ACCEPTED
13-15-00174-CV
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
7/22/2015 8:09:32 PM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
CLERK
No. 13-15-00174-CV
In The FILED IN
Thirteenth Court of Appeals
13th COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
Corpus Christi, Texas 7/22/2015 8:09:32 PM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
HALE-MILLS CONSTRUCTION, LTD., HALE-MILLS CONSTRUCTION,
Clerk
INC., and HMC CONTRACTING SOUTH TEXAS, LLC
Appellants,
v.
WILLACY COUNTY,
Appellee.
On Interlocutory Appeal from the 197th District Court of Willacy County Texas
(Cause No. 2014-CV-0103-A)
APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Mazin Sbaiti Ramon Garcia
State Bar No. 24058096 State Bar No. 07641800
Bruce Steckler Emerson E. Arellano
State Bar No. 00785039 State Bar No. 24067490
Steckler, LLP Law Office of Ramon Garcia, P.C.
12720 Hillcrest Road, Ste. 1045 222 West University Drive
Dallas, TX 75230 Edinburg, Texas 78539
Telephone: (972) 387-4040 Telephone: (956) 383-7441
Fax: (972) 387-4041 Facsimile: (956) 381-0825
mazin@stecklerlaw.com rgarcia@ramongarcia-law.com
bruce@stecklerlaw.com earellano@ramongarcia-law.com
Manuel Solis Daniel G. Rios
State Bar No. 18826790 State Bar No. 00784844
Law Office of Manuel Solis Law Office of Daniel G. Rios, PC
6657 Navigation Boulevard 323 W. Nolana Avenue
Houston, TX 77011 McAllen, TX 78504
Telephone: (713) 844-2700 Telephone: (956) 630-9401
Fax: (281) 754-4681 Facsimile: (956) 682-0566
msolis1882@yahoo.com dan@danrioslaw.com
Counsel for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court’s order and the
names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel.
APPELLANTS HALE-MILLS CONSTRUCTION, LTD., HALE-MILLS
CONSTRUCTION, INC., and HMC CONTRACTING SOUTH TEXAS, LLC
Represented in the trial court and in this appeal by:
William B. Westcott
Robert A. Plessala
Andrews Myers, P.C.
3900 Essex Lane, Suite 800
Houston, TX 77027-5109
APPELLEE WILLACY COUNTY
Represented in the trial court and in this appeal by:
Mazin Sbaiti Ramon Garcia
State Bar No. 24058096 State Bar No. 07641800
Bruce Steckler Emerson E. Arellano
State Bar No. 00785039 State Bar No. 24067490
Steckler, LLP Law Office of Ramon Garcia, P.C.
12720 Hillcrest Road, Ste. 1045 222 West University Drive
Dallas, TX 75230 Edinburg, Texas 78539
Telephone: (972) 387-4040 Telephone: (956) 383-7441
Fax: (972) 387-4041 Facsimile: (956) 381-0825
mazin@stecklerlaw.com rgarcia@ramongarcia-law.com
bruce@stecklerlaw.com earellano@ramongarcia-law.com
Manuel Solis Daniel G. Rios
State Bar No. 18826790 State Bar No. 00784844
Law Office of Manuel Solis Law Office of Daniel G. Rios, PC
6657 Navigation Boulevard 323 W. Nolana Avenue
Houston, TX 77011 McAllen, TX 78504
Telephone: (713) 844-2700 Telephone: (956) 630-9401
Fax: (281) 754-4681 Facsimile: (956) 682-0566
msolis1882@yahoo.com dan@danrioslaw.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ...................................................... …..cover
IDENTITIES OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL…………………………………............i
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………………………………….ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………...............v
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .............................................. ix
RESPONSE ISSUES PRESENTED ........................................................................ x
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT………………………………………………xi
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................1
I. Defendants/Appellants Propose to Build Three Facilities Using Taxpayer
Dollars…………………………………………………………………….......1
II. The Scandal……………………………………………………………………2
III. The State of the Facilities……………………………………………………..4
STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................6
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES…………………………………………..……6
I. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Arbitration as to Any
of the Three Facilities at Issue…………………………………………………6
A.Appellant has Waived any Argument Challenging the District Court’s Finding
that the Contracts were Unconscionable when Made…………………………...8
B.Appellant has Waived any Argument Challenging the District Court’s Finding
that Compelling Arbitration Would be Substantively Unconscionable………..10
ii
C.Appellants have Waived any Challenge to the District Court’s Finding of
Insufficient of Evidence to Support the Existence of a Valid Agreement……..14
II. The District Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Arbitration on the
Basis of Sovereign Immunity………………………………………………….15
A.The District Court Properly Found that there had been no Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity…………………………………………………………...15
B.Willacy County Has Not Waived Its Sovereign Immunity Because It Has Not
Signed the Agreements………………………………………………………...16
C. Texas Local Government Code Does Not Waive Sovereign Immunity...18
1. Local Government Code Section 271 Does Not Waive the
County’s Sovereign Immunity………………………………….18
2. Appellant’s Contentions Regarding the Local Government
Corporations’ Agency are Inapt and Irrelevant………………..19
3. Local Government Code Section 262.007 Also Establishes Why
the County has Not Waived Sovereign Immunity………………21
III. Willacy County has Not Filed Suit to Enforce the Agreements, Nor Does It Seek
a “Direct Benefit” From Them, Therefore It Is Not Bound By the Arbitration
Clause……………………………………………………………………….22
A. Texas Supreme Court Precedent and Persuasive Authority Support the
District Court’s Discretionary Finding……………………………………….24
B. Under KBR, The Court at most Would Reverse as to the Warranty
Claims………………………………………………………………….29
IV. This Court Should Affirm on Contractual Grounds…………………………..30
A. The Sherriff’s Office Agreement Does not Provide for Mandatory
Arbitration by the County Because it Was Not a Party and the Provision is
Patently Ambiguous…………………………………………………31
B. The County is Expressly Excluded from Mandatory Arbitration Regarding
iii
the Marshall’s Office………………………………………34
C. The Agreements’ Clauses are Limited to Disputes that Arise During
Construction and Pendency of the Contracts- Not After………………35
D. Appellant Has Not Proven that All Pre-Requisites to Compelling
Arbitration on the Detention Facility Have Been Met…………………38
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER……………………………………………..………39
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE………………………………………………………41
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE………………………………………………...41
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Aldridge v. Thrift Fin. Mktg., LLC,
376 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, no pet.)………………..….30, 36
Amir v. Int’l Bank of Commerce,
419 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.)………..……..38
Bankhead v. Maddox,
135 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App –Tyler- 2004, no pet.) …………………………8, 15
Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Turkmenistan,
345 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2003)…………………………………………………...23
Britton v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice,
95 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)………….7, 8, 13
Carr v. Main Carr Dev., LLC,
337 S.W.3d 489 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011)………………………………….25, 27
Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct Mortgage, Inc.,
138 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. den). 9, 10, 13, 15
First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938 (1995)……………………………………………………..…30, 36
Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. Travis County,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 8138, *4 (5th Cir. Tex., Apr. 30, 2003)………...…….17
Freis v. Canales,
877 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding)…………………………….14
Gonzalez v. Mission Am. Ins. Co.,
795 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. 1990)…………………………………………31, 33, 37
Green Tree Find. Corp. v. Randolph,
531 U.S. 79 (2000)……………………………………………………………..12
Hill v. G.E. Power Sys, Inc.,
v
282 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2002)…………………………………………………..25
In re Choice Homes, Inc.,
174 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)…………35, 37
In re First Merit Bank N.A.,
52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001)…………………………………………………11
In re Halliburton Co.,
80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002)……………………………………….………11, 13
In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.,
166 S.W.3d 732 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)…14, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30
In re Luna,
175 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2004)………………………….12
In re Pisces Foods, L.L.C.,
228 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App–Austin 2007, orig. proceeding)………………….38
In re Poly-America, L.P.,
262 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. 2008)……………………………………9, 10, 11, 12, 13
In re Serv. Corp. Intern.,
355 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. 2011)……………………………………………….31, 37
In re Weekley Homes, L.P.,
180 S.W.3d 127 (Tex. 2005)……………………………………………..23, 24
Intergen N.V. v. Grina,
344 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2003)………………………………………20, 26, 27, 32
Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen Anlagen GMBH
206 F.3d 411 (11th Cir. 2000)………………………………………………….23
Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps,
842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)……………………………….6
J.M. Davidson Inc. et al. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2003)
vi
128 S.W.3d at 227……………………………………………………………...14
Landmark Org., L.P. v. Tremco Inc.,
2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5052, *29 (Tex. App. Austin 2010)………………….29
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003)…………………………………………………...12
Okorafor v. Uncle Sam & Assocs., Inc.,
295 S.W.3d 27 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)…………..6
Olshan Found. Repair Co. v. Ayala,
180 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied)………………….10
R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners Ass’n,
384 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2004)…………………………………………………25
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc.,
355 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2011)…………….............6
Schwartz v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
127 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. den)……9, 10, 13
Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc.,
207 S.W.3d 342 (Tex.2006)……………………………………………….31, 37
Town of Highland Park v. Iron Crow Construction Incorporated,
168 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. App. Dallas 2005)…………………………16, 17, 18, 22
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy,
74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002)……………………………….………………17, 18
Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman
395 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App. Eastland 2013)…………………………………...13
Webb County v. Khaledi Props.,
2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9063, *3 (Tex. App. San Antonio, July 24, 2013)……18
Wortham v. Otis Elevator Co.,
vii
2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3443, *8 (Tex. App. Dallas May 25, 2000)…………..14
Secondary Authorities
Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 171.001………………………………………………14
Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 262.001…………………………………………………….20
Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 262.007…………………………………………………21, 22
Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 262.011……………………………………………………..21
Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 271.151…………………………………………………18, 19
Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 271.152……………………………………………………..18
Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 271.154……………………………………………………..19
Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 271.160……………………………………………………..20
W. Wendall Hall et al., Hall’s Standards of Review in Texas,
42 St. Mary’s L.J. 1, 78 (2010)…………………………………………………6
viii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellee respectfully requests that this Court grant oral argument. Due to the
novelty of the arguments raised by Appellants, Appellee believes oral argument will be
of assistance in this matter.
ix
RESPONSE ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Texas law states that a party who does not raise evidentiary objections before
the district court waives them on appeal. Here, Appellants failed to raise any
evidentiary objections before the district court seeking to strike Willacy County’s
evidence supporting the district court’s finding of unconscionability. Did Appellants
waive these objections on appeal?
2. Texas law states that an appellant’s failure to raise points of error in an opening
brief waives them for the appeal. Texas law also requires proof of a valid agreement
before ordering arbitration. Here, Appellants’ opening brief fails to challenge the
district court’s adopted finding that Appellants’ motion was unsupported by
competent evidence of a valid agreement. Have the Appellants waived any right to
argue against this finding?
3. Texas law states that a County has sovereign immunity from enforcing an
arbitration clause, and that only the legislature may waive sovereign immunity.
Texas statutes have only waived sovereign immunity for a county with regards to
specific contracts to which the County is a party, and even then immunity is waived
only to the extent suit is brought in a district court in that county. Here it is
undisputed that Willacy County is not a signatory to any of the Agreements. Was
the district court correct in finding that sovereign immunity applied and had not
been statutorily waived for Willacy County?
4. Texas law states that the doctrine of “direct benefits estoppel” may apply to a
third party to a contract where that party’s claims seek a direct benefit from
enforcement of the contract. Texas courts review such determination for abuse of
discretion. Here, the district court found that the County’s claims for fraud, unjust
enrichment, warranty and negligence did not seek derive a direct benefit from the
Agreements. Did the district court abuse its discretion in finding that direct
benefits estoppel did not apply to one or more of the County’s claims?
5. This court may affirm on any basis in the record. Texas law requires that
arbitration agreements be construed by their terms. Here, two of the Agreements are
limited by their terms to the signatories to the contracts, and the others are limited to
claims arising during the time period during which the work was in progress. Do
these support the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration on a
harmless error standard?
x
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This appeal arises from the improvident motion by Appellants to compel Willacy
County to arbitration. The record is clear that Willacy County is not a signatory to any
of the Agreements. The Agreements are project specific, and therefore, must be
evaluated on their own terms.
However, Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration, and this Appeal, suffer from
four common flaws:
First, the district court’s adopted finding on unsconscioability was predicated on
evidence that Appellants never challenged below—therefore, Appellants have waived
their appeal on this issue which is sufficient to affirm in full.
Second, the district court’s conclusion is supported by its adopted finding that
Appellants’ motion was not supported by competent evidence of a valid agreement to
arbitrate—Appellants fail to address this issue in their opening brief and therefore, have
waived their appeal on this issue which is sufficient to affirm in full.
Third, it is well established that only the Texas legislature can waive immunity.
Here, the district court’s conclusion is supported by the fact that the County is immune
from suit to compel arbitration, and its immunity has not been waived by the Texas
legislature for suits brought on contracts to which the county is not a signatory. The
only statute that remotely speaks to the issue only applies to signatories, and even then
xi
only waives immunity from suits brought in district court.
Fourth, the Texas Supreme Court in KBR said that “direct benefits estoppel”
only applies to a non-signatory who “seeks, through the claim, to derive a direct benefit
from the contract.” The Court very clearly excluded any non-contractual claims from
arbitration. Courts have consistently held that extra-contractual warranty claims are not
the types of claims that invoke the estoppel doctrine. Here, Appellants have failed to
demonstrate how the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the county’s
claims for fraud, unjust enrichment, negligence and implied warranty did not seek to
derive a direct benefit from the Agreements. Under KBR, even if this Court thinks that
the warranty claim triggers estoppel, it should only reverse as to the warranty claim and
affirm on the other claims.
The foregoing demonstrate four independent and sufficient reasons to affirm.
But before this Court must also consider the individual Agreements’ terms. There
are three facilities and each is governed by its own arbitration provision. However, (i)
Two of the arbitration clauses by their terms are limited to the parties to the respective
agreements unless otherwise stated in writing. Binding authority holds that arbitration
cannot be compelled under those circumstances. (ii) The other arbitration clause is by
its terms, limited to the pre-dispute resolution provisions, which itself only applies to
disputes that arise during the pendency of the construction project. It lacks any
language taking it beyond to any and claims arising under the agreement before or after
xii
the contract terminates.
xiii
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS PROPOSE TO BUILD THREE FACILITIES USING
TAXPAYER DOLLARS
Defendants Hale Mills Construction, Ltd., Hale-Mills Construction, Inc., and
HMC Contracting South Texas, LLC (“Appellants”) approached members of
Willacy County’s board of commissioners proposing to build a detention center for
the U.S. Marshall’s Office, a detention center for pre-deportation inmates of the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (aka “ICE”), and a new jail for the
Willacy County Sherriff’s office in Raymondville (altogether, the “Facilities”).
To that end, over the course of years, four principal agreements were entered
into between one or more of the Defendants/Appellants and one of the County’s
local government entities (altogether, the “Agreements”)1.
For the Marshall’s Office, Willacy County Public Facility Corporation
contracted with Hale Mills Construction, Ltd., and Hale-Mills Construction, Inc.
(CR 106 - 130). Attached hereto as Exhibit A (the “Marshall’s Office Agreement”).
For the Willacy County Sherriff’s office, Hale-Mills Construction Ltd.
contracted with the County Jail Public Facility Corporation of Willacy County,
1 Below, Appellee moved to strike any such evidence as not properly for the district court. See
Exhibit F; CR 90-91). The district court adopted this finding in its Order. Appellee’s citation to the
agreements in the record is without waiving their contention that such evidence was not properly before
the district court or the contention that Appellants have waived the challenge on appeal since they did not
raise it in their opening brief. See Section I(c) supra.
1
Texas, on June 29, 2004 (CR 132 - 158). Attached hereto as Exhibit B (the “Jail
Agreement”).
For the Detention Center for ICE, the ICE Facility was constructed
under an agreement between the Willacy County Local Government Corporation
and HMC Contracting South Texas, LLC, and was executed on July 19, 2006 (CR
160-196). Attached hereto as Exhibit C. An addition was constructed pursuant to an
agreement executed on August 2, 2007 between The Willacy County Local
Government Corporation and HMC Contracting South Texas, LLC. (CR 198-239).
Attached hereto as Exhibit D (Exhibits C and D together, the “ICE Facility
Agreements”).
There is no dispute that the Facilities were substantially completed by January
2008, (CR 130, 158, 196, 239) 2 and that the completion of the facilities terminated
the contractual relationships cited above.
II. THE SCANDAL
The Agreements were neither negotiated, nor made without substantial
controversy. (CR 92). They were procured through a system of bribery that
ultimately saw two Willacy County officials get indicted and plead guilty with a
third official to criminal charges. (CR 92).3 Jose Jimenez and Israel Tamez were
2 Appellants admit as much in the brief. See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1).
3 Citing http://www.myplainview.com/article_439ed742-bbc0-51de-8368-26bf030b4c35.htm (“Two
former Willacy County commissioners pleaded guilty Tuesday to accepting bribes for their votes on federal
2
sentenced to six months in prison each for their roles in voting in favor of the
Facilities projects. (Id.)
Yet, these men’s names are all over the Local Government Entities’
paperwork that Appellants attach to their opening briefs. For example, in Appellants’
Opening Brief, Appendix 2, the Articles of Incorporation of Willacy County Public
Facility Corporation, Israel Tamez is named on the Board of Directors (pg 2) and
Jose Jimenez is additional board member (pg 2(A)). In Appellants’ Opening Brief,
Appendix 3, the Articles of Incorporation of County Jail Public Facility
Corporation, Israel Tamez is the “Incorporator” (Art. IX) and is named to the Board
of Directors (Art. VIII).
What makes the scandal so insidious is that the Facilities were financed
through public bond issuances that the Taxpayers undertook to bear and repay in
reliance on the representations that the Facilities would not only perform a function,
but also on the basis that the Marshall’s Office and the ICE Facility would generate
revenue and jobs to the County. (CR 92; see also Willacy County Commissioner Bd.
prison contracts. Jose Jimenez, 67, of Sebastian, and Israel Tamez, 58, of Raymondville, waived indictment
and admitted accepting more than $10,000 each from companies competing for work on the Willacy County
Adult Correctional Center. The $14.5 million prison was being built to house federal inmates.”); and see
http://www.myplainview.com/article_92fb86e1-aa11-504a-94cf-49820f746300.html (“The last of three
county commissioners to plead guilty in a bribery scandal involving a Rio Grande Valley federal detention
facility has been sentenced…Webb County Commissioner David Cortez, 72, of Laredo was given three
months in prison Tuesday in federal court for his role in funneling $39,000 in bribes to former Willacy
County Commissioners Jose Jimenez and Israel Tamez in 2002. The money was given in exchange for
favorable votes on contracts to design, build or manage a 500-bed facility in Raymondville that opened in
2003.”).
3
Resolutions attached to Appellant’s Brief).4 This is reflected in the various board
resolutions attached to Appellants’ Opening Brief. See also Appellants’ Br. app’x 3,
Art. XIII.
III. THE STATE OF THE FACILITIES
While what was promised by Appellants was state-of-the-art facilities, what
was delivered was substandard. After only a few years of use, the facilities are in
complete disrepair, revealing the fraud and slipshod workmanship done by the
Defendants. (CR 06 et. seq.)
The Facilities are in no shape to last their useful lives. As revealed in the
Original Petition (CR 06 et. seq.), poor materials were used in place of proper
construction materials, thus requiring constant repairs (Id. at ¶ 17). The site
preparation was irremediably flawed, with building sitting below grade, subjecting
them to shifting, flooding and improper drainage (Id. at ¶ 18). Whereas the typical
home houses 3 to 4 people, and has 8 to 12 inches of foundation, the buildings are
based on less than that (Id. at ¶ 19). Moreover, the quality of the concrete is
substandard. The concrete throughout reveals flaking, chipping, and spalding—all
of which should not happen had minimally appropriate concrete and cement been
used. (Id. at ¶ 21) There are structural defects in load-bearing walls—these are
4 Appellants have attached several appendices to the Opening Brief that are not part of the record.
These should be stricken to the extent Appellants have not made them a part of the record, but also serve
as admissions.
4
cracking and showing signs of failure. Walls without sufficient internal structure are
bearing heavy steel beams that cause a danger of failure. (Id. at ¶ 22). There are
cracks and chipping in all walls and ceilings that continually have to be repaired.
This is cumulatively worse in quarantine and isolation rooms, since cracks in interior
walls allow contamination to pass through the walls that are supposed to prevent that
from happening. (Id. at ¶ 23). There are have been hundreds of roof leaks due to poor
roofing installation techniques. (Id. at ¶ 24). There is evidence of serious water
penetration and leakage into the Centers. These are dangerous and cause electrical
wiring failures, and have caused shorting wiring and otherwise damage conduits and
electrical appliances and equipment (HVACs, grid ceiling, etc.). (Id. at ¶ 26) The
sewage and drainage system is demonstrably deficient and exhibits signs of
improper construction and building techniques. The sewage line is (singular) far too
small for the Centers and the number of people in them—causing constant grotesque
backup of sewage and human waste into the dormitories and cafeterias. (Id. at ¶ 27)
The list is endless.
The County in filing the instant suit, presciently observed in its Original
Petition:
Make no mistake: What is at stake here is the potential loss of
the contracts and eventually closure of the Centers (all of them)
because they fail to meet even the most basic requirements of
suitable construction. Such a cataclysmic event would cost jobs
5
in addition to County revenue. (CR 07)
Thus, it surprised absolutely no one at the County when a riot broke out at the
ICE Facility in February 2015 precipitating its closure and the dismissal of all but a
skeleton crew of employees.5 Appellants’ misconduct has contributed to the loss of
the government contract with the Bureau of Prisons for the ICE Facility, costing over
400 Willacy County residents their livelihood, and costing the County fiscally as
well. (Id.) That is just one building; the rest are soon to fall.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration
for abuse of discretion. See Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Baker Hughes Inc.,
355 S.W.3d 791, 800 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2011); Okorafor v. Uncle
Sam & Assocs., Inc., 295 S.W.3d 27, 38 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet.
denied); see also W. Wendall Hall et al., Hall’s Standards of Review in Texas, 42
St. Mary’s L.J. 1, 78 (2010) (citing Jack B. Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d
266, 271–72 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
ARBITRATION AS TO ANY OF THE THREE FACILITIES AT ISSUE
The District Court denied arbitration on several independent grounds. (CR
5 See http://www.valleymorningstar.com/news/local_news/article_bf112990-cc4a-11e4-ba2f-
e3c024760e63.html.
6
418) (the “Order”). The Order is attached hereto as Exhibit E. The district court ruled
that the County had sovereign immunity because it was not a signatory to the
agreements and was not seeking to enforce the Agreements; that Defendants’ had
failed to properly authenticate their evidence to establish their contractual right to
arbitrate; and that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable.6
Appellants expends the entirety of their Appellate briefing on the first of these
arguments. But they never address the other independent grounds for the denial of
their motion to compel arbitration. For that reason, Appellants have waived them
and this Court need not wade into the mire of sovereign immunity.
An appellant “must attack all independent bases or grounds that fully support
a complained-of ruling or judgment.” Britton v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 95
S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). If the appellant
fails to do so, the court of appeals “must affirm the ruling or judgment.” Id. The
reason is that:
If an independent ground fully supports the complained-of ruling
or judgment, but the appellant assigns no error to that
independent ground, then (1) [the appellate court] must accept
the validity of that unchallenged independent ground, … and thus
(2) any error in the grounds challenged on appeal is harmless
6 The District Court’s Order cited sovereign immunity, and incorporated as independent grounds the
balance of the issues raised in Willacy County’s Response below (Willacy County’s Plea to the Jurisdiction
and Response to Plea in Abatement and Opposition to Arbitration Before AAA (CR 84 et seq.) is attached
hereto as Exhibit F). This Court thus must treat the Willacy County Response below as incorporated by
reference into the Court’s Order.
7
because the unchallenged independent ground fully supports the
complained-of ruling or judgment.
Id. at 681-682. It is not enough for the Appellants to try and cure this waiver in their
reply brief. That would sandbag the Appellee and be patently unfair. The failure to
address these issues in the opening brief constitutes an irrevocable waiver. See
Bankhead v. Maddox, 135 S.W.3d 162, 164-65 (Tex. App –Tyler- 2004, no pet.)
(holding issues not raised in appellant's initial brief are deemed waived on appeal).
Accordingly, the waiver of the issues provides ample ground for affirmance.
A. Appellant Has Waived any Argument Challenging the District Court’s
Finding that the Contracts Were Unconscionable When Made
The District Court adopted the argument set forth in Willacy County’s
opposition to arbitration. (CR 418, 84; see Exhibits E and F). Below, the County
contended that the Contracts were contracts of adhesion, procured in the midst of a
criminal bribery scandal during which two of Appellant’s affiliates (former county
commissioners) were tried, convicted, and sent to prison. (CR 92) The District Court
adopted this argument in its Order, thus holding that the Agreements were
unconscionable when made. (CR 418).
These facts were never controverted nor even addressed by Appellant before
the district court. They never objected to the evidence, and never obtained a ruling
on their objections. Appellants have thus failed to preserve the alleged evidentiary
error for this Appeal.
8
In Cruikshank v. Consumer Direct Mortgage, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 497 (Tex.
App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied), appellant argued that the trial court
had erroneously sustained objections to the appellant's summary judgment affidavit.
The court of appeals held that the appellant had not preserved error because he had
not filed a response to the objecting party's motion to strike, he did not object to the
trial court's ruling, and he did not request the court to reconsider its ruling. Id. at 499.
Also, the fact that Appellants did not specifically object to the evidence
anywhere, and failed to obtain a ruling means they have irrevocably preserved the
error. Accord Schwartz v. Forest Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 118, 120 (Tex.
App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. den) (holding that failure to specifically raise
relevance or sufficiency objection before trial court and obtain a ruling failed to
preserve the objection for appeal even though same evidence had been objected to
on other grounds).
The failure to preserve error on appeal deprives the appellate court of any
jurisdiction to reverse on that basis. Id. That is true even if the Appellate court
believes it might have otherwise ruled in the appellant’s favor.
Furthermore, Texas law applies to determine the validity or revocability of the
arbitration clause. See In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 348 (Tex. 2008).
There is no presumption favoring arbitration when it comes to determining whether
there is a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate. Id. “Unconscionable
9
contracts, however – whether relating to arbitration or not – are unenforceable under
Texas law.” Id. at 348.
Here, Appellant neither raised Willacy County’s support of unconscionability
as a matter of factual or legal error before the district court. Therefore, Appellant
cannot argue that the District Court abused its discretion or applied the wrong law,
and has thus waived any contention to that effect in this appeal. Schwartz, 127
S.W.3d at 120; Cruikshank, 138 S.W.3d at 499. Moreover, this Court would be duty-
bound to defer to the district court’s findings even without a finding waiver. See
Olshan Found. Repair Co. v. Ayala, 180 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2005, pet. denied) (when reviewing “the trial court's decision concerning the
unconscionability of an arbitration agreement . . . we defer to the trial court's factual
determinations”). Appellants’ waiver of their challenges thus conclusively requires
affirmance.
Therefore, it is undeniable that Appellant has waived any point of error on the
District Court’s finding that the agreements are unconscionable. See id. Its waiver
provides prima facie, independent and uncontroverted grounds for affirming the
District Court’s Order.
B. Appellant Has Waived any Argument Challenging the District Court’s
Finding that Compelling Arbitration Would be Substantively
Unconscionable
Below, the County contended that the arbitration clauses were unconscionable
10
because they imposed on Willacy County and the county taxpayers an insupportable
burden and expense in filing and litigating before the Arbitral panel. (CR 92). The
District Court adopted this position in its Order, thus holding that the Agreements
were unconscionable when made. (CR at 418).
Contrary to Appellants’ position that, under In re In re First Merit Bank N.A.,
52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001), substantive unconscionability lies within the exclusive
realm of the arbitrator, the Texas Supreme Court overruled that opinion and held
that a court may find that procedural or substantive unconscionability is sufficient
to invalidate an arbitration clause. See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 572
(Tex. 2002) (“We therefore clarify that courts may consider both procedural and
substantive unconscionability of an arbitration clause in evaluating the validity of an
arbitration provision.”).
The case law is littered with courts invalidating arbitration clauses for being
substantively unconscionable. The Texas Supreme Court specifically held that an
arbitration provision is unconscionable if it imposes on the party raising the claim
the obligation to pay the costs of arbitration which render access to the forum
unaffordable. See In re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d at 355. There, the Supreme
Court agreed that:
[I]n some cases, the potential of incurring large arbitration costs
and fees will deter potential litigants from seeking to vindicate
their rights in the arbitral forum . . . . [I]f the fees and costs of the
11
arbitral forum deter potential litigants, then that forum is clearly
not an effective, or even adequate, substitute for the judicial
forum . . . [T]he burden of demonstrating that incurring such
costs is likely under a given set of circumstances rests, at least
initially, with the party opposing arbitration.
Id. (quoting Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 659-60 (6th Cir.
2003) (invalidating arbitration provision that imposed excessive fees on litigant)).
While the Supreme Court held that there was no “per se” rule, it ruled that such a
determination would be a question of fact. Id. The lower court had found that there
was sufficient evidence of the litigants inability to afford access to the arbitral forum.
In re Luna, 175 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 2004). The Supreme
Court disagreed, noting that the fee provisions were not unconscionable because the
arbitrator was permitted to adjust any unconscionable terms including the fee split
between the parties, and therefore, he had a remedy. In re Poly-America, L.P., 262
S.W.3d at 355. Here, the District Court implicitly found that the County is required
to foot the entire cost of filing arbitration which is substantial, and the Agreements
afford no discretion to the arbitrator to reduce the amount(s).
Similarly, under Green Tree Find. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that prohibitively high arbitration costs that would
“preclude a litigant...from effectively vindicating [her] rights in the arbitral forum”
are unsconsionable, and held that it raised a question of evidentiary fact, not law.
Following these precedent, Texas courts have invalidated arbitration clauses that
12
substantively deny a litigant the right of redress. See, e.g., Venture Cotton Coop. v.
Freeman, 395 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App. Eastland 2013),
Applying these precedents, it is clear that Appellant has waived any challenge
to the district court’s factual finding of unconscionability due to the expense and cost
to be imposed on the County.
While Appellants contend that there was insufficient evidence to support this
finding, Appellants never specifically raised that objection before the district court.
Appellants thus fail to preserve the factual and legal error for appeal. See
Cruikshank, 138 S.W.3d at 499 (failure to raise matters before trial court does not
preserve error on appeal and waives such issues); Schwartz, 127 S.W.3d at 120
(holding that objection to ruling on one issue—in that case, Rule 401 prejudice, does
not preserve objections on relevance of evidence).
Accordingly, Appellants have waived any challenge to the District Court’s
finding of substantive unconscionability. The finding of unconscionability is
sufficient in and of itself to vitiate the arbitration clause and its enforcement. See In
re Poly-America, L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 348; In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at
572. This Court need not address the other issues as they are rendered moot. See
Freeman, 395 S.W.3d at 277 (“Because we have held that the arbitration agreement
is substantively unconscionable…we need not consider appellants’ remaining
arguments attacking appellees’ other substantive unconscionability and procedural
13
unconscionability defenses.”); Britton, 95 S.W.3d at 681 (failure to attack all
independent grounds requires affirmance).
Therefore, the district court’s order may be summarily affirmed.
C. Appellants Have Waived Any Challenge to the District Court’s Finding of
Insufficient of Evidence to Support the Existence of a Valid Agreement
To compel arbitration, a party must show that there is a valid arbitration
agreement and that the claims raised fall within the agreement's scope. In re Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); see also
Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code § 171.001(a). Without an agreement to arbitrate,
arbitration cannot be compelled. J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 227 (citing Freis v.
Canales, 877 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding)).
Below, Willacy County attacked the insufficiency of Defendants’ evidence in
their motion to compel arbitration, and moved to strike the supporting evidence as
being unsubstantiated, inauthentic, and incomplete. (CR 91-92). This objection was
sustained by the district court (see Order, CR 418), despite Appellants’ last-ditch
effort to supplement their motion papers with the agreements. (CR 103 et seq.).
Appellants never obtained a ruling overruling the objection, meanwhile, the Order
plainly adopts it as independent grounds to deny arbitration and is correct. See
Wortham v. Otis Elevator Co., 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3443, *8 (Tex. App. Dallas
May 25, 2000) (sustaining trial court striking of evidence where “documents
14
constituted hearsay and were not properly authenticated”).
However, Appellants also fail to raise the issue in the opening brief before this
Court. This waives the issue on appeal. In Cruikshank, the court held that raising a
general point of error only preserves such errors if the errors are expressly and
specifically addressed in the briefing. 138 S.W.3d at 502. The court of appeals
concluded that, because the appellant only generally addressed the issue in its brief,
those issues and the error had been waived. Id. at 503. Furthermore, such waiver
cannot be cured in an Appellant’s reply brief. See Bankhead, 135 S.W.3d at 164-65
(holding issues not raised in appellant's initial brief are deemed waived).
Accordingly, Appellants have likewise waived yet another independent
grounds for affirming the district court’s Order denying arbitration against Willacy
County.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
ARBITRATION ON THE BASIS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. The District Court Properly Found That There Had Been No Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity
The district court, after considering the parties’ motion papers and hosting a
lengthy hearing, found that the County was protected by sovereign immunity from
a suit to compel arbitration because it was not a signatory to the Agreements, found
that the County’s factual allegations at best merely touched upon the Agreements,
but that the County was not seeking to enforce the Agreements. See Order.
15
The fault in this appeal lies in the fact that Appellant side-steps the salient
argument. Rather than address the district court’s finding head-on, Appellant hangs
its hat on the premise that the County as a third-party beneficiary of the Agreements
is attempting to enforce the Agreements, and therefore, is bound by the Arbitration
clauses. These premises rest on a faulty and simplistic construction of the allegations
and the law. We address the issues one by one.
B. Willacy County Has Not Waived Its Sovereign Immunity Because It Has
Not Signed the Agreements
Appellant does not dispute that Willacy County is a sovereign cloaked in
sovereign immunity from suits to compel arbitration. This was clarified by the
Supreme Court initially in Town of Highland Park v. Iron Crow Construction
Incorporated, 168 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. App. Dallas 2005) (“Because its contract
with Highland Park provided for binding arbitration in the event of a dispute between
the parties, Iron Crow was seeking to enforce Highland Park's performance under
that contract. Therefore, sovereign immunity was indeed implicated here.”).
In Town of Highland Park, the town was a signatory to the contract and the
Supreme Court refused to allow it to be compelled to arbitration because merely
signing the agreement did not waive sovereign immunity. 168 S.W.3d at 319. The
Court held that a motion or action to enforce an Arbitration clause is essentially a
suit to enforce the terms of a contract, a suit against which the County has sovereign
16
immunity. Id. The Court noted that only the legislature can waive immunity which
it did not do in this case. Id. The court of appeals also held that the Federal
Arbitration Act did not apply because both the plaintiff and the defendant were Texas
residents (as is the case here: Willacy and Hale-Mills are Texas residents); and even
if the FAA did apply, it could not preempt the sovereign rights of the County. Id. at
317-318. Town of Highland Park thus stands for the proposition that a sovereign is
generally immune from suit to compel arbitration, even if it is a counterclaim to a
suit brought by the sovereign.
In another case analogous to this one, in Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002), the Texas
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a contractual provision providing that
disputes could be decided by arbitration could be enforced against a County. Id. at
857-58. The court held that since only the Legislature could waive sovereign
immunity, “administrative agents,” even those with authority to enter into contracts
such as the County Judge, had no authority to bind the County. Id.
Likewise, in Fluor Daniel, Inc. v. Travis County, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
8138, *4 (5th Cir., Apr. 30, 2003), the Fifth Circuit held that Travis County had not
waived its rights as a sovereign in a contract with Fluor, despite the fact that the
County Judge had signed the contract. The Court held that only “the legislative body
of the county—the commissioner’s court—can waive sovereign immunity.” Id. at
17
*5. And moreover, even then it must be “clear and unambiguous.” Id. In that case,
the Court held that Travis County—even though it arguably invoked the jurisdiction
of the court by filing counterclaims—had not waived any of its sovereign rights not
to be brought into court without its express consent. It is also well-established that
these rights cannot be waived through the conduct of the county. See Webb County
v. Khaledi Props., 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9063, *3 (Tex. App. San Antonio, July
24, 2013).
The Texas legislature amended the statutes after Town of Highland Park and
It-Davy to provide that sovereign immunity could be waived in the limited
circumstances. See Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 271.151 et seq. However, outside of these
amendments, Town of Highland Park is still good law.
Appellant apparently does not disagree that Willacy County is not a signatory
to the Agreements. And it cannot show how Section 271 of the Texas Local
Government Code applies to Willacy County as a non-signatory to the agreements.
C. Texas Local Government Code Does Not Waive Sovereign Immunity
1. Local Government Code Section 271 Does Not Waive the County’s
Sovereign Immunity
Appellant attempts to expand the reach of the waiver of sovereign immunity
by invoking Local Government Code section 271.
However, Local Government Code section 271.152 states that “A local
governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a
18
contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign
immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract,
subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.”
And Texas Local Government Code 271.154 states that “Adjudication
procedures, including requirements for …engaging in alternative dispute resolution
proceedings before bringing a suit or an arbitration proceeding, that are stated in the
contract subject to this subchapter or that are established by the local governmental
entity and expressly incorporated into the contract or incorporated by reference are
enforceable except to the extent those procedures conflict with the terms of this
subchapter.”
The definition of a “contract” includes the fact that the contract “is properly
executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” See Tex. Loc. Gov. Code §
271.151(2)(A). And the definition of “Local Government Entity” excludes a County.
See id. at § 271.151(3).
Therefore, even if the local government entities’ execution of the Agreements
waives sovereign immunity, it does not extend to the County as a non-signatory.
Nothing in Section 271 extends the waiver of sovereign immunity for signing the
Agreements to the County.
2. Appellant’s Contentions Regarding the Local Government
Corporations’ Agency Are Inapt and Irrelevant
Appellants take the position that the founding and structure of the various
19
local government corporations and their signatory authority creates an agency
relationship with the County. Appellants ask this Court to conclude that the agency
relationship binds the County to the Arbitration clause.
This argument is inapt and irrelevant.
First, if there is there is no agency, then there can be no binding authority.
Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 148 (1st Cir. 2003). Here, the local government
entities were not serving as agents of the County. If they were, they would have been
signing the Agreements on behalf of the County as a party. The Agreements
expressly disclaim such a relationship, relegating the County to anything from
complete stranger (Exhibit A, at CR 106-130) to assignee (Exhibit B, at CR 132-
158) to third party beneficiary (Exhibits C, at CR 160-196 and D at CR 198-239).
Second, Texas Local Government Code section 271.160 expressly precludes
Appellants’ argument. That provision states that “A contract entered into by a local
government entity is not a joint enterprise [with the county] for liability purposes.”
In other words, where a local government entity signs an agreement, under Chapter
271 it would waive immunity. This provision states that it only waives immunity as
to itself—not as to the local governing body (e.g., here, the County).
This stands in distinction to Appellants’ invocation of Local Government
Code section 262.001(b). That states that “A contract or other act of an agent
appointed under this section that is properly executed on behalf of the county and
20
is within the agent's authority binds the county to the contract for all purposes.”
However, Willacy County did not appoint any of the local government entities as its
agents—the documents attached to Appellants’ brief clearly show the decision to
create the local government entities to do the work themselves. Moreover, nothing
says that creating local government entities is the same as “appointing” an agent
under section 262 as agents of the County. See Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 262.011 or
0115 (purchasing agents). Appellants also never demonstrate how the local
government entities were appointed as agents under the section.
Therefore, Willacy County is not liable for any contractual liabilities—
including liability for the contract’s arbitration provision—entered into by one or
more of the local government entities.
3. Local Government Code Section 262.007 Also Establishes Why the
County Has Not Waived Sovereign Immunity
Section 262.007 only applies to contracts and waives sovereign immunity for
a County that is a signatory to the contract. See Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 262.007(a)
(“A county that is a party to a written contract for engineering, architectural, or
construction services or for goods related to engineering, architectural, or
construction services may sue or be sued, plead or be impleaded, or defend or be
defended on a claim arising under the contract.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, this
section only applies to contracts where the County is a signatory.
Consequently, the section specifically requires all suits to be brought in court.
21
It provides that even where the county is a signatory to the contract, “a suit on the
contract brought against a county shall identify the county by name and must be
brought in a state court in that county.” Id. (emphasis added). No exception is made
for a contract that contains an arbitration clause.
It is now well established that only the Texas legislature can waive sovereign
immunity, or delegate the specific power to do so to subordinate entities, such as the
County or municipal entity. See Town of Highland Park v. Iron Crow Constr., Inc.,
168 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. App. Dallas 2005).
The Texas legislature has spoken and stated that where the County is a
signatory to a contract for specified goods, it may only be sued in the state court of
that county. See Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 262.007(a). Nowhere has the Texas
legislature stated that a County may be compelled to arbitration on a contract, much
less on a contract to which it is not a signatory. The inclusion of only a means to sue
a county in state court (e.g., irrespective of an arbitration agreement), necessarily
implies the exclusion of the right to impose arbitration on a signatory, much less to
do so on a county that is not even a signatory to an arbitration agreement.
III. WILLACY COUNTY HAS NOT FILED SUIT TO ENFORCE THE AGREEMENTS,
NOR DOES IT SEEK A “DIRECT BENEFIT” FROM THEM, THEREFORE IT IS
NOT BOUND BY THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Finding no statutory grounds for the premise that the Texas legislature has
22
waived sovereign immunity to compel the County into arbitration, Appellants’
primary argument is the equitable contention that the County cannot bring suit to
enforce the Agreements, but evade the Agreements’ arbitration provisions. They cite
the “direct benefits estoppel” argument for this position.
The district court has substantial discretion in deciding whether the equitable
doctrine applies. See In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex. 2005)
(“the equitable nature of the [direct benefits estoppel] doctrine may render firm
standards inappropriate, requiring trial courts to exercise some discretion based on
the facts of each case.”) (citing Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347,
360 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The use of equitable estoppel is within a district court's
discretion.”)).
Appellants rely exclusively the contention that the district court committed
legal error. Appellants conveniently gloss over the fact that in its cited cases, the
sovereign at issue had brought to suit to enforce a contract’s specific provisions, or
the record had evidence that the plaintiff had specifically adopted the contract as its
own prior to instituting suit. See Weekley, 180 S.W.3d at 131 (also discussing lnt'l
Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen Anlagen GMBH, 206 F.3d 411 (11th Cir.
2000) (estopping non-signatory from denying agreement to arbitrate "when he has
consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be
enforced to benefit him.”)).
23
A. Texas Supreme Court Precedent and Persuasive Authority Support the
District Court’s Discretionary Finding
In Weekely, the Supreme Court reiterated that “a nonparty may be compelled
to arbitrate ‘if it seeks, through the claim, to derive a direct benefit from the contract
containing the arbitration provisions.’ On the other hand, claims can be brought in
tort (and in court) if liability arises from general obligations imposed by law.” Id.
(citing In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. 2005)). The
Supreme Court created a two part test: “Claims must be brought on the contract (and
arbitrated) if liability arises solely from the contract” and if the claims “must be
determined by reference to [the contract].” Weekley, 180 S.W.3d at 132.
The narrowness of Weekely’s adoption of the direct benefits estoppel doctrine
was clarified by the Texas Supreme Court in In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166
S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. 2005) (“KBR”). There, the Supreme Court addressed
whether by alleging damages due to non-payment under color of a claim for unjust
enrichment or declaratory relief of valid liens, KBR has in effect sought to enforce
a contract and could be subject to arbitration as a non-litigant. The Supreme Court
said no. The Supreme Court agreed that KBR was seeking to enforce a right that was
“based on the fabrication subcontract in the sense that KBRs labor and services were
linked inextricably to that subcontract.” Id. at 739-740. But it held that it was not
enough. “[U]nder ‘direct benefits estoppel,’ a non-signatory plaintiff cannot be
compelled to arbitrate on the sole ground that, but for the contract containing the
24
arbitration provision, it would have no basis to sue.” Id. at 740.
The KBR court further elucidated: “We conclude that, under ‘direct benefits
estoppel,’ although a non-signatory's claim may relate to a contract containing an
arbitration provision, that relationship does not, in itself, bind the non-signatory to
the arbitration provision. Instead, a non-signatory should be compelled to arbitrate a
claim only if it seeks, through the claim, to derive a direct benefit from the contract
containing the arbitration provision.” Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held
that “we conclude that the court of appeals abused its discretion to the extent it
compelled KBR to arbitrate its quantum meruit claim[.]” Id. at 741.
As a Texas Court of Appeals likewise explained, “a non-signatory cannot be
compelled to arbitrate when claims merely ‘touch matters’ covered by a contract or
‘are dependent upon’ a contract; instead, the claims must rely on the terms of the
contract.” Carr v. Main Carr Dev., LLC, 337 S.W.3d 489, 498 (Tex. App. Dallas
2011) (citing Hill v. G.E. Power Sys, Inc., 282 F.3d 343, 348-49 (5th Cir. 2002).
“Where the obligations arise under general law”—e.g., here, the law of negligence,
anti-fraud and implied warranty—then a non-signatory to the agreement cannot be
compelled to arbitrate. Id.
Furthermore, it is well-established that a warranty and defect claims can be
brought by third parties to the contract without enforcing any specific terms of the
contract. Highly instructive is R.J. Griffin & Co. v. Beach Club II Homeowners
25
Ass'n, 384 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2004), on which the Texas Supreme Court heavily
relied on in KBR, 166 S.W.3d at 740. There, the Fourth Circuit denied application
of “direct benefits estoppel” to compel homeowners association who were non-
signatories to a development contract, even though they sued on the basis of breach
of contract/breach of warranty. Id. at 164. The circuit court recognized that the claim
did arise from the construction agreement—but they were not seeking to enforce
particular terms of the agreement; e.g., they were suing “to enforce extra-contractual
common law rights created by South Carolina to protect homeowners from shoddy
construction practices.” Id. Moreover, the circuit court noted that the doctrine did
not apply because “equitable estoppel operates to prevent one party from holding
another to the terms of an agreement while simultaneously avoiding the same
agreement's arbitration clause. Here, the Association is not attempting to hold
[defendant] to any term of” the agreement in question.” Id. at 165.
Similarly, in Intergen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Mass. 2003), the
court of appeals refused to apply the direct benefits estoppel to force a plaintiff to
arbitration even though the plaintiff alleged breach of contract to which it was not a
signatory. The plaintiff had alleged that it was the “the successor to all rights of
predecessor entities related to the actions and omissions alleged.” Id. The court of
appeals noted that the plaintiff was not seeking to enforce the contract in its breach
of warranty claims because, inter alia, the “claimed damages are not contract
26
damages per se.” Id. The court further noted that the damages were instead a series
of “extra contractual” acts and representations. Id. at 145-146. Moreover, the court
held that where a non-signatory has been forced to arbitrate, it is only where the non-
signatory “during the life of the contract, have embraced the contract despite their
non-signatory status but then, during litigation, attempt to repudiate the arbitration
clause in the contract.” Id. at 146. The court saw no evidence before it of the plaintiff
attempting, during the life of the contract, to enforce the terms of the agreement to
its benefit. Id.
Here, the district court’s Order is fully consistent with binding precedent.
Appellants identify no grounds for finding that the district court abused its discretion
in holding that the claims in the case did not seek to enforce the terms of the
Agreements. Indeed, Appellants have identified no terms or provisions of the
Agreements that are being enforced. The Agreements contain no warranty language
being enforced, nor fraud nor unjust enrichment language. This is all a red herring.
Willacy County’s claims for breach of implied warranty, negligence, unjust
enrichment and fraud may “relate” to the Agreements to the extent they relate to the
Facilities, but they do not actually depend upon them or enforce them. See KBR, 166
S.W.3d at 740 (“under ‘direct benefits estoppel,’ a non-signatory plaintiff cannot be
compelled to arbitrate on the sole ground that, but for the contract containing the
arbitration provision, it would have no basis to sue”); Carr, 337 S.W.3d 489, 498
27
(contracts that merely “relate” or “touch upon” an agreement insufficient to impose
arbitration obligation). Nor do Appellants identify how the County seeks to obtain
“through the claim, to derive a direct benefit from the [Agreement],” KBR, 166
S.W.3d a 741.
There is no evidence in the record of any direct benefit obtained by the County
from the Agreements. The specific evidence in the Appendices shows that the
County got no direct benefit because the local government entities were handling the
work load and raised the funds to build the Facilities. Moreover, those Agreements
terminated a long, long time ago (CR 130, 158, 196, 239). Therefore, any alleged
benefit to the County from this lawsuit is incidental.
For these reasons, Appellants’ continual recitation of the fact that the County
is a named third-party beneficiary in two of the three Agreements is a non-starter.
Being named a third party beneficiary does not change the fact that Willacy is a
stranger to the Agreements. No case has held that a sovereign entity can be bound to
the breadth of fundamental waivers of sovereign immunity even when it has not
signed the Agreement. Not a single case has held that.
To the extent that Appellants admit that in one of the Agreements—the
Sherriff’s Office Agreement—the County is NOT a third party beneficiary—that
justifies affirming prima facie. Thus, if as Appellants’ own contorted logic demands,
being a named third-party beneficiary is outcome determinative, this Court cannot
28
reverse the district court as to the Sherriff’s Office Agreement.
B. Under KBR, The Court At Most Would Reverse as to the Warranty Claims
Under KBR, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that a non-signatory
cannot be compelled to arbitrate claims lying outside of the contract, even if it can
be compelled to arbitrate claims within the contract.
The KBR Court recognized the general rule that arbitration clauses can be read
expansively for signatory parties to include all claims arising between them; the
same is not true for non-signatories. The Court expalained:
A party to a contract may, however, seek alternative relief under
both contract and quasi-contract theories. Pleading in the
alternative does not defeat the effect of an arbitration clause that
broadly covers all disputes between signatories that arise out of
the underlying agreement. But in this case, KBR is not a
signatory to the fabrication subcontract between MacGregor and
Unidynamics; therefore, the scope of that subcontract's
arbitration clause does not answer whether KBR must arbitrate.
KBR, 166 S.W.3d at 740. Thus, the KBR ultimately reversed as to the quantum
meruit claim because it was definitely not under the contract, and remanded for
further determination by the district court of whether the other claims could be
arbitrated. Id. at 742.
Therefore, at best, Appellants’ estoppel theory would place the warranty
claims in arbitration. Seeking restitution for negligence or unjust enrichment and
fraud in the inducement does not invoke any terms of the agreement. Landmark Org.,
29
L.P. v. Tremco Inc., 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5052, *29. These arise independent of
any contract. KBR, 166 S.W.3d at 740. Therefore, the claims for negligence, fraud
and unjust enrichment must be allowed to remain in district court.
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM ON CONTRACTUAL GROUNDS
An appellate court may affirm a trial court’s determination on any sufficient
ground in the record. Here, in the event this Court overrules the district court’s
sustaining of Willacy County’s objection to the lack of evidence and admits the
Agreements as evidence, the Agreements themselves provide textual grounds to
affirm.7
It is important to note that the three facilities were subject to independent
contracts, none of which had the same arbitration clause or arbitration language. A
close reading of these Agreement shows that they do not compel arbitration under
these circumstances and that the trial court did not abuse her discretion – or said
differently, any error was ultimately harmless.
Arbitration agreements are creatures of contract and are construed under the
same rules of construction as applied to other contracts. See Aldridge v. Thrift Fin.
Mktg., LLC, 376 S.W.3d 877, 882 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, no pet.); First
Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). When interpreting a
7 Because they were never provided in full, Appellee did not have the opportunity to raise the textual arguments
herein except where noted. Thus, to the extent this court overrules the district court’s implicit evidentiary ruling, it
should permit these arguments to be raised and find sufficient grounds to affirm the district court’s order.
30
contract, the primary concern is “to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
parties as expressed in the contract.” In re Serv. Corp. Intern., 355 S.W.3d 655, 661
(Tex. 2011). “To discern this intent, we ‘examine and consider the entire writing in
an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that
none will be rendered meaningless. No single provision taken alone will be given
controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the
whole instrument.’” Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d
342, 345 (Tex.2006) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, all of these agreements were presented and drafted by the
Defendants. And “[i]t is well-established law that where an ambiguity exists in a
contract, the contract language will be construed strictly against the party who
drafted it since the drafter is responsible for the language used.” Gonzalez v. Mission
Am. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. 1990).
A. The Sherriff’s Office Agreement Does not Provide for Mandatory
Arbitration by the County Because it Was Not a Party and the Provision is
Patently Ambiguous
In addition to not naming the County as a third party beneficiary, the Sherriff’s
Office Agreement does not provide for mandatory arbitration involving the County.
That agreement only provides for arbitration or mediation of “Claims, disputes, or
other matters in question between the parties to this Agreement arising out of or
relating to this Agreement or breach thereof[.]” (see Exhibit B, at CR 132-158)
31
(emphasis added).
As revealed in the Record before this Court, the County is not a Party and is
not a named third party beneficiary to the Sherriff’s Office Agreement. (see Exhibit
B, at CR 132-158). In fact, that agreement specifically provides that “Nothing
contained in this Agreement shall create a contractual relationship between the
Owner [County Jail Public Facility Corporation] and any person or entity other than
the Design/Builder [Hale-Mills].” (see Exhibit B at § 1.2.3, at CR 132-158).
Thus, the express inclusion of the limitation of “parties” as persons bound by
the arbitration provision to the Agreement cannot be overridden by an equitable
catch-all. None of the cases cited by the Appellants addressed an arbitration
provision that was, by its terms, limited to the “parties” of that contract. To the
contrary, at least one appellate court has held that even a third party beneficiary to a
contract who brings suit cannot be compelled to arbitrate when the contract
specifically delineates who must arbitrate, and does not specifically identify the third
party. See Intergen, 344 F.3d at 146 (“Each purchase order's arbitration clause
applies to "any and all controversies, disputes or claims between Buyer and Seller."
The words "Buyer" and "Seller" are explicitly defined.”).
Additionally, the contract provision is ambiguous. It does not provide that
arbitration is the exclusive or mandatory means to settling disputes. Indeed, Section
10.1 specifically states that “Claims, disputes or other matters in question between
32
the parties to this Agreement arising out of or relating to this Agreement or breach
thereof shall be subject to and decided by mediation or arbitration.” (see Exhibit B,
at CR 132-158).
Section 10.2 then clarifies that if a party selects arbitration under Section 10.1,
it must be preceded by a demand for mediation. (See id.). But the opposite is plainly
not true. A party who elects mediation—as the County did—which then turns out to
be unsuccessful is nowhere required to then also seek arbitration. The “or” in
“mediation or arbitration” is disjunctive. Either the mediation, or the arbitration is
mandatory. Both are not.
Because neither Section 10.1 nor Section 10.2 states that once a demand for
mediation is made then a party must then also file for arbitration, arbitration is not
mandatory under the Sherriff’s Office Agreement. Indeed, Section 10.2, by its own
terms, only applies to mandatory mediation preceding arbitration.
This language can be juxtaposed to the ICE Agreements (see Exhibits C, at
CR 160-196 and D, at CR 198-239) which specifically states that if mediation is
unsuccessful, then the complaining party must move for arbitration. (See § 10.2 and
10.3).8 Thus, to the extent that the provision allows the party to select between
mandatory mediation or arbitration, it is patently ambiguous and must be construed
8 The Arbitration provision in the Ice Agreements do not compel arbitration for other reasons, however, as we spell
out below.
33
against the Appellant. Gonzalez, 795 S.W.2d at 737.
Because the County is not a named third party beneficiary, is not a party to
the agreement required to bring an arbitration, and arbitration is not clearly
mandatory under the provision, this Court must affirm the district court’s denial of
arbitration as to the Sherriff’s Office Agreement.
B. The County is Expressly Excluded from Mandatory Arbitration Regarding
the Marshall’s Office9
Appellants’ own arbitration clause in the Marshall’s Office Agreement
expressly excludes arbitration with non-signatories to the Agreement. (See Exhibit
A, at CR 106-130). Specifically, the agreement provides, for example, that:
No other arbitration arising out of or relating to this Part 2
Agreement shall include by consolidation, joinder, or in any
other manner, an additional person or entity not a party to this
Part 2 Agreement or not a party to an Agreement with [Hale-
Mills], except by written consent[.]
See Exhibit B, at CR 132-158.
Thus, by the plain language in the Marshall’s Office Contract, Willacy County
cannot be compelled to arbitration over the marshal’s office facility because Willacy
County is not a signatory to any of the arbitration agreements with Hale-Mills, and
Willacy County has not otherwise agreed in writing to be bound.
Thus, the County is expressly excluded from being required to bring
9 This argument was raised and upheld by the district court.
34
arbitration under Marshall’s Office Agreement, and could not otherwise join the
non-signatory defendants.
C. The Agreements’ Clauses are Limited to Disputes that Arise During
Construction and Pendency of the Contracts—Not After
In In re Choice Homes, Inc., 174 S.W.3d 408 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, no pet.), the appeals court acknowledged that generally, events that occur after
a contract lapses or has terminated, they are not governed by the contract or its
arbitration provision unless expressly provided for. That is true even between the
same parties to the contract. Id. But, because the arbitration provision in that case
“encompassed claims that arose ‘during or after’” the contract period (there, the
period of employment), they were “thus subject to arbitration regardless of whether
the [events occurred] before or after [the contract] was terminated.” Id. at 413-14.
Under this language, the In re Choice Homes court held that the plaintiff’s
defamation claim was within the scope of the arbitration provision. Id.
While the court’s opinion in In re Choice Homes, Inc., turned on the “during
or after” language contained in the arbitration provision, no such language appears
in any of the Agreements at issue in this case. Appellants do not deny that the period
governed by the Agreements ended years ago, but that the latent infirmities and
cover-ups have only metastasized in recent years. Nonetheless, the disputes at issue
did not arise during the pendency of the Agreements—those contracts have long
lapsed, and therefore arguably, so have the Arbitration clauses. There is no dispute
35
that the Facilities were substantially completed by January 2008, (CR 130, 158, 196,
239)10 and that the completion of the facilities terminated the contractual
relationships.
This reading is consistent with the language in the Agreements. For example,
the ICE Agreements’ dispute resolution provisions address the parties relationship
“throughout the project.” See, e.g., Exhibit D, at CR 198-239 § 10.2 (§ 10.2.1). That
same provision then provides that “if disputes or disagreements do arise,” e.g.,
“throughout the project,” then the parties “commit to resolving such disputes or
disagreements in an amicable, professional, and expeditious manner so as to avoid
unnecessary losses, delays and disruptions to the Work.” Id. The balance of Section
10.2 describes the procedures for resolution thereof. Id. § 10.3.2-4.
Section 10.3 governs “Arbitration,” but by its own terms specifically and only
applies to disputes that arise and cannot be resolved under Section 10.2. See Exhibit
D, CR at 198-239 at § 10.3 (§§ 10.3.1). In other words, if the dispute arose under
Section 10.2 and was not resolved, only then would it be subject to Section 10.3.
Nothing in Section 10.2 suggests that it would apply to disputes that arose after the
completion of the “Project,”
It is black letter law that the provisions of contracts, especially those
containing an arbitration clause must be read to give each term its meaning, and to
10 Appellants admit as much in the brief. See Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1.
36
harmonize the terms thereof. See Aldridge, 376 S.W.3d at 882; Kaplan, 514 U.S. at
944. When interpreting a contract, the primary concern is “to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract.” In re Serv. Corp.
Intern., 355 S.W.3d at 661. “To discern this intent, we ‘examine and consider the
entire writing in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the
contract so that none will be rendered meaningless. No single provision taken alone
will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with
reference to the whole instrument.’” Seagull Energy, 207 S.W.3d at 345.
Here, the plain reading of Section 10.3 of the ICE Agreement renders it
limited in scope to the “disputes or disagreements” that arise under Section 10.2,
which is limited to disputes and disagreements that arise “throughout the project”—
e.g., while the construction project is still underway. Any other reading would
expand the scope of Section 10.3 beyond its textual moorings, and would render the
reference to Section 10.2 meaningless. Id.
Had the drafters intended for Arbitration to be mandatory regardless of when
the dispute arose—e.g., before or after, it would have expressly stated as much, and
it would not have referred to the limited scope of Section 10.2. Accord In re Choice
Homes, Inc., 174 S.W.3d at 413-14. Moreover, to the extent these provisions are
ambiguous, the ambiguity should be construed against Appellee as the drafter.
Gonzalez, 795 S.W.2d 734, 737.
37
Because there is no dispute in the record that the construct project is no longer
“underway,” and there is no risk of “unnecessary losses delays or disruptions to the
work” that could be avoided by mediation under Section 10.2, the plain language of
Section 10.3 renders the mandatory arbitration provision therein inapplicable to the
current litigation.
D. Appellant Has Not Proven that All Pre-Requisites to Compelling Arbitration
on the Detention Facility Have Been Met
The Appellant has not proven that the pre-requisites to invoking arbitration
have been met. Where there are contractual prerequisites to invoking an arbitration
agreement, the party seeking an order compelling arbitration is not entitled to relief
if it cannot demonstrate that those pre-requisites were met. See In re Pisces Foods,
L.L.C., 228 S.W.3d 349, 353 (Tex. App–Austin 2007, orig. proceeding) (holding
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to compel arbitration, and noting
that many courts have held “arbitration could not be compelled when parties who
were contractually required to mediate or follow other grievance procedures as a
precondition to arbitration had failed to do so.”); Amir v. Int’l Bank of Commerce,
419 S.W.3d 687, 692 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). (holding that
where it is clearly established that a strictly procedural requirement has not been met
and that procedural requirement precludes arbitration, a court can deny a motion to
compel arbitration).
38
Here, the ICE Agreement Section 10.1 requires that the Parties mediate in
good faith to resolve any dispute that arises during the project. Therefore, if the scope
of that clause is broadened, then Appellant as the movant bears the burden of proving
that all pre-requisites were met. The record is barren of any evidence that such a
prerequisite has been met.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, any one of which is sufficient, Appellee,
Willacy County respectfully requests this Court affirm the Order of the Trial Court
denying Appellant’s motions to compel arbitration.
39
Respectfully submitted,
By_____/s/Mazin Sbaiti
Bruce W. Steckler
State Bar No. 00785039
Mazin Sbaiti
State Bar No. 24058096
STECKLER, LLP
12720 Hillcrest Road, Ste. 1045
Dallas, TX 75230
Telephone: (972) 387-4040
Fax: (972) 387-4041
bruce@stecklerlaw.com
mazin@stecklerlaw.com
Ramon Garcia
State Bar No. 07641800
Emerson E. Arellano
State Bar No. 00785039
LAW OFFICE OF RAMON GARCIA, P.C.
222 West University Drive
Edinburg, TX 78539
T: 956-383-7441
F: 956-381-0825
Manuel Solis
State Bar No. 18826790
LAW OFFICE OF MANUEL SOLIS
6657 Navigation Boulevard
Houston, TX 77011
T: 713-844-2700
F: 281-754-4681
msolis1882@yahoo.com
Daniel G. Rios
State Bar No. 00784844
LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL G. RIOS, PC
323 W. Nolana Avenue
McAllen, TX 78504
T: 956-630-9401
40
F: 956-682-0566
dan@danrioslaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on July 22, 2015, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellee’s Brief was served via U.S. Mail, Fax and/or Electronic Service, upon the
following counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure:
William B. Westcott
Robert A. Plessala
Andrews Myers, P.C.
3900 Essex Lane, Suite 800
Houston, TX 77027-5109
(713) 850-4211 (facsimile)
/s/Mazin Sbaiti
Mazin Sbaiti
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Based on a word count run in Microsoft Word 2010, this Appellant’s Brief
contains 9,415 words, excluding the portions of the document exempt from the word
count under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Mazin A. Sbaiti
Mazin Sbaiti
41
EXHIBIT A
JENKENS &GILCHRIST • Fax=214-855-4107 Aug ~ 2003 9:01 P.02
MA Document A191
Standard Form of Agreement Between
Owner and Design/Builder
THIS DOQ..;)/£NT HAS IMPORTANT LEGAL CONSEQUENCES: CONSULTKl'ION WffH AN
AITORNEl•JS ENCOURAGED VlffH RESPECI10 ITS USE. CQ"'1PIE1'JON ORlrlODJF/CATION.
7bis d«umeru a>mprises tUJD Slljlarate~ Jbrt 1 ~ement and lbrl 2 ~- 10 tbe
e:rumr n/enmced in tbae ~- subordinate pruolblf qrumena to A191 consisl of ALA
Document ~l. Standard Farm of A8"emtetlts 811tKYnm Deslp,&dldtzr and Conrractor, and A/A
Do<:umenl B!JOI, Standard Form of~ .8etr.wm Du/gn/Builder and ;.rcbitea..
. .
PART 2 AGREEMENT
1996EDmON
AGR~ENT
made as oft~ Tenth day.of June in che year of two thousand
two
BETWEEN rhe Owner.
~_,,atlJnsJ
Armando Ruba1caba-President
Willacy c~unty Public Faciiity Corporation
546 W. Hidalgo Street
Raymondville, Texas 78580
Hale-Mills Construction, Ltd.
Bale-Mills Construction, Inc.
413Q Bellaire Blvd, Ste 210
Houston, Texas 77025
EXHIBIT
I I\ .
C:•1flo/111(h1 i'lll~. O'Jl'l'lll 1"ho; Am'-"fll."ilA llll'lilulc 11( Ard11ln1,S, 1-~~ ~~w lork ,w..-11uc. ),"It; lr•ohln11tun. DC .!llUOl>o';l\I.!. llc1tr11(l\A~l\lll Ill 1hc "'"''-"""' h1t11ru"'I
I•"""""'".,
•1uut.:.U\\Jt\ 1•l 1b rhL"
u.11hoU1 ttu.... ""'''-··.., JA'l"ln•Ultlft u( the AJJ\ \"Md.Ill") d11; ''"P'TI~hl b•·a 1.t 1·n11t,:d ~l.:ito ilnd w1U .. uh1~'' lh.,; ,.,,,~11or ,.. "-~I pt\NoL"l•utmn.
- 106
JENKENS &GILCl-RIST Fax:214-855-4107 ~ug ~ 2003 9:01 P.03
For the foUo"ing Projet.'t:
''""'""" l'roj«;t ....,.•. loctil1on and,..,,,._,,. "-t;rlptlan.1
See ParagraPi 1 of Apperdix "A".
T'" 'UChlt.caural services desc:ribcd in Article 3 will be pcovided by the fbllowing peaon or entity who is lawfully licensed
.Cli-
pi:ovide sttviccs oo rhc Project thac implementation of riKd t0 ace on the owner·• behalf Wich respect ro du!:
any instruction received from the Ownet would cause a Profeet. The OWner or such authoclzcd repreR:ruadve
violation of any ~Ucable la-. the Design/Builder shall shall cxo.mine documencs submitted by the Desianl
notify dte Owner m writing. Netdler the OesigntBuildec 8U1Jderand shall tender decisions in a timdy manner and
nor the Archltca shall be obl(ga(ed co perform anv ace In accordance wfth the schedule accepted by the Owner.
which either believes wtU Violate any appllablc law..· l"he Owner may obtain Independent review of me
Contraet Documents by a sepaate ;architcet, eQRineer,
'1 .2..3 Nothtog c:ontained in this Patt l Agreement shall con~r. or cost ~tor under contn.et to OC
CR::3IC II conmu:wal relationship between me.Owner and em~ by- the Ownci: Such inde~nt ~shall
any person or enrity orher than the Daisn/BUUder. be underckcn at che 0wncc·s cicpcn11e in a amely m211·
ner :and 11hall ncl delay the orderly [>f'UKri:ss of ~he Wbc\.
1.3 OWNERSHIP AND USE OF DOCUMENTS
1.3.1 Drawings, spcdficatians. and other documents and 2.2 The Owner may appoint an on-site project rcpre.o;en-
electronic data fumished by ~ .Dc$ign18uUdec :u:e iatiYC co ob;erve the Worlc 41nd co ha~ .such ocher
tnsttUntems of secvtce. The OesiJ,wBuildcr's A.n:hltect responsibilities :JS the OwneC" :ind Dc.'fi~uildc:r agree
lllld other providcn or profe$stonal ~ shaft ~rain in writing.
all common law, $1attllory nnd other resenicd righu,
;.,dut.l1ng c=opyri8ht In those in.'itrumentli of service fur- 2.3 The O\\ncr sh:all ll>t>pc:race With the 0cs1Rnl13ulkkr in
'1cd' by them. Dnlwini;tS, spccifac-Jtions. aru.l other doc- :;ecurinJt buildina and ocher pennies. 111.-.::nses md ilU~
ienr.s and ela-cronic cJ:im are fumi:;hed lbr use sol<.."ly tioni;. ·nle O\\"n\."f sh~• not be requil\!d «> pay the li.-e.~ nn:
wich l'C.!'ipect to this f3.n l J\qreemenc. The O\\ncr i;haU such permit.". li1."Cn.'K.-s :ind !mp."t.·dons unk::l.1 the t-'t>.>;l ot
l.>~ p~rmitted ru re~ain cupl~. indodin~ reproducible: sud1 ft."c::I is 1:-'Q:ludec.I rrum the: Dcs~liuik.lc:r·, Propc:i.o;:JJ.
t:,-Opic:;. of the drawings. ~1>ccif'i<.~dun.'i. and other
cJocumc:nts and d~ctmnit.· dat:i. rurrti~hed hy chc 2..4 1"hc C)\m1.T shall fuml.~h l>&.:rvicc..'I of bnd ~urvt.·yor.;.
~~~------~~~T1Q8
JENKENS & GILCHRIST Fax:214-S55-4107 Aug ~ 2003 9:02 P.05
ge:otec:hnical engineei:s. and other consultants for subsoil the persons or entities identified In this hn 2 ~ent,
air and \\-ater conditions. in addition ro chose prQ\;ded and any subsequent mod!ftcations. shall be in wridng.
under the Pan l -"'8ret:ment. \\'hen such 5c:rvices are These a.gceemencs, including financial arrangements ~ith
deemed nccessat)· ~- the Design Buildcc co properlr carry respect to tbis Protea. shall be prompt!~· and fully
ou( the design senices required by d\is hct 2 .<\g(ecmcnt. disclosed to the Owner upon request
2.5 The 01\"tler shall disclose, co the extent kno\\-n to the 3.1.3 The DeslgnlBuilder shall be responsible w lhe
OwnC(. the results and rcpons of prior cests. inspections Owner for aos and ombs.ions sf the Design/Builder's
or invesligations conducted for the Project itl\'oidng: employees, subcontraetors and ·their agents and em-
suuaui:al or mechanical .svsteans: dlemical. air and \\1lter ployees. and other persons. lnduding the Archirect and
pollution; hazardous mar.Crials: or Other environmental other design prok:ssionals, pedocmlng any portion of the
and subsurface conditions. The Owner shall disclose all Design/Builder·s obligations under rhis .Patt Z .~nc.
information known to rhc Owner regarding the presence
of pollutants at the Ptojea's site. 3.2 BASIC SERVICES
3.2.1 The Design/Bulldec's Basic Services ~ described
2.S The Owner shall fumi.sh all Jeg:d, accounling and below and in An:ide 14.
insurance counsding senices as .inay be ncccssacy at any
tlme for the Project. indudins such.aqdl.tjng senices as 3.2.2 The DesigolBuUde.r shall destgoace a re~ta
me Owner may require tO \'lerify tbc Deslgn/BuUdcr's civi(auclioriled· to ace an rhe DesJgntBulldr:r's bChalf with
Applic:adons for ~mc.ru. respect to the Pmjca.
3..2.3 The D~ullder shall submit Consuuc:don
Document! for revtew and approval by the: Owner.
Construaion Documcncs may IDdude tirn-'ingS. sped&·
adons, and other docwnenrs and electronk; data setting
forth In derail the requlrementS for c:onsauclion of the
WOlk, and shall;
.1 be consiste.nt with the intent of die Desiga/Build-
er's Proposal:
'-' If the Owner requires the Designl8u1kler to maintain .2 provide infonnation for the use of those in the
any speci31 insurance ~. po1q amendment. or
cider, the Owner shall pay the addidonal c:oSt thereof, building trades; and
except as otherwise StlpWated ln this hn 2 Aareemcnt. .3 Include documents c:uscomarity required for
tcguWory asenc:y appcova.1$.
2.1 If che Owner observes or ot.hctwJsc becomes aware
of a fault ot defect in the Work or nonconformity \\'lth 3.2.4 The Ocsijp11Buj1der, with the assistance of the
the Design/Builder's Proposal or che Construcdon Owner, shall rue documents required to obtdn nr.ces-
Documeius. the Owner shall give prompt written nolice sary approvals of govcramennd authorities having
thaeofm rhe D~ildet: jurisdiCtion over the Projec:t.
3.2.5 Unless orherwiSe proVided . in the COouact
2.10 The Owner shall, at the request of the Design/· Docurnents. dlc: De1ign1Buildec .shall pro\lide or cause to
Bulk.lei-, pnor to QC!CUdon of this .P.ut 2 Aareement aod be pC'Ol'ided and shall paJ"tor desJ.gn services. labor,
prompdy upon request thereafter, furnish to the materials. equipment, tooJs, constrUCdon equipment
Design/Builder reasonable evidence that financial md machine~ water, heat. utillde., Uln&pon.adon and
~rs h«Ve been made to fulfill i:hc O\\ner·s
other &dlides and scrvio:s n~ for proper CCCCU·
obllgaiions under rhe Conrna. don and compledOn of the Work. whethcC temporary or
pennancru and whether or nor incorporaed or to be
2.11 nu:C>wner shall com"1unlcate with persons or incorporated In rhe Work.
entities empfoyed or reWllcd by me
DcsfgntBullder
through rhc Oeslgn/Bullder, unless othenvise directed 3.2.6 The OesignJBuilder ithall be responsible Cot all
by the Design/Bulfder. C003trucdon DlCIOa, mcd\oc;ls, -=iudqWK.. ~
and procedures, and i>r coordinating all poniOnS of me
~.de under thi$ P..an: 1 Agreement.
AATICLE3 3.2.7 The De20ign1Builder shall keep the Own« infuc-
DESIGN/BUILDER med of the progress and qu~ty of the Work.
3.2.B The Df:sitn/Builucr shall be: responsible for
3.1 SERVICES AND ftESPONSIB1unES L-orrc:cting Work which <.lo.:J> nm conform ro the Contract
Documen1:1.
' l'>c:!IJCO scn-lc:coc require:d by thL1 fart .2 :\J!reement
he 1~cfonncd tw qualified irchlreas and ndu:r 3.2.1 Tilc! Design/Builder "~"rrants m the Owner that
uc.~ pmlcs... iun:il'L The cunrcaawll abl~ttun.; 01' sui::h 1nareriaJs ;md equi1>rmmt fuml."il11..-d under the Conu-a£;t
profr:s.'iiona.I per:-ion., or meides are undlm:ila:n :inti per· will be: uf l(iJ.{Nl3uikl1.:r :ind c.:nnstruc..·tiun \\itl c:onform \\ith Che: tcqUin:numtS of the
~~~--~~--~~~~~~~--~109
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax=214-855-4107 Aug 8 2003 9:02 P.06
Contract Documencs. Construction not conforming ro not included in Basic Senices unless so identified In
these rcquiremencs, Including substitutions ncx properly .\cticlc 14. and they shall be paid for~ the Ql\·ner as pro-
approved by the Owner. shaJJ be corrected in accoroancc \.ided in this Pan 2 Agreement. in addition to the com·
\\ith Article 9. pensatlOn for Basic Services. The services described in
thi' Paragraph 3.3 shall be provided onJy if aucoorized or
3.2.1 o The Design.IBuilder shall pay all saJc:s. consumer. confitmcd in writing b~· the Owner.
use and similar mes which had been lcgallv enacted at
chc rime the Or.:s.ign.IBuildcr's Proposal was n.x;i; submitted 3.3.2 Making revisions in dtawlngs, spccillcati00$. and
co the ~er. :and shall secure and pay for buildlng and other documcntS or elecuonic data "·hen such revisions
~ pcnruts and govemmcnw kc:s, licenses and in.spcc- ace required by the enactment or te\islan of codes, l:a\\'5
t1ons necessary for the proper execution and completk>n or regulations subsequent to the: prepacatlon of such
of the Work l\illch are dt:her customarih• secured after documentS or electr0nic data.
c:edldously as Is conslatent with rCasonable s~ and
Owner concurs, the OealgnJBullder shaH Issue a catt: and che ocdcdy progress of me Projca.
Cenificate of Sub5lllntial Completion which shall estab-
lish the Date of Substmdal Completion. shall swie the 4.2 Time limits seated in chc: Conmct Documents arc of
responsibility m eadl pany ror securitv. mainceoance. the essence. TilC Work to be perfonned uC1der Pare mas
heat. udlldes, damage to the \Vock and "tnsuranct!. sh:ill .? Agn:emenc sh:ill commence upon iec:dpt of a nonce to
incluclc a list of lccins to be compleced or c:orrec:ted and proc:_eed unless otherwlile agreed aod, subject to autho-
stwl fix the time within which the DesigntBuildcr shall rized Modlllcadons. Substantial compledon shall be
achlcVcd on or bc:forc chc: date c;:smb11ahed tn Att1cle 14.
complete items lism:l lheretn. -9isptrllCS between ~-
-'>wRef ~Q11111p1Buil•f-f88&RillRtt ahe CIK-Cifiwe et: 4.3 Subsw.nd:il Completion L.; che stage in the progre:s.~
4ubaaRlkal~~ RSQlt...c}Jn ac:GOR.laAQt
~AJ01ido10
of the Work when me
wt>rk or d~ted portion there-
of is :sufficiently complete in acconlance with the
3.2.15 11-.e Design/Builder shall maintain ac me :ilte for Conmct Documents so the Owner can occupy or utUize
the Owner one tce0cd copy of the drawio~. itpt:etfk2- the Wbrk for it."i intended use.
ric>no;, produce data, samples. shop dr:i\\inRS. Ch.:i~e
Ordeni :and ocher modificarioos. in gou1.."SigrvBullcJc:r·11 Pmpo...:.il, :i cull!itnl\!·
tiOR !;cheduic 1th::tll be r>roviuctl l.'UOllistCnt with P:lra-
~larly updarttl 10_ record the t.-Omplered construction.
'it: sNll be dcltven:d to the Own~ upon complt:tinn
graph 4.2 ~bcn-c.
.n:strUc."tion :md prior ro Ii~ p:iyn1ait. 4.5 If the 11c.si1lr\/Builth:r is c.lela~'t:O at any [lntc in the:
3.3 ADDmONAL SERVICES p~s of ch~ \'1;11rk br 41n nt.'l or n1..1flc.:t..1 of rhc O\mcr.
0Wncr·i; ltlll[)(C~"C~l'i. \ll" !iC!:r.lf;UC t;Ontr.u:mrs t.'mplu~·t.'tl
3-3.1 The services described in thi'I 1';1r.i~C"J.ph .3.3 are by the O\\'flcr. 111· I~· c:h~~'-"l:i urderttl ln chc '\M1rk. or hy
110
JENKENS &GILCl-RIST Fax:214-855-4107 Aug 8 2003 9:03 P.07
labor di:iputcs. fire, unusual delar In deliveries. aU\'ersc sti2ll become due until the Design/Builder submlts to
weather conditions not fe2sonably anticip:uable. the Owner OJ an affldavit that payrolls. bills for materials
unavoidable casualties or other causc:s be\•ond the and equipment. and ocher indebtedness connected with
DesignlBuilder's conucl. or by delay authorized by the the Work for "·hich the Owner or Owner's property
Owner pending arbitRtlon. or~· Ot'her causes "'hich the might be responsible or encumbered (less amounts
Ownc:c and Design/Builder agree m:iy justi~· dela~·. then tVichhcJd b\• the Owner) have been pald or otherwise
the Con~ Time shall be reasonablv extended bv saclstled: tk. .3 t~ of spedaJ wamanties required by the eon-
5.1.6 Neithct progress payment nor partial or entire use u:ux Document$.
oc occupancy of r:he Project by rhc Owner shaO ccnsd- 5.2.4 ~lance of final payment shall constiture a
rure an ac:ceplanCl! of 'Mlrk noc in accordance ~id\ me
Contra.ct Documenrs.
waM:r o( all daims by me
~uilder ~ those
prcVlous1v made in writing and idcntitlcd by the
Design/Builder as unsettled at the time or ftml
5.1.7 The De.sfgo/.Buildc:r wamw.1 rhat Ude IO all con- Application for P:t.ym~nt.
~truetioncowm:d by an ~ for Paymcnc will pass
ro ~ OWncr no Jacec- tbail the dme uf payment. the 5.3 INTEREST PAYMENTS
~iJesignlBuildcr 01" any other pc:n;on ur in the ®sente of a spcclftcd rate. at the legal rate
or r:ntity pcrlbrming c:unstruCtion m the site: or furnishln,g prevaillng u-lu:re the Project L'! IOOlced.
marerial.'I or equipment relacing to the <.."OnStJU(..-tiun.
5.1.8 AL the time of Substanclal Curnplc.-titJD, the Owner
s!la.11 par tile Ol.-sign/Builder the r<..'13in:ip;c, if :in~~ less the
.....~on:ablc cu.,c w wrrecc or cumpk.-u: inc:um:a Clr incom·
ARTICLE&
,, ~
PROTECTtON OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY
~ -
u: ~irk. Final payment uf !iud1 \\.'ithbdd :turn :ihall be
.1dc upon co1n..~'don or compleciuo of i;udl 'M>rk.
6.1 The Ocsi!tn1 BuiklL'1' :1h:sll be n:sponsible fur i1lil,i:U-
5.2 FINAL PAYMENT ing, m.11nrainini.t and pnwltling !lupervL'liun cif all :s;itcty
prec..":lutio11:1 :mu pn>Nr.am:i i11 c:nnn~ctlun wich the
5.2.1 ~r:ilhc.:r tinal p.:t}'l11enc nor arnoums rr.:raiireU. if •lnY. pecfurmanec uf thL'I hrt l ~rt.-emem.
111
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax:214-855-4107 Aug S 2003 9:03 P.08
6.2 The besign!Builder shall take reasonable prccau· of ownershlp, maintenance or use of a motor
tion.s for the safety of. and shall pCOYide reasonable vehicle; and
protection co pre:vcnr damage:, injucy or loss co: (1) .7 claims involvlng comrac;tual liabilir:r insurance
empl~es on the Work and other pe(So~ who ma~· be applicable to the DesigntBuilder·s obligations
affected thereby; (2) rhe Work and materials and equip-. under Paragraph 11.5.
mcru to be incorporated therein. whether In scora~e on
oc off the sice, under care. custodl( or control or the 7.1.2 The insucancc required bv Subparagraph 7.1.l
Design/Builder or the Dcsignlt!uilder's contractors: and shall be \\'rittcn foe not less titan limitS of liabiJlty
(3) Other property at or adjacent thereto, 5uch as u-ees, spec:ifkd in this Part l Agreemcii.t or requ1n:d by law,
shrubs, lawns. walks, pavements, roadways, structures whichever coverage i$ greater. Coverages, whether
and utilities not dcslgf1ated for removal, relocation.. or "-'fitten on an occur.rence or claims-made basis, shall be
replacemeoc in rhe course of constnJCtion. malnrained "1ilhout interruption frolll dale of com-
mencemenc or the Wbrk until date of final paymtnc and
6.3 11\e Design/Builder shall give notices and comply termination of any covenge required to be mainwned
with ~ laws, ·on:iinances, rule.&, regu)ations and after final payment.
lawful Oaleas or public aut:hondes bearing on rhe safety
of pe.rsons oc pcopercy or their prorecdon from damage. 7.1.3 Ccrdftcaces of lnsuta11cc acceptable to the Owner
injucy CC" loss. . shllll be dellvete:d to che Owner immediately after execu-
tion of dns Pan 2 Agrmnenc. These_Cerdfic:.:ard an~~. _ .....
6.4 The Design/Builder shall promply remedy damage inSurance poUck:s required ~· this Pmgraph 7.1 SlllW
and loss (odlcr than c:Wnage or Joss insured under cootaJn a provision that ooveJ38CS afl"orded under rhe
property insua.na: provided or i:equired by the Conaaa palidcs wifl not be canceled or allowed to expJre until at
Documerus) to property at the site caused In whole or least 30 davs' pd_51r written notice has beet\ given to the
in pare by the Dcstgn/Builder. a conam:tor of che Owner. Jf my ol the Co~ lnsurance coverages arc
~ed ro remain in lDrcc after final payment, an Mkli·
Oesi,gn/Builder ot anyone directly ar indirectly empl~
::i:~ of them. oc by myonc for whose aas they may be tiOOal cenificacc evidencing contlnll2lion of such cow:r-
agc shall be submitted with the appllcauon for ftnal pay-
ment. lntormadon concerning ccdualon of' CO¥er2F
.shall be Cumlshai by rhe Desigi1/Builder with reasonable
prompcncss ln acCocdanc:e wkh the DesJanlBuiJdet's
ARTICLE7 information and belie[
INSURANCE AND BONDS
7.2. OWNER'S UABIUTY INSURANCE
T.1 DESIGN/BUILDER'S UABIUTY INSURANCE
:::~,::e~~~~::t=:~
7.1.1 The Design/Builder shall purchase from and ~Owawmaypu,.;._.ud Rlinl1liA od'•
mainl2in. in a company or~ lawfully aulhor.izcd ~ (ef lelltw~~~~ .......... -.y
to do buslnea in die furisdicdOn In whk:b die Profect is
located, sud\ lmuraDce as will protea the DcslglvBullder
from dalins set Cvnh below which may anse out or or
~~..::~:c=r::
llHI R'lliMdAWtg • ., epfie8lll OPIAet's liMilier IAsUllMEe -
1C$Ult from opetation5 under this Pan 2 Agreement by '1calc5S sptdlicall.¥ f8'1111RMI i..•• C9"m Oocz·•enti--
the DcsignlBuilder or by a c:oruraaor of the Design(
BWldet, or by anyone dtrecdy or llldkecdy emplm'l:d bv 7.3 PROPeft'n" INSURANCa
any of mcm, 0( by anyone for whose aas any of them ~At l::Jntess e~1-t:toder ehie- PHI 3
may be liable:
•8""'ffl!"'1', the GWftef shall purchase and maintain, In
.1 daiiN undet workecs' CIDl1lpeosation, disabillly a company or co~panic:S authorized to do busineSs in
benefit and orher simiJar employee bcne6t laws · the jurisdiction In which the principal improvell'lCDt5
that :are applicable to dte 1ft:Jrk to be performed; are to be located, prl!lpe;ner insUl'lll'\U ttpeft lhe Wem •
...Z c:bims for dilv lniurv.
dcach of a pc:r.mn or property c.i:lma~e :ari:;in~ ouc
112
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax:214-855-4107 Aug ~ 2003 9:04 P.09
professionals. contractors. subconmaaors. agents :and
employee$. each of the Other. for damages caused by fire
or other perils to the extent covered by prope«!f insur-
ance obtained pursuant to this Paragraph : .3 or other
propcn:y Insurance applicable to the '«'Ork, except such
rtghts as th~· may haw: ro proceeds of such Insurance
held by the Owner as trUStee. The 0\\-ner or Design/
Bullder. as appropriate, shall require Crom conuacrors
and subcontraaors by approptiatc agreements, written
v.ncrc legall~· required for validlry. similar waivm's each in
favor of other pantes enumerated in this Paagraph 7.3.
The policies shall provide such waivers of subrogation by
endorsement or otherwtsc. A waiver of subropclon shall
be efleaJve as to a person or entity ever> rhough that ~·
son ()(' entity would othcrwi.se have a duty lndemnffi... or
cation, conuaaual or otherwise, did not pay dle Jnsur-
ance premium directly or lndireal~ and whedlcr or not
the peaon or endcy had an insurable interest in the
prope(t! damaged.
7.3.9 11 requfrcd in writing by a pany In inrcrest. the
Owner as tn.IStee shall, upon oa:urrc:oce of an Insured
7.3.4 Unless ~e prot'idcd. me Owner shall pW'- loss, give bond tor fropcr
performance of the Owner's
duties. The eost o required bood5 shall be ~
chase and maintain such bollef and machinety Insurance
requhcd by this Pan 2 ~enc or by law, which shall ~ proceeds recd\fed as ~ The Owner shall
spedfu:aDy CCM:r such insured objeas dutiog insrallark>n deposit in a separate account p~ so received. which
and until final m:qmancc by the Owner. This iDsuGlnCC rhe Owner shall dlsrn'bute In a:f."I<::>
a~ainst t::ich ocher :ind the Architect lnd other dc.-slgn uue tU tit"U Uf other hazards. however <:aWICU.
.. --··-·- ........................""• ........,.,..,,. 113
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax:214-855-4107 Fk..tg 8 2003 9:05 P.10
AATICLI; B design services and revisions to che Contract
----
CHANGES IN THE WORK
Documenrs. In case of an increase in chc COncract Sum.
the cosc shall indude a ctlSonable allowance for
overhead and pro.fiL In such case, rhe DcsigniBuilder
8.1 CHANGES shall keep and present an itemized accounting cogether
with appropriate .supporting data for inclusion h1 a
8.1.1 Chang~ in the ~Ork ma~· be accomplished after Change Order. Unless otherwise provided ln the
O(CCUtlon of this Pact Z -~t, whhout imralidal:lng Contraa Documc:na. co;,c:i tor ihcic pwposcs :shsl1 be
rhis Pact 2 Agreement. bY Change Order,
Constn.tc::don li.mltcd to the following< .
Cb,anse Dlcective, or order for a minor change in the •1 costs or 1mor, including sodal security. old age
Work. subject co rhe limiwkms stau:d in the Conuacr and unemployment \Nul;ill1Ce, fringe benefiu
Documcncs. requ~ by agreement or cusmm, Nld workets'
8.1.2 A Change Ocdc:r sh'a.11 be based upon a~c:mcnt compenso.don lnsur:ancc;
bl!t'\leen du~ Ownec- and rhe DesignlBui,Jdcr; i:a Cori.struc- .2 ~~ of rnau:.rials, $upplies $Ind equipment, in-
tiOn Change Direaive may be issued by rhe Owner with- cluding cost of rransponacion, whether mcorpo-
out rhc agra:m~t of the DcsigrvBuildcf; an order for a med of consumed:
minor change ID rhe ~ may be issued b\• rhe .a cental coacs of m;ac:hinery and equipment exclu-
Design/Builder alone. ·
.. slve. of h2od to0ls, whelh.ec l'CJlted .from the
8.1.3 Changes in lhe ~ shall be performed under Design/Builder or othttS;
app~e ~c~ of the Conuaa Documents. and _4 c0$U of premiums foe all boods and lnSUr;3nCC
the ~slmll ~ ~pdy. unlcs.1 othero. permit fees. and &ales. use: or similar c:axcs;
wise provided In the Change Order, Consuuctlon .& Wdldonml cosrs of r;;up~ llJld field office
Change DlcecUVe. or oRier for a mlJlOr change tn the
Work. pemmnd directly att.dbutable m r.be diaoge; :znd
fees paid to the Archlt:ect. engineers aod other
8.1.4 If.unit pdca are swed In me Conttact Documents professionals_
or subsequently agreed upon. and Jf quantities originally 8.U Pcm:llng lioa.l dctcrmloadon ol cost to the Owner,
contemplared aR: so c:binged In a pcopo5ed Cfumge
Orde.f o.r consuuc:uon awnge Ditealve mac applicatlOn amounm not in dispute maybe Included In~
- r 5uc:b unit priom '°
quamldes of Work propo,ed wW b- PlilYmeOt. The sunount Of cn!!dlt w be allowed by the
DcsWnlBulldcr t0 the Owner for ddedon or change
1e aubs12.0dlal Inequity m che Owner or the Des.lgoJ
.kier, rhe appJiablc unir prices shall be ~tablv whidi results tn a ner decrease In Ibo Coaaact sum Wtll
~usted. ~~- . be aaull net cost. When both addidOllS and aa:iltS cov·
l!dog related "Wbrk or substitutions are tnvol-.ed in a
&.Z CtlANGI!! DRDl!RS chsnge, rhe allowance foe ovel'hmd and pro&t shall be
~ on the b2Sis o( the net inae:ISe. if IPY. with
8.2..1 A rt of proposed l'CYlslons tO the COncract lntonn the Owner, in wrldn& of minor changes in me
Documenr.s. COllSU\lctlon Oocumenu mcl consuuaion.
8.3 CONSTRU~N CHANGE DIRECTIVES I.I CONCUL.m CONDITIONS
B.a.1 A Consttuetion Change Directive 15 a wtirtcn order 8.5.1 If conditions are encourucred at the sire which ace
prepared and signed by lhe Owner. directing a change in (1) subsurface or othenWic cona:aled physbl condi-
che Wlbri£ prior (0 agreement on adjustment, if :mv, in che uons Which differ nuu:Cl'lally ttom those fudiaa:d in chc
ConU2Ct Sum or Conmaa nmc. or both. · Concraa: Documcnc:t or (2) unknown physical condi..
dON of Ill\ unusual nature, which di8'er inslterially from
8.3.2 Except as uthcnYisc agreed by me Owner and the those on::linacumems. then nodcc by
. · aruJ savin~s of those performing the 'Mtrk ~tribut- che observing p:iny shllll be gi¥en co the other pacey
m lhe change, lnduditlft Che c:xpcndtcures fur proniptly betOrc conditionS ;ire disturbed and in no
AIA OOCUllllENT A191, Pllt I o(J"VNEll~ICH.U&:llJ)tll At:llf'.£\IE...:T• "F.C0!'1D mmoN. AL\~. '"9'Jfi A191-1HI
n1£ A.'\11".llit:AS L'l;smt.7E 01' NlOurectS. 17;\~ l'il!W' ")RK A\11.~Cr., :,"'I( "\FISMINCilCN, nc JO(llto-~J9J.
WAl'VH!fG: UfMI.,.,,.... ~,... vfDIMH U.S. vapyrtgnc- HD •• llUCll- kl ..... pr-an. Part 2-P99e 9
114
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax:214-855-4107 Aug fl 2003 9:05 P.11
event later than 21 davs after first observance of the ouc the \~'ork io accordance t-.·irh che Coouact
conditions. The Concract Sum shall be equitably adjust- Documents and (ails within SCVCl (i) days after receipt
ed for such concealed or unknown conditions by of written notice from the Owner to ccmmence and con-
Change Oeder upon daim by either patty made within 21 tinue correction of such default or neglect wich diligence:
da~ after the daimanc becomes aware of the conditions. and promptness. the Owner m~ give a second written
notice to the Design/Builder and. SC\-'Cn r.) da~'S fo~ow:·
8.6 REGULATORY CHANGES ing receipt bv the Design/Builder of chat second wnuen
notice and ~ithout prejudice to orhcr remedies che
8.6.1 The Design/Builder shall be compensated for Owner mav ha"C, correct such ddldencies. tn such asl!!
changes in the construction ncCCiSltarcd by the enact· an appropriate Change Order shall be issued deductJng
mcnr or revisions of codes, laws or reguladons subse- from paymencs then or thereafter due the Design/
qucru t0 chc submission of the Oesign/Builder..s Prop052.I. Builder cosu of correcting such delidencics. U che pay-
mcnrs then or thereafter due rhe DesJgntBullder are nor
suffidenr re cover the amount ol the deduction, the
ARTICLES Design/Builder .shall pay the difference to the Owntt.
Such actlon by the Owner shall be subject to d15pote
CORRECTION OF WORK resolution procedul'C$ as pt'OYided In .Artide 10.
9.1 1be Desigll/BuUdec shall prtJlJlptly coaea \Vork
rtjc:ctc:I by rbc Owner or lmown by the DcsignJBuildcc to ARTICLE 10
be defcctivc oc f.Wlng co confi>cm to the requirements of
the Contraet Documents, wh.erher obaerved before or· DISPUTE RESOLUTION-
atitt Sllbswu:bl Cornplerion and whether or not f.abricat- MED~TION AND ARBITRATION
ed, lnsralled occompleced. 1be ~shall bear'
costS of correcdng such rejected Work, including 10.1 Claims. '"5putcS ·or other mauers in question
adc:Utkxaal tesdng :and insptttiOns. between the patties to thlS Pan 2 Agreement a.riSin& our
of tX relating to this Part 2 Agrttmcnc or bn:ach thereof
1.2 I( widUn one (l) year after &:he dale of Subscanlial sh;dl be subject to and decided by mediation ot abim-
C' ·letion oI the \lClbrk oc, aftu the date for oommence- tlon. Such mediatioo or ubiuation s.ball be conducted in
n. of W'llmUldc:s established ln a written agR:emc:nt accordance 'Mch the Consuuc:tion lndusuy Media~ or
bct\Vttll rhe OWnet and me Dcsign/BUildcr, or by tcrmS Atbitration Rules of the AuieriC2'1 Arbkr.ation Association
oI an applk:able special warranty required by the cummtly in eftCa.
Conuaa Dacu.ments. any or me Wbrk is fi::Jund EC be not
In acCoabnce 'l'llch the requimnc:nu of che ConU3ct 10,2 ln additton to and prior w adJJtration, the parties
Oocumems, the Daign/Builder shall con:ect .it pxomptly shall endeavoc m settle disputcS by medladon. Demand
afu:r receipt o! a wrtm:n ncxice from che owner ra do so fur mediation shall be lilc:d in writing with the orher
unless lhe Own« has pccviously ~ the Desigpl pany to this fut 2 Agl'eemcnt and with the Amaic:an
BUfldcr a written aa::epCllDCe of 5uch condldon.. Arbiindon Association. Adeuaand tor medlation shall be
made within a reasonable time al\er the claim, dispute.
9.3 Nodling contained in rhis Anide 9 a;hall be coo- 01: ocher matter In questlon has arisen.· Jn no ~t shall
suued ro esl2b!lsh a period of IJmiwioo With rcspca i:o the demand for mediation be made aftc:t the dare when
otbec obli,pdons which the DesiplBuilder mighc haw! lnftltudon of legal or equh:lble proceedinas bslsed on
under the Conrna Documents. Esrabllshmerit ofthe such clahn, dispure oc other mauer In quesdon would be
dme period of one (1) year• desalJed in Subparagraph barred by the appllcable stature of repose or limbadons.
9.2 relates only to the specific obligadon of d\e
Desf8n/BUlldCl' ro correct the '\lb'k, and has no relatiOn· 10.8 Demand For arbitl2don shall l:!F filed In writing with
ship to d\e Wile Within whk:h the obligadon to comply · the other party to this Part 2 Agreement and Wir.h me
with th.e c.onuaa Docwnems may be sought 1:c be Amcdcan Nblttation AssodarJon. A demand for acbitra--
enforced, nor ro rhe dmc within~ch e_cocee~ may tion shall be made wlthiil a reasonable dme afra' the
be commenced to escabJJsh me ~uildcr's ffabuky claim, dJspure or Other matter in ~uesrion has amen. In
W1ch ropc:a to the Dcir1.g111BufJd~t"':i oblfptlons Other no cvenc snau enc ctc:mand a wlt;ral:icn be mtadc after
than spedflally to c:x>rrect the '1.brlt. the date when lnstkudon of lc;pl or equir.abJe proceed-
ings based on $Uch claim, c.Jisputc or oc:her mattct' In
9.• If the Oesign/Bulldcr faiJ.'i ro correct nonconforming quesdon would be barred by the applicable srarures of
W'ortl:: a.s n:quired or f.l1ls ro catty ouc \M:>(ic in a«ocdance repose or limitations.
wirh !:fie Conuacr Docwnents, the Owner, t.,• wrtcceo
order signed personally or by an agou spo:UkaJI~· so 10.4 An arbimuJ.oo pursunnc to thili Para~ph may be:
t!nlpowcred by the Owner in writing, ma.y order rhe joined with :m arbitration involving common ls.slid or
Desigri/Buildcr to stop the W'ork. or any portion thereof. law or fac.'t bctMCrt the ~ign/Builtlt!r :i.ntl any person
untU che Cl.use for such onler has been ctiminaced: how· or entity \\.ith whom me Dcst.gnJBuUcler N.-c a concra<.."tu-
r:v1 '1c Owner's right to srop rhc Work shall noc give al obligation tu .arbitr:ate disputes. No othtt a.rbiu;itiun
ris a duty on the part of the Owner tQ exercise the arising uuc o( or n:latinR lO this Part l ~nt sh2JI
ripu tor benefit or the Oec;1RnJBulldl!r or ocher persons include. by c;unsolid:uion. julndcr or in any other man-
or entitie$. ner, :in addidon:d per.1on or endry noc a p:i.rty co thljtratc with an addltlonal person ur eodcy duly con· 11.6.1 To the fullC$t extent pc.nnitccd by law, the
:sentcd to by the putia to thb Part 2 Agreement sf\all be . De5JgrvBuilder &hall indemnify and hoJd harmless the
'peci&co.fl~ enforceable in accordance -.ith applii;ablc Owner. OWnet''s consulcuus, :and ~cs snd employees
law itl any coun havlns ;urisdiction cheteot of anv of thcim from and ~insc claims. damascs. Jo5SCS
and expenses, inducting bur not limited to atmmeys'
1 o.sThe award rendered bv the arbitrator or arbitratots fets. arising out of or resulting from performance of the
slWl be final, and iudgmeni may be entered upon it in Wt>rlc. provldcd thac such daJm, a.image, Joss or
accordance wtdi applicable l2w In tny courc haVing expense is amibutable co bodily inlu.cy, sickness, dJse:asc
jutisdiaioo thcn:of. or- dn.ch. or co injucy ~ or: daottuction of caagiblc: prop-
etty (od>er cMn the We.it: lcs:e1f) indudtns roo
of use
resul~a thci;efrom. bur onty to che ~c caused in
whole or in pan by negligcot aas or omwlons of the
ARTICLE 11 Oesign/BuUder. anvone dJi:ectly or indlrecdy employed
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS by the Design/Builder oc anyone for whose aas the
Ocsign/Bulldc:r may be liable. n:prdla5 of wllcctlu or
not :iuch claim, damage, loss OC' apense is caused in
11.1 Unles$ odtccwisc provided. this Part z Agtttmeoc p2Ct by- a p:any indemnified hel'eundec Such obligation
shall be g~cd by the law of che place where the shall not h! consrnied to ~ abfidae. or reduce
Projea is located. · · other righu or obliptions of indemnity wh1ch Wl)Uld
omerwise cxisc as to a pany or person described lo this
11.Z SU8CONTRACTS Pacagraph 11.5.
11.2.1 The Dc:sig.yBullder. as soon as praccicab~ a!ra 11.5.2 In claims apfnst :any peison °"entity indemnified
~ution or miS Pan 2 Agreement, shall furnish co the under this Pa.rasraPh 11.5 by an emp&oyee of the
nee in wrtdng die names of rhe persons or entitia DcsilWIBuU".'a·-~ direcr:ly or indkecdy employed
•••e DeeignlBuilder 1'11ijJ cngasc a:s COntraaor.5 for- the by dle DCSlgnll:SUlldCr or anyone tor whoise acrs die
Profea. Oes.ign/Builder may be liable, die Ulde.mnificaEion oblig·
adon under r1d3 Patagraph 11., ahall not be: JUPkc:d by a
11.J WORK BY OWNER OR llmlcadon an amount or type of daanagl:s, eompensation
OWNER'S CONTRACTORS
or benefits ~ by °'
foe the Desien/Builder uru:le:
wodccrs' compensadon acts, diubilir:y bene&t acts or
11.3.1 The Owner rescrw:s the right m pedorm c:on-
struetlon ot opcr:adons related to lbe Project \\1th the other employee benefit aas.
Owner's own fon:a, and IO a'l\'acd separate conuaas Jn
conm:alon With other porttons of the Protect or other 11.8 SUC&:eSSORS AND ASSIGNs
consuuaion or opc:radons on the~ under condidons 11.e.1 The OtMer and ~c:r, ac:s~ bind
of imur.ancc and waiver of subcopdon idenc.tcal to the rhemsel'l<-es, their parmers., successocs, 8SSignS aod legal
pl'DYisJoos of this Part 2 A.lircemenL lf the OeslenrBuikkr repl'Clic:matlVes 10 the ocher pany to dlf.5 Part 2
Claims dw delay or addldonal cosc is In~ 6ecause of Agreement and to the panncis.. :n.accic::soon and~ of
:such aaion by the Ownes:, the OesignlBudder shall a$Sert such othel' P='"Y With respea co 1111 c:ovenams ol dds Part
lJUdl daims·as pawfded in SUbparagraph 11.4.
2 Aarecmc:m.. Neither the Owne.r noc the De.siaol.Builder
11.3.2 The Des.ign/BuUdcc shall afford the O~"ner'.s shall :WiS!\ this Part 2 Agreement wilhout the written
5c:par,.te mntt:aet0a reasonable oppomanh:y foe inuo- consent Of the orher. The a.met may .assJgn this Part 2
duafon :and $10(3Be of didr m:uerillls and equipm•t .~em co :my insritudonal lender~ eon·
~d pcrfOnnancc ofthck aa1vn1es and shall connect :md :strucdoa financing. and rhc .DcslgnlB • l18la:3 to
cooo:lin2ce the Dc:signlBuilder·s L'Onstruccion and opera- eecutc all cunsents ceasonablY required ao f:acilicace
tions with theit5 35 required ~· the Coner-act Docvmems. 5uch an :assignment. II either patty mab:s such an assign-
ment, th2t P.3ftY s112ll nevertheless remain leg:ally respon-
11,3.3 CusL'i t:1u.o;ed by rne bv the unless oc.herw;se agreed by- the other p:arty.
parry n."5ponslblc rhcr:cfor. ·
11.7 TEFIMINATION 01"
11.4 CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES PROFESSIONAL DESIGN SliRVICE8
11.4.1 If either party to rhls P.Jtt 1. ·"-t:erecmen( sutlers i1.1.1 PB t89tc~Mm/~mt .services or the
injur~· or tbm::t~ co per.ion or pmpcny bet."au.'ic: of :in act Archircc';;~ any nther dc.':iign pmfessiunal desianatc:d in
Of ontl"siun nftho other p:irt~ (Jf :1.ny lic: :&cti; o;uch m me O\,.m,.r in wrltinK lllloth l'C'.JSUnahlc ohjCL11Un, who WIO f)fU\•ide the ~C!C\'in:.'i
AJA DOCUMINT A 111. P•" 2 • 1111'!111'.ll·l>lil'k:i< bl :11.J)Kll .ACl<~IV.'T • i:tiCOND F'.Dl1'10l'r • All\ .e. • ., I 'I'"•
111£ AMl!lll~~'> l:o\:l'l1Tl:TF. Of •.\llCHITF.~. 1-i; !(f,... YOHK A\'FSl:F.. ;>."\II( •"'-~1 ll:St.TOlol. l'IC·!lllllte,.o\~\ll • A191-1996
WARNING: Unrlcemrord pit_ _,....,....,., u.s. copyrlgllt i.... ena 19 eaei-& It> legal ,'°'9cvllon. Part 2-Page 11
116
JENKENS & GILC~IST Fax=214-855-4107 Aug 8 2003 9:06 P.13
originally to have been provided by the: Arehirea or notice that the owner intends to lerminatc this Part Z
other design professional whose services are being .o\gfccment. lf the Design/BuJlder £ails to cocrcct the
cccmlnated. defaults. failure or neslect within seven (/J days after
being given notice. the Oomer may then give a second
11.8 EXTENT OF AGREEMENT \\'Otten notice and, after an additional seven (';) days. the
Qwner may without prejudice to any O(bei: remedy tCC'·
11.s.1 This P:u:t 2 Agreement represents che entire minate the employment of the Design/Builder and caltk c:ompleu:d and Cot proven toss sustained upon the Dcsign/Bullder fails.to receive payment within seven
materials, equipment. wols, and co.nsuuctioo equipment (7) days after cecdpt of such noclce by the Owner, the
and~ ioduding reasoo.ible pWN!a-Pl!SIGM~l AGUEM8'IT ~ 199& IElmON • /dAe • Ol996 ~
ITSCl'S, 1735 tf8'I' YORK AYllflJB. h.W, Y~GTON, D.C. 10006·~ • A191-1fJ!I
JENKENS &GILC~IST Fax:214-855-4107 Aug 8 2003 9:07 P.17
APPENDIX "A"
1. A minimum and medi\lJJl security coaecti.onal facility to house 500 inmates, to be
located on the real property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, located in
the Town of Raymondville, Willacy County, Texas, design to be. approved by the
Texas Commission on Jail Standards.
2. Design/Build.er acknowledges the funds for the construction of the Project are to
be provided through the issuance of Lease Certificates of Participation by Willacy
County (the "County,,), the disbursement of which will be governed by a certain
Trust Indenture between Municipal Capital Mafkets Coxporation (''Owner'') and
U.S. Bank National Association C'Trustee''). Design/Builder had reviewed the
Trust Indenture and hereby agrees to be bound by the terms thereof. Further,
Design/Builder acknowledges and.understands the Owner, immediately upon
cxerution hereof, will assign to the County this agreement and Design/Builder
agrees that Owner should have no penonal liability whatsoever for any payments
due to Design/Builder heremider and that Design/Builder shall look solely to the
Construction Fund established pursuant to the Trust Indenture by the Tru.stcc for
any and all payments due to Design/Builder hereunder. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, Owner shall be liable to Design/Builder for any act or omissions of
Owner which are negligent, grossly negligent or willful and which are directly
related to the obligations of Owner hereunder.
3. This agreement is make and intended for the benefit of Owner and Design/Builder
only, and is not made or intended for the benefit of any third party, except the
County and the Trustee. Design/Builder makes no representations 11!1 to the
com.merciality or profitability of the Project, and does not guarantee or. wanant
any representations or statemeiits made by any other party in connection with the
Project.
4. If the Desiga/Builder is delayed in the progress ofthe Project by acts of neglect of
Ownec, Owner's employees, sepataie con.1ractorS employed by the Own.er,
changes ordered in the Work except as provided in Paragraph 7 below, labor
disputes, fire not caused by Design/Builder, wiusual delay in transportation,
unavoidablo oMUnltic~, or another cause which the Owner and Design/Builder
agree is justifiable, the contract time shall be reasonably extended by Change
Order.
5. Should Design/Builder fail to substantially complete the Project within 1hirteen
(13) months from the date of :funding, subject to any extensions pursuant to this
Agreement ("Time of Completion of Work"). the Design/Builder agrees to pay
the OWner as liquidated damages for each and evezy day of delay beyon~ the
Time of Completion of Work the sum of $6,475 per day, which sum is hereby, in
view of the difficulty of estimating such dam.ages, agrc:ed upon, :fixed, and
Page 1 of3
121
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax:214-855-4107 Aug 8 2003 9:08 P.18
per day, which sum is hereby, in view of the difficulty of estimating such
damages. agreed upon, fixed, and detennined by the parties hereto, as the
liquidated damages that the Owner will suffer by such default and not by way of .
penalty, and shall be deducted as such from the "Balance Due Design/Builder."
The facility will be considered substantially complete upon inspection and
approval by tbB Texas Jail Standards Commission. :
6. Design/Builder's liability for damage or loss shall be limited to the amount of
insurance coverage and payment and pmonnance bonds required by the teims of
this Agreement. In no event shall Design/Builder by liable for any damages or
losses, no matter how described, for amounts in excess of that cove.red by the
insl11'81ice required hcrebv.
7. DesigliJBuilder shall receive a total of thirteen million eight hundred tbcusand and
.n0/100 dollars ($ 14,279,000) as coinpensation for services provided under this
Agreement, subject to the time and provisions he.reof. The parties hereto agree
tb;lt the Project, as coDStructed in accordance with th.is Contlact, will not be .
subject to state 8Jld local sales taxes. Owner will provide Des.igo/Builder an
exemption certificate fur exemption from payment of state and local sales and use
taxes in order to oomply with applicable sales tax lBWS of the State of Texas, this
Agtcemcnt shall be separated contract, with the amount fOr, materials and
services specified separat.ely:
Ma1a:iaJ.s - S 7,.350,000 Services - S 6,979,000
Application for payment will be for 100% of work completed, less I 0% retainage,
which retainage shall be paid upon completion of the Project. The rctainage is not
applicable to development insurance and bond costs. The price is subject to
change only pursuant to the provisions contained in this Agreement .
8. Design/Builder and Owner agree that Design/Build.a need not present a complete
set of docum.ent.s for Owner to approve prior to the begjnniDg of construction.
Design/Builder will present for approval such documents as are reasonably
avail.able at the time Design/Builder is xeady to commmwe construction of the
Project and Dcisignmuildct shall be entitled. to commence construction based on
partial documents. Notwithstanding the foregoin& Design/Builder repxesents and
waxrants that the Project will be designed and conatrlletecl to house 500 im;wrtca,
to be located on the real property described in Exhibit '"A" attached hereto, and to
be approved by the Texas Commission 011 Jail Stand~,
122
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax=214-855-4107 Aug 8 2003 9:08 P.19
9. W eathettrime Extensions
The time quoted in this contract includes -0- days for weather related 4elays on the project and the
contractor has made no allowance for time or cost above this number for delays caused by weather. Any
delay or work stoppage due to a.o.y weather above the stated allowance will necessitate a change order to
address this change to the contract The time quoted in the contract is in calendar days and the schedule
of the project recognizes a S day work week, therefore, the loss of part or all of a day will need to be
converted to calendar days.
10. Warranty
Hale-Mills Construction, Inc. wmants our finished product to be the project as defined on the plans aod
specifications. Conttactor warrants all work. for one year after substantial completion. Contractor ~es
to provide the OWncr with all wananties as required by the specifications. Some systems and/or
products have been selected by the Design Professionals on this project for tbW value to the project and
an extended warranty by the vendor is required by the couttaot documents. For any extended warranties
.required in any conttact doCUIJBUts, the Contractor will provide and the Owner will rely Solely on the
Product or ManuDcttirer or Subconfractor providing the syst.em, for 1be extended warranty.
11. Design Liability
Hale-Mills Construction, Inc. bas no licend professional design or engineering personnel nor do we
engage in professional design work. Hale-Mills Construction. Inc. docs not represent that we have tht
capability or expertise to evaluate such services or product The Architect is the design profcssiouaJ on
this proj~ and is qualified to mab these ~uations and judgments. bl the event design or engineering
work is required llllder the conftact, Hale-Milla Construction, blc. will provide and pay for the
'professiooal &sign work required but, Hale-Mills Construction, Inc. and the Qlmer are relying on the
Architect and his project design professionals in evaluati:og and approving this design work. Hale-Mills
C~struction, Inc. will assist the Owner 111d Architect in any 'Way, necessary and will, if request.eel, assign
any rights Hale-Milla Construction, Inc. might have, to the Owner :regarding this professional design and
engineering work and the entity or pe:rson providing the professional design or engineering services
wider this contract.
12. Change Order Cost
Any increased cost to the project will increase the cost of the insurance and if applicable the cost of any
bonds. The cost on 8ny chan&e order will cmy a added burden of 1.97% for insurance cost a.o.d 1.15%
for bonds wh«e applicable.
Page3 of3
123
JENKENS &GILCHRIST Fax:214-855-4107 i:\J.g 8 2003 9:08 P.20
..
Willacy 500 Bed Detention Center
08/05/2002
Cash Flow anal}'Sis of a 500 bed Detention center
Based on a total east of: $14,279,000
Many things effect the timing of draws and detemine
progresss on a particular project. Sorre of these are:
rain, approvals/inspection&, changes, deli\ery, schedules,
etc. This is only a projection of work on the project
and does not con\ey or guarantee the resorces needed
for any particular month. ·
:·,,~:-, ,;-~ 1 : ~ •=~ r~~ --:;. ~~-' ' : ~; ~· :' ~ 5_;~ '. r ~~~~w~~fi-~':t,:~. :l .~•~\}(~':I~:·:~:~~-~·~,_;·~·~ 7}-_-,~~:~·.~~
3,656,352 26% 1 At Closing
1,285,110 9% 2 September
1.142,320 8% 3 October
999,530 7% 4 November
999,530 7% 5 December
1,142,320 8% 6 January
999,530 7% 7 February
713.950 5% 8 March
713,950 5% 9 April
579,460 4% 10 May
571,160 4% 11 June
428,370 3% 12 July
1,047,418 7% 13 August
14,279,000 100%
124
_..APPLICATION AND CERTIFICATE FOR PAYMENT
It)
ro (OWl!Cr): WiUac.y Couty Public racillty Corp. l'!lOJ'BCTl Al'PUCA.TlON NO: 1 DiSlcflulim (A);
N
~--
5'16 West Hidalgo Sll'eel Willaey Coua(1 'I""
Raymondville, Tcx111 785 80 Deteatloa Ceater PBRJODTO: Start ARCHlTBC'r
CX»mlACTOR
....... FROM {G'C): HaleeMllls Comlnldiou, Inc. VIA AB.CHmlC'l'~ INSPliCTOR
N
0..: 4130 Bellaire Blvd. #210 Apll"re, lnc. • .•.
HoUll:On, Texas no25 r.2100 Park ~ill>rive #~_.sos PIOJECrMO: 09-016
Atteatioa: Dallas, Texas ·1~251
l1m11 P•rkey
CONTRACTOR'S APPLICATION FOR PAYMENT The umfenripd. C'bmnr.tor =tifn duic ID the best of .bis knowledge.
Apphclltlon 13 maac tor l'Byment, as st\etow, 1n connecti.on w1Ul. tnc t;onua.c-.t. ~oa I.ad belld the WorJt CDftteci by thG APJ:'L.ltATLUN .t11tna: Docune.or.a, hued on on-sim obse.rfttiou
8. CURRENT PAYMENT DUE •••••••••••••• '-''s_ _ _3_,_,6_56.....~_5_l._Oo_,I wi the d.ata coiqirising die above applialioc, the AGENT caci6es 10 die
Oilmr dllt .die work lW progressed 10 the point indicad; chat to the ben
9. BALANCE TO FINISH (INCLUDING UTAINAGE of hil lmowhdge, .infutnlllticn aod belef, the quaaityof th.e "WO.tk~ i:i
(Lino l lcas Liae 6) s 10,62.l,648.00 acccndw:ie with the Cmctact documro.tt; and tLat the <:oanctOl' is elllidorl
to pa')lllellt of the AMOUNT CEKIFIED.
CHANGE OlU>Ell SUMMARY ADDl1tONS DEDUCJ'JONS
Change Orders approved AMOUNT CER.111<'.IED ••••• , •
in nrc.vious mnnths bv Owner COR-PI;AN OORREC1lONS
Tolal 8tlnroved this Month BY: DA"re:
TOTALS 0.00 0.00 Thts c:ma tiu.lo ii not 111aati1ble. Th• AMOlNI' CEllTmBD is pt,yable obly 1o ll&Acc of 11•J1M11l are witbo11t
Net changed bv Ch.a!ll!'e Orders 0.00 prajlld.ice ID 111Yrialill of