ACCEPTED 03-14-00782-CV 3623689 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/31/2014 8:47:25 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK NO. 03-14-00782-CV NO. 03-14-00782-CV THE THIRD IN THE IN COURT OF THIRD COURT APPEALS OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN, AT TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/31/2014 8:47:25 AM SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. JEFFREY D. KYLE Appellant, Clerk v. V. MARIO A. MATA, MARIO MATA, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC., THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX JOHN F. THOMPSON JOHN AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC. REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION, REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION, INC., and BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, Appellees. Appealed from the 353rd Judicial District Court Travis County, Texas BRIEF OF BRIEF APPELLANT OF APPELLANT DONALD L. TURBYFILL DONALD TURBYFILL 20296380 State Bar of Texas # 20296380 dturbyf111@dnt1aw.com [[E-MAIL] dturbyfill@dntlaw.com E-MAIL] DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD DEBORAH RIHERD driherd@dnt1aw.com [[E-MAIL] driherd@dntlaw.com E-MAIL] 24038904 State Bar of Texas # 24038904 VICKI W. VICKI HART W. HART 24046037 State Bar of Texas # 24046037 Vhart@dnt1aw.com [[E-MAIL] vhart@dntlaw.com E-MAIL] & Turbyfill, Devlin, Naylor & Turbyfill, P.L.L.C. 4801 Woodway, 4801 Woodway, Suite 420-West 420-West 77056-1805 Houston, Texas 77056-1805 622-8338 [[PHONE] (713) 622-8338 PHONE] (713) 586-7053 [[FACSIMILE] FACSIMILE] ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED OF PARTIES IDENTITY OF IDENTITY AND COUNSEL PARTIES AND COUNSEL Party Counsel Consumer USA, Santander Consumer Santander USA, Inc. Donald L. Turbyfill Donald Turbyfill Defena’ant/Cr0ss- Defendant/Cross- dturbyfill@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL dturbyfill@dntlaw.com E-MAIL Plaintiff/Appellant Deborah C. S. Riherd Deborah driherd@dnt1aw.corn [[E-MAIL] driherd@dntlaw.com E-MAIL] W. Hart Vicki W. vhart@dntlaw.corn [[E-MAIL] vhart@dntlaw.com E-MAIL] Devlin, Naylor && Turbyfill, Turbyfill, P.L.L.C. Woodway, Suite 420 4801 Woodway, 4801 West 420 West 77056-1805 Houston, Texas 77056-1805 622-8338 [[PHONE] (713) 622-8338 PHONE] 586-7053 [[FACSIMILE] (713) 586-7053 FACSIMILE] Trial/Appellate Counsel Mario Mata Mario A. Mata Mata Mario A. Mata Plaintiff/Appellee Mario A. Mata, P.C. 400 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 400 111 78701 Austin, Texas 78701 681-4461 [[PHONE] (512) 681-4461 PHONE] 682-2147 [[FACSIMILE] (512) 682-2147 FACSIMILE] Plaintiff, Pro se Redshift Investigation Inc. David L. Treat David Defendant/Cr0ss- Defendant/Cross- dlt@lstlaw.co1n [[E-MAIL] dlt@lstlaw.com E-MAIL] Defendant/Appellee Lindow Stephens Treat, LLP Lindow LLP Vogue Building The Vogue The 600 Navarro Street, Sixth Floor San Antonio, Texas 78205 227-2200 [[PHONE] (210) 227-2200 PHONE] 227-4602 [[FACSIMILE] (210) 227-4602 FACSIMILE] Trial counsel i Blake Thornton Blake Vandusen Thornton Vandusen Kenefick John S. Kenefick Defendant/Cr0ss- Defendant/Cross- JKenefick@Macdona1dDevin.com [[E-MAIL] JKenefick@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL] Defendant/Appellee John R. Sigety J Si et Macdona1dDeVin.corn [[E-MAIL] JSigety@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL] MacDonald Devin, P.C. MacDonald PC. Tower 3800 Renaissance Tower Elm Street 1201 Elm 1201 75270-2130 Dallas, Texas 75270-2130 744-3300 [[PHONE] (214) 744-3300 PHONE] 747-0942 [[FACSIMILE] (214) 747-0942 FACSIMILE] Trial counsel Centroplex Automobile Centroplex Automobile Karen C. Burgess. Karen Burgess. Recovery, Inc. kburgess@richardsonburgess.com [[E-MAIL] E-MAIL] Defena’ant/Cr0ss- Defendant/Cross- Richardson + LLP + Burgess LLP Defendant/Appellee West 66”‘th Street, Suite 900 221 West 221 900 78701-3445 Austin, Texas 78701-3445 John Thompson John F. Thompson 482-8808 [[PHONE] (512) 482-8808 PHONE] Defena’ant/Cr0ss- Defendant/Cross- 499-8886 [[FACSIMILE] (512) 499-8886 FACSIMILE] Defendant/Appellee Trial counsel ii TABLE OF TABLE CONTENTS OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF PARTIES IDENTITY OF AND COUNSEL. PARTIES AND COUNSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INDEX OF INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STATEMENT OF STATEMENT THE CASE. OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STATEMENT FOR STATEMENT FOR ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ORAL ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FOR REVIEW.. PRESENTED FOR ISSUES PRESENTED ISSUES REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ISSUE NO. ISSUE NO. 1: 1: The trial court erred by The Santander’ s Motion by denying Santander’s Motion Compel Arbitration and Stay of to Compel Mata’s of Case as to Mata’s Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 claims against all Defendants.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . STATEMENT OF STATEMENT OF FACTS. FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Standard of Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Issue no. 1: The trial court erred by 1: The by denying Santander’s Motion Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay of Compel of Case as to Mata’s Mata’s claims against all Defendants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 PRAYER. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFICATE COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 OF COMPLIANCE.. 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 . . 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Vi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Cases Cases Page Page Investments, No. 11-03-00175-CV, v. Taylor Investments, Gililland v. 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 11-03-00175-CV, 2004 LEXIS 8521 8521 App.—East1and 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.). (Tex. App.–Eastland op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In re D. Wilson Constr. D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006).. 196 S.W.3d 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In re FirstMerit Bank, Bank, N.A., S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding).. 52 S.W.3d proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 15 . . . . . . . . . . In re Kellogg Brown Brown & Root, & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2005).. 166 S.W.3d 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In re McKinney, 167 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. 2005). 167 S.W.3d 2005) . ............................ 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In re MHI MHI Partnership, Partnership, S.W.3d 918 (Tex. 7 S.W.3d App.—Houston 1999, App.—Houston 1999, orig. proceeding) proceeding). . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . In re Rubiola, S.W.3d 220 (Tex. 2011).. 334 S.W.3d 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.W.3d 807 273 S.W.3d In re Stanford Group, 273 App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding). (Tex. App.—Houston proceeding) . . . . . . . 16 . . . . . . . . . . . 16 . . . . . . . In re Sun Communications, 86 S.W.3d App.—Austin 2002, orig. proceeding). S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App.—Austin proceeding). . . . . . 15 . . . . . . 7, 8, 15. Weekley Homes, In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127 180 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2005).. 2005) . . .................................... 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jack B. B. Anglin Co. Co. v. v. Tipps, S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992).. 842 S.W.2d 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & Jenkins & Gilchrist v. v. Riggs, S.W.3d 198 87 S.W.3d App.—Da11as 2002, no pet.) 198 (Tex. App.–Dallas pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J.M. Davidson, J.M. Davidson, Inc. Inc. v. Webster, v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003).. 128 S.W.3d 223 2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . USA, Inc. Keytrade USA, v. AIN Inc. v. Temouchent M/ AIN Temouchent M/V, V, 404 F.3d 891 404 891 (5th Cir. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, . . . . . . . . . . .11, 12, . 13 12, 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv Kvaerner ASA Kvaerner ASA v. Bank of V. Bank Tokyo—Mitsubishi, Ltd., of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., New New York York Branch, 210 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 11, 13,14 11, 13, 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mbank Mbank El Paso v. Sanchez, Paso v. S.W.2d 151 836 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1992).. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . McGehee v. Bowman, McGehee v. Bowman, 339 S.W.3d App.—Da11as 2011, no. pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . McMillan McMillan v. v. Computer & Support, Computer Translation Sys & Support, Inc., S.W.3d 477 (Tex. App.–Dallas 66 S.W.3d App.—Da11as 2001, no pet.) 10 pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Motors Corp. Chrysler—Plymouth, Inc., v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, U.S.614 473 U.S. . . . . . . . . .15 614 (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v. Merrill Lynch, Pritzker v. Pierce, Fenner, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Smith, Inc., & 1110 (3rd Cir. 1993). 7 F.3d 1110 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 10 . . . . . . Prudential Sec., v. Marshall, Inc. v. Sec., Inc. S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1995).. 909 S.W.2d 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 . . .15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rachal v. v. Reitz, S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013).. 403 S.W.3d 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SEB, SEB, Inc. v. Campbell, No. Inc. v. 03-10-00375-CV, No. 03-10-00375-CV, 2011 LEXIS 1588 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1588 App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).. (Tex. App.–Austin 10 op.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 9, 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and Codes Statutes and Codes 99U.S.C.§2 U.S.C. § 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...6,15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 U.S.C. §§ 3. 3 ....................................................... 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99U.S.C.§4 U.S.C. § 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...6,15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & Comm. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Code §§ 9.609. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & Rem. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 33.015. Rem. Code 33.015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & Comm. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Code 17.555. 17.555 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & Rem. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 171.021. Rem. Code 171.021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v STATEMENT OF STATEMENT THE CASE OF THE CASE Plaintiff MARIO MATA (“Mata”) filed MARIO A. MATA filed suit against Defendants SANTANDER SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, CONSUMER USA, INC. (“Santander”), CENTROPLEX CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC. INC. (“Centroplex”), BLAKE THORNTON BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN (“Vandusen”), JOHN VANDUSEN THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX JOHN F. THOMPSON CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, RECOVERY, INC. INC. (“Thompson”), (“Thompson”), and and REDSHIFT REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION, INC. (“Redshift”) (collectively called, “Defendants”) asserting INVESTIGATION, common law fraud, trespass, conversion, gross causes of action of breach of contract, common of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. All of negligence, and violations of Mata’s of Mata’s 2003 Chevrolet Suburban of a 2003 claims related to an alleged attempted repossession of pledged by by Mata money debt evidenced by Mata as collateral to secure purchase money by a motor vehicle retail installment contract (“Contract”) held by (CR 3-10.) by Santander. (CR Santander asserted cross-claims against Centroplex, Thompson, Vandusen, and & Rem. Redshift for statutory contribution under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 33.015, Rem. Code & Comm. statutory contribution under Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Code 17.555, 17.555, statutory & Comm. indemnification under Tex. Bus. & indemnification Comm. Code Code 17.555, 17.555, and contractual (CR 47-59.) indemnification against Redshift. (CR indemnification Vandusen asserted a counter-claim against Santander for indemnity and/or Vandusen contribution and asserted cross-claims against Redshift for indemnity and/or (CR 20-23.) contribution. (CR Redshift asserted cross-claims for contribution, indemnity, and breach of (CR 28-46.) contract against Centroplex. (CR -1- filed a Motion Santander filed Compel Arbitration and Stay of Motion to Compel of Case, seeking an (CR 60- Mata’s claims against all Defendants be submitted to arbitration. (CR order that Mata’s The trial court granted the motion as to the claims between Santander and Mata, 96.) The (CR 251-255.) but denied the motion as to all other claims. (CR FOR ORAL STATEMENT FOR STATEMENT ARGUMENT ORAL ARGUMENT The Court should grant oral argument for the following reasons: The a. would give the Court a more Oral argument would more complete understanding of of the facts presented in this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.1(c). b. would significantly Oral argument would significantly aid the Court in deciding the case. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e), 38.l(e), 39.1(d). FOR REVIEW PRESENTED FOR ISSUES PRESENTED ISSUES REVIEW Issue No. 1: The trial court erred by 1: The Motion to by denying Santander’s Motion Compel Arbitration and Stay of Case as to Mata’s Compel Mata’s claims against all Defendants. STATEMENT OF STATEMENT OF FACTS FACTS On or about December On December 1, BAY CITY 1, 2002, BAY INVESTIGATIONS (“Bay City”) CITY INVESTIGATIONS DRIVE FINANCIAL and DRIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES SERVICES (“Drive Financial”) entered into a Service Agreement (“Service Agreement”) Agreement Agreement”) whereby Drive Financial secured the services of Bay of motor vehicles in which Bay City to take possession of which Drive Financial held an (CR 68-70, 81-85.) Bay interest. (CR now known Bay City is now known as Redshift. (CR 70.) Drive Redshift. (CR name of assumed name Financial is an assumed (CR 70, 86-94. )) of Santander. (CR On December On December 28, 2002 Mata and Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. (“Seller”) executed 2002 Mata (CR 68-72.) The the Contract for the purchase and finance of the vehicle. (CR The Contract money of the purchase price and granted a purchase money provided for terms of payment of -2- security interest in the vehicle which was perfected by which was by notation on a Texas certificate certificate (CR 68-74.) Thereafter, the Seller assigned the Contract to Arcadia Financial, of title. (CR (CR 68- Auto is the successor-in-interest to Arcadia. (CR Ltd. (“Arcadia”). CitiFinancial Auto 70, 73-74, 91-94.) In January 2009, Mata Amendment Agreement Mata entered into an Amendment Agreement with (CR 68-70, 75-80). Under Auto to modify the terms of the Contract. (CR CitiFinancial Auto Under Amendment Agreement, CitiFinancial Auto of the Amendment the terms of Auto agreed to reduce the annum to 4.0% 12.82% per annum Contract rate of interest from 12.82% Mata promised 4.0% per annum; Mata to pay $1 1,448.67, plus interest at the reduced Contract rate of interest in twenty-three pay $11,448.67, (23) monthly installment payments of $518.70, $5 1 8 .70, beginning February 23, 2009, with the December 23, 2010. (CR on December final installment being due on (CR 68-70, 75-80.) As consideration for CitiFinancial Auto’s As Auto’s agreement to modify the terms of of the Amendment Agreement Contract as set forth in the Amendment Agreement and to forbear exercising its remedies after default under the Contract, Mata Amendment Agreement Mata agreed in the Amendment Agreement may against CitiFinancial Auto, its agents, Mata may that any claims or disputes that Mata successors, or assigns that arise out of or relate to the Contract or any relationship who did not sign the Contract shall, at Mata’s with any third parties who Mata’s or CitiFinancial Auto’s election, be resolved by Auto’s by arbitration. (CR 68-70, 75-80.) All terms and arbitration. (CR provisions of the Contract remained in full force and effect except those expressly modified by modified Amendment Agreement. (CR by the Amendment (CR 68-70, 75-80.) -3- The Amendment Agreement The Arbitration Provision of the Amendment Agreement states as follows: Any claim or dispute . . . whether in contract, tort or otherwise Any . . . (including, without limitation, interpretation and the scope of of this of any issue and matters relating to the provision, the arbitrability of consummation, servicing, collection or enforcement of this contract or note) between [Mata] and [CitiFinancial Auto] or [CitiFinancial Auto’s] between [Mata] which arise out of or relate to employees, agents, successors or assigns which this contract or note or any resulting transaction or relationship who do not sign this including any such relationship with third parties who contract or note shall, at [Mata’s] or [CitiFinancial Auto’s] election (or the election of any such third party) party) be resolved byby neutral, binding arbitration and not by by court action. . . . upon and inures to the benefit . . . This Arbitration Provision is binding upon benefit of our respective heirs, successors, and assigns. (CR 68-70, 77, 80.) The (CR “The Federal The Arbitration Provision further states that “The (CR 68-70, 77, 80.) Arbitration Act governs this Arbitration Provision.” (CR On or about June 1, On 1, 2010, Redshift and Centroplex entered into a Collateral Agreement (“Recovery Agreement”). Recovery Agreement The Recovery Agreement Agreement”). The Agreement recites that Redshift contracts with financial institutions to recover secured collateral, and that Centroplex is in the business of recovering personal property and “wishes to establish a relationship with Redshift Investigation in order to receive recovery assignments . . .” . . (CR 170-182.) .” (CR 170-182.) On September 6, 2010, Santander became On became the servicer of the Contract as modified by modified Amendment Agreement, and subsequently became by the Amendment became the owner owner and (CR 68-70.) holder. (CR Mata alleges that despite Redshift’s acknowledgment Mata acknowledgment of Santander’s receipt of payment in full Redshift hired Centroplex to repossess the vehicle, on February 23, -4- Mata suffered physical injuries during the course of a repossession of the 201 1 Mata 2011 vehicle by Centroplex employee Vandusen by (CR 6.) Vandusen (CR Mata brought suit against Santander for breach of the Contract and against all Mata common law fraud, trespass, gross negligence, violations Defendants for conversion, common of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act relating to the alleged attempted repossession. (CR Mata alleges that Redshift is an agent of (CR 3-10.) Mata of Santander; that Vandusen is an employee of Centroplex; that Centroplex is the agent of Redshift; and Vandusen Thompson is the owner that Thompson owner of Centroplex. (CR 3-10.) Centroplex. (CR Redshift does not deny that it Agreement with Santander, it executed the Service Agreement and concedes that it Agreement with Centroplex. it entered into the Recovery Agreement (CR 31, Centroplex. (CR 97.) Centroplex concedes that it Agreement with Redshift it entered into the Recovery Agreement Vandusen to repossess Mata’s to conduct repossessions; and that Centroplex tasked Vandusen Mata’s vehicle. (CR 118-119, (CR 118-119, 165-182.) 165-182.) Thompson, and Santander asserted cross-claims against Redshift, Centroplex, Thompson, Vandusen for indemnification, Vandusen (CR 47- indemnification, contribution, and proportionate responsibility (CR 59.) Vandusen asserted a counter-claim against Santander for indemnity and/or Vandusen contribution and asserted cross-claims against Redshift for indemnity and/or contribution. Redshift asserted cross-claims for contribution, indemnity, and breach (CR 28-46.) of contract against Centroplex. (CR -5- filed a Motion Santander filed Compel and Stay of Motion to Compel of Case, seeking an order that Mata submit his claims against all Defendants to arbitration, since all of his claims Mata (CR 60-96.) The arise out of or relate to the Contract. (CR The trial court granted the motion with regard to the claims between Santander and Mata, but denied the motion as to (CR 251-255.) claims. (CR all other claims. ARGUMENT ARGUMENT Review Standard of Review Standard Whether an enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists is a legal question that the Whether appellate court reviews de novo. Rachal Rachal v. S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. 2013). v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration, the appellate by the court defers to the trial court’s factual determinations that are supported by Id.; J.M. evidence but reviews the trial court’s legal determinations de novo. Id.; J.M. Davidson, Davidson, Inc. Inc. v. Webster, 128 v. Webster, S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003). 128 S.W.3d Issue No. 1: The trial court erred by 1: The Motion to by denying Santander’s Motion Compel Arbitration and Stay of Case as to Mata’s Compel Mata’s claims against all Defendants. The trial court erred in denying Santander’s motion to compel arbitration as to The was a valid agreement to arbitrate, Mata’s claims against all Defendants because there was Mata’s Mata’s claims were within the scope of the Arbitration Clause. and Mata’s A party seeking to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act A (“FAA”) must establish (1) a valid (“FAA”) Valid agreement to arbitrate and (2) that the claims §§ 2, 3, 4; In re Kellogg Brown raised are within the agreement’s scope. 9 U.S.C. §§ & Brown & Root, Inc., 166 Root, S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. 2005). 166 S.W.3d -6- Texas procedure controls the determination of whether claims fall within the scope of the arbitration clause, regardless of whether the arbitration agreement FAA or the Texas Arbitration Act ("TAA"). invokes the FAA ("TAA"). In re MHI MHI Partnership, Partnership, 7 S.W.3d 918, 921 S.W.3d App.—Houston 1999, 921 (Tex. App.—Houston 1999, orig. proceeding). proceeding). The TAA provides The TAA upon the application of a party showing that a court shall order the parties to arbitrate upon an agreement to arbitrate and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate. arbitrate. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. & Code Ann. §§ 171.021(a)(1),(2). Rem. Code 171 .021(a)(1),(2). If If a party opposing an application denies the of the agreement, the court shall summarily determine that issue. Id. at (b). existence of The may summarily decide whether to compel arbitration on the basis of The trial court may of stipulations. MHI, affidavits pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. S.W.3d at 922 (citing Jack MHI, 7 S.W.3d B. Anglin Co. B. Co. v. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268-69 (Tex. 1992)). S.W.2d Ifthe 1992)). If the opposing party fails to present such controverting evidence, the trial court has no discretion but to arbitration. MHI, summarily grant the movant's motion to compel arbitration. MHI, 7 S.W.3 at 922; see S.W.2d at 270 (the court must accept as true the clear, direct, and also, Anglin, 842 S.W.2d also, positive evidence of an undisputed affidavit, affidavit, even of a party's agent). Absent fraud, bound by misrepresentation, or deceit, parties are bound of an arbitration by the terms of agreement. See In re McKinney, 167 agreement. S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. 2005); SEB, 167 S.W.3d SEB, Inc. Inc. v. v. 03-10-00375-CV, 2011 Campbell, No. 03-10-00375-CV, LEXIS 1588, 201 1 Tex. App. LEXIS *9 (Tex. App.–Austin 1588, *9 App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). The first question for this Court is whether there exists an agreement for The which is reviewed de novo. Rachal, 403 arbitration, which S.W.3d at 843 (Tex. 2013); In 403 S.W.3d re FirstMerit Bank, S.W.3d 749, 753-54 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d proceeding); In -7- Sun Communications, 86 S.W.3d re Sun App.—Austin 2002, orig. S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—Austin proceeding) Whether an arbitration agreement is binding on a non-party proceeding) (per curiam). Whether implicates the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate and is therefore a gateway Homes, L.P., 180 Weekley Homes, matter for the trial court to decide. See In re Weekley S.W.3d 127, 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005); McGehee 130 v. Bowman, McGehee v. App.—Dallas S.W.3d 820, 826 (Tex. App.—Dallas Bowman, 339 S.W.3d 2011, no. pet.). The Amendment Agreement The Amendment Agreement contains an Arbitration Provision Mata agrees to arbitrate, at Mata’s whereby Mata Mata’s or Santander’s election (as CitiFinancial Auto’s successor and assignee) any claim or dispute arising out of Auto’s of the Contract, including any claim or dispute between Mata and any third parties relating to a between Mata (CR 68-70, 75-80.) And, neither Mata, relationship resulting from the Contract. (CR Vandusen presented any evidence to controvert Thompson, nor Vandusen Redshift, Centroplex, Thompson, the existence of the Arbitration Clause or presented any evidence that the arbitration was procured by clause was (CR 117-152, by fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. (CR 153-15 5, 117-152, 153-155, Mata’s claims relating to 202-210.) Thus, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists as to Mata’s the Contract. by Redshift, Centroplex, While the Arbitration Provision is not signed by Thompson, or Vandusen, that is not determinative of whether there exists a valid Thompson, S.W.3d at 738. There are six recognized 166 S.W.3d agreement to arbitrate. Kellogg, 166 common principles of contract and agency law, that may theories, arising out of common may bind by reference; (2) agreements: (1) incorporation by non-signatories to arbitration agreements: assumption; (3) agency; (4) alter ego; (5) equitable estoppel, and (6) third-party assumption; Id. at 739. beneficiary. Id. -8- The scope of The may be extended to claims against agents of an arbitration agreement may of the principal when when the agents’ allegedly wrongful acts relate to their behavior as agents and when by the when those acts are within the scope of the claims covered by arbitration provisions. provisions. SEB, 2011 LEXIS 1588, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1588, at *13; Gililland v. Taylor 12. 11-O3-00175-CV, 2004 Investments, No. 11-03-00175-CV, Investments, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8521, *8-9 LEXIS *8-9 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.); McMillan App.–Eastland McMillan v. Computer Translation v. Computer & Support, Systems & S.W.3d 477, 481 Support, Inc., 66 S.W.3d App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). 481 (Tex. App.–Dallas “agent” includes those persons or entities for whom The term “agent” The would be whom a party would vicariously liable. & Gilchrist v. Jenkins & S.W.3d 198, v. Riggs, 87 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex. App.–Dallas A secured creditor is vicariously liable for a breach of App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.). A of by its independent contractor during an attempted repossession the peace committed by of collateral. & Comm. collateral. Tex. Bus. & Code §§ 9.609(b)(2); Mbank Comm. Code Mbank El Paso Paso v. v. Sanchez, S.W.2d 151, 836 S.W.2d 153-54 (Tex. 1992). 151, 153-54 When a duty is imposed by 1992). When by law on the basis by of concerns for public safety, the party with the duty cannot escape that duty by it to an independent contractor. Mbank, delegating it S.W.2d at 153. Mbank, 836 S.W.2d 153. Therefore, a secured creditor is vicariously liable for breaches of the peace committed by by its contractors. Id. independent contractors. Id. at 153-54. Mata’s petition expressly asserts Santander’s 153-54. Mata’s Vandusen under the liability for the acts or omissions of Redshift, Centroplex and Vandusen Mbank (CR 8.) Mbank doctrine. (CR home from SEB. In SEB, the Campbells purchased a manufactured home SEB. 2011 201 1 Tex. LEXIS 1588 App. LEXIS The Campbells executed an Arbitration Agreement 1588 at *1-2. The Agreement as of their purchase of part of home in which of the home which they agreed to arbitrate all claims and -9- disputes arising out of way to the sale, purchase or occupancy of of or relating in any way of the was signed by Agreement was home. Id. at *8-9. However, the Arbitration Agreement Sam Bath, by Sam SEB's president, on behalf SEB's behalfof"Circle B Homes." of "Circle B Homes." Id. The Campbells sued SEB, Id. at *3. The 967—as the seller of real property Bath, Larry Cousins (a salesman for SEB), as well 967—as home was which the home on which was located—and located—and 967's general partner and vice president home and real property. of action relating to the sale of the home asserting several causes of Id. at *2. Id. SEB, Bath, and Cousins (collectively, “Circle B”) moved to compel B”) moved compel ammmmn%mflwCmmmm¥dmmaymmCmbB.MJHU.flwnmcwn arbitration as to the Campbells’ claims against Circle B. Id. at *3. The trial court Id. denied the motion. Id. Agreement was This Court found that the Arbitration Agreement by was not only enforceable by Agreement also applied to the Campbells’ SEB, but that the Arbitration Agreement Campbells’ claims against Bath and Cousins, even though they were not signatories to the agreement. Id. at *12-13. The Campbells specifically alleged that their claims against Bath and The employment of actions taken within the course and scope of their employment Cousins arose out of Campbells’ claims against Bath and Cousins all arose out of or with SEB, and the Campbells’ were related to the Campbells’ Campbells’ purchase of the home. Id. 13-14. This Court ruled Id. at 13-14. that “[e]xtending the scope of an arbitration provision to an agent of the party who who agreed to arbitration furthers the policy favoring arbitration and the parties‘ parties' intent to forum for resolving disputes arising under an agreement. provide a single forum agreement. Id.; see S.W.3d at 481 McMillan, 66 S.W.3d 481 (citing Pritzker v. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, Lynch, Pierce, & Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, Smith, 1121 (3rd Cir. 1993)). 1110, 1121 1993)). -10- Mata alleges that Santander is vicariously liable as a matter of law for the Mata “agents” of Santander, Thompson, and Vandusen, as “agents” actions of Redshift, Centroplex, Thompson, Mata’s vehicle. Redshift does not deny that in the course of the repossession of Mata’s acting on behalf of Santander it Mata’s vehicle. it engaged Centroplex to repossess Mata’s CENTROPLEX admits that acting on behalf of Redshift, itit “tasked” Vandusen CENTROPLEX who Vandusen who Mata’s vehicle -— Santander’s collateral. did, in fact, repossess Mata’s collateral. Thus, these non- bound to the Arbitration Provision. And, it signatories are bound would further public it would Plaintiffs claims against all Defendants in this case to policy favoring arbitration for Plaintiff’s forum in an arbitration proceeding. be resolved in a single forum As such, the trial court proceeding. As Plaintiffs claims erred in denying Santander’s motion to compel arbitration as to Plaintiff’s against the other defendants who Provision. who were non-signatories to the Arbitration Provision. Furthermore, the other Defendants, as non-signatories to the Contract are bound by reference. See, bound to arbitration under the theory of incorporation by 166 See, Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739; Keytrade USA, S.W.3d USA, Inc. v. AIN Inc. v. AIN Temouchent 404 F.3d 891, 896-97 Temouchent M/V, 404 Kvaerner ASA (5th Cir. 2005); Kvaerner v. Bank ASA v. 0fT0ky0—M1'tsubishi, Bank of Ltd., New Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., York Branch, New York 266-67 (4th Cir. 2000). 210 F.3d 262, 266-67 & Compagnie In Keytrade, Societe Nationale de Transports Maritimes & Compagnie ("CNAN"), the owner Nationale Algerienne de Navigation Maritime ("CNAN"), owner of the bulk Temouchent M/V, entered into a time charter party with Progress Bulk carrier Ain Temouchent Temouchent to Progress Bulk Carriers, Inc. ("Progress Bulk"), providing the Ain Temouchent Bulk for A charter party of $ 6,000 per day. Id. at 892. A a period of six to ten months at a cost of by name. Id. is a specialized form of contract for the hire of an entire ship, specified by -11- at n. 1. A time charter provides for the charterer to obtain the vessel for a fixed 1. A fixed period of time; a voyage charter provides for the charterer to obtain the vessel for the of a voyage. Id. length of The time charter at issue contained an arbitration clause, Id. The which which stated that "all disputes arising out of this contract . . . shall be referred to . . . London." Id. arbitration in London." Id. Bulk subsequently entered into a voyage charter with Keytrade A.G. Progress Bulk USA ("KUSA"), company of Keytrade USA ("KAG"), a Swiss corporation and the parent company ("KAG"), ("KUSA"), a Chicago-based subsidiary that sells fertilizer to customers in the United States. Id. Bulk/KAG voyage charter contained an arbitration clause that "any The Progress Bulk/KAG The dispute arising under this Charter Party [was] to be referred to Arbitration in London." Id. London." Id. The Bulk/KAG voyage charter also provided that a "Congen" The Progress Bulk/KAG "Congen" bill was to be utilized. Id. The of lading was Congen bill of lading stated that "all terms The Congen and conditions, liberties and exceptions of the Charter Party, dated as overleaf, Law and Arbitration Clause, are herewith incorporated." Id. at 893. including the Law Congen bill of lading, however, did not specify which The Congen The was which charter party was incorporated—the time charter between CNAN and Progress Bulk, or the voyage between CNAN charter between Progress Bulk KAG. Id. Bulk and KAG. Id. at 894. Pursuant to the Progress Bulk/KAG voyage charter, cargo was Bulk/KAG was loaded onto the Ain Temouchent, KUSA was Temouchent, KUSA was Temouchent signed the of the Ain Temouchent given a bill of lading for the cargo, and the master of bill oflading of lading on behalf of CNAN. Id. of CNAN. Id. at 892-93. -12- The shipment arrived 16 The KUSA filed suit against Progress Bulk 16 days late, and KUSA Bulk CNAN in personam and CNAN Temouchent in rem personam and the Ain Temouchent rem for breach of the bill of of CNAN moved lading. Id. at 893. CNAN KUSA's claims based on moved to compel arbitration of KUSA's of lading incorporated the arbitration agreement by the theory that the bill of by reference. Id. The district court denied the motion. Id. The Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that KUSA, On KUSA, although itit was was a non-signatory KAG, was Bulk and KAG, to the arbitration agreement between Progress Bulk was required to Bulk/KAG arbitrate its dispute because the bill of lading incorporated the Progress Bulk/KAG voyage charter and arbitration clause by The Fifth Circuit by reference. Id. at 896. The explained that it it has never held that “an may only be found “an agreement to arbitrate may from the four corners of the document.” Id. at 896. Rather, “there are exceptions to the four corners rule,” and thus the “charter’s arbitration clause established in [the of lading] a right to parties to the bill of compel arbitration. arbitration. Id. at Id. 896-97. In Kvaemer, BCH Energy entered into a Construction Agreement Kvaerner, BCH Agreement with a of constructing a waste-to-energy oint venture for the purpose of general contractor as a jjoint plant in Fayetteville, North North Carolina. 210 The Construction Agreement 210 F.2d at 264. The Agreement of or relating contained a broad arbitration clause requiring that disputes "arising out of Agreement be submitted to arbitration in North to" the Agreement A North Carolina. Id. at 265. A syndicate of banks, including The Bank of The Bank financing for the project. of Tokyo, provided financing Id. at Id. Agreements to "irrevocably and 264. Kvaerner and Jones executed Guaranty Agreements guarantee[] the punctual performance of each and every obligation unconditionally guarantee[] of [the joint joint venture] under the [Construction] Agreement." Id. [Construction] Agreement." Id. at 264. -13- The Guaranties could be enforced against Kvaerner and Jones in the event the The joint joint venture did not Agreement. Id. perform its duties under the Construction Agreement. The Id. The and Jones "shall Guaranties provided that Kvaerner and same rights and “shall have the same remedies of [the joint [Construction] Agreement." Id. joint venture] under the [Construction] The Id. at 265. The Bank of Tokyo Bank Tokyo signed the Guaranties on behalf of the banks. The banks. Id. at 264. The Agreement and Guaranty Agreement Construction Agreement became in default due to failure Agreement became make payment on the banks' of the project to make banks’ financing, Bank of financing, and the Bank Tokyo of Tokyo brought suit against Kvaerner and Jones for breach of the Guaranty Agreements. Id. Id. The Bank of The Fourth Circuit found that the Bank was bound Tokyo was of Tokyo bound to arbitrate its was Agreement was claims against Kvaerner and Jones because the Construction Agreement The Fourth Circuit held that although Id. at 265. The incorporated into the Guaranties. Id. the Guaranties did not specifically reference arbitration, because the Construction Agreement contained an arbitration clause, the provision of the Guaranties that gave Agreement Agreement to Kvaerner and Jones also the rights and remedies under the Construction Agreement of or related granted Kvaerner and Jones the right to arbitrate disputes that arose out of Agreement by to the Construction Agreement by reference. Id. by incorporation by Id. at 265-66. Agreement between Here, the Service Agreement SCUSA and Redshift, and the Recovery between SCUSA Agreement upon and incorporate by Agreement between Redshift and Centroplex are dependent upon by by Mata, that reference the retail installment contracts, such as the Contract executed by which Redshift and Centroplex are grant a security interest in the collateral and for which to provide recovery services for such collateral. The Service Agreement collateral. The Agreement provides that “[SCUSA] hereby engages the services of “[SCUSA] of [Redshift] to perform investigation and -14- owned by specific accounts receivable, owned recovery services for specific [SCUSA] and placed by [SCUSA] which of all accounts which with [Redshift]. Redshift agrees to undertake collection of [SCUSA] (CR 81-85.) The [SCUSA] decides to place with [Redshift]...." (CR The Recovery Agreement Agreement provides that Redshift contracts with financial financial institutions to recover secured collateral, and that Centroplex is in the business of recovering personal property and “wishes to establish a relationship with Redshift Investigation in order to receive (CR 170-182) assignments...” (CR recovery assignments....” 170-182) (emphasis added). The Service Agreement added). The Agreement Agreement incorporate by and the Recovery Agreement by reference the underlying retail which recovery services will be provided and are dependent installment contracts for which upon upon secured transactions, such as the Contract. All repossessors derive a benefit benefit from such retail installment contracts that are incorporated by by reference into the Agreement and the Recovery Agreement Service Agreement Agreement by As engagement in repossession. As by engagement bound to such, the other Defendants, as non-signatories to the Contract, are bound of incorporation by arbitration under the theory of by reference. The second question is whether the arbitration agreement covers the claims The §§ 2, 4; In re D. before the court. 9 U.S.C. §§ Wilson Constr. D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 781 196 S.W.3d 781 Any doubt regarding coverage of the dispute is resolved in favor of (Tex. 2006). Any arbitration because both Texas and federal policies have clearly expressed a arbitration. Mitsubishi Motors preference for arbitration. Corp. v. Motors Corp. Chrysler—Plymouth, Inc. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. Sec., Inc. S.W.2d 896, 899 v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d S.W.3d at 753-54; Sun Communications, 1995); FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d (Tex. 1995); Communications, Inc., 86 S.W.3d at 317. S.W.3d .15- -15- "To determine whether a claim falls within the scope of the agreement, courts "To ‘focus on the factual allegations of must `focus of the complaint, rather than the legal causes 334 S.W.3d asserted."‘ In re Rubiola, 334 of action asserted.'" S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. 2011) (quoting Prudential, 909 S.W.2d Prudential, 909 S.W.3d 807, 813 (Tex. S.W.2d at 900); In re Stanford Group, 273 S.W.3d App.—Houston [14th App.—Houston ("We look at the facts alleged, [l4th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding) ("We rather than the legal causes of actions presented, presented, and consider whether the facts touch A plain reading of the by the underlying arbitration agreement." A matters covered by Mata is bound Arbitration Provision leaves no doubt that Mata bound to submit his claims 68-70M 77, 80.) Under (CR 68-70M asserted in the underlying suit to arbitration. (CR Under the Mata agreed to submit to arbitration his claims or disputes that Arbitration Provision, Mata relate to the Contract, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, including, the of the Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of interpretation and scope of of any issue, and any matters relating to the consummation, servicing, collection, or (CR 68-70, 77, 80.) All of enforcement of the Contract. (CR Mata’s claims against all of of Mata’s of the defendants in this case arise out of and relate to the servicing, collection, or enforcement of the Contract in the alleged attempt to repossess the vehicle that secured payment of Mata specifically of the Contract. Mata specifically alleges an agency relationship between between the Defendants in this case. Mata’s claims asserted against all Defendants are within the Arbitration Thus, Mata’s Motion to Provision’s scope, and the trial court clearly erred in denying Santander’s Motion Compel Arbitration and stay of Compel Mata’ s claims against the other Defendants. of case as to Mata’s Defendants. -15- -16- PRAYER PRAYER WHEREFORE, WHEREFORE, PREMISES PREMISES CONSIDERED, CONSIDERED, Appellant, SANTANDER SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, CONSUMER USA, INC., fully prays that this Court grant oral argument on this appeal, and thereafter, reverse the trial court’s order denying Santander’s motion to Mata’s claims against the other Defendants, enter an order compel arbitration as to Mata’s Mata’s claims in the underlying cause of action, and compelling arbitration of all of Mata’s for all other and further relief which Santander Consumer relief to which may show USA, Inc. may Consumer USA, show itself to be justly entitled. Respectfully submitted, DEVLIN, NAYI DEVLIN, NAYLOR & & TURBYFILL, TURBYFILL, P.L.L.C. iOR DONALD L. TURBYFILL DONALD TURBYFILL 20296380 State Bar of Texas # 20296380 ddturbyfill@dntlaw.com turbyfill@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL] E-MAIL] DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD DEBORAH RIHERD 24038904 State Bar of Texas # 24038904 driherd@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL] E-MAIL] VICKI W. VICKI HART W. HART 24046037 State Bar of Texas # 24046037 vhart@dntlaw.com [[E-MAIL] E-MAIL] Woodway, Suite 420-West 4801 Woodway, 4801 420-West 77056-1805 Houston, Texas 77056-1805 622-8338 [[PHONE] (713) 622-8338 PHONE] (713) 586-7053 [[FACSIMILE] FACSIMILE] ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEYS APPELLANT FOR APPELLANT SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. -17- CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFICATE COMPLIANCE OF COMPLIANCE was produced on a computer using Corel document was I certify that this document WordPerfect X5X5 and contains 3,821 by the computer software's 3,821 words, as determined by word-count function, excluding the sections of of the document listed in Tex. R. App. docyiment P. 9.4(i)(1). 9.4(i)(1). DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD DEBORAH RIHERD CERTIFICATE OF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE SERVICE The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy The of the above copy of was served upon and foregoing instrument was upon the following parties either electronically manager or in the alternative served by filing manager through an electronic filing by fax prior to 5:00 December 31, by mail, commercial delivery service, or email, on December p.m., in person, by 2014: 2014: Mata Mario A. Mata Mario Kenefick John S. Kenefick Mario PLLC Mario A. Mata, PLLC JKenefick@MacdonaldDevin.com [[E-MAIL] JKenefick@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL] 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 111 John R. Sigety 78701 400Austin, Texas 78701 J Sigety@Macdona1dDevin.com [[E-MAIL] JSigety@MacdonaldDevin.com E-MAIL] 681-4461 [[PHONE] (512) 681-4461 PHONE] MacDonald Devin, P.C. MacDonald 682-2147 [[FACSIMILE] (512) 682-2147 FACSIMILE] 3800 Renaissance Tower 3800 Tower APPELLEE, pro se APPELLEE, Elm Street 1201 Elm 1201 75270-2130 Dallas, Texas 75270-2130 David L. Treat David 744-3300 [[PHONE] (214) 744-3300 PHONE] dlt@1st1aw.com [[E-MAIL] dlt@lstlaw.com E-MAIL] 747-0942 [[FACSIMILE] (214) 747-0942 FACSIMILE] Lindow Stephens Treat, LLP Lindow LLP ATTORNEYS FOR ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE APPELLEE The Vogue Building The Vogue BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN 600 Navarro Street, Sixth Floor San Antonio, Texas 78205 Karen C. Burgess Karen 227-2200 [[PHONE] (210) 227-2200 PHONE] kburgess@richardsonburgess.com [[E-MAIL] E-MAIL] 227-4602 [[FACSIMILE] (210) 227-4602 FACSIMILE] Richardson + LLP + Burgess LLP ATTORNEY FOR ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES APPELLEES 221 West 66"‘th Street, Suite 900 221 West REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION 78701-3445 Austin, Texas 78701-3445 INC. 482-8808 [[PHONE] (512) 482-8808 PHONE] 499-8886 [[FACSIMILE] (512) 499-8886 FACSIMILE] ATTORNEY FOR ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES APPELLEES CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, RECOVERY, INC. AND JOHN AND JOHN F. THOMPSON THOMPSON ,j:. DEBORAH C. S. RIHERD DEBORAH RIHERD -18- NO. 03-14-00782-CV NO. 03-14-00782-CV THE THIRD IN THE IN COURT OF THIRD COURT APPEALS OF APPEALS AT AUSTIN, AT TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. Appellant, v. V. MARIO A. MATA, MARIO MATA, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC., THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX JOHN F. THOMPSON JOHN AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC. REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION, REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION, INC., and BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, Appellees. APPELLANT’S APPENDIX APPELLANT’S APPENDIX LIST OF LIST DOCUMENTS OF DOCUMENTS Necessary Contents: Consumer USA, Order on Defendant Santander Consumer USA, Inc.’s Motion to Compel Inc. ’s Motion Compel Arbitration and Plea in Abatement . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 11 Abatement .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amendment Agreement Amendment Agreement (with TAB 2 (With Arbitration Provision). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 3 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... TAB 9 U.S.C. §§ 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 U.S.C. §§ 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 4 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... TAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB 5 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... TAB 9 U.S.C. §§ 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & Comm. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code TAB 6 Code §§ 9.609. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & Rem. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Code Ann. §§ 171.021. Rem. Code TAB 7 171.021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _Vi_ -vi- TAB 1 TAB Flled In The District Court of Travis county. Texas DEC e 2 201‘; M M4. ’ Mm Mm At ._-_,.._. N0. D-1-GN-13 000677 _ MARIO A. MATA IN THE DISTRICT COURT VS. ¢0'3¢0>€O2®D CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY,§ TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS INC., BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, § JOHN F. THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX § AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC., § SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., § and REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION INC. § 353” JUDICIAL DISTRICT ORDER ON DEFENDANT SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.’S MQIION TQ COMEEL ARBITRATION AND PLEA IN QATEMENT CAME to be heard on August 6, 2014, the MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY OF CASE, filed herein by Defendant SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC., Movant and Defendant herein. Afier notice and hearing, and upon the review of the motion, any responses and replies submitted thereto, and the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Motion should be granted in part, and denied in part. It is therefore, ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED with regard to the claims of Plaintiff MARIO A. MATA (‘Plaintiff’) against Defendant SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. (“Santander"), only, and that those claims of Plaintiff against Santander must be submitted to arbitration in a manner provided by the arbitration agreement dated January 9, 2009. It is further, ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED with regard to all other claims, including Plaintiffs claims and Santander’s cross-claims, against Defendants CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC., BLAKE THORNTON VANDUSEN, JOHN F. THOMPSON d/b/a CENTROPLEX AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY, INC., and REDSHIFT INVESTIGATION INC. It is further, tn-’H ' 4"" GS) ORDERED that not later than thi 0) days from the date of this Order, Plaintiff must ‘,4 1,( \ ‘l initiate arbitration of his claims against Santander with the American Arbitration Association or the National Arbitration Forum. It is further, ORDERED that Santander shall pay to the American Arbitration Association or the National Arbitration Forum the filing fee required by applicable rules in excess of the filing fee paid by Plaintiff in the above—styled and numbered cause of action; and further, Santander shall pay to the administrator all other administrative costs of the arbitration proceeding. It is further, ORDERED that if Plaintiff does not initiate arbitration timely pursuant to this Order, Plaintifi’s claims against Santander may be dismissed on proper motion and after hearing. It is further, ORDERED that pending arbitration ofthe claims brought by Plaintiff against Santander, the entirety of this litigation is hereby STAYED until further order of the Court. SIGNED: D£€£.H\5GL L ,2o14. JUDG1 PRESIDIN ’\\M so Order on Defendant Santander Consumer USA, Inc.'s Motion to Cornpel Arbitration and Plea in Abatement Page 2 AGREED AS TO FORM ONLY: AGREED AS TO FORM ONLY: Vfifzf DEVLIN, NAYLOR & TURBYFILL, P.L.L.C. LINDOW STEPHENS TREAT LLP _@.\-.u..Uu.a-.k.m. .HZ0~n.ufl»-N... Z9u.r<$.au0.-Zn my Umunnvuhu urn .30? may v»Z(xw.F R.<~.rZHn.n..uZ0U .5Oxn EPOZ Z0Fr...IL to av nvuhuu .W...- w.0¥ZH¥ E»./\uu.n.~ 30$ nvZu?.n.9U .S\1%\ UE.n..urunv.a.uLW< E2... WVRWK uuwmn $3 02:4. a.rflZ.fi9.L.< (5 .u:0.Guufi K0 O9 mafia ‘ Xmflwk Huawbfi mu._El¢nr( 7: ma 0:!» uS.v 6Rfi.R...:iAH Z°Kk.».v ..< Onvnfiflrubs Wmwa. >QHF€QhaF‘!p#N°’6W§AFwFlx(fidgflH!zH(VFJJ(flVfim0»-.uuiH BIL. .HN¢wxIQWNxIN.Hm W»vfiW|h.N.hllN.-um A-H...v.HUBK Zn uwav. 5.5-. hm .k.Z...-PIUHE uuflc-Th wmunvéwnx hp N-FF miiaxfl \ruuZ° Rm nlvs .flHv/— Z°nk.(v¢uu0.iZu £.....n.7nD.Av0nv4\ 969 nflo .Da.nAvu06.MK umPZJ...Hu>n°U mVuHN .-..H..Hvmuk.¢Q.HVW "3. zMn~fluFuhJh mmefimnuum u ..n._n-...-E-Ervuhru O....ud...>~ uunndwuuu.-... Uunnnvhvh LSHGAH A-Nnulur-.Zn H..>H°Mur.n G2O.Zur.rZu Auuuuv uuukuawnn Un.€4.W .AvZ R.Z< BEE. OH; mNON\mH\fl0 N0 mwqn new.) H in .55 final 0 flaiviflfl ..LnSs»:..vu kink: uivn. ..¢5n:.:n . ulU.u..vnE.n Jovuuuou dvkuflldkfl 90.. ‘NDDN flflifldaflflflflfl F.F.w.u.._.V.k u.R!n:Ew Viihflfl .!!.V 01.» hHh.I¢WHhH!.UHW Hdfififl “uni VDON ‘E Inhvdunl Eu «D E00 .mN ufl IN a9u.HII9flH0N NI M...§.%...unn vs flea U0.?Hnxud. “A8 .mN Faun nnnummuu IE wflvbh. HNO ..nMD:.nD£. flu! fin.......l.x.w Dvdfl din) ..n.n.N Mflduidflfldv ¢0n7.n»c..nu0 ..uBh.kD9.unn Uhvu 55!) unylu NWHIB nan luflu-lulu‘ «unnfl 59 BS... Bbmvuou 0:1 0&0 LP.n.u...r!flfl.W and \q VI .MuuEvHUufl.m .0.ul.< aflnwlunflk .Rw0k>vA ad n.n\¢w.....v..L... Ifinvtv we «fla,~.DV_=LH.V.— B530 “EV 0UI.n.1G.u ba.I1.D.T..Dh..M udaoin d.ifl.mu..THD unkflfl-nr.RHuaM.“v onni .hfllfi:.hU HDXBU Vvflfifi ...u.mv«.d.uu EHWHBE 0£..nJ mt .~flI.m« uni lfl uu,nnn.««o 00:6.-flmu nuulduul , Vnbflfll 0HIfl¢KFmNw.n.«anu «in E3 nu-AV HWKO w<\h...m.M.HunHflW1h l0kh.u .a.n§..un« Ilhuu mtalfinnflu »:uHfih it ABWMMM A-mJ<1u nrwna. K0\flI4 an: BA.» ED ZDHFMKFNWN4 M.a.DMbM.FUH.nsHn xmomh DEN nB..R.HH.N2Mal.PkN~lW (3.; H543 0... -.914 RA. E8 uulvflkuinke Oh. ha Plum! fiAD !.0Hh.OW.w mamfl N-0 Jud lD.m»0.».o0I.u. EEG \n.h( :03uaBaIa.uDB«hu0I«.a.5u.luaMaflndinunosfiqaozms &.u«»Iuv«.-« HBHU AG.«flll¢u.n«»m0 505» mflflunknv dnrlulluflu‘ kw EFDEMHD ENE WV Muufilumfl Vfld EB Ofiuacvuwa MHE. HUQH :n:.€ul MR3..- Hui... Eu hak .u.m.ufl> u.HN val-uluuflllua . §9.nu.v6 a.N!DD ILL. hflw MM! nh.0NNVw mNON\m;n\.flN TAB 3 TAB Page 11 UNITED STATESCODE UNITED STATES CODESERVICE SERVICE Copyright © Copyright 2012 Matthew © 2012 Bender&&Company, MatthewBender Company,Inc. Inc. a member member of theLexisNexis of the Group(TM) LexisNexisGroup (TM) All rights All rights reserved. reserved, *“* through PL Current through *** Current 112-139,approved PL 112-139, 6/27/12*** approved6/27/12 *** TITLE 9.9.ARBITRATION TITLE ARBITRATION CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS G0 to Go the United to the StatesCode UnitedStates CodeService ServiceArchive Directory Archive Directory USCS §§ 2 9 USCS Review expert Review expert commentary fromThe commentaryfrom TheNational NationalInstitute InstituteforforTrial Advocacy Trial preceding Advocacy 9 USCS preceding 9 USCS § 1.§ 1. §§ 2. 2. Validity, irrevocability, and Validity, irrevocability, andenforcement enforcementofofagreements agreementstotoarbitrate arbitrate AA written written provision provision in any maritime in any maritime transaction transaction or or aa contract contractevidencing evidencingaatransaction involvingcommerce transactioninvolving settlebyby commercetotosettle arbitration aa controversy arbitration controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any thereof, or part thereof, an agreement or an agreement inin writing to submit writing to arbitration an submit toto arbitration existingcontroversy anexisting arisingout controversyarising ofsuch outof suchaacontract, contract, transaction, or refusal, transaction, refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation ofof any contract. contract. HISTORY: HISTORY: (July (July 30, 1947,chch392, 30, 1947, 6161 392,§ §1, 1, Stat. Stat. 670.) 670.) HISTORY; ANCILLARYLAWS HISTORY;ANCILLARY LAWSAND ANDDIRECTIVES DIRECTIVES Prior law Prior law and and revision: revision: This This section basedon section isisbased onAct ActFeb‘ Feb.12, 1925,chch213, 12,1925, 213, 43 43 § 2, § 2, 883883 Stat. Stat, (§offormer (§ 2 2 of former Title Title 9), 9). TAB 4 TAB Page 1I UNITED STATESCODE UNITED STATES CODE SERVICE SERVICE Copyright © 2012 Matthew © 2012 Bender&&Company, MatthewBender Company,Inc. Inc. a member member of LexisNexisGroup theLexisNexis ofthe Group(TM) (TM) All All rights reserved. *** Current *** through PL Current through 112-139,approved PL 112-139, 6/27/12**" approved6/27/I2 *** TITLE 9.9. ARBITRATION TITLE ARBITRATION CHAPTER I.1.GENERAL CHAPTER GENERALPROVISIONS PROVISIONS Go Go to theUnited to the StatesCode UnitedStates CodeService Archive Service Directory Archive Directory USCS §§ 3 99 USCS Review expert Review expert commentary fromThe commentaryfrom TheNational NationalInstitute InstituteforforTrial Advocacy Trial preceding Advocacy 9 USCS preceding 9 USCS § 1.§ 1. §§ 3. 3. Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable Stay of referable to to arbitration arbitration If any suit or proceeding be brought in any any of the courts of the United States upon any any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied satisfied that the issue involved involved inin such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of of one of the parties parties stay trial of stay the trial of the the action until been had until such arbitration has been accordance with had in accordance of the with the terms of agreement, agreement, providing providing the the applicant applicant for for the the stay stay is is not not in in default default in in proceeding proceeding with with such such arbitration. arbitration. HISTORY: HISTORY: (July 1947,chch392, 30,1947, (July30, 61 61 392,§ §1, 1, Stat. Stat. 670.) 670.) HISTORY;ANCILLARY HISTORY; ANCILLARYLAWS AND LAWS DIRECTIVES AND DIRECTIVES Prior law and Prior law and revision: revision: This section This basedon sectionisisbased onAct ActFeb. Feb.12, 1925,chch 12,1925, 213, 213, 43 43 § 3, § 3, Stat. Stat. (§ 3(9offormer 883883 3 of former Title Title 9). 9). TAB 5 TAB Page 11 UNITED STATESCODE UNITED STATES CODESERVICE SERVICE Copyright © 2012 Matthew Copyright © 2012 Bender&&Company, MatthewBender Company,Inc. Inc. a member member of theLcxisNexis ofthe Group(TM) LexisNexisGroup (TM) All rights All rights reserved. reserved. ‘** throughPL Current through *** Current 12-139, approved PL 1112-139, 6/27/12‘** approved6/27/12 *** TITLE9.9.ARBITRATION TITLE ARBITRATION CHAPTER CHAPTER1.1.GENERAL GENERALPROVISIONS PROVISIONS Go Go to the United to the StatesCode UnitedStates CodeService Archive Service Directory Archive Directory 9 USCS USCS § §4 Review expertcommentary Review expert fromThe commentaryfrom TheNational NationalInstitute InstituteforforTrial Advocacy Trial preceding Advocacy 9 USCS preceding 9 USCS § 1.§ 1. §§ 4. Failure to arbitrate under 4. Failure under agreement; agreement; petition petition totoUnited UnitedStates courthaving Statescourt havingjurisdiction jurisdictionfor ordertotocompel fororder compel arbitration; notice and arbitration; notice and service service thereof; hearing and thereof; hearing and determination determination AA party party aggrieved aggrieved by by the the alleged alleged failure, failure,neglect, neglect,or orrefusal refusalof ofanother anothertotoarbitrate arbitrateunder writtenagreement underaawritten agreementfor for arbitration may arbitration may petition petition anyany United United States Statesdistrict districtcourt courtwhich, which,save savefor forsuch agreement,would suchagreement, wouldhave jurisdictionunder havejurisdiction under Title 28 Title 28 [28 USCS§§§§1 1etetseq.], [28 USCS in a seq.], in a civil civilaction or in admiralty of the action or in admiralty of the subjectsubject matter matter of a a suit suit arising arising out out of of the the controversy between controversy between the parties, for an the parties, an order directing that that such arbitration proceed such arbitration proceed in the manner provided in the provided for for in such such agreement. Five agreement. Five days’ days’notice writingofofsuch noticeininwriting suchapplication applicationshall servedupon shallbebeserved uponthe theparty partyinindefault. default.Service Servicethereof thereof shall be made shall be madeininthethemanner mannerprovided providedbybythe FederalRules theFederal Rules ofof Civil Civil Procedure Procedure [USCS [USCS Rules Rulesof Civil of Civil Procedure]. Procedure]. TheThe court shall court shall hear hear the the parties, and upon parties, and uponbeingbeing satisfied satisfiedthat themaking thatthe makingof ofthe theagreement agreementfor forarbitration arbitrationororthe thefailure failuretoto comply therewith comply therewith is is not not inin issue, issue, the the court shall make court shall make anan order orderdirecting directingthe partiestotoproceed theparties proceedtotoarbitration arbitrationinin accordance accordance withwith the terms of the terms of the agreement. The the agreement. hearing and The hearing proceedings, under and proceedings, under suchsuch agreement, agreement, shallshall be be within within thethe district in which district in whichthethepetition petitionforforananorder directingsuch orderdirecting sucharbitration filed.IfIfthethemaking arbitrationisisfiled. makingofof thethe arbitration arbitration agreement agreement or or the failure, neglect, or failure, neglect, refusaltotoperfonn or refusal performthe thesame samebebeininissue, issue,the thecourt courtshall proceedsummarily shallproceed summarilyto to thethe trial trial thereof. thereof. If If no jury jury trial be demanded trial be demandedby by the theparty allegedtotobe partyalleged beinindefault, thematter default,ororififthe disputeis iswithin matterinindispute withinadmiralty admiralty jurisdiction, jurisdiction, the court shall hear and shall hear and determine such issue. Where Where such such anan issue isis raised, the the party party alleged to be in default may, may, except in cases of in cases admiralty, on of admiralty, on or or before before the the return return day day of ofthe thenotice noticeof application,demand ofapplication, demandaajury trialofofsuch jurytrial suchissue, issue, and upon such demanddemand the court shall make make an an order referring the issue or issues to a jury jury in the manner provided by by the Federal Rules of Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure[USCS CivilProcedure [USCSRules RulesofofCivil CivilProcedure], Procedure], may or or may specially specially callcall a jury ajury for for thatthat purpose. purpose. If the If the jury find find that no agreement in writing for for arbitration was made arbitration was made or or that there isisno that there defaultininproceeding nodefault proceedingthereunder, thereunder,the the proceeding proceeding shallshall be be dismissed. dismissed. If If the jury find thejury that an find that an agreement agreementfor arbitrationwas forarbitration wasmade writingand madeininwriting andthat thereisisa a thatthere default in default in proceeding proceeding thereunder, thereunder, the the court shall make court shall make an ordersummarily an order summarilydirecting directingthe partiestotoproceed theparties proceedwith withthethe arbitration arbitration in in accordance accordance with with the the terms terms thereof. thereof. HISTORY: HISTORY: (July 30, (July 30,1947, 1947,chch392, 392,§ §1, 1, 61 61 Stat. Stat. 671; 671; Sept. Sept. 3, 1954, 3, 1954, ch 1263, ch 1263,§ 19, §68 19, 68 1233.) Stat. Stat. 1233.) ANCILLARYLAWS HISTORY;ANCILLARY HISTORY; LAWSAND ANDDIRECTIVES DIRECTIVES law and Prior law and revision: revision: This basedon sectionisisbased This section onAct ActFeb. 1925,chch213, 12,1925, Feb.12, 213, 43 43 § 4, § 4, Stat. Stat. (§ 4(§offonner 883883 4 of former Title Title 9). 9). Page 2 99 USCS USCS §§44 Amendments: Amendments: 1954. Act 1954. Act Sept. 3, 1954 Sept. 3, substituted "United 1954 substituted "United States States district district court" for "court court" for "court of the United of the United States“, substituted "Title States", substituted "Title 28, 28, in a civil civil action“ action" for for "the judicialcode "thejudicial codeatatlaw, law,ininequity," substituted"the equity,"substituted "theFederal CivilProcedure" RulesofofCivil FederalRules Procedure" “law forfor "law forfor summons in the jurisdiction the service of summons which the proceeding is jurisdiction in which is brought", and substituted "the Federal Rules of of Civil Procedure" for "law Procedure" for "law for for referring referring to to aajury jury issues issues inin an anequity equityaction" action". TAB 6 TAB Page 11 DOCUMENT of11 DOCUMENT 11 of LeXisNeXis (R) LexisNexis (R) Texas Annotated Statutes © 2014 Copyright © 2014 by Matthew Bender by Matthew & Company, Bender & Company, Inc. member of a member of the LexisNexis Group LeXisNexis Group All rights reserved. *** This document *** *** document is current through the 2013 3rd Called Session *** AND COMMERCE BUSINESS AND BUSINESS COMMERCE CODE CODE TITLE 1. TITLE 1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE CHAPTER 9. SECURED CHAPTER SECURED TRANSACTIONS TRANSACTIONS SUBCHAPTER F. DEFAULT SUBCHAPTER DEFAULT GO TO GO TO TEXAS CODE ARCHIVE TEXAS CODE DIRECTORY ARCHIVE DIRECTORY Tex. Bus. Tex. & Com. Bus. & Code § Com. Code 9. 609 (2014) § 9.609 Take Possession After Default §§ 9.609. Secured Party's Right to Take (a) After default, a secured party: may take possession of (1) may of the collateral; collateral; and may render equipment unusable and dispose of (2) without removal, may on the debtor's premises under of collateral on 9610. Section 9.610. A secured party may (b) A may proceed under Subsection (a): (a): (I) pursuant to judicial (1) judicial process; or (2) without judicial process, if itit proceeds without breach of the peace. may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and (c) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may make it make by the secured party that is reasonably convenient to it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by both parties. parties. HISTORY: Am. HISTORY: Am. Acts 1999, 414 (S.B. 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 414 1058),§§ 1.01, (S.B. 1058), 1.01, effective July 1, 1, 2001. TAB 77 TAB Page 11 LexisNexis (R) Texas LexisNexis (R) Texas Annotated AnnotatedStatutes Statutes Copyright © Copyright © 2012 by Matthew 2012 by Bender&&Company, MatthewBender Company,Inc. Inc. aa member member ofofthe LexisNexisGroup theLexisNexis Group All All rights reserved. “** This document *** This current through is current document is the 2011 through the First Called 2011 First Session *** Called Session *** *** Federal case *** Federal annotations: Apr. case annotations: 26,2012 Apr. 26, postingson 2012postings Lexis*** onLexis *** *** State case annotations: *** annotations: May *** May 10, 2012 postings on Lexis *** CIVIL PRACTICEAND CIVIL PRACTICE ANDREMEDIES REMEDIESCODE CODE TITLE ALTERNATEMETHODS TITLE7.7. ALTERNATE METHODS OFOF DISPUTE RESOLUTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION CHAPTER 171.GENERAL CHAPTER 171. GENERALARBITRATION ARBITRATION SUBCHAPTER B.B.PROCEEDINGS SUBCHAPTER PROCEEDINGS COMPEL TOTO COMPELOR OR STAY ARBITRATIONS STAY ARBITRATIONS GO GO TO TEXASCODE TOTEXAS CODEARCHIVE DIRECTORY ARCHIVE DIRECTORY Tex. Civ. Prac. Tex. Civ. Prac. &&Rem. Rem.Code§ Code §171.021 171.021 (2012) (2012) §§ 171.021. ProceedingtotoCompel 171.021. Proceeding CompelArbitration Arbitration A court shall (a) A showing: shall order the parties to arbitrate on application of a party showing: (1) an agreement (1) an agreement to arbitrate; and to arbitrate; and (2) the (2) opposing party's party’s refusal refusal to to arbitrate. arbitrate. Ifaa party (b) If opposing an party opposing an application made under Subsection application made Subsection (a) (a) denies the existence denies the the agreement, existence of the the court agreement, the court shall summarily summarily determine determine that issue. The that issue. The court shall order court shall orderthe thearbitration arbitrationififititfinds forthe findsfor theparty thatmade partythat madethe the application. If the application. the court find for that party, court does not find deny the application. party, the court shall deny (c) (c) An order compelling An order arbitration must compelling arbitration must include stayof include aa stay anyproceeding ofany subjecttotoSection proceedingsubject Section171.025. 171.025. HISTORY: HISTORY: Enacted Enactedby byActs 1997,75th Acts1997, 75thLeg., Leg., 165 ch.ch. 165 (S.B. (SABI 898), 898), § 5.01, § 5.01, September effective effective 1, 1997. September 1, 1997.