Officer
Bragg that he did not know what was going on, but that he did not believe that
Dee Dee lived at the residence.
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[4] Officer Bragg was concerned for Dee Dee’s safety, so he called another officer
to the scene to assist him. When the other officer arrived, Officer Bragg
knocked on the back door and announced his presence, and someone inside the
house immediately began turning off the interior lights. Officer Bragg knocked
again, and the other responding officer shined his spotlight on the house and
used his PA system to ask the occupants of the house to come out. The officers
got no response, and Officer Bragg heard a female voice that he believed to be
yelling for help.
[5] Officer Bragg requested the presence of a police supervisor and additional
officers at the scene. Upon his arrival, the supervisor authorized a forced entry
into the home for a welfare check on Dee Dee. The officers attempted to make
entry by using a ram on the front door, and a man who would later be identified
as Martin shouted from inside the house that he would open the door. Martin
then exited through the back door and police entered the home. Officer Bragg
located a woman in the dining room whom he eventually identified as Dee
Dee. Dee Dee told Officer Bragg that she did not think there was anyone else
in the house, but that she was unsure. Officers then performed a protective
sweep of the home, during which they detected a strong odor of marijuana and
observed a shotgun, a rifle, and multiple scales in plain view. After obtaining
Martin’s consent, police performed a full search of the home and recovered
sixty-four grams of cocaine, fifteen grams of marijuana, and three guns.
[6] As a result of these events, the State charged Martin with multiple drug and
firearm offenses. Martin filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence
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recovered from the home as the products of an unlawful warrantless entry.
Specifically, Martin argued that the initial entry was not supported by exigent
circumstances, and all subsequently recovered evidence was fruit of the
poisonous tree. The trial court denied the motion and the matter proceeded to
a bench trial on July 27, 2015. Evidence seized from the home was admitted
into evidence over Martin’s continuing objections at trial, and at the conclusion
of the evidence, the trial court found Martin guilty as charged. After vacating
two counts due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered judgments
of conviction for class A felony dealing in cocaine, class B felony possession of
a firearm by a serious violent felon, class C felony possession of cocaine and a
firearm, and class D felony possession of marijuana. Martin now appeals.
Discussion & Decision
[7] On appeal, Martin argues that all evidence recovered from the home should
have been excluded as the fruit of an unlawful warrantless entry. Martin
initially challenged the admission of this evidence through a motion to
suppress, and is now appealing its admission after a completed bench trial.
Trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and
such rulings will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion.
Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 725 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. In reviewing a trial
court’s evidentiary rulings, we will not reweigh the evidence, and we will
consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We
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also consider uncontroverted evidence in the defendant’s favor. Joseph v. State,
975 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
1. Fourth Amendment
[8] Martin first argues that the entry into his home violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable
search and seizure and this protection has been extended to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is to protect the legitimate expectations of privacy
that citizens possess in their persons, their homes, and their
belongings. For a search to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, a warrant is required unless an exception to the
warrant requirement applies. The State bears the burden of
proving that a warrantless search falls within an exception to the
warrant requirement
Taylor v. State, 842 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. 2006) (citations omitted).
[9] In this case, the State argued and the trial court found that the warrantless entry
into Martin’s home was justified by exigent circumstances. As this court has
noted,
[t]he existence of exigent circumstances falls within an exception
to the warrant requirement. In other words, the warrant
requirement becomes inapplicable when the exigencies of the
situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that
the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Under the exigent circumstances exception, police
may enter a residence without a warrant if the situation suggests
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a reasonable belief that someone inside the residence is in need of
aid. However, an officer’s subjective belief that exigent
circumstances exist is insufficient to justify a warrantless entry.
Rather, the test is objective, and the government must establish
that the circumstances as they appear at the moment of entry
would lead a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to
believe that someone inside the house required immediate
assistance.
Joseph, 975 N.E.2d at 425 (citations omitted). Officers do not, however, need
“ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury” to invoke the exigent
circumstances exception. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
[10] The evidence presented in this case amply supports the trial court’s finding that
the warrantless entry into Martin’s home was supported by exigent
circumstances. When Officer Bragg arrived at the scene, he observed one man
take off running, and Petty told him that another man had chased Dee Dee into
the house. When Officer Bragg knocked on the door, someone inside the house
started turning off the interior lights. When police attempted to make contact
with the occupants of the house using a PA system, they got no response.
Moreover, Officer Bragg believed that he heard a woman yelling for help,
although he could not make out words or pinpoint exactly where the voice was
coming from. These facts were more than sufficient to support an objectively
reasonable belief that someone inside the residence—namely, Dee Dee—was in
need of aid. Accordingly, the warrantless entry into Martin’s home did not
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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2. Article 1, Section 11
[11] Martin also argues that the warrantless entry into his home violated Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Article 1, Section 11, like the Fourth
Amendment, bars unreasonable searches and seizures. Carpenter v. State, 18
N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014). “Although Indiana’s Section 11 and the Federal
Fourth Amendment are textually identical, they are analytically distinct.” Id.
Specifically, while Fourth Amendment analysis turns on whether the subject of
a search had a reasonable expectation of privacy, analysis under Article 1,
Section 11 turns on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1001-02. In evaluating the reasonableness
of police conduct, we consider: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or
knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method
of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the
extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at 1002 (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 2005)). The State bears the burden of establishing that
the police conduct was reasonable. Id.
[12] We acknowledge, and the State concedes, that the degree of police intrusion in
this case was great—police used a battering ram to attempt to gain entry into
Martin’s home. Balanced against this intrusion, however, are a very high
degree of concern that a violation was occurring and considerable law
enforcement needs. Petty told Officer Bragg that a man had chased Dee Dee
into the home, and when Officer Bragg knocked on the door, someone inside
started turning off the interior lights. Police got no response when they used
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their PA system to ask the occupants of the house to come outside, and Officer
Bragg heard what he believed to be a woman yelling for help. Under these
circumstances, we cannot conclude that the officers’ decision to take immediate
action to ensure Dee Dee’s safety was unreasonable. Indeed, it is plainly
reasonable for police to forego seeking a warrant under circumstances such as
these, where a person appears to be in imminent peril. We therefore conclude
that the warrantless entry into Martin’s home did not violate Article 1, Section
11 of the Indiana Constitution.
[13] Judgment affirmed.
[14] Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.
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