Juan Manuel Alfaro v. State

ACCEPTED
13-15-00075-CR
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
12/7/2015 3:15:24 PM
Dorian E. Ramirez
CLERK

No. 13-15-00075-CR

FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
In the Thirteenth Court of Appeals
12/7/2015 3:15:24 PM
Edinburg, Texas DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
Clerk

JUAN MANUEL ALFARO,
Appellant
V.

STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. CR-3287-14-H
TH
289 District Court, Hidalgo County, TEXAS
HON. Leticia “Letty” Lopez,
Judge Presiding

Appellant’s Brief Submitted in Accordance with Anders
v. California

O. Rene Flores
State Bar No. 24012637
O. Rene Flores, PC
1308 S. 10th Ave.
Edinburg, TX 78539
(956)383-9090
(956)383-9050 (fax)
Counsel for Appellant

NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

1
 IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant Appellate Counsel
JUAN MANUEL ALFARO O. Rene Flores
1308 S. 10th Ave.
Edinburg, Texas 78539
(956) 383-9090
(956) 383-9050

Trial Counsel
Armando Marroquin
Marroquin Law Firm
421 S. 12th Street
McAllen, Texas 78501
(956) 287-7400

Appellee Appellee’s Counsel
STATE OF TEXAS Theodore “Ted” Hake
Assistant DA
Hidalgo County DA
100 N. Closner
Edinburg, Texas 78539
(956) 318-2300
(956) 318-2301

Trial Counsel
Hope Palacios
Assistant DA
Hidalgo County DA
100 N. Closner
Edinburg, Texas 78539
(956) 318-2300

2
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel …………………………………………2

Table of Contents…………………………………………………………………………………3

Index of Authorities…………………………………………………………………………4

Anders Statement …………………………………………………………………………………8

Statement of the Case ……………………………………………………………………9

Issues Presented ………………………………………………………………………………10

Statement of Facts …………………………………………………………………………10

Summary of the Argument ……………………………………………………………15

Argument ……………………………………………………………………………………………………16

Possible Issue 1: After review of the Record on
appeal and after reviewing the current state of
the law, the undersigned finds that the Court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant
Alfaro’s Motion to Suppress Statements.

Possible Issue 2: After review of the Record on
appeal and after reviewing the current state of
the law, the undersigned finds there was no error
in not including a 38.23 charge on admission of
Appellant Alfaro's statement.

Possible Issue 3: After review of the Record on
appeal and after reviewing the current state of
the law, the undersigned finds that Appellant
Alfaro’s finding of guilt was supported by the
evidence.

Prayer for Relief ……………………………………………………………………………57

3
 Index of Authorities

Cases

1. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171
(Tex.Crim.App.1985)

2. Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211
(Tex.Crim.App.1999)

3. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

4. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19
L.Ed.2d 35 (1967).

5. Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800, 812
(Tex.Crim.App.1979);

6. Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387, 389–90 (1857)

7. Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488
(Tex.Crim.App.1970).

8. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93
L.Ed.2d 473

9. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860,
6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).

10. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct.
1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966).

11. Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249
(Tex.Crim.App.2007) (footnote omitted)

12. Foster v. State, 101 S.W.3d 490, 497
(Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)

4
13. Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 88 S.Ct.
1152, 20 L.Ed.2d 77 (1968).

14. Hamlin v. State, 39 Tex.Crim. 579, 47 S.W. 656
(1898).

15. High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1978),

16. Huizar v. State, 12 S.W.3d 479 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

17. Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504
(Tex.Crim.App.2007).

18. Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236, 239
(Tex.Crim.App.2002).

19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

20. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57
L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).

21. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 556
(Tex.Crim.App.1998),

22. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2
L.Ed.2d 975 (1958).

23. Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d at 446 (U.S.1986).

24. Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 60
(Tex.Crim.App.1998)

25. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6
L.Ed.2d 948 (1961).

5
 26. Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998).

27. Ritchie v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 38, 296 S.W.2d 551,
554 (1956).

28. Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 19–20
(Tex.Crim.App.2000)

29. Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729–30
(Tex.Crim.App.1977)

30. State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727
(Tex.Crim.App.1999)

31. Vasquez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 541
(Tex.Crim.App.2007).,

32. Warren v. State, 29 Tex. 369 (1867)

33. Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 282
(Tex.Crim.App.1996).
Statutes

1. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 15.17, O’Connor’s Criminal
Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

2. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14, O’Connor’s Criminal
Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

3. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.19, O’Connor’s Criminal
Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

4. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, O’Connor’s Criminal
Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

5. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21, O’Connor’s Criminal
Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

6
 6. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.22 (2), O’Connor’s
Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

7. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.22 (2)(a), O’Connor’s
Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

8. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.22 (3), O’Connor’s
Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

9. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.22 (3)(a), O’Connor’s
Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

10. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22(6), O’Connor’s
Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

11. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.22 (7), O’Connor’s
Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

12. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.23, O’Connor’s Criminal
Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

13. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.23(a), O’Connor’s
Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-2016)

Other

1. George E. Dix, “Voluntariness” and “Intelligence”
of Confessions as “Independent” Texas Law Issues,
20 TEX. TECH L.REV. 1017, 1080, 1091 (1989).

7
 Anders Statement
This brief is being submitted in accordance with

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). I affirm

that I have reviewed the complete Clerk’s Record and

all fifteen (15) volumes of the Reporter’s Record,

which include arraignment, pretrial hearings, jury

selection and the unitary trial proceedings given

Appellant Alfaro’s plea of guilty to the jury. After

having carefully examined this record and researching

the relevant statutes and case law, I have concluded

that this case presents no meritorious grounds of error

upon which an appeal can be predicated. Therefore, I

request the Court’s permission to withdraw as attorney

of record and to allow appellant to file any further

briefs he deems necessary or appropriate.

In accordance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807,

813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), I further

affirm that, simultaneous with the filing of this

brief, I am serving a copy of the brief and my Motion

to Withdraw on Appellant, accompanied by a letter

8
informing Appellant of his right to review the record

and to file a pro se response.

Statement of the Case

On September 4, 2014, Appellant was charged by

indictment with the offense of Aggravated Robbery.1

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the allegations

in the indictment on January 14, 2015.2 On January 16,

2015, Appellant was found GUILTY by a jury and the jury

assessed Appellant’s punishment at fifty (50) years

confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections

Institutional Division.3 The trial court certified

Appellant’s right to appeal, and his appeal was

perfected on February 6, 2015.4

1
CR6
2
Defendant is arraigned in front of the jury. RR13@5; Appellant Alfaro
PLEADS “guilty” to the jury. RR13@6; Court admonishes and inquires several
times whether he understands what he’s doing – to which the Appellant Alfaro
advises – Yes. RR13@6-7
3
CR97; RR14@149-152
4
CR100; 105

9
 Issues Presented

My review of the record reveals no issues which can

be advanced on appeal in good faith. Any arguable

points that could exist are identified herein below and

discussed with respect to why they are not meritorious

appealable issues.

Statement of Facts
The State of Texas approached this case as “crime

spree.” The evidence adduced at trial after Appellant

Alfaro pleaded guilty to the jury served to support the

plea and further served to support the State’s theory.

At trial, the evidence showed that on August 1,

2014, Hidalgo County Sheriff’s deputies responded to an

assault later classified as an aggravated robbery.5

Upon his arrival, Deputy Juan Garcia made contact with

Ranulfo Dantes Mars who although overwhelmed, bleeding

and in shock was able to describe what had just

happened.6 Mars was able to describe what the

5
RR13@13
6
RR13@15-16; RR15@State’s Exhibit 15 and 16 show the jury that his shirt was
bloody and he had injuries to the side of his head.

10
assailants were wearing; he also described the truck

the assailants were driving. At this time, deputy

Garcia also observed three spent casings found at the

scene where the assault took place. This was

consistent with Mars’ explanation that shots were fired

at a passing vehicle. This information would be

corroborated through another witness later in the

trial.7

While at that scene, Deputy Garcia makes contact

with another individual reporting another incident just

up the road from that location. Apparently, this

second individual was advised to travel to where Deputy

Garcia was making contact with Mars.8

Investigator Ruben Silva testified that after he

took a written statement from Mars, he made contact

with two individuals at the County Sheriff’s substation

in Weslaco, Texas. There he identified Luis Amador and

Appellant Juan Manuel Alfaro as suspects in this case.9

7
RR13@13-22
8
RR13@21
9
RR13@31-34

11
Investigator admitted that Appellant Alfaro appeared

intoxicated but further advised the jury that Appellant

seemed to be in his right frame of mind. He testified

that Appellant understood English and Spanish; he

testified that while Appellant Alfaro smelled of

alcohol, he was not too intoxicated to have understood

his rights. Investigator Silva further advised the

jury that Appellant Alfaro was properly Mirandized and

waived any rights he had to an attorney and/or to

terminate any interview.10

Investigator Adam Palmer was called to testify

about yet another incident on August 1, 2014. He

testified about a “call” to a Gentleman’s Club not far

from the original call. There, the same truck was

described. There again, shots were reported fired.11

Palmer also related to the jury about this case and how

the same description of the assailants and their

vehicle was given. In all, Palmer told the jury about

three different robberies involving the same
10
RR13@34-38; Note that on cross-examination, Silva admitted that Appellant
appeared intoxicated at 3:02am. RR13@39; See also RR13@37, 42
11
RR13@42-45

12
descriptions and shots fired. The responding officers

and investigators noticed a pattern and began to

believe the same suspects were committing all of these

robberies. At that point, Palmer and his Sheriff’s

Department believed they were in fact dealing with a

“spree.”12

Palmer would testify about a couple more incidents

in Alamo, Texas later that night. At some point, an

eye-witness flagged down a Sheriff’s Deputy and was

shown where the shooters had apparently fled to hide.

Deputy Cindy Caceres was able to detain Amador and

Appellant Alfaro. They were taken into custody and

detained at the Hidalgo County Sheriff’s Department

substation in Weslaco, Texas.13

At 6am, Palmer made contact with Appellant Alfaro;

Palmer and Investigator Avila ended up getting a

written statement of accused from Appellant Alfaro.14

Appellant Alfaro and Luis Amador implicated themselves

12
RR13@41-46
13
RR13@52-53
14
RR15@State’s Exhibit 36; RR13@55-57

13
and further led investigators to the mobile home where

they were originally detained.15 Armed with this

information, a warrant was executed and a two weapons

were recovered.16 Along with these weapons were live

rounds of ammunition stamped with the same brand as the

spent casings found at the scene and in the suspect

vehicle which was later processed.17 Palmer also

testified that these weapons matched the descriptions

given at the scene.18

Investigator Alfredo Avila made contact with

Appellant Alfaro just before 6 am and according to him,

Appellant Alfaro had the normal use of his mental and

physical faculties. Avila advised that Appellant

Alfaro was cooperative and agreed to give him a

15
RR13@57, 74; Note that Palmer testified he didn’t know Alfaro was
intoxicated. He observed Appellant Alfaro to be fine and in his right mind
and very cooperative. RR13@74-78
16
RR13@57-63
17
RR13@61-62, 65; RR15@State’s Exhibit 24-28, 6-9
18
RR13@63

14
statement.19 On cross examination, Investigator Avila

advised that Appellant Alfaro admitted everything.20

Summary of the Argument

The undersigned counsel has reviewed the record on

appeal thoroughly is unable to identify any legally

non-frivolous issues. The only areas in which arguable

issues could arise would be: (1) Whether the trial

court erred by denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress

Statement; (2) Whether there was error in not

including an instruction on the voluntariness of the

statement of accused; and (3) Whether there was

sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

After reviewing the appellate record and the

current state of the law, the undersigned is of the

opinion that the issues identified herein would not be

viable appealable issues.

19
RR15@State’s Exhibit 18 and 36. These Exhibits represent the Miranda Form
signed by Appellant Alfaro and the Statement of Accused signed by Appellant
Alfaro – they were offered and admitted without objection.; RR13@83-88
20
RR13@97-99

15
 Argument
Possible Issue 1: After review of the Record on appeal
and after reviewing the current state of the law, the
undersigned finds that the Court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Appellant Alfaro’s Motion to
Suppress Statements.

Applicable Law
Under Article 38.21, “A statement of an accused may

be used in evidence against him if it appears that the

same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion

or persuasion.”21 A defendant may claim that his

statement was not freely and voluntarily made and thus

may not be used as evidence against him under several

different theories: (1) Article 38.22, § 6 - general

voluntariness; (2) Miranda v. Arizona22 as expanded in

Article 38.22, §§ 2 and 3 (the Texas confession

statute); or (3) the Due Process Clause.23 It may be

involuntary under one, two, or all three theories.

A. Claims of involuntariness under the Due Process
Clause and Miranda

21
TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21, O’Connor’s Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-
2016)
22
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)
23
Wolfe v. State, 917 S.W.2d 270, 282 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

16
 A confession may be involuntary under the Due Process

Clause when there is police overreaching.24 Even if a

confession is not the product of a meaningful choice,

it is nonetheless “voluntary” within the meaning of the

Due Process Clause absent some coercive police

activity. The Supreme Court made this clear in Colorado

v. Connelly,25 when it held that if there is no police

coercion or overreaching, there is no due-process

violation — even if a suspect is suffering from chronic

schizophrenia and is in a psychotic state following the

“voice of God” at the time he confesses.26 Absent police

misconduct causally related to the confession, there is

24
See Perry v. State, 158 S.W.3d at 446 (defendant not entitled to any jury
instruction under art. 38.23(a) as evidence of his intoxication and injury
“does not raise any constitutional voluntariness issues because this evidence
does not involve any police coercion or other official over-reaching.”);
Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (statement
involuntary under federal due process “only if there was official, coercive
conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to
have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker”).
25
479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (U.S.1986).
26
Id. at 164, 107 S.Ct. 515. In Connelly, the defendant approached a Denver
police officer and said that “he had come all the way from Boston to confess
to the murder of Mary Ann Junta, a young girl whom he had killed in Denver
sometime during November 1982.” Id. at 160, 107 S.Ct. 515. Unbeknownst to the
police (who scrupulously followed the dictates of Miranda), the defendant was
apparently obeying the “voice of God” which had instructed him “to withdraw
money from the bank, to buy an airplane ticket, and to fly from Boston to
Denver.” Id. at 161, 107 S.Ct. 515. Even though the evidence showed that the
defendant was suffering from “command hallucinations that interfered with his
volitional abilities; that is, his ability to make free and rational choices”
and “he wasn't capable of making a ‘free decision’ to waive his Miranda
rights,” his confession was not involuntary under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at
161–64, 169–71, 107 S.Ct. 515.

17
“simply no basis for concluding that any state actor

has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of

law.”27 The Due Process Clause is aimed at protecting

suspects from police overreaching, not at protecting

people from themselves or other private actors.

The same is true for Miranda rights and waivers that

apply to custodial-interrogation statements. As the

Supreme Court explained in Connelly: “Miranda protects

defendants against government coercion leading them to

surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it

goes no further than that.”28 Thus, the defendant's

waiver of his Miranda rights, made under the perception

of coercion flowing from the “voice of God, ... is a

matter to which the United States Constitution does not

speak.”29

As Judge Posner has explained:

The significance of the principle of Connelly, the

principle that the Constitution doesn't protect the

27
Id. at 164, 107 S.Ct. 515.
28
Id. at 170, 107 S.Ct. 515.
29
Id. at 170–71, 107 S.Ct. 515.

18
 suspect against himself, is that if he understands

the Miranda warnings yet is moved by a crazy

impulse to blurt out a confession, the confession

is admissible because it is not a product of

coercion. The police have given him his Miranda

warnings in an intelligible form; it is not their

fault that he is impulsive.30

Statements that have been found to be involuntary

under Miranda or the Due Process Clause were collected

in Connelly;31 they involve the crucial element of

police overreaching and involve fact scenarios such as

the following: (1) the suspect was subjected to a four-

hour interrogation while incapacitated and sedated in

an intensive-care unit;32 (2) the suspect, while on

medication, was interrogated for over eighteen hours

without food, medication, or sleep;33 (3) the police

officers held a gun to the head of the wounded suspect

30
Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 750 (7th Cir.1998).
31
479 U.S. at 164 n. 1, 107 S.Ct. 515.
32
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).
33
Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 88 S.Ct. 1152, 20 L.Ed.2d 77 (1968).

19
to extract a confession;34 (4) the police interrogated

the suspect intermittently for sixteen days using

coercive tactics while he was held incommunicado in a

closed cell without windows and was given limited

food;35 (5) the suspect was held for four days with

inadequate food and medical attention until he

confessed;36 (6) the suspect was subjected to five days

of repeated questioning during which police employed

coercive tactics;37 (7) the suspect was held

incommunicado for three days with little food, and the

confession was obtained when officers informed him that

their chief was preparing to admit a lynch mob into the

jail.38

As is evident from these fact scenarios, due-process

and Miranda claims of involuntariness generally do not

require “sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a

criminal defendant who has confessed.”39 They involve an

34
Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967).
35
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895
(1966).
36
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961).
37
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).
38
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958).
39
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. 515.

20
objective assessment of police behavior. The

Constitution leaves voluntariness claims based on the

defendant's state of mind “to be resolved by state laws

governing the admission of evidence.”40 In Texas, that

state law is Article 38.22, the Texas Confession

Statute.

B. Claims of involuntariness under the Texas
Confession Statute
Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets

out rules governing the admissibility of an accused's

written and oral statements that are the product of

custodial interrogation. Under our precedents, however,

Section 6 of Article 38.22 applies to both an accused's

custodial and non-custodial statements because it

provides that only “voluntary” statements may be

admitted.41 Sections 2 and 3 apply to an accused's

40
Id.
41
State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (“Article 38.22,
Section 6, literally applies to ‘all cases where a question is raised as to
the voluntariness of a statement of an accused.’”). In Terrazas, this court
explicitly overruled Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex.Crim.App.1998),
to the extent that it held that Article 38.22, § 6 applied only to custodial
statements. Id. However, the Court concluded in Terrazas that the trial court
erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that the defendant's statement to a
Department of Human Services investigator could be considered “involuntary.”
Id. at 726 (the investigator “telling [defendant] in a noncustodial setting
‘what had to be’ in her statement is not the type of practice that has been
held to be inherently coercive as to make a statement involuntary”).

21
custodial-interrogation statements and provide that

only “warned and waived” statements may be admitted.

That is, an accused's custodial-interrogation statement

is not admissible unless, prior to making the

statement, he received the warnings provided in Article

15.17 or Article 38.22, § 2(a) or § 3(a) (which

incorporate the requirements of Miranda), and he

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those

rights.

Claims of involuntariness under Article 38.22 can be,

but need not be, predicated on police overreaching, and

they could involve the “sweeping inquiries into the

state of mind of a criminal defendant who has

confessed” found in Connelly that are not of themselves

relevant to due process claims.42 Article 38.22 is aimed

at protecting suspects from police overreaching. But

Section 6 of that article may also be construed as

protecting people from themselves because the focus is

upon whether the defendant voluntarily made the

42
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166–67, 107 S.Ct. 515.

22
statement. Does it appear — as Article 38.21 requires —

that the statement was freely and voluntarily made

without compulsion or persuasion?43 Or, in the case of a

custodial-interrogation statement, did the suspect

“knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waive the

rights set out in Article 38.22 § 2(a) or § (3)(a)?

These inquiries do not turn solely on police

overreaching. The behavior of the police may or may not

be a factor. A confession given under the duress of

hallucinations, illness, medications,44 or even

intoxication, for example, could be involuntary under

Article 38.21 and the Texas confession statute.45 The

defendant in Connelly did not have a valid federal

constitutional involuntariness claim, but, had he

confessed in Texas, he might have had a viable claim
43
TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21, O’Connor’s Criminal Codes Plus, (2015-
2016) (“A statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it
appears that the same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or
persuasion, under the rules hereafter prescribed.”).
44
See, e.g., Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 19–20 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (trial
court's general jury instruction under articles 38.21 and 38.22 concerning
voluntariness of statement sufficed for jury to consider any evidence of his
illness and medication; no error in denying instruction that specifically
mentioned illness and medication as that would be a comment on the weight of
the evidence).
45
This has long been the case in Texas. See Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387, 389–
90 (1857) (“Before confessions can be received in evidence in a criminal
case, it must be shown that they were voluntary. They must not have been
obtained by the influence of hope or fear, applied by a third person to the
prisoner's mind.”).

23
under Articles 38.21 and 38.22. As Professor Dix has

noted, “evidence of a defendant's psychological

abnormality” (such as Connelly's evidence of

hallucinations and following God's command) “has its

full logical relevance” under Texas law.46

Under Articles 38.21 and 38.22 and their

predecessors, fact scenarios that can raise a state-law

claim of involuntariness (even though they do not raise

a federal constitutional claim) have in the past

included the following: (1) the suspect was ill and on

medication and that fact may have rendered his

confession involuntary;47 (2) the suspect was mentally

retarded and may not have “knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily” waived his rights;48 (3) the suspect

“lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights”;49

(4) the suspect was intoxicated, and he “did not know

46
George E. Dix, “Voluntariness” and “Intelligence” of Confessions as
“Independent” Texas Law Issues, 20 TEX. TECH L.REV. 1017, 1080, 1091 (1989).
47
Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
48
Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Casias v. State,
452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1970).
49
Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729–30 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (finding
reversible error in trial court's refusal to give jury general instruction on
voluntariness of statement when evidence raised an issue that defendant
lacked the mental capacity to understand and waive his rights before giving
his statement).

24
what he was signing and thought it was an accident

report”;50 (5) the suspect was confronted by the

brother-in-law of his murder victim and beaten;51 (6)

the suspect was returned to the store he broke into

“for questioning by several persons armed ‘with six-

shooters.’”52

C. Jury Submission of Voluntariness Instructions

Under Texas statutory law, there are three types of

instructions that relate to the taking of confessions:

(1) a “general” Article 38.22, § 6 voluntariness

instruction; (2) a “general” Article 38.22, § 7

warnings instruction (involving warnings given under §
50
Ritchie v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 38, 296 S.W.2d 551, 554 (1956). In Ritchie,
the evidence was undisputed that the defendant was intoxicated, but the trial
judge found that he was not so intoxicated that he could not understand what
he was doing. Id. Therefore, the trial judge “instructed the jury not to
consider the [statement] unless they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that,
prior to making the statement, the appellant was duly warned, and that
thereafter he voluntarily and freely made the same and understood and signed
it.” This Court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the
evidence and instructing the jury as he did. Id.; see also Foster v. State,
101 S.W.3d 490, 497 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (noting that
“[l]ack of sleep for as long as 16 hours does not, in and of itself, render a
confession involuntary,” and that “a person's illiteracy alone will not
necessarily render his statement inadmissible.”).
51
Hamlin v. State, 39 Tex.Crim. 579, 47 S.W. 656 (1898). As Professor Dix
points out, in these early decisions, “It was simply beyond question that
private coercion rendered a confession involuntary and that even private
detention invoked the predecessor to article 38.22.” Dix, 20 TEX. TECH L.REV.
at 1083. After 1977, however, the provisions of Article 38.22 (except for
Sections 6 and 7) apply only to custodial interrogations by law enforcement
officials. See 41 DIX & DAWSON, supra note 17, § 13.31 at 33–35.
52
Warren v. State, 29 Tex. 369 (1867); See also Dix, 20 TEX. TECH L.REV. at
1084.

25
2 and § 3); and (3) a “specific” Article 38.23(a)

exclusionary-rule instruction. The Section 6 “general”

instruction asks the jury: “Do you believe, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the defendant's statement was

voluntarily made? If it was not, do not consider the

defendant's confession.” The Section 7 instruction sets

out the requirements of 38.22, § 2 or § 3 and asks the

jury to decide whether all of those requirements were

met. The Article 38.23(a) “specific” instruction is

fact-based: For example, “Do you believe that the

Officer who took the statement held a gun to the

defendant's head to extract his statement? If so, do

not consider the defendant's confession.”

In Vasquez v. State,53 confusion exists about which,

if any, jury instruction is appropriate because our

case law “does not always distinguish, and sometimes

blurs, the requirements for getting an instruction

53
225 S.W.3d 541 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

26
under article 38.22 and for getting an instruction

under the exclusionary rule of article 38.23.”54

In an attempt to clarify the distinction: Due process

and Miranda claims may warrant both “general” and

“specific” voluntariness instructions; Texas statutory

claims warrant only a “general” voluntariness

instruction. It is the defendant's responsibility to

delineate which type of “involuntariness” he is

claiming—a general lack of voluntariness or a specific

police-coerced lack of voluntariness—because the jury

instruction is very different depending upon the type

of claim.55

Obviously, the evidence must raise a “voluntariness”

issue, and the defendant should request a jury

instruction that relates to his theory of

involuntariness. But if the defendant never presents a

proposed jury instruction (or fails to object to the

54
Id. at 544.
55
Note again, that Appellant Alfaro lodged NO OBJECTION at the time of trial
when his statement of accused was offered.

27
lack of one), any potential error in the charge is

reviewed only for “egregious harm” under Almanza.56

1. Article 38.22, § 6 Instructions
Article 38.22, § 6 is a very detailed section that is

essentially independent of the other sections contained

within Article 38.22.57 Section 6 provides:

In all cases where a question is raised as to the

voluntariness of a statement of an accused, the court

must make an independent finding in the absence of

the jury as to whether the statement was made under

voluntary conditions. If the statement has been found

to have been voluntarily made and held admissible as

a matter of law and fact by the court in a hearing in

the absence of the jury, the court must enter an

order stating its conclusion as to whether or not the

statement was voluntarily made, along with the

specific finding of facts upon which the conclusion

was based, which order shall be filed among the

56
See Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 513 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).
57
See State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (deciding that
Article 38.22, § 5's provision exempting non-custodial statements from the
coverage of Article 38.22 did not apply to § 6).

28
papers of the cause. Such order shall not be

exhibited to the jury nor the finding thereof made

known to the jury in any manner. Upon the finding by

the judge as a matter of law and fact that the

statement was voluntarily made, evidence pertaining

to such matter may be submitted to the jury and it

shall be instructed that unless the jury believes

beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was

voluntarily made, the jury shall not consider such

statement for any purpose nor any evidence obtained

as a result thereof. In any case where a motion to

suppress the statement has been filed and evidence

has been submitted to the court on this issue, the

court within its discretion may reconsider such

evidence in his finding that the statement was

voluntarily made and the same evidence submitted to

the court at the hearing on the motion to suppress

shall be made a part of the record the same as if it

were being presented at the time of trial. However,

the state or the defendant shall be entitled to

29
 present any new evidence on the issue of the

voluntariness of the statement prior to the court's

final ruling and order stating its findings.58

The language “where a question is raised” contrasts

with the language found in Article 38.22, § 7 and

Article 38.23 which speaks of the evidence raising an

issue.59 Because raising a “question” is what triggers

the trial court's duty under Section 6 to conduct a

hearing outside the presence of the jury, the only

reasonable reading of this language is that a “question

is raised” when the trial judge is notified by a party

or raises on his own an issue about the voluntariness

of the confession. This is the sequence of events that

seems to be contemplated by Section 6: (1) a party

notifies the trial judge that there is an issue about

the voluntariness of the confession (or the trial judge

raises the issue on his own); (2) the trial judge holds

a hearing outside the presence of the jury; (3) the

58
TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 6
59
See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 38.22, § 7 (“When the issue is raised by the
evidence ...”) and 38.23(a) (“where the legal evidence raises an issue
hereunder ...”).

30
trial judge decides whether the confession was

voluntary;60 (4) if the trial judge decides that the

confession was voluntary, it will be admitted, and a

party may offer evidence before the jury suggesting

that the confession was not in fact voluntary; (5) if

such evidence is offered before the jury, the trial

judge shall give the jury a voluntariness instruction.

It is only after the trial judge is notified of the

voluntariness issue (or raises it on his own) that a

chain of other requirements comes into play,

culminating in the defendant's right to a jury

instruction.

And Section 6 expressly dictates the content of that

instruction to be as follows: “unless the jury believes

beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was

voluntarily made, the jury shall not consider such

statement for any purpose nor any evidence obtained as

a result thereof.” Because Section 6 contains its own

60
The trial judge must also make written findings of fact and conclusions of
law in support of his ruling. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 6. The need
for written findings should alert the parties and trial judge to the need for
a general voluntariness jury instruction as well.

31
jury-instruction provision, it is not governed by the

jury-instruction provision found in Section 7.61 The

obvious purpose of Section 7 is to authorize and

require jury instructions regarding the warnings and

safeguards for written and oral statements outlined in

Article 38.22, § 2 & § 3 (warnings on the right to

remain silent, right to counsel, etc).

Consequently, a Section 6 instruction becomes “law

applicable to the case” under Posey v. State62 only if

the parties actually litigate a Section 6 voluntariness

issue before the trial judge. If such litigation occurs

(on the admissibility of evidence for example), a jury

instruction need not be specifically requested to pass

the Posey gateway, although a request would still be

necessary to obtain the most beneficial harm analysis

under Almanza v. State.63

61
See Terrazas, supra (§ 5 not applicable to § 6, given the specific
provisions found in § 6).
62
966 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (a defensive issue is not “law
applicable to the case” unless the defendant timely requests the issue or
objects to its omission from the jury charge).
63
686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (“some harm” versus “egregious
harm”).

32
 An interpretation of Section 6 that requires some

sort of litigation before it becomes law applicable to

the case accords not only with the statutory language

but also with common sense. The broad range of

voluntariness issues covered by Section 6 could easily

be implicated by evidence that would also be relevant

for other purposes, and Section 6 does not even require

the existence of a factual dispute that might at least

obliquely alert the trial judge to the need for an

instruction. The Section 6 requirement that

voluntariness be litigated in some manner before a jury

instruction becomes necessary ensures that the trial

judge is on notice that the instruction is required.64

For example, the evidence may be undisputed that the

defendant did not sleep for 24 hours, or has a low

I.Q., or was “high” on drugs at the time he gave his

statement. If a reasonable jury could find that the

facts, disputed or undisputed, rendered him unable to

64
Vasquez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (noting that,
although a defendant may be entitled to an Article 38.22 jury instruction
even when the evidence is undisputed, “[s]ome evidence must have been
presented to the jury that the defendant's confession was not given
voluntarily.”).

33
make a voluntary statement, he is entitled to a general

voluntariness instruction when he has raised a question

of the voluntariness of his statement.

2. Article 38.22, § 7 (Statutory Warnings)

Instructions

If the defendant made his statement as the result of

custodial interrogation, he is also entitled—when the

issue is raised by the evidence—to have the jury decide

whether he was adequately warned of his rights and

knowingly and intelligently waived these rights.

Section 7 of Article 38.22 states:

When the issue is raised by the evidence, the trial

judge shall appropriately instruct the jury,

generally, on the law pertaining to such statement.65

The phrase “the issue” refers to compliance with the

statutory warnings set out in both Articles 15.17

(Duties of Arresting Officer and Magistrate) and 38.22,

§§ 2 & 3, and the voluntariness of the defendant's

waiver of the rights. For it to be “raised by the
65
TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 7.

34
evidence” there must be a genuine factual dispute, just

as is true under Article 38.23 issues. The same

procedures—including a hearing outside the presence of

the jury and the entry of written findings—that apply

to a general voluntariness challenge under Section 6,

also apply to a challenge that is made to the

sufficiency of warnings and voluntary waiver of the

rights communicated by those warnings. As with Section

6, the trial judge's Section 7 jury instructions are

“general” ones that set out the pertinent law and legal

requirements of Sections 2 and 3 (or, in an appropriate

case, those of Article 15.17).66

But suppose there is some evidence that the police

held a gun to the head of the defendant—who,

unbeknownst to the police, had not slept for twenty-

four hours—to extract the confession. In that case, the

defendant may also be entitled to a fact-specific,

exclusionary-rule instruction, in addition to the two

general voluntariness instructions.

66
See, e.g., Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d at 238 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2002)
(quoting a portion of an Article 38.22, § 7 jury instruction).

35
 3. Article 38.23 (Exclusionary Rule) Instructions

Article 38.23(a) states that

(a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person

in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or

laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or

laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted

in evidence against the accused on the trial of any

criminal case.

In any case where the legal evidence raises an

issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if

it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the

evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of

this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall

disregard any such evidence so obtained.67

The wording is absolute (“the jury shall be

instructed”), just as it is in Article 38.22, but the

triggering mechanism is more complex.68 As we recently

held in Madden v. State,69 the second sentence of

67
TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23.
68
See Murphy v. State, 640 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
69
242 S.W.3d 504 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

36
Article 38.23 requires a jury instruction only if there

is a genuine dispute about a material fact.70 A

defendant must establish three foundation requirements

to trigger an Article 38.23 instruction: (1) the

evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact;

(2) the evidence on that fact must be affirmatively

contested; and (3) the contested factual issue must be

material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in

obtaining the statement claimed to be involuntary.71 The

defendant must offer evidence that, if credited, would

create a reasonable doubt as to a specific factual

matter essential to the voluntariness of the

statement.72 This factual dispute can be raised only by

affirmative evidence, not by mere cross-examination

questions or argument.73

For example, the officer in our hypothetical may

deny, on cross-examination, that he held a gun to the

defendant's head to extract the confession. The
70
Id. at 510; See also Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 199
(Tex.Crim.App.2008); Pierce v. State, 32 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).
71
242 S.W.3d at 510.
72
Id. See also 40 GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON, TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4.194, at 282 (2d. ed.2001).
73
Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 513 nn. 22–23.

37
implication by counsel, that the officer did perform

that act, does not, by itself, raise a disputed fact

issue. But if the defendant (or some other witness)

testifies that the officer held a gun to his head, then

a disputed fact issue exists. And the jury must resolve

that disputed fact issue.

If the jury finds that the officer did hold a gun

to the defendant's head, the statement is involuntary

as a matter of federal constitutional law. If the jury

finds the officer did not do so, the statement is not

constitutionally involuntary. Of course, if there is no

disputed factual issue—if there is a video definitively

showing that the officer did or did not hold a gun to

the defendant's head—the legality of the conduct is

determined by the trial judge alone, as a question of

law. The legal question would never go to the jury.

Normally, “specific” exclusionary-rule instructions

concerning the making of a confession are warranted

only where an officer uses inherently coercive

38
practices like those set out in Connelly.74 In Texas, if

there is a disputed fact issue about whether this type

of coercive practice was employed—by either an officer

or a private citizen75—to wring a confession out of a

suspect against his will, a specific exclusionary-rule

instruction under Article 38.23 is appropriate.

4. Error in the Failure to Give Appropriate
Voluntariness Instructions
The question then becomes: When does a trial judge

err in failing to give an Article 38.22 or 38.23 jury

instruction? Today’s cases might appear to be in

conflict on whether there can be any error whatsoever—

at least in the Article 38.23 context—absent a proper

request by the defendant. In Mendoza, the Court of

Criminal Appeals stated, “Generally, when evidence from

any source raises a defensive issue and the defendant

properly requests a jury charge on that issue, the

74
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164 & n. 1, 107 S.Ct. 515; see also State v.
Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (citing Note: Evidence–
Criminal Law–Constitutional Law–Due Process–Confessions–Judge and Jury–
Determination of Preliminary Fact of Voluntariness of Confession, 3 BAYLOR
L.REV. 561, 563–65 (1951) (inherently coercive practices include: subjection
to persistent and protracted questioning, threats of mob violence, unlawful
detention incommunicado without advice of counsel or friends, and taking at
night to lonely and isolated places for questioning)).
75
See Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 39 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

39
trial court must submit the issue to the jury.”76 But

that general statement does not imply the converse—that

the trial court need never submit a jury instruction on

a particular defensive issue unless the defendant

properly requests one. There is nothing in that

sentence or in the rest of the Mendoza opinion that

states or holds that the trial judge shall instruct the

jury to disregard illegally obtained evidence only if

the defendant requests a jury charge on that issue.

Under Posey v. State,77 a trial court has no duty to

instruct the jury on unrequested defensive issues-such

as mistake of fact.78 A defensive issue is not “law

applicable to the case” for purposes of Article 36

unless the defendant timely requests the issue or

objects to the omission of the issue in the jury

charge. Any other holding would render Article 36.14—

which also requires a party to make specific objections

to the charge—meaningless, and “might encourage a

defendant to retry the case on appeal under a new
76
Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
77
966 S.W.2d 57 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
78
Id. at 60.

40
defensive theory effectively giving him two bites at

the apple.”79

The principle in Posey is that no rule or statute

requires the trial judge to give instructions on

traditional defenses and defensive theories absent a

defendant's request. As stated in Delgado: “The trial

judge has an absolute sua sponte duty to prepare a jury

charge that accurately sets out the law applicable to

the specific offense charged. But it does not

inevitably follow that he has a similar sua sponte duty

to instruct the jury on all potential defensive issues,

lesser-included offenses, or evidentiary issues. These

are issues that frequently depend upon trial strategy

and tactics.”80 These are also issues on which

instructions are not mandated by any statute.81 Thus,

79
966 S.W.2d at 62–63.
80
Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (footnote
omitted).
81
For example, TEX.R. EVID. 105(a) explicitly recognizes that the advocates
bear full responsibility for requesting appropriate limiting instructions
when they are entitled to them. The rule states:
(a) Limiting Instruction.—When evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to
its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly; but, in the absence of
such request the court's action in admitting such evidence without limitation
shall not be a ground for complaint on appeal.

41
under Posey, it is only when a “requirement of the

various statutory provisions referenced in Article

36.19 ‘has been disregarded,’” that the trial court

errs in omitting instructions relative to that

statute.82

But where a rule or statute requires an instruction

under the particular circumstances, that instruction is

“the law applicable to the case.” Such statutes and

rules set out an implicit “If-then” proposition: If the

evidence raises an issue of voluntariness, accomplice

witness, confidential informant, etc., then the trial

court shall instruct the jury that whatever the statute

or rule requires. In Huizar v. State,83 for example, it

was held that Article 37.07 is “the law applicable” to

all non-capital punishment proceedings. Thus, the trial

judge must instruct the jury at the punishment phase

concerning that law, including the fact that the State

TEX.R. EVID. 105(a) (emphasis added). Trial judges should be wary of giving a
limiting instruction under Rule 105(a) without a request because a party
might well intentionally forego a limiting instruction as part of its
deliberate strategy “to minimize the jury's recollection of the unfavorable
evidence.” United States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C.Cir.1995).
82
Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 60 & n. 5
83
12 S.W.3d 479 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

42
must prove any extraneous offenses beyond a reasonable

doubt.84 Posey was distinguished there as it was

explained the difference between instructing the jury

on “defensive” issues and instructing them on the law

that is applicable to all cases.

Articles 38.21–38.23 are legislatively mandated

procedures governing the admission and consideration of

a defendant's statements. Article 38.21 explicitly

states that voluntary statements may be used in

evidence “under the rules hereafter prescribed”—that

is, Article 38.22 and Article 38.23.

Article 38.22, § 6 is “the law applicable” to any

case in which a “question” is raised and litigated as

to the “general” voluntariness of a statement of an

accused. As noted above, under that statute, the trial

judge must then (1) make an independent determination

that the statement was made under voluntary conditions;

and then (2) instruct the jurors that they shall not

consider the statement for any purpose unless they

84
Id. at 484.

43
believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statement

was made voluntarily.

Article 38.23 is “the law applicable” to any case

in which a specific, disputed issue of fact is raised

concerning the constitutional voluntariness of the

making of the defendant's statement. These are

statutorily mandated instructions and the trial judge

must include them in the jury instructions when the

voluntariness of a defendant's statement is at issue.

Law Applied to the facts in the instant case

In the instant case, there was evidence that in

fact Appellant Alfaro gave a statement of accused.85

Note that State’s witness, Investigator Ruben Silva

testified that after making initial contact with the

defendant, his first impression was that he was

uncooperative.86 This witness would go on to testify

that he also believed Appellant Alfaro was under the

influence of some kind of alcohol or drug at that

85
RR14@ State’s Exhibit 36
86
RR11@11

44
time.87 Even so, it seemed to Investigator Silva that

Appellant Alfaro understood what he was saying to him.88

“He appeared to have full use of his mental and

physical faculties.”89

Investigator Silva advised Appellant Alfaro of his

rights and he understood them as indicated by his

initials and his signature.90 However much Appellant

Alfaro was uncooperative, he persisted that he didn’t

know anything91 yet he never exercised his right to an

attorney or to remain silent; he simply continued to

say he knew nothing.92 Investigator Silva clarified on

cross examination and on re-direct examination that the

only signs of intoxication he saw were that Appellant

Alfaro smelled of alcohol and he was uncooperative.93

When pushed for clarity by the Court,94 Investigator

87
RR11@12
88
They spoke in English and Spanish and Silva testified it was his
impression Appellant Alfaro understood him in both languages. RR11@13-14;
When asked which language Appellant Alfaro preferred to be Mirandized in and
Appellant chose Spanish. RR11@14; See also Miranda Warnings (in Spanish)
RR11@15, 17-18
89
RR11@12-13
90
RR11@15-16, 17-18
91
RR11@17
92
RR11@17
93
RR11@27
94
Note that the Court’s examination of the witness drew no objection from the
defense.

45
Silva admitted the only “sign” of intoxication was that

defendant smelled of alcohol.95 Silva would further

testify that Defendant did not have slurred speech;96

Appellant Alfaro had no problems maintain his

composure; he had no problems maintaining his balance;

he was not “falling over;” he knew where he was, who

Silva was and who he was; he was lucid and in his right

mind; he had no problems holding and using the pen.97

Next, the testimony at the suppression hearing

shows that Investigator Adam Palmer arrived at 6 am;98

when he made contact with Appellant Alfaro, he did not

appear to be intoxicated although he’d learned

Appellant Alfaro was slightly intoxicated a few hours

earlier. Approximately three hours had passed from the

time Alfaro was Mirandized and the time that this

witness made contact. Palmer testified: to him, Alfaro

appeared to have the normal use of his mental and

95
RR11@27
96
RR11@28
97
RR11@29
98
The testimony shows that Palmer got to the station at 4 am but I didn’t
not start talking to Appellant Alfaro until 6 am. When he did see him and
talk to him, he appeared to be in a normal mental state. RR11@39

46
physical faculties;99 Appellant Alfaro understood

English; he is a high school graduate;100 Appellant

Alfaro spoke plainly in English; Appellant Alfaro never

requested an attorney nor did he ever request that the

interview be terminated.

Then Investigator Avila testified that he took the

statement of accused from Appellant Alfaro.101 When he

made contact, Appellant Alfaro appeared to have the

normal use of his mental and physical faculties; he

understood the English language; they spoke in

English.102 According to Avila, Appellant Alfaro never

requested an attorney; He did not ask that the

interview be terminated; Avila did not coerce Appellant

Alfaro or threaten him; He did not promise Appellant

Alfaro anything in exchange for his statement; He did

not deny Appellant Alfaro any basic necessities.103

99
RR11@38
100
RR11@38
101
Made contact around 6 am; RR11@42
102
RR11@44
103
RR11@44-45

47
 According to Avila, Appellant Alfaro’s 2-page

statement of accused was prepared voluntarily on August

2, 2014. It was created and prepared at 6am;104

Appellant Alfaro talked while Avila typed as he’s

talking; Appellant Alfaro had an opportunity to review

and correct any mistakes; it is then printed out.105

The rights contained within the statement were

reviewed with Appellant Alfaro and he acknowledged he

understood them as indicated by his initials next to

each of the rights.106 According to Avila, after that,

Defendant Alfaro freely and voluntarily waived his

rights and gave the statement of accused.107

Although the Defense argued the Statement of

Accused was not given freely and voluntarily because

Appellant Alfaro was intoxicated108 at least while being

Mirandized – referring to State’s Exhibit 1 – the

104
this exhibit also contains the Miranda warnings (same as on State’s Exhibit
1)
105
RR11@47; This exhibit also has the Miranda Warnings listed on the exhibit
itself.
106
RR11@48-49
107
RR11@49; Avila testified that he did not have the impression Appellant
Alfaro was under the influence of any drug, alcohol or medication; It took
about 3 ½ hours to take the statement. RR11@54-55
108
He was not in the right state of mind to intelligently and freely waive his
rights

48
defense did not put on any evidence to that effect.

The defendant must offer credible109 evidence that would

create a reasonable doubt as to a specific factual

matter essential to the voluntariness of the

statement.110 This factual dispute can be raised only by

affirmative evidence, not by mere cross-examination

questions or argument.111

Defense counsel waived any possible error by not

objecting to the admissibility of the statement of

accused at the time of trial. State’s Exhibit 18 was

offered and admitted without objection.112 Exhibit 36

offered and admitted without objection.113

Given the evidence adduced by the State at the

suppression hearing and further considering the defense

produced no affirmative evidence to the contrary,

Appellant Alfaro was appropriately Mirandized; he
109
Noting of course that the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses at the suppression hearing. Note further that Appellant did
not testify to his own intoxication; nor did Appellant Alfaro contradict the
testimony of the investigators that he had the normal use of his mental and
physical faculties at the time he was Mirandized and when he gave the
Statement of Accused.
110
See 40 GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON, TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, § 4.194, at 282 (2d. ed.2001).
111
Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 513 nn. 22–23.
112
RR13@37; RR13@42
113
RR13@88

49
appeared to have understood his rights sufficiently

enough to voluntarily waive them. The evidence shows

that the Statement of Accused was given voluntarily.

Further, the evidence adduced at the suppression

hearing was devoid of any “police overreaching.”

Accordingly, undersigned counsel believes there is no

meritorious issue for appeal with respect to the

Court’s ruling on Appellant Alfaro’s Motion to suppress

the statement of accused. The undersigned does not

believe the record on appeal supports an abuse of

discretion on the part of the trial court.

Possible Issue 2: After review of the Record on appeal
and after reviewing the current state of the law, the
undersigned finds there was no error in not including a
voluntariness charge on admission of Appellant Alfaro's
statement.

A. Standard of Review - Almanza
Because Appellant Alfaro not properly object to the

jury charge Alfaro could only obtain reversal if any

jury charge errors, assuming they exist, were

50
egregious.114 Under Almanza, courts evaluate harm by

taking into account (1) the entire jury charge; (2) the

state of the evidence, including contested issues; (3)

arguments of counsel; and (4) any other relevant

information contained in the record as a whole.115

B) Voluntariness of Appellant's Statement of

Accused

Typically, a Court should submit a 38.23

instruction to the jury when voluntariness of a

confession is raised by the evidence. However, even if

Appellant Alfaro could show in the record that the

issue of voluntariness was raised: (1) because of

Appellant Alfaro's intoxication at the time he was

Mirandized, (2) because Appellant Alfaro’s intoxication

sufficiently compromised his ability to knowingly,

intelligently and voluntarily waive the rights

contained within the Miranda Warnings, he waived any

right to that instruction when he lodged “no objection”

114
(Conceding defense counsel did not object to the jury charge); see also
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (describing
“egregious harm”).
115
See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

51
at the time the Miranda Form and the Statement of

Accused were admitted at trial.116 Appellant neither

requested a voluntariness instruction nor objected to

its exclusion.117

The first Almanza factor requires this Court to

consider the entirety of the jury charge.118 In this

case, the charge instructed the jury that Appellant was

charged with Aggravated Robbery and that Appellant

Alfaro voluntarily entered a plea of guilty, persisted

in his plea of guilty and further that it appeared to

the Court that Appellant Alfaro was competent to enter

such a plea of guilty. Accordingly, the Court

instructed the jury to find Appellant Alfaro guilty of

Aggravated Robbery and assess his punishment.”119 The

charge also contained general language, informing the

jury of the conditions of probation and general

principles of law. Assuming the charge was erroneous

by omission of an Article 38.23 instruction, as a

116
State’s Exhibit 18 was offered and admitted without objection. RR13@37;
RR13@42; Exhibit 36 offered and admitted without objection. RR13@88
117
Insert reference to jury charge conference
118
CR86
119
CR86

52
whole, the jury charge did not further compound any

harm suffered.120

The second Almanza factor requires this Court to

consider the state of the evidence. In this case, there

was no testimony which created a fact issue as to

whether Appellant Alfaro was coerced by the

investigators into signing his written confession.

Appellant Alfaro did not testify in order to negate his

guilt for the offense. In fact, Appellant entered a

plea of guilty.121 No harm can be shown on this basis.

Despite the lack of the Article 38.23 instruction,

Appellant Alfaro's the resultant finding of guilty was

resolved consistently with Appellant Alfaro’s

acceptance of responsibility when he entered a plea of

guilty.122 Implicit in any Almanza challenge here is a

contention that if the jury determined Appellant

Alfaro’s statement was involuntary, the State would

120
Again, noting that Defense counsel did not object to the admission of the
statement at trial and further recognizing the implied strategy of “throwing
defendant Alfaro on the mercy of the jury,” the undersigned does not presume
to allege ineffectiveness; rather counsel goes through this exercise in order
to explore any meritorious issues for appeal.
121
RR13@6
122
RR13@6

53
have not been able to carry its burden of showing

Appellant Alfaro’s guilt. The evidence was legally

sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that

Appellant was guilty of aggravated robbery. Considering

the circumstantial and direct evidence, the jury could

also have reasonably found Appellant guilty even

without the statement. Thus, Appellant's own plea

contributed to the finding of guilt for aggravated

robbery. In order to have acquitted Appellant, the jury

would have had to discredit all testimony, including

Appellant Alfaro’s plea of guilty. Under the particular

facts of this case, any showing of harm would amount to

theoretical, rather than action harm.

The third Almanza factor requires this Court to

consider the arguments of counsel. Defense counsel

addressed the voluntariness of Appellant's statement of

accused at the pretrial suppression hearing only. There

was no objection to either the admission of Appellant’s

Miranda form or the statement of accused.123 Instead,

123
RR15 @ State’s Exhibits 18 and 36

54
much of the focus of the defensive theory during

closing argument was that Appellant Alfaro was guilty

and was sorry for his actions.

The fourth Almanza factor requires this Court to

consider other relevant information contained in the

record. It bears repeating that Appellant affirmatively

confirmed to the trial court that he had no objections

to the jury charge.124 After reviewing the entire record

under the appropriate Almanza harm analysis standard,

it is apparent that egregious harm has not occurred in

this case. As such, the undersigned finds no

meritorious issue on appeal here.

Possible issue number three, whether appellant’s
finding of guilt was supported by the evidence.
Appellant entered a plea of guilty. The jury

sentenced appellant to imprisonment for fifty (50)

years for the offense of aggravated robbery.125 The

record reflects appellant pleaded guilty to the jury.126

124
RR14@120
125
CR93; 97; RR13@6
126
Defendant is arraigned in front of the jury. RR13@5; Appellant Alfaro
PLEADS “guilty” to the jury. RR13@6; Court admonishes and inquires several

55
 This plea of guilty to the jury made Appellant

Alfaro’s trial a unitary proceeding.127 The trial court,

accordingly instructed the jury to find the defendant

guilty and assess punishment.128 Gonzales v. State

states, “the court should instruct the jury to find the

defendant guilty as part of the punishment charge.”129

In Basaldua v. State, the court noted that, though it

was argued that the charge did not require the jury

find the defendant guilty, the trial court used a

standard form that instructed the jury to find the

defendant guilty and assess his punishment.130 It is

well established that when a defendant has entered a

guilty plea to a felony before the jury, there remains

no issue of guilt for the factfinder to determine.131 A

plea of guilty substitutes for a jury verdict of guilt

and is itself a conviction.132 Like a jury's verdict, a

times whether he understands what he’s doing – to which the Appellant Alfaro
advises – Yes. RR13@6-7
127
State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695, 698 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).
128
CR86
129
868 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.) (emphasis added).
130
481 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.1972); CR86
131
Holland v. State, 761 S.W.2d 307, 313 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). See also In re
State ex rel. Tharp, 393 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (a plea of
guilty to a jury eliminates guilt as an issue to be determined).
132
Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).

56
plea of guilty is conclusive and nothing more is

required but to give judgment and sentence.133 “When a

defendant pleads guilty to a jury, the jury need not

return any verdict of guilty. The case simply proceeds

with a unitary punishment hearing.”134

Accordingly, the undersigned finds no meritorious

appeal as it relates to sufficiency of the evidence to

support the conviction.

Prayer for Relief

Wherefore, premises considered, Appellant prays

this Court grant the undersigned’s motion to withdraw

as counsel. No oral argument is requested or needed.

Respectfully submitted

O. Rene Flores, PC
State Bar No. 24012637
1308 S. 10th Ave.
Edinburg, TX 78539
(956)383-9090
(956)383-9050 (fax)

/S/ O. Rene Flores
O. Rene Flores

133
Id
134
Id.

57
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of

the foregoing Anders Briefing Brief was served in

accordance with the rules on the following persons:

Theodore “Ted” Hake
Assistant District Attorney
Hidalgo County District County Attorney
Appellate Division
Hidalgo County Courthouse
100 N. Closner
Edinburg, Texas 78539
By: Hand delivery

Appellant Juan Manuel Alfaro
TDCJ Number 01988848
Texas Department of Corrections
Connally Unit
899 FM 632
Kenedy, TX 78119

/S/ O. Rene Flores
O. Rene Flores

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to TRAP 9.4 (3), I hereby certify this

Brief contains 10,289 words.

/S/ O. Rene Flores
O. Rene Flores

58