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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.A.M., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR CHILD : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.M., MOTHER :
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: No. 767 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered February 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000586-2015
CP-51-DP-0001168-2013
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R.L., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR CHILD : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: T.M., MOTHER :
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: No. 768 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered February 3, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000587-2015
CP-51-DP-0000193-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., and FITZGERALD, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2016
Appellant, T.M. (“Mother”), appeals from the February 3, 2016 orders
involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her children, A.A.M., born in
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Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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June 2012 and A.R.L., born in October 2010 (collectively, “Children”) under
the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).1,2 We
affirm.3
In its opinion, the trial court sets forth the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case, which we incorporate herein. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/16/16, at 1-2 (unpaginated). On August 31, 2015, Philadelphia
County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed petitions for involuntary
termination of parental rights of Mother to Children. On February 3, 2016,
the trial court held a hearing on these petitions. Of particular importance,
the trial court heard the testimony of Lakesha Akins, a DHS social worker,
and Amy Sesay, a caseworker for Youth, Family and Children’s Service
(“YFC”). That same day, the trial court entered orders terminating Mother’s
parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8), and (b).
Mother timely filed notices of appeal, together with concise statements
of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and
(b).
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1
E.L., (“Father”) is the birth father of Children. Father signed a voluntary
relinquishment of his parental rights on February 29, 2016. Father is not a
party to this appeal, nor did he file an appeal.
2
Mother has another child, J.A., who is not subject to these appeals.
3
On April 11, 2016, this Court consolidated these appeals.
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Mother raises two questions on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights where
such determination was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) as [M]other made progress
towards working and meeting her [Family Service Plan]
goals, namely staying drug free, working towards obtaining
housing, working on parenting skills, and other goals, during
[Children’s] placement?
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it
involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights without
giving primary consideration to the effect that the
termination would have on the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs of [Children] as required by the Adoption
Act 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 2.
Our standard of review regarding orders terminating parental rights is
as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the
trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse
of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support
for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a
trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate
parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s
decision the same deference that we would give to a jury
verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761
A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2000)). In termination cases, the burden is
upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
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asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid.
See id., at 806. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the
trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue.” In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super.
2003).
The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.
Super. 2004). Additionally, this Court “need only agree with [the trial
court’s] decision as to any one subsection in order to affirm the termination
of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citation omitted).
In terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court relied upon §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, which provide as
follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
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be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied
by the parent.
…
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child within a reasonable period of time and
termination of the parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
…
(8) The child has been removed from the care of
the parent by the court or under a voluntary
agreement with an agency, 12 months or more
have elapsed from the date of removal or placement,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and
welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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With respect to § 2511(a)(2), the grounds for termination of parental
rights, due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are not limited to
affirmative misconduct; “to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of
refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797
A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Parents are required to
make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full
parental responsibilities. See id., at 340. A child’s life “simply cannot be put
on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super.
2008) (citations omitted). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the
custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or
her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and
fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citation omitted).
On appeal, Mother argues she is attempting to establish a loving
relationship with Children, and that DHS did not prove that Mother could not
remedy the conditions that led to Children’s removal. Mother asserts that
her parental rights should not be terminated due to economic factors, as she
is unable to obtain appropriate housing because of her income.
At the hearing, Lakesha Akins, a DHS social worker, testified that
Children were placed in DHS care because Mother was inconsistent with her
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mental health treatment, there were issues with housing as the home was in
a deplorable condition, and Children had hygiene issues. See N.T., Hearing,
2/3/16 at 19. Ms. Akins further testified Mother had not completed her
parenting capacity evaluation. See id., at 23. Ms. Akins stated that Mother
only had two unsupervised visits with Children in the 2½ years Children
have been in DHS custody. See id., at 25. Mother testified that she had
tried to be independent in the past, but has now begun asking for help from
her own mother. See id., at 71.
This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.
See In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous. See id., at 340. That is the case here.
After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the
trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by
competent evidence in the record. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s
determinations regarding § 2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient,
competent evidence in the record.
The trial court must also consider how terminating Mother’s parental
rights would affect the needs and welfare of Child pursuant to § 2511(b).
Pursuant to § 2511(b), the trial court’s inquiry is specifically directed to a
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consideration of whether termination of parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical and emotional needs of the child. See In re C.M.S.,
884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and
welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We have instructed that
the court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,
with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond. See id.
Mother argues that the trial court found Mother to be fully compliant
with her Family Service Plan. This is simply untrue. See Trial Court Opinion,
5/16/16, at 3 (unpaginated) (“In the instant case, the mother did not
complete her Family Service Plan (FSP) goals.”) Mother further argues that
she made efforts to comply with both DHS and trial court objectives, and she
attempted to make herself a better parent so that she could reunify with
Children because she loves Children and has a bond with Children. See id.
The trial court’s findings are in direct contention with Mother’s assertions.
After detailing all of Mother’s failings, the trial court concluded that Children
would not suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s rights were terminated, and
that it is in Children’s best interest that Mother’s parent rights be
terminated, and the goal changed to adoption. See id., at 5 (unpaginated).
Again, the trial court relied on the testimony of Lakesha Akins, the DHS
social worker, and also the testimony of Amy Sesay, the YFC caseworker.
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Ms. Akins testified that Children do not have a parental bond with
Mother. See N.T., Hearing, 2/3/16 at 27. Ms. Akins further testified that
Children would not suffer permanent emotional harm if Mother’s parental
rights are terminated. See id., at 28. Ms. Akins concluded that it is in the
Children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. See id.
Ms. Sesay, testified that Children look to their foster parent to meet
their daily needs. See id., at 50. Ms. Sesay concluded that it is in the
Children’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights because
Children are happy in the foster home, and the foster home is stable. See
id. at 49. The trial court found she testified credibly. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/16/16, at 5 (unpaginated).
After this Court’s careful review of the record, we find that the
competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determination
that there was no bond between Mother and Children, which, if severed,
would be detrimental to Children, and that the termination of Mother’s
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Children. As the
trial court noted, “[i]n the instant matter, the [C]hildren have been in
placement care for over twenty-five months. The testimony established that
the [C]hildren are in a stable, happy home.” Id., at 3.
We affirm the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights on the basis
of § 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act.
Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/23/2016
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