UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-2067
LAKESHA RUFFIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:13-cv-02744-WDQ)
Submitted: August 30, 2016 Decided: September 13, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; affirmed in part as modified by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
James C. Strouse, STROUSE LEGAL SERVICES, Columbia, Maryland,
for Appellant. Michael J. Murphy, Denise E. Giraudo, OGLETREE,
DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lakesha Ruffin appeals from the district court’s August 24,
2015, order granting judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c) to Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed) on her
claims for race discrimination (count I), sexual harassment
(count II), and a hostile work environment (count III) under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (Title VII), dismissing for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction her claim (count IV) for a violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (2012) (ADA), 1 and denying her motion
for leave to amend the complaint. 2 We affirm in part and affirm
in part as modified.
1Invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), Lockheed argued in its
motion for judgment that subject matter jurisdiction over count
IV was lacking based on Ruffin’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The district court agreed, relying on
lack of subject matter jurisdiction over count IV that was not
cured by the proposed amended complaint in rendering judgment
with respect to this count.
2Ruffin’s notice of appeal states that she wishes to appeal
the district court’s August 15, 2015, decision. The district
court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings, dismissing
Ruffin’s ADA claim, and denying Ruffin’s motion for leave to
amend was entered on the district court’s docket on August 24,
2015. There is no August 15, 2015, order in this case.
Although “we do not commend the careless formulation of
[Ruffin’s] notice of appeal,” Bogart v. Chapell, 396 F.3d 548,
555 (4th Cir. 2005), we conclude that intent to appeal the
August 24 order is readily inferable. The district court clerk
(Continued)
2
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), applying the same
standard of review as we apply to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Butler v.
United States, 702 F.3d 749, 751-52 (4th Cir. 2012).
Specifically, we look to determine whether the complaint alleges
“facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level, thereby nudging the claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.” Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d
171, 180 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). In undertaking this review, although we
“must accept the truthfulness of all factual allegations, we
need not assume the veracity of bare legal conclusions.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, we must accept
conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts “only to the
docketed the notice as appealing the August 24 order, and Ruffin
devotes her brief on appeal to arguing that the district court
reversibly erred in that order. Lockheed had the opportunity to
fully brief relevant issues, including whether any deficiencies
in the notice of appeal deprived this court of jurisdiction over
the August 24 order. It chose instead to explain why the
district court did not commit reversible error in the August 24
order. Lockheed thus was not prejudiced by this deficiency, and
we may properly consider the August 24 order in this appeal.
See id.
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extent they are plausible based on the factual allegations.”
Id.
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), the grant
or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of
the district court.” Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470,
474 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We thus
review the district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse
of discretion. Id. “A district court’s denial of leave to
amend is appropriate when (1) the amendment would be prejudicial
to the opposing party; (2) there has been bad faith on the part
of the moving party; or (3) the amendment would have been
futile.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not reversibly err in
granting judgment on the pleadings to Lockheed on Ruffin’s
counts I, II, and III or in denying Ruffin’s motion for leave to
amend those counts. The original and proposed amended
complaints did not articulate facts that, when accepted as true,
demonstrate a plausible claim under Title VII that Lockheed
terminated Ruffin’s employment because of her race. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep’t of Transp.,
State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 584-86 (4th Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1162 (2016). The original and proposed
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amended complaints also fail to articulate facts that, when
accepted as true, demonstrate plausible claims under Title VII
for sexual harassment and a hostile work environment.
See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277-78
(4th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385
(4th Cir. 2011); Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766,
771-73 (4th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s order with respect to its disposition of counts I, II,
and III. Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 1:13-cv-02744-WDQ
(D. Md. Aug. 24, 2015). 3
With respect to count IV, we review a dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Balas v. Huntington
Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 406 (4th Cir. 2013). The
ADA incorporates Title VII’s enforcement provisions, including
the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust her administrative
remedies by filing an administrative charge of discrimination
before pursuing a suit in federal court. Sydnor v. Fairfax
Cty., Va., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff’s
3In this regard, we reject as flatly contradicted by the
record Ruffin’s argument that the district court erred by
imposing on her a pleading standard more rigorous than required
by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), in
requiring her to plead a prima facie case of discrimination and
Ruffin’s other arguments on appeal with respect to counts I, II,
and III.
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failure to exhaust her administrative remedies deprives a court
of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Jones v. Calvert
Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009). In determining
whether jurisdiction exists, courts are to regard the
allegations in the complaint as “mere evidence” and may properly
consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the
proceeding into one for summary judgment. See Richmond,
Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d
765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991).
We conclude after review of the record that Ruffin failed
to include in her administrative charge of discrimination the
claim of termination from employment while on long-term
disability leave underlying count IV in the complaint and
proposed amended complaint. The district court thus properly
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over count
IV, and we reject Ruffin’s arguments on appeal to the contrary.
The court’s dismissal of that count, however, should be without
prejudice. See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Assoc., Inc.
v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir.
2013). We therefore modify the district court’s order to
reflect that the dismissal of count IV for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction is without prejudice and affirm the
dismissal as modified. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2012); MM ex rel.
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DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir.
2002) (“[W]e are entitled to affirm the court’s judgment on
alternate grounds, if such grounds are apparent from the
record.”).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART AS MODIFIED
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