In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-16-00087-CV
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IN RE JOHN F. WILLIAMS
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Original Proceeding
435th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 14-02-01500-CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this mandamus proceeding, the relator, John F. Williams, seeks to compel
the trial court to vacate its September 1, 2015 orders granting the State’s motion to
place Williams in a tiered treatment program and amending a 2014 order of civil
commitment. 1 Williams contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
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The mandamus record reflects that the relator’s name is John Franklin
Williams, Jr. Williams was adjudicated to be a sexually violent predator on August
14, 2014. See generally In re Commitment of Williams, No. 09-14-00407-CV, 2016
WL 1600789, at *1-5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 21, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
According to Williams, the predecessor agency of the Texas Civil Commitment
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ordering him into a tiered treatment program as required by amendments to the
civil commitment statute that came into effect on June 17, 2015. See Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann. § 841.0831 (West Supp. 2015); see also Act of May 21, 2015,
84th Leg., R.S., ch. 845, § 40(b), 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2700, 2711(West).
We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
First, Williams argues the amended order of civil commitment is contrary to
the final judgment committing him for outpatient sex offender treatment. Williams
argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him into the tiered
treatment program because section 40(a) of the amending legislation, S.B. 746,
provides that the 2015 amendments to Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code apply only to a civil commitment proceeding that is initiated on or after June
17, 2015. See 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 2711. However, the trial court may
modify the requirements of a civil commitment order “at any time after notice to
each affected party to the proceedings and a hearing.” Tex. Health & Safety Code
Ann. § 841.082(e) (West Supp. 2015). When Williams was civilly committed in
2014, the civil commitment requirements of section 841.082 of the Texas Health
and Safety Code included “requiring the person’s participation in and compliance
with a specific course of treatment” provided by the office responsible for
Office housed Williams in the Southeast Texas Transitional Center after his release
from prison on January 14, 2015.
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treatment and supervision of sexually violent predators in Texas. See Act of May
23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1201, § 8(a)(4), 2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 3197,
3200 (West) (amended 2015) (current version at Tex. Health & Safety Code §
841.082 (West Supp. 2015)). In 2015, the legislature expressly required the Texas
Civil Commitment Office to develop a tiered sex offender treatment program. See
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.0831. Section 40(b) of S.B. 746 states that
a civil commitment requirement imposed before the effective date of the act must
be modified to conform to the amended version of the act. See 2015 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. at 2711.
Sex offender treatment is a civil commitment requirement imposed by
section 841.082 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. See Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 841.082(a)(3). The amended act changed the sex offender treatment
required by section 841.082 to a tiered treatment program. See Tex. Health &
Safety Code Ann § 841.0831. We conclude that section 40(b) of S.B. 746 required
the trial court to modify the sex offender treatment requirement imposed by section
841.082 to a tiered treatment program after notice to the committed person and a
hearing. See 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. at 2711. Williams received notice and a
hearing, which is all that was required to place him into the new tiered treatment
program. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 841.082(e).
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Second, Williams contends that as applied to him the 2015 amendments to
Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code deny due process of law. We
recently addressed the constitutionality of S.B. 746 in the case of a person who had
been civilly committed in 2013. See generally In re Commitment of May, No. 09-
15-00513-CV, 2016 WL 4040186, at *1-9 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2016,
no pet. h.). Considering May’s claim to a vested right to outpatient treatment under
a judgment that pre-dated S.B. 746, we held that the 2015 amendments to Chapter
841 of the Texas Health and Safety Code did not render civil commitment
unconstitutionally punitive or retroactive. Id. at *4-8. Our reasoning in May applies
to the issues under consideration here.
In 2014, Section 841.082 of the Texas Health and Safety Code required a
civilly committed sexually violent predator to reside in a residential facility under
contract with or approved by the office administering his sex offender treatment,
and the original order of commitment required that Williams reside in supervised
housing. See 2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. at 3200 (amended 2015). Moreover, in
2014 Section 841.082 required the person’s participation in and compliance with a
specific course of treatment provided by the office. See id. Therefore, when
Williams was civilly committed, the settled expectations included having the
treating agency determine where Williams would live and the program of treatment
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he would receive. The State’s need to operate a sex offender treatment program for
sexually violent offenders who have discharged their criminal sentences justifies
requiring a person to receive sex offender treatment at the general location where
he resides, as determined by the Texas Civil Commitment Office. See May, 2016
WL 4040186, at *8.
In a supplemental petition, Williams argues the amended order of civil
commitment is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata is an
affirmative defense that must be pleaded in the trial court. See generally Tex. R.
Civ. P. 94. Furthermore, in a civil commitment case, the trial court may modify the
requirements of a civil commitment order “at any time after notice to each affected
party to the proceedings and a hearing.” Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §
841.082(e).
Williams has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. See In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). We deny the petition seeking mandamus relief. See Tex. R. App. P.
52.8.
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PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on May 11, 2016
Opinion Delivered August 11, 2016
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
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