City of Leon Valley, Texas, Unknown Employee(s) of City of Leon Valley, and Irene Baldridge v. Wm. Rancher Estates Joint Venture, Rafael Alfaro, Jose Alfaro, Carman Alfaro, Daniel Bee, Robert Caldwell, Anne Caldwell, Earl Doderer, Sylvia Doderer, James Dowdy, Betty Dowdy, Issac Elizondo, Suzanne Elizondo, Roberto Galindo, Erma Galindo

ACCEPTED
04-14-00542-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
3/4/2015 5:18:52 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK

CASE NO. 04-14-00542-CV

FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
3/4/2015 5:18:52 PM
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk

CITY OF LEON VALLEY, TEXAS,
UNKNOWN EMPLOYEE(S) OF CITYOF LEON VALLEY
and IRENE BALDRIDGE
Appellants

v.

WM. RANCHER ESTATES JOINT VENTURE,
RAFAEL ALFARO, JOSE ALFARO, CARMAN ALFARO, DANIEL BEE,
ROBERT CALDWELL, ANNE CALDWELL,
DEFERENCE SERVICE BUSINESS, INC., EARL DODERER,
SYLVIA DODERER, JAMES DOWDY, BETTY DOWDY, ISSAC
ELIZONDO,
SUZANNE ELINZONDO, ROBERTO GALINDO, ERMA GALINDO,
SHIRL JACKSON, ANNE JACKSON, AND RICARDO A. PADILLA
Appellees

APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF

PATRICK C. BERNAL
CLARISSA M. RODRIGUEZ
DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C.
2517 N. Main Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Telephone: (210) 227-3243
Facsimile: (210) 225-4481
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
 IDENTITY OF COUNSEL

Appellants/Trial Court Defendants:

City of Leon Valley, Texas
Unknown Employee(s) of City of Leon Valley
Irene Baldridge

Appellants’ Counsel:

Patrick C. Bernal
Clarissa M. Rodriguez
Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal Hyde & Zech
A Professional Corporation
2517 N. Main Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Telephone: (210) 227-3243
Facsimile: (210) 225-4481
patrick.bernal@rampage-sa.com
clarissa.rodriguez@rampage-sa.com

Appellees/Trial Court Plaintiffs:

Wm. Rancher Estates Joint Venture
Rafael Alfaro
Jose Alfaro
Carman Alfaro
Daniel Bee
Robert Caldwell
Anne Caldwell
Deference Service Business, Inc.
Earl Doderer
Sylvia Doderer
James Dowdy
Betty Dowdy
Issac Elizondo
Suzanne Elizondo
Roberto Galindo
Erma Galindo

ii
Shirl Jackson
Anne Jackson
Ricardo A. Padilla

Appellees’ Counsel:

Mr. O. Rene Diaz
Mr. Jason J. Jakob
DIAZ, JAKOB, LLC
115 E. Travis Street, Ste. 333
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Telephone: (210) 226-4500
Facsimile: (210) 226-4502
judgediaz@diazjakob.com
jjakob@diazjakob.com

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF COUNSEL ...................................................................................... ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................v
I. CITY IS IMMUNE FROM STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION....................1
A. No Waiver of Immunity Exists for Claims Arising Under the
Texas Water Code, Health & Safety Code, Natural Resources
Code, Property Code and Due Process Clause of the Texas
Constitution. ..................................................................................................1
B. Appellees’ Claims Under the Texas Tort Claims Act Fail. ..........................2
C. Appellees’ Monetary Damages Claims Under the Texas Open
Meetings Act and Declaratory Judgment Act Fail. .......................................3

II. LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY ..............................................................................5
III. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................7
PRAYER ....................................................................................................................8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................10

iv
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 118 S. Ct. 966,
140 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1998) ................................................................................... 6

Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2003) ....................... 2

Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Bossley,
968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998) .......................................................................... 1

Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) ................... 5, 7

In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001) ................................................................... 7

Lee v. Whispering Oaks, 797 F.Supp. 2d 740 (W.D. Tex. 2011) ............................. 5

Tex. Ass’n. of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ............... 2

Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. 2001).......................... 2

Texas Dep’t of Trans. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999)...................................... 1

Texas Nat. Res. Conserv. Com’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2009) .............. 5

Statutes

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §101.057 (West 1985) ..................................... 3

Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 311.034 (West 2005)........................................................ 1

Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 551.142 (West 1993)........................................................ 4

Texas Gov’t Code Ann. §551.146 (West 2013) ....................................................... 3

Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1101.557 (West 2005) ........................................................ 6

Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1101.558 (West 2003) ........................................................ 6

v
Constitutional Provisions

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17 ......................................................................................... 2

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19 ......................................................................................... 2

vi
 I.
CITY IS IMMUNE FROM STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION

Appellees misconstrue the requirement under Texas law for properly invoking

the Court’s jurisdiction to state a viable claim for monetary damages against a

governmental entity.

A. No Waiver of Immunity Exists for Claims Arising Under the Texas Water
Code, Health & Safety Code, Natural Resources Code, Property Code
and Due Process Clause of the Texas Constitution.

To properly invoke the Court’s jurisdiction against a governmental entity,

Appellees must reference a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity. Under the

Bossley Texas Supreme Court case and the Texas Code Construction Act, a plea to

the jurisdiction of the court can properly raise a question of governmental immunity.

Dallas County Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339,

341 (Tex. 1998); see, Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 311.034 (West 2005). When that is

done, the plaintiff must invoke the court's jurisdiction by identifying the language of

a statute that waives governmental immunity by clear and unambiguous language.

Texas Dep’t. of Trans. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999).

Appellees made no attempt in the trial court, nor do they do so here, to identify

language in the following statutes where the Texas Legislature has clearly and

unambiguously waived governmental immunity for Appellees to sue the City of

Leon Valley:

1
 • Texas Water Code. See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition, pp.
35-36, ¶¶ 130-134 [CR V7 144-145];

• Texas Health and Safety Code, §343.001(c)(11). See, Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Original Petition, pp. 18, 34, ¶¶ 59, 125-129 [CR V7 127; 143-144];

• Article 1, §19 of the Constitution of the State of Texas. See, Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Original Petition pp. 27-29, ¶¶ 88-94, 97 [CR V7 136-138];

• Texas Property Code. See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original Petition pp.
41-42, ¶155 and ¶ XIII Prayer for damages in the amount not greater than
$3,975,000.00 [CR V7 150-154]; and

• Texas Natural Resources Code.1 See, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Original
Petition pp. 41-42, ¶155 [C.R. V7, 150-154].

• Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Original Petition pp. 26-27, ¶ 83, 86 [CR V7 135-136].

B. Appellees’ Claims Under the Texas Tort Claims Act Fail.

Even when a statute clearly and unambiguously waives governmental

immunity, a plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction by

alleging facts to establish a valid waiver of immunity. See, Tex. Dep't. of Criminal

Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n. of Bus. v. Texas Air

Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Appellees attempt to argue that the

involvement of equipment is sufficient to invoke liability for property damages

under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Their argument fails. Dallas Area Rapid Transit

1
Appellant City did not assert immunity from a claim arising under Article I, § 17 of the Texas
Constitution. This claim remains pending against the City in the trial court.

2
v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex. 2003) (nexus between the operation or use of

motor-driven vehicle or equipment and a plaintiff’s injuries requires more than mere

involvement of property to waive governmental immunity; rather, the vehicle’s or

equipment’s use must have actually caused the injury).

Furthermore, Appellees’ claims asserting intentional tort liability, i.e.

trespass, does not satisfy the limited waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act

Section 101.057 Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which explicitly preserves

the City’s immunity from intentional tort claims. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§101.057 (West 1985).

C. Appellees’ Monetary Damages Claims Under the Texas Open Meetings
Act and Declaratory Judgment Act Fail.

Appellees avoid the clear and unambiguous waiver requirement to seek

monetary damages from Appellants under TOMA. Instead, they attempt to argue

that they do not directly seek an award of monetary damages but then argue that the

setting aside of a decision of the City Council in violation of TOMA would result in

monetary damages flowing for the breach of TOMA and the Declaratory Judgment

Act. [C.R. V7, 136 ¶¶84-86; Appellees’ Brief p. 36]. Appellees do not disagree

with Appellants’ position that only one section in TOMA, which is inapplicable to

the facts underlying this dispute, authorizes the recovery of limited monetary

damages. See, Texas Gov’t Code Ann. §551.146 (West 2013). Nonetheless,

Appellees attempt to argue that an act allegedly taken by the City Council in

3
violation of TOMA automatically results in monetary damages to Appellees for the

loss of the sale of their property. [C.R. V7, 136 ¶¶84-86].

The proper construction of TOMA is that a waiver of governmental immunity

is clear and unambiguous according to the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, a

court may consider an action to void a vote of the City Council under §551.142 if

TOMA provisions are not followed. Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 551.142 (West 1993).

However, under the facts of this case, the only material act of the City Council

occurred on March 1, 2011, when the City Council voted on appeal of the denial of

a zoning request applicable to Appellees’ property. [C.R. V1, 8; C.R. V7, 119; C.R.

V6, 28-37; 281-284]. Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. § 551.142 (West 1993). The City's

Zoning Commission initially denied the Appellees' request for a zoning designation.

[C.R. V2, 175-184]. Appellees appealed the denial to the Leon Valley City Council

which ultimately voted on the matter on March 1, 2011. [C.R. V2, 28-30; 190-199;

200-207; 224; C.R. V2, 38-40; 200-209; 210-217; 231]. The City Council, by a

unanimous vote of five to zero, denied the appeal. [C.R. V2, 28-30; 185-186; C.R.

V6, 38-40; 195-196; 218-230]. The only possible voidability of the denial would

result in no action taken rather than a "yes" vote resulting automatically in monetary

damages. Appellees’ construction of the provisions of TOMA is, therefore,

unsupportable and contrary to case law construing whether governmental immunity

4
has been waived by an act of the legislature. Texas Nat. Res. Conserv. Com’n. v. IT-

Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2009).

II.
LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY

There is only one meaningful and material action related to Appellees’ claim

for damages in this lawsuit – a vote of the City Council on March 1, 2011, affirming

the Zoning Commission’s denial of Appellees’ request for a zoning change.2 [C.R.

V1, 8; C.R. V7, 119; C.R. V6, 28-37; 281-284]. Appellees assign bad motives and

moral imperatives to Appellant Baldridge's vote, which is not uncommon in the

various cases discussing a legislator's immunity from a claim for monetary damages.

See, Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) (attacking

leadership role of councilmember voting for moratorium on new construction

against law firm client’s interest); see also, Lee v. Whispering Oaks, 797 F.Supp. 2d

740 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (accusing councilmember of illegal conspiracy with citizens

over zoning action). Appellees’ shotgun approach in raising attacks aimed at

numerous meetings of the City Council and Zoning Commission avoids one basic

premise: voting and attending meetings as a member of a public governing body

clearly falls within the sphere of legitimate legislative activities that are the heart of

the legislative immunity doctrine. [C.R. V7, 129-134]; see, Joe v. Two Thirty Nine

2
In her Plea to the Jurisdiction, Appellant Baldridge seeks legislative immunity in her official
capacity as a member of the Leon Valley City Council, not in any other capacity.

5
Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d at 157, citing, Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 53,

118 S. Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed. 2d 79 (1998).

Appellees not only attempt to claim monetary damages against Appellant

Baldridge for casting a vote, but also, for attending meetings where various topics

were discussed, including the hiring of a city manager and discussing City-related

issues such as zoning, tax abatements and other economic development issues.

Appellees’ Brief pp. 33, 39-40. Appellees’ allegations clearly invoke legislative

activities by Councilmember Baldridge.

Appellees concede Appellant Baldridge had no written contract for

representation of anyone interested in Appellees’ property at the time she voted on

the zoning appeal. Appellees’ Brief pp. 40. Without a written contract of

representation, Appellant Baldridge could not have possessed a conflict of interest

in the subject property as a real estate agent as a matter of law. Real Estate License

Act, Tex. Occ. Code §§ 1101.557-558. Notwithstanding Appellees insertion of

“moral obligations” on Appellant Baldridge, there is no legal basis to assert a conflict

of interest against Appellant Baldridge without a written contract of representation.3

Appellees’ Brief p. 33.

3
Appellants objected in the trial court to Appellee Bee’s attempt to characterize secretly recorded
telephone conversations with Ms. Baldridge in violation of a Rule 11 Agreement entered into by
all counsel of record on September 11, 2013. Appellees again reference excluded evidence to
support this contention. The trial court sustained the objection. [C.R. V1, 232-238; R.R. (May 19,
2014) 84-86].

6
 Appellees cite to In Re Perry as the basis for Appellants’ immunity defense.

However, Appellees make no mention of the Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture

case which involved a similar set of circumstances presented here. Appellees’ Brief

pp. 64. In the Joe case, a councilmember had a presumptive conflict of interest but

the court refused to deny legislative immunity to a vote imposing a moratorium on

new construction. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d at p.158.

Similarly, in the case at bar, Appellant Baldridge, as a member of a City Council, is

immune from casting a vote to uphold the denial of a zoning request.

Again, Appellees miss the point of Appellant Baldridge's immunity from a

damages claim under the Texas Open Meetings Act and Declaratory Judgment Act.

Her immunity does not stem from compliance with the provisions of TOMA but

from Appellees’ attempt to seek monetary damages against her under TOMA and

the TDJA. Even assuming a conflict of interest existed at the time of her vote on

March 1, 2011, the meeting of the City Council was not an illegal meeting under

TOMA. Appellant Baldridge does not claim immunity from complying with the

procedural provisions of TOMA; however, monetary damages are not available to

Appellees for any of the alleged violations of the Act.

III.
CONCLUSION

The Appellants are immune from the various causes of action asserted by

Appellees as discussed herein. Appellees failed to properly invoke the trial court’s

7
jurisdiction for statutory claims asserted against the City of Leon Valley.

Additionally, Appellees cannot hold Irene Baldridge liable for damages in her

capacity as a member of the City Council of the City of Leon Valley because of her

absolute legislative immunity. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the

Appellants’ Pleas to the Jurisdiction.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellants City of Leon Valley,

Texas, Unknown Employee(s) of the City of Leon Valley, and Irene Baldridge pray

this Court:

1. reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant City and City’s Unknown

Employees’ Plea to the Jurisdiction and render a dismissal of Appellees’

statutory causes of action brought under the Texas Water Code, Health &

Safety Code, Natural Resources Code, Property Code, Tort Claims Act, Open

Meetings Act or Declaratory Judgment Act;

2. reverse the trial court’s denial of Appellant Irene Baldridge’s Second

Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and render a dismissal of Appellant

Baldridge in her capacity as a member of the City Council of the City of Leon

Valley;

3. remand this cause to the Trial Court with instructions according to the Court’s

opinion and judgment; and

8
4. for such further relief, in law and in equity, to which the Appellants may show

themselves justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

DENTON, NAVARRO, ROCHA, BERNAL HYDE & ZECH
A Professional Corporation
2517 N. Main Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78212
Telephone: (210) 227-3243
Facsimile: (210) 225-4481
patrick.bernal@rampage-sa.com
clarissa.rodriguez@rampage-sa.com

By: /s/ Patrick C. Bernal
PATRICK C. BERNAL
State Bar No. 02208750
CLARISSA M. RODRIGUEZ
State Bar No. 24056222
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

9
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has
been served in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure on this 4th
day of March, 2015, to the following:

CMRRR # 9171 9690 0935 0067 1638 82
Mr. O. Rene Diaz
Mr. Jason J. Jakob
DIAZ, JAKOB, LLC
115 E. Travis Street, Ste. 333
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CMRRR # 9171 9690 0935 0067 1638 754
Darby Riley
Riley & Riley, Attorneys at Law
320 Lexington Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78215
Attorneys for Irene Baldridge

/s/ Patrick C. Bernal
PATRICK C. BERNAL
CLARISSA M. RODRIGUEZ

10