Hermenia Jenkins v. Crosby Independent School District and Michael L. Williams in His Official Capacity as State Commissioner of Education

ACCEPTED 03-15-00313-CV 7078401 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/24/2015 11:25:11 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-15-00313-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/24/2015 11:25:11 AM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk HERMENIA JENKINS, Appellant v. CROSBY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT AND MICHAEL L. WILLIAMS, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, Appellees On Appeal from the District Court of Travis County, Texas 200th Judicial District Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000619 BRIEF OF APPELLEE CROSBY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT David B. Hodgins State Bar No. 09775530 dhodgins@thompsonhorton.com THOMPSON & HORTON LLP Amber K. King 3200 Southwest Freeway, Suite 2000 State Bar No. 24047244 Houston, Texas 77027 aking@thompsonhorton.com Telephone: 713-554-6745 Facsimile: 713-583-8245 Frances Broussard State Bar No. 24055218 fbroussard@thompsonhorton.com ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CROSBY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the following listed persons have an interest in the outcome of this case. These representations are made so that the judges of this Court may evaluate possible disqualification or recusal. 1. Hermenia Jenkins Plaintiff / Appellant 2. Kevin F. Lungwitz Elizabeth Poole The Lungwitz Law Firm, P.C. 3005 S. Lamar Blvd. Austin, Texas 78704 Attorneys for Plaintiff / Appellant 3. Crosby Independent School District Defendant / Appellee 4. David B. Hodgins Amber K. King Frances R. Broussard Thompson & Horton LLP 3200 Southwest Freeway, Suite 2000 Houston, Texas 77027 Attorneys for Defendant / Appellee CISD 5. Michael Williams, Commissioner of Education Defendant / Appellee 6. Greg Abbott Daniel T. Hodge David C. Mattax David A. Talbot, Jr. Andrew Lutostanski Office of the Attorney General of Texas PO Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711 Attorneys for Defendant / Appellee Williams i 7. Texas Elementary Principals and Supervisors Association Amicus Curiae 8. Daniel A. Ortiz Giana Ortiz The Ortiz Law Firm 1304 West Abram St., Suite 100 Arlington, Texas 76013 Attorneys for TEPSA 9. Texas Association of School Boards’ Legal Assistance Fund Amicus Curiae 10.David P. Backus Ronn P. Garcia Underwood Law Firm, P.C. 1111 West Loop 289 Lubbock, Texas 79416 Attorneys for TASB ii TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................ i TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES......................................................................................v STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. viii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................. ix ISSUES PRESENTED............................................................................................. ix STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................1 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................4 ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ........................................................................6 I. Standard of Review .............................................................................................6 II. The Term Contract Nonrenewal Act ...................................................................8 III. Jenkins’ Claim Did Not Involve An Expiring Term Contract And, Consequently, Was Not Ripe For The Commissioner’s Review, as Pled. .......10 IV. Assuming Arguendo §21.206 Applied To Jenkins’ Claim, The Commissioner Correctly Determined that Jenkins’ Reassignment from Principal to Assistant Principal was in the Same Professional Capacity and Legally Valid. ..............13 1. The phrase “same professional capacity” is not defined in the Texas Education Code; therefore, the Commissioner’s interpretation must be afforded broad deference...............................................................................13 2. The Commissioner has reasonably and consistently interpreted the phrase “same professional capacity.” ..........................................................14 3. The Commissioner has properly declared that “administrator” is a distinct professional capacity. .......................................................................16 4. Tex. Educ. Code §21.201(1) does not define “professional capacity” for purposes of §21.206. ................................................................................18 5. The Commissioner’s interpretation is entitled to deference. ................21 6. The Commissioner’s longstanding interpretation of “same professional capacity” should be upheld by the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. .....22 7. A change from principal to assistant principal is not a per se change in professional capacity. ....................................................................................26 iii 8. The Commissioner considered the contract, compared the two positions at issue, and appropriately determined they were both within the professional capacity of administrator. .........................................................29 9. Plaintiff’s argument that “once a principal, always a principal” is an unsound policy for school districts in the state of Texas. ..............................32 CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................33 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................35 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................35 APPENDIX ..............................................................................................................36 iv INDEX OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Barich v. San Felipe-Del Rio Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No 117-R1a-484 (Comm’r Educ. 1985) .........................................passim Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 247-3-491 (Comm’r Educ. 1993) ..................................17, 19, 29, 32 City of Austin v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 146 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) ....................................31, 32 Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.1994)....................................................................7, 14, 25, 26 DuPont Photomasks, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 219 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) ................................... 23 Goodie v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 57 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)............................................................................................................... 6, 7 Gustafson v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 113-R10-0812 at 6-13 (Comm’r Educ. 2014) ..........................passim Holman v. Arp Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 093-R8-805 (Comm’r Educ. 2007) ...........................................12, 36 Judson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ruiz, 04-13-00706-CV, 2015 WL 1501758 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 31, 2015, pet. filed) ...................................................................................... 7 Lehr. v. Ector County Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 003-R3-0908 (Comm’r Educ. 2011) ............................................... 13 Matthews v. Scott, 268 S.W.3d 162 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) ............................... 6 McCoy v. Kermit Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 004-R3-0908 (Comm’r Educ. 2012) ........................................passim v McGilvray v. Moses, 8 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied) ..........................14, 22 Miller v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 51 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) ................... 7 Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128 (Tex.1999)...................................................................................... 6 Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2000)............................................................................... 6, 7 Murillo v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 027-R3-0108 (Comm’r Educ. 2012) .............................11, 12, 17, 36 Pasqua v. Fort Stockton Indep. Sch. District, Docket No. 011-R3-1102 (Comm’r Educ. 2004) ...................................17, 26, 37 Perales v. Robstown ISD, Docket No. 052-R10-104, 084-R-604 (Comm’r Educ. 2006)......................19, 20 Poole v. Karnack Indep. Sch. Dist., 344 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.) ........................................ 7, 8 Railroad Comm'n v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. 2011) .............................................................................. 22 Ramos v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 002-R10-900 (Comm’r Educ. 1999) ...................................17, 32, 36 Tex. Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2004) ........................................................................23, 24 Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.1988).................................................................................. 6 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) ........................................................................14, 22 Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2010) ........................................................................23, 24 vi Underwood v. West Rusk County Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 062-R3-198 (Comm’r Educ. 1998) .....................................18, 26, 37 Wheeler v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 008-R3-1108 (Comm’r Educ. 2011) ............................................... 30 Young v. Leggett Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 175-R3-898 (Comm’r Educ. 1999) ...........................................17, 32 Statutes 19 Tex. Admin. Code Ann. § 241.1(d) ........................................................21, 27, 31 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057 ..................................................................................ix Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.201(d)(2) ..................................................................... 31 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 11.202(b) .......................................................................... 27 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.046 ............................................................................... 27 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.201(1) ...................................................................passim Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.201(3) ............................................................................ 8 Tex. Educ. Code. Ann. § 21.206(b) ..................................................................passim Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.210 ................................................................................. 2 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.211. .............................................................................. 11 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 21.251 et seq. ................................................................. 11 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.307(f) ............................................................................. 6 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.174 ............................................................................. 6 Other Authorities Tex. Atty. General Op. DM-27 (1991) .................................................................... 27 vii STATEMENT OF THE CASE This is an appeal pursuant to section 7.057 of the Texas Education Code. On December 2, 2011, Jenkins filed a Petition for Review with the Commissioner of Education seeking a review and decision by the Commissioner that Crosby Independent School District improperly reassigned Jenkins from a principal position to an assistant principal position in violation of the Education Code and her contract. (A.R. 155-158.1) The Commissioner upheld the District’s reassignment decision (“Commissioner’s Decision”). (App’x 1.) Subsequently, on February 28, 2014, Jenkins filed an Original Petition in the 200th Judicial District of Travis County, Texas against both the District and the Commissioner seeking a reversal of the Commissioner’s Decision. (C.R. 32.) The parties each filed trial briefs supporting their respective positions. (C.R. 71, 224, 263.) On December 4, 2014, the Honorably Amy Clark Meachum held an oral hearing, and then issued a final judgment affirming the Commissioner’s Decision. (App’x 2.) Jenkins filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. (C.R. 378.) On May 22, 2015, Jenkins filed a notice of appeal. (C.R. 385.) 1 The abbreviation “A.R.” is used for the Administrative Record that is included as Joint Exhibit No. 1 of the Reporter’s Record. The page numbers referenced are the TEA page numbers located at the bottom right-hand corner. 2 The abbreviation “C.R.” is used for the Clerk’s Record. viii STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT Oral argument is unnecessary because this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation for which this Court is well equipped, an issue of substantial- evidence review where more than a scintilla of supporting evidence is apparent, and an issue of contract interpretation where the contract unambiguously permits the reassignment at issue. ISSUES PRESENTED Whether the Commissioner’s Decision to uphold the District’s reassignment of Appellant/Plaintiff from principal to assistant principal is supported by substantial evidence? ix TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT: The Appellee, Crosby Independent School District, submits it’s brief as follows: STATEMENT OF FACTS Jenkins worked as the principal of Charles R. Drew Intermediate School within Crosby ISD from 2003 to June 2011. (A.R. 6, ¶2.) In March 2011, Jenkins’ employment contract with the District was renewed, and she signed a new two- year term contract for the upcoming school years 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. (A.R. 294.) The contract stated in pertinent part the following: 1. The Board hereby agrees to employ the Employee and the Employee agrees to serve the Board by engaging in duties as assigned by the Superintendent of the Crosby Independent School District for the school years 2011-2013 with beginning and ending dates as set by the Board. ... 3. It is understood and agreed by the parties to this Contract that the Superintendent of Crosby Independent School District shall have the right to reassign such duties to the Employee as Superintendent shall deem proper, and since the Employee is not employed to fill a specific position or assignment, the Superintendent may assign or reassign to other or additional duties for which he or she is professionally certified or otherwise qualified to perform. (Id.) On June 28, 2011, the Superintendent notified Jenkins of his decision to reassign her from the principal position at Drew Intermediate to the assistant principal position at Crosby High School. (A.R. 291.) Both positions were 1 campus administrator positions, and Jenkins’ compensation remained the same. (A.R. 286.) The District provided the reassignment notice prior to the “penalty- free resignation date,” which for the 2011-2012 school year, was July 8, 2011.3 Jenkins did not resign, but instead accepted her new position as assistant principal at Crosby High School. On July 18, 2011, Jenkins filed a grievance with the Superintendent through the District’s board policy DGBA, which is an internal grievance/complaint procedure available for employees. (See A.R. 331.) In her grievance, Jenkins alleged that the Superintendent lacked the legal authority to reassign her from an intermediate school principal position to a high school assistant principal position because it amounted to an improper change in professional capacity in violation of the Texas Education Code. (A.R. 287.) The District held a Level Two grievance hearing to address the complaint. (A.R. 284.) In his decision upholding her reassignment, the Superintendent communicated his rationale for the reassignment explaining that Jenkins’ “skill set could meet a real need at [the] High School.” (A.R. 285.) According to the Superintendent, the high school campus was in dire need of “administrative support and focus” and Jenkins’ “previous experiences, . . . skills and abilities with 3 The “penalty-free” resignation period is a statutory period of time provided to an individual employed under a term contract during which the individual may relinquish his/her position and leave the employment of the district without penalty. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.210. 2 organization, problem solving, and attention to detail” would be “valuable and helpful in this very important endeavor.” (Id.) The Superintendent also detailed Plaintiff’s duties as a high school assistant principal: At this much larger campus, you will continue to have numerous administrative responsibilities, including, but not limited to, appraising and making recommendations regarding staff, helping provide instructional leadership, implementing student discipline, facilitating and assisting with developing an effective campus improvement plan based on student needs, providing leadership in the identification, evaluation, and election of instructional programs, materials, and equipment with regard to increased student achievement, training teachers to utilize various instructional strategies to meet student learning needs, assisting in the planning and implementation of staff development programs designed to fulfill the professional growth needs of the high school staff, planning and implementing staff development programs designed to fulfill the professional growth needs of the high school staff, working directly with parents and patrons on solving problems and addressing numerous issues that may be presented, facilitating the implementation of new assessment and working to support the alignment of campus and district curriculum, as well as numerous other administrative duties as assigned. (A.R. 285-86.) Jenkins was not satisfied with the Superintendent’s decision and filed an appeal on September 27, 2011, through a Level Three grievance. (A.R. 282.) On October 24, 2011, the Crosby ISD Board of Trustees held a hearing. (A.R. 255.) At the time of her Level Three grievance hearing in October 2011, Jenkins had been performing in her role of assistant principal for Crosby High School for approximately nine (9) weeks. At no time, nor in any grievance hearing, did 3 Jenkins argue that the duties outlined for her current assistant principal position were untrue, inaccurate, or needed further clarification. Nor did Jenkins claim that her principal duties at the intermediate school were substantially different than her administrative duties as an assistant principal at the much larger high school. (See A.R. 255, 258-61; see also A.R. 155-58.) The Board denied Jenkins’ grievance in a six to one vote. (A.R. 324.) Consequently, Jenkins filed a Petition for Review with the Commissioner of Education on December 2, 2011. (A.R. 155.) On December 19, 2013, the Commissioner issued his Decision denying Plaintiff’s petition in part and dismissing in part. (App’x 1.) The Commissioner rejected Jenkins’ arguments and concluded that being employed by a school district as a principal under a term contract does not mean that the person is employed under the professional capacity of “principal.” (A.R. 29, ¶10.) The Commissioner went on to find that Jenkins’ professional capacity was “administrator,” and that the District’s reassignment of Jenkins to an assistant principal position was within the same professional capacity; therefore, the District did not violate the Texas Education Code. (App’x 1, p. 25, ¶¶12, 14.) SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Jenkins failed to plead this case as a demotion, and instead opted to plead it as a failure to employ her in the “same professional capacity” in violation of § 4 21.206(b). Jenkins’ claim, however, involved a mid-contract reassignment of Plaintiff; thus, the requirement in § 21.206(b) to employ an employee in the “same professional capacity” was not even triggered in this case, depriving the Commissioner of jurisdiction. Assuming the Commissioner did have jurisdiction, he properly determined that Jenkins’ reassignment from principal to assistant principal was in the “same professional capacity” and, therefore, Jenkins’ reassignment did not violate §21.206. This decision was appropriate and supported by substantial evidence for a number of reasons. First, the term “same professional capacity” is not defined in the Education Code. Consequently, over the last three decades, the Commissioner has consistently interpreted “same professional capacity” by comparing the duties, responsibilities, and salary of the reassigned position and not by the title of the position alone. Second, the Commissioner has properly declared that “administrator” is a distinct professional capacity; that a principal is an administrator; and that reassignment from a principal to assistant principal position can be appropriate. Third, the Commissioner has never defined principal as its own professional capacity and has consistently declined to do so. Finally, the Commissioner’s longstanding interpretation should be afforded substantial deference by this Court and should be upheld by the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. Jenkins’ arguments to the contrary are misplaced, inaccurate, and, if adopted by this Court, will result in poor public policy for Texas 5 school districts throughout the entire state. Consequently, this Court should affirm the Commissioner’s decision and deny Jenkins’ appeal. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES I. Standard of Review “On appeal of the district court's judgment, the focus of the appellate court's review, as in the district court, is on the decision of the Commissioner.” Goodie v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 57 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (citing Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 562 (Tex. 2000)). A court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision unless his decision is not supported by substantial evidence or his conclusions of law are erroneous. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.307(f); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2001.174; Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 566. Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla; thus, the evidence may preponderate against the decision, yet still amount to substantial evidence. Mireles v. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex.1999). The test is whether reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the Commissioner. See Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex.1988). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Matthews v. Scott, 268 S.W.3d 162, 172 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 6 2008, no pet.); Miller v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 51 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Whether the Commissioner's Decision meets this standard is a question of law. Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 566. “With respect to conclusions of law, the Commissioner's reasoning for his decision is immaterial if his conclusion is correct.” Goodie, 57 S.W.3d at 650; Judson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Ruiz, 04-13- 00706-CV, 2015 WL 1501758, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 31, 2015, pet. filed). The court, therefore, must uphold the Commissioner's Decision on any legal basis shown in the record. Goodie, 57 S.W.3d at 650. Finally, as with administrative agencies generally, the Commissioner's construction of a statute is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain meaning of the statute. Id. (citing Dodd v. Meno, 870 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Tex.1994)); see also Poole v. Karnack Indep. Sch. Dist., 344 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.). The Texas Supreme Court has held that, in education law, the Court should defer to the Commissioner‘s “reasonable determination in an area where he possesses considerable authority and expertise.” Dodd, 870 S.W.2d at 7. When the Education Code is ambiguous or silent as to a term, the question “is not whether the interpretation of the statute posed by [the plaintiff] is reasonable, but whether the Commissioner’s interpretation is 7 reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute.” Poole, 344 S.W.3d at 444. II. The Term Contract Nonrenewal Act The vast majority of Texas school districts employ teachers, administrators, and other professionals pursuant to a term contract. A term contract is a contract for employment between a school district and an individual for a fixed number of years, not to exceed five school years. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.201(3). Chapter 21, Subchapter E of the Texas Education Code is referred to as the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act (“TCNA”) and provides extensive administrative processes that a school district must follow prior to terminating or nonrenewing a term contract. An employee may be proposed for termination during the contract term only for good cause or a financial exigency. Id. §21.211. In that situation, the employee is entitled to notice and a hearing pursuant to the procedures outlined in Chapter 21, Subchapter F. See id. §§21.251, et seq. Alternatively, at the end of a contract term, the board of trustees must determine whether it will renew or nonrenew the employee’s contract for another term. The TCNA requires the following notice: (a) Not later than the 10th day before the last day of instruction in a school year, the board of trustees shall notify in writing each teacher whose contract is about to expire whether the board proposes to renew or not renew the contract. The notice must be delivered personally by hand delivery to the teacher on the campus at which the teacher is employed, except that if the teacher is not present on the campus on 8 the date that hand delivery is attempted, the notice must be mailed by prepaid certified mail or delivered by express delivery service to the teacher's address of record with the district. Notice that is postmarked on or before the 10th day before the last day of instruction is considered timely given under this subsection. (b) The board's failure to give the notice required by Subsection (a) within the time specified constitutes an election to employ the teacher in the same professional capacity for the following school year. (c) This section does not apply to a term contract with a superintendent. Id. §21.206.4 Upon receiving notice of a proposed nonrenewal, the employee has the right to request a hearing before the board. See id. §21.207. The Commissioner’s interpretation of the term “same professional capacity” in §21.206(b) is the crux of this case. Jenkins asserts that, as a principal, the only position within her “same professional capacity” is another principal position. See Appellant’s Brief, pp. 14-30. Therefore, according to Jenkins, the District’s reassignment of her from principal to assistant principal was in violation of the “same professional capacity” mandate. See id. The Commissioner disagreed finding that Jenkins’ professional capacity was as an administrator, and Jenkins’ reassignment from principal to assistant principal was in the “same professional capacity” and did not violate §21.206(b). (See App’x 1.) 4 The term “teacher” as used in this provision is defined much more broadly than the traditional concept of teacher. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.201(1). 9 III. Jenkins’ Claim Did Not Involve An Expiring Term Contract And, Consequently, Was Not Ripe For The Commissioner’s Review, as Pled. The requirement to employ an individual, such as Jenkins, in the “same professional capacity” is triggered when a term contract is about to expire and the board of trustees fails to give timely notice of a proposed nonrenewal. See Tex. Educ. Code. Ann. § 21.206(b). Under those very specific circumstances, a school district is obligated to employ the individual within the “same professional capacity” for at least one additional school year. See id. This is not the factual scenario that occurred in this case. Here, Jenkins received timely and appropriate notice, her contract was renewed for a two-year term, and she began the terms of her new contract assigned to serve as principal. (A.R. 294.) After the renewal process and during the term of Jenkins’ new contract, the Superintendent, pursuant to both the contractual agreement made between the parties and Crosby ISD Board Policy DK (Local), exercised his express authority and reassigned Jenkins “to other or additional duties for which [she was] professionally certified or otherwise qualified to perform.” (See A.R. 203, 294.) In the Superintendent’s professional judgment and in the best interest of the District, Jenkins’ skill set would serve an important role at the high school. (See A.R. 285.) Under these facts, the “same professional capacity” requirement and analysis pursuant to §21.206(b) was not triggered because Jenkins’ contract was renewed 10 and she was originally assigned to serve in the same position. In the context of a multiple year contract, such as Jenkins’, due process via nonrenewal is not an available remedy under Chapter 21 of the Education Code until the end of the multiple-year term. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 21.211, 21.251 et seq.; see also App’x 1, pp. 5-6. Nevertheless, Jenkins pled her case to the Commissioner as an inappropriate change in professional capacity without due process in violation §21.206 – a due process she was not entitled to because the District was not seeking to nonrenew her contract nor had it failed to provide appropriate, timely notice. Although it ultimately would have been unsuccessful under the present facts, Jenkins could have and should have pled an inappropriate demotion, which would have been the proper pleading for this mid-contract reassignment case. Jenkins failed to do so instead electing to plead the strained and unsupported argument of “once a principal always a principal.” (See A.R. 132; see also C.R. 82-87.) This case is factually similar to Murillo v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 027-R3-0108 (Comm’r Educ. 2012). (App’x 3.) Murillo was employed under a term contract for the 2006-2007 school year as a middle school principal. Murillo signed another contract with the district for the 2007-2008 school year as a “professional employee.” Murillo accepted the contract and shortly into its term was reassigned to the position of Human Resources Coordinator. Murrillo filed 11 internal grievances and then an appeal to the Commissioner. One of Murillo’s complaints was that the district changed her professional capacity in violation of §21.206. The Commissioner disagreed and held: A school district does not violate Texas Education Code section 21.206 when a term contract expires without notice of proposed nonrenewal and the district employs the teacher in a position for the next school year that the teacher held under the contract during the previous school year. If a teacher holds the same position in both school years, the teacher’s professional capacity has not changed. Because Respondent employed Petitioner for the 2007-2008 school in a position that Petitioner held under her 2006-2007 contract, Respondent did not violate Texas Education Code section 21.206. Id. at 3. Similarly, Jenkins’ reliance on §21.206 is misplaced because no violation of 21.206 had occurred at the time she filed her appeal with the Commissioner. Jenkins held the same position (principal) in both school years, and was then properly reassigned during the term of the contract to a new position pursuant to the language of the contract, state law, and local policy. Consequently, Jenkins’ case was not ripe at the time she filed and should have been dismissed based on a lack of jurisdiction. See Holman v. Arp Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 093-R8-805 (Comm’r Educ. 2007) (stating that ripeness is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissing appeal because petitioner had not yet been injured by the policy challenged) (App’x 4). The Commissioner’s conclusion of law that 12 Jenkins’ claim was ripe as to the 2011-2012 school year was erroneous and should be reversed by this Court. (See App’x 1, pp. 5-6; 24, ¶7.) IV. Assuming Arguendo §21.206 Applied To Jenkins’ Claim, The Commissioner Correctly Determined that Jenkins’ Reassignment from Principal to Assistant Principal was in the Same Professional Capacity and Legally Valid. This Court should affirm the Commissioner’s Decision because substantial evidence shows that Jenkins’ reassignment from the principal of an intermediate school to an assistant principal of a high school was within the “same professional capacity” and not in violation of §21.206. Jenkins seeks for this Court to reverse the Commissioner and find that the position of principal constitutes its own professional capacity, resulting in the unworkable conclusion that a principal may never be reassigned to any position other than that of principal. Jenkins’ position constitutes a radical departure from the longstanding precedent set by the Commissioner and should not be embraced by this Court. 1. The phrase “same professional capacity” is not defined in the Texas Education Code; therefore, the Commissioner’s interpretation must be afforded broad deference. Although the phrase “same professional capacity” is used in §21.206(b) of the Education Code, the phrase has not been defined by the Legislature, causing it to be susceptible to multiple interpretations. See Lehr. v. Ector County Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 003-R3-0908 (Comm’r Educ. 2011) (stating that the Texas Education Code does not define “same professional capacity”) (Appellant’s Brief, 13 App’x 9). When vagueness, ambiguity, or room for policy determinations exist, as in this case, the Court should defer to the agency’s interpretation unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the statute. See TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. 2011). “Construction of a statute by the administrative agency charged with its enforcement is entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is reasonable and does not contradict the plain language of the statute.” Dodd, 870 S.W.2d at 7. Given the Commissioner’s considerable authority and expertise in matters involving the Education Code, the Court should not be inclined to reverse the Commissioner's reasonable determination. See id. (upholding the Commissioner’s interpretation of the definition of “teacher” in the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act); see also McGilvray v. Moses, 8 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). 2. The Commissioner has reasonably and consistently interpreted the phrase “same professional capacity.” Because the phrase “same professional capacity” is not defined, the Commissioner has been tasked with interpreting and applying the “same professional capacity” requirement found in §21.206. The Commissioner first ruled on this issue in 1985 in the seminal case of Barich v. San Felipe-Del Rio Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No 117-R1a-484 (Comm’r Educ. 1985) (Appellant’s Brief, App’x 6). In that case, the Commissioner outlined what has 14 become the well-established test for analyzing the “same professional capacity” question: It is more reasonable to conclude that the legislature, by using the term, “same professional capacity” (instead of “exact same position”), intended to allow school districts to be flexible in their personnel assignments while discouraging the abuse of the district’s inherent or contractual authority. In other words, the district may place a teacher whose employment has been renewed by operation of law in a position different from that to which the teacher was assigned the previous year, as long as the position is one to which the district could have reassigned the teacher had the parties voluntarily entered into a contract for the following year. In some instances the validity of a particular placement will be clear. For example, an administrator who does not receive notice by April 1 may not be placed in the capacity of a classroom teacher; a classroom teacher may not be placed in the capacity of a counselor; a counselor may not be placed in the capacity of a librarian; etc. In other instances, the validity of a particular placement might not be so clear. For example, a placement might be to another position within the same professional category (e.g., administrator), but nevertheless be invalid (e.g., from superintendent to assistant elementary school principal). Factors to be considered in determining the validity of such an assignment include, but are not limited to differences in authority, duties, and salary. A reassignment is in the same professional capacity if the employee could have contracted with the teacher for the reassignment, that is a district cannot reassign an employee to a position that the employee is not certified to hold, and when both positions are in the same category, such as administrator, whether applying such factors as differences in authority, duties, and salary show that the two positions are really in two different professional capacities. Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Thus, according to the Commissioner, the focus is not on the title of the positions at issue, but rather on two fact-intensive questions: (1) whether the 15 employee could contract for the reassigned position and (2) whether the new position is one of similar authority, duties, and salary. The phrase “same professional capacity” must not be interpreted to mean “the exact same position,” and must allow school districts the necessary flexibility to make personnel changes and decisions. Over the last three decades, the Commissioner repeatedly has evaluated, from a nonrenewal perspective, whether a particular assignment or reassignment is in the required same professional capacity, and has consistently applied the test first set out in Barich. The Commissioner’s Decision provides a detailed and thorough analysis of Barich and its progeny regarding how the phrase “same professional capacity” is to be evaluated and applied. See App’x 1, pp. 9-16; see also Appellant’s Brief, Appx. 13; Gustafson v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 113-R10-0812 at 6-13 (Comm’r Educ. 2014) (App’x 5). 3. The Commissioner has properly declared that “administrator” is a distinct professional capacity. On numerous occasions, the Commissioner has directly addressed the very issue on appeal in this case – the reassignment of administrators (including principals) – and has correctly determined that “administrator” itself is an appropriate professional capacity. It has been the consistent view of the Commissioner that the TCNA balanced its grant of limited tenure rights against the considerable personnel management problems it might cause if imposed inflexibly. 16 Districts have responded to this law by creating broad classes within which transfers do not implicate the TCNA. If taken to extremes, this tactic would be against public policy as expressed in the TCNA, but I cannot make such a finding in this case. The need for flexibility in making personnel changes is strongest, and the argument for a rigid tenure system weakest, at the administrative level. In short, I find the generic “administrator” position before me consistent with the policies of the TCNA. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 247-3-491 (Comm’r Educ. 1993) (Appellant’s Brief, App’x 8); see also Barich, Docket No 117-R1a- 484 at 8 (referencing “administrator” as a professional category); Ramos v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 002-R10-900 (Comm’r Educ. 1999) (the district properly transferred the employee from the position of high school principal to the position of elementary principal) (App’x 6); Young v. Leggett Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 175-R3-898 (Comm’r Educ. 1999) (contracted as a teacher/coach, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of varsity coach and teacher to the position of junior high school coach and teacher) (Appellant’s Brief, App’x 10); Murillo, Docket No. 027-R3-0108 at 2-3 (contracted as a “professional employee,” the district properly reassigned the employee from a principal position to the position of Human Resource Coordinator). Moreover, the Commissioner has directly addressed the issue of a principal being reassigned to an assistant principal position and has found the reassignment appropriate under many circumstances. See, e.g., Pasqua v. Fort Stockton Indep. Sch. District, Docket No. 011-R3-1102 (Comm’r Educ. 2004) (contracted as an 17 administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of high school principal to the position of middle school assistant principal) (App’x 7); Underwood v. West Rusk County Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 062-R3-198 (Comm’r Educ. 1998) (contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from principal of an independent middle school campus to the position of principal or assistant principal for grades 7 to 9 at a unified junior high/high school campus) (App’x 8); McCoy v. Kermit Independent School District, Docket No. 004-R3-0908 (Comm’r Educ. 2012) (contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of principal to the position of assistant principal) (App’x 9); Gustafson, Docket No. 113-R10-0812 at 6-13 (contracted as administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from a principal position to an assistant principal position). 4. Tex. Educ. Code §21.201(1) does not define “professional capacity” for purposes of §21.206. Section 21.201(1) of the Education Code defines the term “teacher” for purposes of identifying which professionals in the educational setting are entitled to a Chapter 21 contract: “Teacher” means a superintendent, principal, supervisor, classroom teacher, school counselor, or other full-time professional employee who is required to hold a certificate issued under Subchapter B or a nurse. . . . Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.201(1). 18 Jenkins erroneously asserts that the definition of “teacher” in §21.201 should be used to define the term “professional capacity” for purposes of 21.206(b). See Appellant’s Brief at 14-20. According to Jenkins, pursuant to this definition, “principal” constitutes one of several professional capacities specifically identified; therefore, the District can only reassign principals to other principal positions in order to comply with the “same professional capacity” requirement under 21.206(b). See id. Jenkins’ position is completely unsupported by a series of Commissioner’s decisions. A multitude of cases exist where the Commissioner has thoroughly analyzed the meaning of “same professional capacity” and appropriately and specifically rejected Jenkins’ argument that 21.201’s listing of individual classifications defines the term professional capacity for purposes of 21.206. See, e.g., Perales v. Robstown ISD, Docket No. 052-R10-104, 084-R-604 (Comm’r Educ. 2006) (stating that “‘same professional capacity,’ as used in Texas Education Code section 21.206, is not limited to the individual classifications used in Texas Education Code section 21.201(1). This interpretation of the Commissioner is affirmed by the doctrine of legislative acceptance”) (Appellant’s Brief, App’x 7); Carpenter, Docket No. 247-R3-491, at 3 (“Petitioner would have the commissioner…hold that the phrase ‘same professional capacity” is defined…by the definition of ‘teacher’ found in 21.201(1) of [the TCNA]….[T]his phrase 19 is….undefined…and…is a matter for interpretation by the commissioner, in the first instance, and by the courts.”). Indeed, the Commissioner has articulated multiple problems with Plaintiff’s interpretation. See Perales, Docket No. 052-R10-104, at 3-4. First, §21.201 specifically provides a definition of “teacher” that is used to determine who is entitled to a term contract, not “professional capacity.” See id. at 3. Second, under the analysis, the term “other full-time professional employee who is required to hold a certificate under Subchapter B” would also be a professional capacity. See id. According to the Commissioner, this “hardly seems a distinct category.” Id. Third, the Commissioner’s longstanding interpretation of the phrase “same professional capacity” does not support this analysis. See id. at 4. The Commissioner has repeatedly upheld categories of professional capacities that are not listed in §21.201(1). See id. Contrary to Jenkins’ assertion, the Commissioner certainly has not “conceded that §21.201(1) defines ‘professional capacity,” nor has he shown “indecisiveness” on this issue. In fact, the Commissioner recognized From the first substantive decision made in the first year the issue could be addressed by the Commissioner, the named positions found at Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) were not held to be professional capacities as the Commissioner used the term ‘administrator’ that is not listed to include superintendents and assistant principals. App’x 1, p. 11. 20 The Commissioner specifically concluded in his decision in this case, “[th]e fact that the position of “principal” is listed in the first sentence of Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) does not mean that if one is employed by a school district as a principal under a term contract that one is employed under the professional capacity of principal.” (Id. at 25, ¶10.) The Commissioner recently reiterated this same analysis, once again rejecting the same argument Jenkins makes here. See Gustafson, Docket No. 113-R10-0812 at 15-16, 21. The Commissioner has never interpreted “principal” as its own professional capacity, and this Court should not do so now. In reality, unlike a teacher, counselor, librarian and others, both a principal and an assistant principal are administrators; have administrative duties and skills; and have an administrative certification. In fact, to serve as either a principal or an assistant principal in Texas public schools, an individual must hold the same “Principal Certificate.” See 19 Tex. Admin. Code Ann. §241.1(d). “Administrator” is, therefore, the proper professional capacity for both a principal and an assistant principal. 5. The Commissioner’s interpretation is entitled to deference. The Commissioner’s interpretation of the phrase “same professional capacity” is reasonable and does not conflict with the plain language of the statute. The Commissioner, who is charged with enforcement of the Education Code, possesses considerable authority and expertise in this area of the law; therefore, his 21 interpretation is entitled to serious consideration and deference. See Combs, 340 S.W.3d at 438; Tarrant Appraisal Dist., 845 S.W.2d at 823; McGilvray, 8 S.W.3d at 764; Railroad Comm'n v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 624–25 (Tex. 2011) (giving “serious consideration” and “some deference” to agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing so long as the construction is reasonable and does not conflict with the statute's language). Jenkins seeks this Court to overturn the Commissioner’s longstanding interpretation of this phrase and hold that, in the context of a principal, “same professional capacity” must be construed to mean only another principal position. This Court should not accept Jenkins’ invitation to alter this well-established and well-reasoned position of the Commissioner. 6. The Commissioner’s longstanding interpretation of “same professional capacity” should be upheld by the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. A firmly-established statutory construction rule in Texas jurisprudence is the concept of legislative acquiescence. Under this doctrine, if a court or an administrative agency (such as the Commissioner) has given a longstanding construction to an ambiguous statute, and in the face of this longstanding construction, the Legislature reenacts the statute without substantial change, the Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with the construction and adopted it. 22 See Tex. Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex. 2004); see also Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 237 (Tex. 2010) (“Once this Court has construed a statute and the Legislature re-enacts the statute without substantial change, it is presumed the Legislature has adopted our interpretation.”). This Court has expressly recognized and applied the doctrine of legislative acquiescence. In Texas Association of Appraisal Districts, Inc. v. Hart, the Court was asked to determine whether two entities constituted “governmental bodies” subject to disclosure of public information under the Texas Public Information Act. 382 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) The Court determined that the definition was susceptible to more than one meaning and that deference was to be given to the Attorney General’s interpretation. See id. at 593. The Court also recognized that for over two decades since the Attorney General first interpreted the definition, the Legislature had amended or modified section 552.003(1)'s definition of “governmental body” several times without altering the language. See id. at 594. “Thus, [the Court was required to] presume that the Legislature was aware of the Attorney General's interpretation of section 552.003(1)(A)(xii) and adopt it as its own.” Id.; see also DuPont Photomasks, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 219 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (finding Comptroller’s interpretation of the sale-for-resale exemption in the Tax Code was longstanding; 23 the Legislature had amended the provision several times without substantial change, therefore, the Legislature was presumed to be familiar with and to have adopted the Comptroller’s interpretation). The Commissioner appropriately determined that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence applies to this case and that the “Legislature has acquiesced in the Commissioner’s interpretation of the phrase ‘same professional capacity.’” (App’x 1, pp. 17-18.) As discussed in detail above, the term “same professional capacity” is not defined, so the Commissioner has been tasked with interpreting its meaning. The Commissioner’s well-established interpretation of the phrase “same professional capacity” spans approximately three decades. As detailed in the Commissioner’s Decision, the TCNA was amended by the Legislature on four occasions between 1990 and 2011, without altering the wording of the phrase or providing a clarifying definition. (See App’x 1, pp. 8-9; 17-18.) The Legislature, therefore, presumably was aware of the Commissioner’s interpretation and has adopted it.5 See Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 176; Transcon. Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d at 237; Texas Ass’n of Appraisal Districts, Inc., 382 S.W.3d at 593-94. 5 During the 73rd Regular Legislative Session, a statutory definition of “same professional capacity” as it related to probationary and continuing contracts was proposed and rejected in Senate Bill 395. Section 13.118(d) provided the following: “Same professional capacity” means a position, including supervision of extracurricular activities, which is substantially equal in duties, responsibility, authority, certification, endorsement, education, and remuneration. No action was taken on the bill in committee. See App’x 10, Introduced Bill, Tex. S.B. 395, 73rd Leg., R.S. (1993). Although proposed, the Legislature elected not to adopt this definition, or any 24 As stated by the Commissioner: If the Legislature intended “same professional capacity” to mean any position listed in the definition of ‘teacher,’ the Legislature would have said so. Instead, the Legislature used an undefined phrase that it intended the Commissioner to interpret using his experience in how schools operate. The Commissioner has done so since the first opportunity to interpret the phrase at issue. (App’x, p. 19.) In fact, the TCNA was amended again during the 83th Legislative Session held in 2013; yet the Legislature did not add a definition of professional capacity or otherwise amend the statute to provide further clarity. See Act of 2013, 83th Leg., R.S., ch. 443, §10 (SB 715) (amending the definition of “teacher” under section 21.201 to state “school counselor” instead of “counselor”). Moreover, the Legislature recently completed the 84th Legislative Regular Session in June 2015. The district court’s ruling in this case affirming the Commissioner’s interpretation occurred in February 2015 – in the midst of the session. (Appx. 2.) Nevertheless, the Legislature took no action to amend or define the term “same professional capacity” in response to the outstanding ruling. The Legislature’s continued silence lends itself to only one conclusion – the Legislature has adopted the Commissioner’s longstanding interpretation, and this Court should too.6 definition, thereby affirming the Commissioner’s reasonable interpretation and application of the phrase “same professional capacity.” 6 Notably, the Legislature has responded to the Commissioner’s and the court’s interpretation of the TCNA in the past. In 1994, the Supreme Court issued the case of Dodd v. Meno, in which it 25 In the present case, the Commissioner used his knowledge and experiences to properly determine that Jenkins’ transfer from one administrative position to another administrative position, while keeping the same salary, was legally valid and in the same professional capacity. 7. A change from principal to assistant principal is not a per se change in professional capacity. As discussed above, the Commissioner has appropriately determined on more than one occasion that principals and assistant principals are both administrators; therefore, based on the particular facts of the case, an assignment from principal to assistant principal can be in the “same professional capacity.” See, e.g., Pasqua, Docket No. 011-R3-1102, at 4, 7; Underwood, Docket No. 062- R3-198, at 2-4; McCoy, Docket No. 004-R3-0908, at 5, 7; Gustafson, Docket No. 113-R10-0812 at 15-16, 21. Jenkins asserts alternatively that even if this Court does not accept her argument that §21.201(1) defines the relevant categories for “professional capacity,” a principal and assistant principal can never be in the “same professional capacity.” According to Jenkins, a principal is such a unique position and so fundamentally different than an assistant principal, that it per se constitutes a professional capacity of its own and cannot fall within the more upheld the Commissioner’s interpretation of the definition of “teacher” in §21.201(1), and found that a nurse did not fall within the definition of “teacher,” as it was defined at that time. See 870 S.W.2d 4, 5-6 (Tex. 1994). Shortly thereafter, during the 1995 Legislative Regular Session, the Legislature responded by amending the definition of “teacher” in §21.201(1) to include a nurse. See Acts 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, §1 (S.B. 1). 26 general category of “administrator.” See Appellant’s Brief at 20-24. Jenkins’ arguments in this regard are misplaced. Section 11.202 delineates the role of the campus principal (the instructional leader of the campus) and job requirements. Legislative history shows that the purpose of section 13.352(d), the predecessor to §11.202, was to “give principals more control over their campuses with a view to greater accountability for campus conditions and student achievement.” Tex. Atty. General Op. DM-27 (1991) (App’x 11). The purpose of §11.202, however, was not to establish the role of principal as a unique, stand-alone “professional capacity,” as Jenkins argues. While it is true that §11.202 of the Education Code identifies certain statutory duties of a principal, this provision does not equate to a per se finding that the position of principal is so fundamentally different and distinct that it must constitute its own professional capacity. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §11.202(b); see also McCoy, Docket No. 004-R3-0908 at 5. In fact, principals and assistant principals are treated similarly in many respects. For example, both a principal and an assistant principal are required to hold a principal certificate, are required to actively participate in professional development activities and training, and are subject to the same standards for serving as a first-time campus administrator. See 19 Tex. Admin. Code Ann. §241.1(c), (d), §241.25; Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §21.046. These similarities further 27 support the argument that both positions are sufficiently similar and are appropriately considered administrative positions. Jenkins’ argument that the change from principal to assistant principal alone is sufficient to show a violation of the “same professional capacity” requirement of §21.206(b) is simply not supported, and is a position the Commissioner has specifically rejected. See McCoy, Docket No. 004-R3-0908, at 5 (“[I]n the present case Petitioner’s argument is that the change from principal to assistant principal alone is sufficient to show a violation of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b). It is not.”); see also Barich, Docket No 117-R1a-484, at 8 (stating “same professional capacity” does not mean “the exact same position”); Gustafson, Docket No. 113-R10-0812 at 6-13. Even though Jenkins failed to plead it or exhaust her administrative remedies on the issue, and thus waived the argument, the appropriate analysis in determining whether a reassignment from principal to assistant principal is within the “same professional capacity” would be to consider the factors set forth by the Commissioner in Barich. Jenkins failed to argue at the Commissioner level as a factual matter that an actual comparison of her position as principal and her position as assistant principal lead to the conclusion that the two jobs were not in the same professional capacity. (See App’x, p. 22.) Jenkins instead relied solely 28 on the argument that as a matter of law the positions could not be in the same professional category. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that Jenkins properly asserted this argument, the Commissioner’s application of the Barich test and determination that the two positions had similar duties, responsibilities, and salary is supported by substantial evidence. Jenkins’ compensation remained the same in her position as assistant principal at the high school, and her administrative duties and responsibilities at a much larger high school campus remained substantially similar (A.R. 285-86). 8. The Commissioner considered the contract, compared the two positions at issue, and appropriately determined they were both within the professional capacity of administrator. Admittedly, the contract at issue is ambiguous with regard to an identified professional capacity. Jenkins contract was for an “employee” for 2011-2013. (A.R. 294.) Although the Commissioner has found that an employment contract simply listing “employee” is too broad to define the professional capacity; the analysis does not end at that point. How a contract defines the professional capacity is relevant but not necessarily dispositive. See Carpenter, Docket No. 247-R3-491 at 3. The Commissioner and the courts have consistently looked to the language of the employment contract itself and attempted to give the parties the benefit of their bargain. See id. 29 Jenkins seeks to rewrite her contract by replacing the term “employee” with her job title of “principal.” The Commissioner, however, has not taken the approach of looking merely at the job title to define “professional capacity.” Instead, he looks to the terms of the contract and the employment category within which the employee is actually assigned (in the present case as an administrator), and considers whether the two positions at issue are in the same professional capacity based upon a factual comparison of the job duties, responsibilities, and salary. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., Docket No. 008-R3-1108 (Comm’r Educ. 2011) (Appellant’s Brief, App’x 11). Here, the terms of Jenkins’ contract are particularly relevant. Jenkins’ contract expressly provided the Superintendent the right to reassign Petitioner: …the Superintendent of Crosby Independent School District shall have the right to assign such duties to the Employee as Superintendent shall deem proper, and since the Employee is not employed to fill a specific position or assignment, the Superintendent may assign or reassign the Employee to other or additional duties for which he or she is professionally certified or otherwise qualified to perform. (A.R. 294.) The contract explicitly stated that: (1) the Superintendent has the right to assign Plaintiff as he “shall deem proper”; (2) Plaintiff is not employed to fulfill a specific position, including campus principal; and, (3) the Superintendent can reassign Plaintiff to any position for which she is certified and qualified to perform. Id. Jenkins was certified and qualified to serve as both a principal and an 30 assistant principal, as the certification requirements are the same. See Tex. Admin. Code Ann. §241.1(d); see also Section IV.7, infra. The Commissioner’s interpretation of Jenkins’ professional capacity as “administrator” rather than just “principal” is consistent with the Superintendent’s contractual reassignment authority – Jenkins’ interpretation is not. Moreover, the Superintendent’s reassignment authority is further outlined and supported in state law and board policy. As stated in the Education Code, the statutory duties of the Superintendent specifically include the administrative authority and responsibility for the assignment of all personnel of the District. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §11.201(d)(2) (emphasis added). Crosby ISD Board Policy DK (LOCAL) also states: All personnel are employed subject to assignment and reassignment by the Superintendent or designee when the Superintendent determines that the assignment or reassignment is in the best interest of the District. Reassignment shall be defined as a transfer to another position, department, or facility that does not necessitate a change in the employment contract of a contract employee. (A.R. 203, Crosby ISD Board Policy DK (LOCAL) (emphasis added).) Jenkins’ preferred solution – replacing “employee” with “principal” – runs contrary to these state and local authorities as well. The Commissioner’s interpretation – that the appropriate professional capacity for principal and assistant principal is “administrator” – is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. See City of Austin v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 146 S.W.3d 742, 748 31 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (stating courts will affirm the agency’s interpretation of an agreement if the interpretation is supported by substantial evidence). 9. Plaintiff’s argument that “once a principal, always a principal” is an unsound policy for school districts in the state of Texas. Jenkins advocates that principals may only be reassigned to other principalships at other campuses within the school district. This is unsound policy that contradicts well-settled law established by the Commissioner. As stated previously, the Commissioner has recognized the importance of flexibility for a school district to reassign employees in order to manage staff to cover school needs. See Carpenter, Docket No. 247-3-491, at 4. This flexibility is especially paramount when reassigning administrators. Id., see also Ramos, Docket No. 002- R10-900 2002, at 2-3 (school districts have broad discretion when it comes to transferring administrators); Young, Docket No. 175-R3-898, at 4 (the phrase “same professional capacity” encompasses broad categories). To hold otherwise, as suggested by Jenkins, would unjustifiably disadvantage students, particularly, as in the present case, when an individual’s, such as Jenkins’, skill sets are needed at a particular campus. (See A.R. 285.) Moreover, such a limitation would inappropriately limit a Superintendent’s reassignment authority and ability to manage staff and meet the ever-changing needs of students within a school district. 32 Jenkins’ position, if adopted by this Court, would cause unjustified operational difficulties for a school district. For example, a school district could face the situation of having to close a campus due to budgetary constraints and/or lower student enrollment. Under Jenkins’ position, if no available principal position existed or if the principal at the campus to be closed refused to be assigned to another administrative position, the school district would have to terminate or nonrenew the employment contract of the principal at that campus instead of having the option to reassign the employee to another non-principal, administrative position. Besides being unreasonable, such a result is neither mandated by statute, case law, or reason. Jenkins’ strained attempt to redefine “same professional capacity” is bad public policy, would reverse well-articulated decisions by the Commissioner, and should be rejected by this Court. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER For all of the reasons set forth above, Appellant’s reassignment from principal to assistant principal was legally valid and did not violate §21.206 of the Texas Education Code. The Commissioner’s Decision, which was based on three decades of precedent from the agency, was correct and supported by substantial evidence. The District, therefore, respectfully requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Commissioner. 33 Respectfully submitted, THOMPSON & HORTON LLP /s/ David B. Hodgins David B. Hodgins State Bar No. 09775530 Amber K. King State Bar No. 24047244 Frances R. Broussard State Bar No. 24055218 3200 Southwest Freeway, Suite 2000 Houston, Texas 77027 Telephone: (713) 554-6745 Telecopy: (713) 583-8245 Attorneys for Appellee Crosby ISD 34 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify that the number of words in this brief, excluding those matters listed in Rule 9.4(i)(1), is 7,881. /s/ Amber K. King Amber K. King CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 24th day of September, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing pleading was served upon counsel of record via electronic filing and certified mail, RRR: Kevin F. Lungwitz The Lungwitz Law Firm, P.C. 3005 S. Lamar Blvd. Suite D-109-362 Austin, Texas 78704-4785 P. 512.462.0188 F. 866.739.7138 kevin@lungwitzlaw.com Via CMRRR: 70102780000049858814 Andrew Lutostanski Assistant Attorney General Administrative Law Division OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS P.O Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, Texas 78711-2548 P. 512.475.4300 F. 512.320.0167 Via CMRRR: 70102780000049858807 /s/ Amber K. King Amber K. King 35 No. 03-15-00313-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS AUSTIN, TEXAS HERMENIA JENKINS, Appellant v. CROSBY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT AND MICHAEL L. WILLIAMS, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION, Appellees On Appeal from the District Court of Travis County, Texas 200th Judicial District Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-14-000619 APPELLEE CROSBY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT’S APPENDIX Decision of the Commissioner ………………………………………………..Tab 1 District Court’s Final Judgment ………………………………………………Tab 2 Murillo v. Laredo Indep. Sch. Dist. Docket No. 027-R3-0108 (Comm’r Educ. 2012) ……………………………..Tab 3 Holman v. Arp Indep. Sch. Dist. Docket No. 093-R8-805 (Comm’r Educ. 2007) ………………………………Tab 4 Gustafson v. Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. Docket No. 113-R10-0812 (Comm’r Educ. 2014) ……………………………Tab 5 Ramos v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist. Docket No. 002-R10-900 (Comm’r Educ. 1999)……………………………...Tab 6 36 Pasqua v. Fort Stockton Indep. Sch. District Docket No. 011-R3-1102 (Comm’r Educ. 2004) ……………………………..Tab 7 Underwood v. West Rusk County Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist. Docket No. 062-R3-198 (Comm’r Educ. 1998) ………………………………Tab 8 McCoy v. Kermit Independent School District Docket No. 004-R3-0908 (Comm’r Educ. 2012) ……………………………..Tab 9 Introduced Bill, Tex. S.B. 385, 73rd Leg., R.S. (1993) ……………………..Tab 10 Tex. Atty. Gen. Op. DM-27 (1991) ………………………………………….Tab 11 37 Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 1 DOCKET NO. 043-RlO-1211 HERMENIA JENKINS § BEFORE THE § § v. § COMMISSIONER OF EDUCA nON § CROSBY § INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STATE OF TEXAS DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER Statement of the Case Petitioner, Hermenia Jenkins, appeals the denial of her grievance by Respondent, Crosby Independent School District. Christopher Maska is the Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Commissioner of Education to preside over this cause. Petitioner is represented by Kevin F. Lungwitz, Attorney at Law, Austin, Texas. Respondent is represented by David B. Hodgins, Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas l . The Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommending that Petitioner's appeal be denied in part and dismissed in paM. Exceptions and replies were timely filed and considered. The central issue in this case is whether a principal serving under a term contract can be reassigned to an assistant principal position in the year after the principal's contract has been renewed. By statute, such a reassignment must be in "same professional capacity." Petitioner contends that a bright line rule should be established so that a principal may only be reassigned to another principal position. For the Commissioner to so rule would require the Commissioner to overrule a string of cases going back to the Commissioner's earliest decisions under the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act. Further, such a ruling is not consistent with the intention of the Legislature which passed the statute in question. The Legislature did not create the purposed bright line rule, but instead used language that allows the Commissioner to 1 The Texas Association of School Board's Legal Assistance Fund filed a Brief of Amicus Curiae. 043-RIO-1211 exercise his broad expenence In education to determine just what IS the "same professional capacity" in each individual case. Findings of Fact After due consideration of the record and matters officially noticed, it is concluded that the following Findings of Fact are supported by substantial evidence and 2 are the Findings of Fact that best support Respondent's decision . 1. . In March 2011, Petitioner and Respondent signed a contract that provides in relevant part: 1. The Board hereby agrees to employ the Employee and the Employee agrees to serve the Board by engaging in duties as assigned by the Superintendent of the Crosby Independent School District for the school years 2011-2013 with beginning and ending dates as set by the Board. 3. It is understood and agreed by the parties to this Contract that the Superintendent of the Crosby Independent School District shall have the right to assign such duties to the Employee as the Superintendent shall deem proper, and since the Employee is not employed to fill a specific position or assignment, the Superintendent may assign or reassign the Employee to other or additional duties for which he or she is professionally certified or otherwise qualified to perform 2. Petitioner served as the principal of Charles R. Drew Intermediate School from 2003 to the end of the 2010-2011 school year. 3. On June 28, 2011, Petitioner was reassigned from the position of principal at Charles R. Drew Intermediate to the position of assistant principal at Crosby High School. 4. The local record does not indicate with specificity what Petitioner's duties as assistant principal at Crosby High School are. 2See 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 157.I073(h); Bosworth v. East Central Independent School District, Docket No. 090-Rl-803 (Comm'r Educ. 2003). 043-R10-1211 2 Discussion Petitioner asserts that Respondent improperly reassigned her. Respondent denies this claim. In particular, Petitioner alleges that Respondent's actions violated Texas Education Code section 11.202, which designates a principal as the instructional leader of a campus; section 11.201, which grants supervisory rights to superintendents, and section 21.206(b) which requires a school board that does not timely give notice of proposed nonrenewal to hire the teacher in the same professional capacity for the following school year. Petitioner also alleges that Respondent violated 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 150.1021, which concerns the Commissioner's Recommended Appraisal process for administrators and policy DN(LOCAL). Respondent denies these claims. Rights Petitioner claims her reassignment violated her rights under Texas Education Code section 11.202,19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 150.1021, and policy DN(LOCAL). Texas Education Code section 11.202 is entitled "Principals." It provides that a principal is the instructional leader of a school. It lists seven duties of a principal. It requires school boards to adopt a policy for selecting principals. It gives a superintendent or designee final authority to assign teachers transferred due to enrollment shifts or program changes. Texas Education Code section 11.202 does not give Petitioner the right to a principal position. Likewise, 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 150.1021, and policy DN(LOCAL) do not give Petitioner a right to a principal position. However, if Petitioner were entitled to a principal position, she would be entitled to the rights provided by this statute and rule, but not local policy. Under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(A), the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over violations of school district policies. Reeves v. Aledo Independent School District, Docket No.1 06-Rl 0-496 (Comm'r Educ. 1999) TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.201 Texas Education Code 11.201 (d)(2) provides that superintendents have responsibility for most assignments. Petitioner contends that Respondent's 043-RI0-1211 3 superintendent reassigned her in an arbitrary and capnclOUS manner and, hence, the reassignment is invalid. However, a superintendent does not violate Texas Education Code 11.20 1(d) when a superintendent poorly exercises an authority granted by this section. The Commissioner has held that: The provisions in question do not require this responsibility to be exercised fairly or wisely. The provisions also do not prohibit a district from taking action against superintendents who act rashly or unfairly. S.R.S. v Groesbeck Independent School District, Docket No. 02S-RS-10S (Comm'r Educ. 2006). Texas Education Code 11.20 1(d) could only be violated by a refusal to exercise the statutory grant of authority. A board's decision may be overturned for being arbitrary and capnclOus. However, this is only the case when the board's decision itself is arbitrary and capricious. That a superintendent's action was arbitrary and capricious does not make a school board's decision arbitrary and capricious. If any action of a superintendent that was alleged to be was arbitrary and capricious could be appealed to the Commissioner, the Commissioner's docket would greatly expand. This would be contrary to the intention of the Legislature of limiting the Commissioner's jurisdiction, which can be seen by comparing Texas Education Code section 7.0S7 to the prior jurisdictional statute, Texas Education Code section 11.13. The Commissioner lacks jurisdiction under Texas Education Code section 7.0S7(a)(2)(A) over a claim Respondent's superintendent arbitrarily and capriciously reassigned her. Same Professional Capacity Petitioner contends that her reassignment is not proper because the positions of principal and assistant principal are not in the same professional capacity. The phrase "same professional capacity" occurs twice in the Texas Education Code. In Texas Education Code section 21 .206 provides: 043-RI0-1211 4 (a) Not later than the 10th day before the last day of instruction in a school year, the board of trustees shall notify in writing each teacher whose contract is about to expire whether the board proposes to renew or not renew the contract. The notice must be delivered personally by hand delivery to the teacher on the campus at which the teacher is employed, except that if the teacher is not present on the campus on the date that hand delivery is attempted, the notice must be mailed by prepaid certified mail or delivered by express delivery service to the teacher's address of record with the district. Notice that is postmarked on or before the 10th day before the last day of instruction is considered timely given under this subsection. (b) The board's failure to give the notice required by Subsection (a) within the time specified constitutes an election to employ the teacher in the same professional capacity for the following school year. (c) This section does not apply to a term contract with a superintendent. If a school district fails to timely give a teacher notice of proposed nonrenewal when the teacher's contract is about to expire, the school district is required to employ the teacher in the "same professional capacity" for the following school year. A requirement to employ a teacher in the "same professional capacity" is triggered only when a contract is about to expire and timely notice of proposed nonrenewal is not given. The other time the phrase "same professional capacity" is used in the Texas Education Code is found at Texas Education Code section 21.212. This provision is very similar to Texas Education Code section 21.206. The major distinction is that it applies exclusively to superintendents. In the present case, it would seem that no violation of Texas Education Code section 21.206 could occur because when Petitioner was reassigned her contract was not about to expire. Petitioner's contract will not expire until the end of the 2012-2013 school year. Petitioner's claim concerning Texas Education Code section 21.206 would not appear to be ripe. However, Petitioner points out that she was employed by Respondent as a principal just prior to her signing her 2011-2013 contract. Hence, during the 2011-2012 school year, Respondent was required to employ Petitioner in the same professional capacity as Petitioner held during the 2010-2011 school year. However, if 043-RlO-1211 5 Petitioner were to prevail on this claim, she would only be entitled to be employed in the same professional capacity for the 2011-2012 school year and not for the 2012-2013 school year. While this may be viewed as a result that does not favor teachers, some implications of multiple year term contracts favor teachers. As the Commissioner pointed out in Smithwick v. Castleberry Independent School District, Docket No. 085-RI-0711 n. 2 (Comm'r Educ. 2011), multiple year contracts can also benefit teachers. A multiple year contract may only be nonrenewed when it is about to expire. A school district that wishes to end a multiple year contract at the end of the fist contract year must proceed by the more difficult process of termination as opposed to nonrenewal. In such a case, the district is required to prove good cause and the case is heard by an independent hearing examiner. TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 21.211, 21.251 et seq. Must Principals Remain Principals? Petitioner argues that the Commissioner should overturn precedent and conclude that if a principal's contract is not nonrenewed, a school district is limited to reassigning a principal to another principal position for the next school year. Petitioner argues that the only position that is in the same professional capacity of a principal is the position of principal. Precedent should not be lightly overturned. Teachers and school districts base important decisions in reliance on Commissioner's Decisions. But the fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. If the Commissioner's long standing interpretation of the statute is in conflict with the intention of the Legislature, the Commissioner's interpretation should change. TCNA The Term Contract Nonrenewal Act3 ("TCNA") was passed by the 6ih Legislature in 19814. Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, 6ih Leg., R.S., ch. 765, 1981 Tex. J Section I ofSB 341 itself provided that "this act shall be known as "The Term Contract Nonrenewal Act." 4 The TCNA became effective on August 31, 1981. However, because most contracts for the 1981-1982 school year had already been signed by that date, the TCNA really became operational for the 1982-1983 043-RIO-1211 6 Gen Laws 2847. This law fundamentally changed teachers contracts. Before the TCNA many districts hired teachers and administrators on one-year contracts. When the contract term expired, the district was not required to offer a contract for the new school year. Seifert v. Lingleville Indep. Sch. Dist., 692 S.W.2d 461,462 (Tex. 1985). Prior to the passage of the TCNA, school districts were not required to establish policy reasons for ending a contractual relationship, to give teachers the reasons why ending the contractual relationship was proposed, and to provide teachers with the opportunity for a hearing where the administration had the burden of proof to show that the teacher's contract should be nonrenewed. A key passage of the original TCNA, then numbered as Texas Education Code section 21.204, required a district that did not nonrenew a teacher's contract to hire the teacher for the next school year: Notice (a) In the event the board of trustees receives a recommendation for nonrenewal, the board after consideration of written evaluations required by Section 21.202 of this subchapter and the reasons for the recommendation, shall in its sole discretion, either reject the recommendation or shall give the teacher written notice of the proposed nonrenewal on or before April 1 proceeding the end of the employment fixed in the contract. (b) In the event offailure to give such notice of proposed nonrenewal within the time herein specified, the board shall thereby elect to employ such employee in the same professional capacity for the succeeding school year. (c) The notice of proposed nonrenewal required in this section shall contain a statement of all the reasons for such proposed action. (Emphasis added). If a teacher's contract was not noticed for nonrenewal, the school board was not only required to hire the teacher for the next school year but also to employ the teacher in the same professional capacity for the next school year. The fundamental dispute in this case is over the meaning of the phrase "same professional capacity. " school year. That makes the 1984-1985 school year, the ftrst time the issue of whether a teacher was rehired in the same professional capacity could actually be raised. 5 From the beginning, the TCNA has used an expansive deftnition of "teacher" that includes many who are not normally referred to as teachers. 043-R10-1211 7 Legislative History The legislative history of the TCNA6 sheds some light on the meaning of the phrase "same professional capacity." Senate Bill 341 created the TCNA. As originally filed, SB 341 was far more ambitious than the TCNA which became law. Under SB 341 as filed, a term or continuing contract could only be ended for "just cause." The contract could only be ended after the teacher was given written notice of deficiencies, assistance, and reasonable time for improvement. Evidence against a teacher could only be used if it was promptly brought to the teacher's attention. The hearing was to be held before an attorney selected by both parties. The hearing examiner's decision was final in that there was no appeal to the board or the Commissioner, but the hearing examiner's decision was appealable to district court under the Administrative Procedures and Texas Register Act. More to the point of the current controversy, SB 341 as filed defined "demotion" in an expansive manner: an involuntary reduction of a teacher to a position of lesser rank, responsibility, or compensation, or the reassignment of a teacher outside the scope of the teacher's teaching certificate or major or minor field of study. Any loss of rank, responsibility, or compensation constituted a demotion. All of the procedures for ending a contract described in the preceding paragraph also applied when a teacher was proposed for demotion. Demotion could only occur after just cause was proved at a hearing. Demotion would apply to a change in professional capacity as well as many more situations. SB 341 made it through the Senate in substantially the same form as it was filed. In the House, SB 341 became the TCNA. The House Education Committee passed its substitute for SB 341 with the following language in section 21.204(b). 6The relevant legislative history may be found at the website for the Legislative Reference Library of Texas. http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/index.cfm. 043-RlO-12Il 8 In the event of failure to give such notice of proposed nonrenewal within the time herein specified, the board of trustees shall thereby elect to employ such employee in the same capacity for the succeeding school year. The meaning of the phrase "same capacity" is not defined in the Committee Substitute. "Same capacity" could perhaps be interpreted broadly to mean in a particular case: the fifth grade English teacher at Davis Elementary School. It could perhaps be interpreted strictly to mean any classroom teaching position. When SB 341 was heard by the House on Second Reading an amendment was made to include the word "professional" between the words "same" and "capacity." No definition was added for the phrase "same professional capacity." Barich The Commissioner has on numerous occasions ruled on the issue of whether a particular assignment was in the same professional capacity. There being no statutory definition of "same professional capacity," the Commissioner has described the meaning of the term. The seminal case as to the meaning of the phrase "same professional capacity" is Barich v. San Felipe-Del Rio Consolidated Independent School District, Docket No. 117-R1a-484 (Comm'r Educ. 1985): Petitioner argues that he did not receive an offer of employment in the "same professional capacity," because he was never offered the same position he had held during the 1982-83 school year; i.e., ROTC teacher. It would not be reasonable, however, to conclude that the legislature intended that every teacher who does not receive notice of his or her proposed nonrenewal by April 1 is entitled to be employed in the exact same position the following school year. Such a holding would require a school district to actually begin nonrenewal proceedings by April 1 against every teacher it might conceivably wish to assign to a different position the following year, or face a nonrenewal claim with any reassignment effected after April 1. It is more reasonable to conclude that the legislature, by using the term "same professional capacity" (instead of lithe exact same position''), intended to allow school districts to be flexible in their personnel assignments while discouraging the abuse oj the district's inherent or contractual reassignment authority. In other words, the district may place a teacher whose employment has been renewed by operation of law in a position different from that to which the teacher was assigned the previous year, as long as the position is one to which the 043-RIO-1211 9 district could have reassigned the teacher had the parties voluntarily entered into a contract for the following year. In some instances, the validity of a particular placement will be clear. For example, an administrator who does not receive the required notice by April 1 may not be placed in the capacity of a classroom teacher; a classroom teacher may not be placed in the capacity of a counselor; a counselor may not be placed in the capacity of a nurse; a nurse may not be placed in the capacity of a librarian; etc. In other instances, the validity of a particular placement might not be so clear. For example, a placement might be to another position within the same professional category (e.g., administrator), but nevertheless, be invalid (e.g., from superintendent to assistant elementary school principal). Factors to be considered in determining the validity of such a placement include, but are not necessarily limited to, differences in authority, duties, and salary. In the present case, Petitioner was employed during the 1982-83 school year as an ROTC teacher. The district's offers of employment ranged from the general (i.e., a statement that the district would comply with the Commissioner's Order and that Petitioner should "report to work" at once) to the relatively - - though not completely - - specific (i.e., references to teaching an elementary grade, eighth grade social science, high school psychology, or high school industrial arts). Nevertheless, it is clear - - and Petitioner concedes (Tr. 77-79) - - that, although the district at no time offered to reinstate Petitioner as ROTC teacher, it did offer to place him in a teaching position of some sort. Further, the uncontested testimony is that Petitioner would not suffer any loss of salary due to the placement. (See Finding of Fact No.4). In his Post-Hearing Brief, Petitioner asserts that the other positions "are substantially different, involve different responsibilities, and require different skills." (p. 3). However, Petitioner introduced no evidence which would support this contention. More importantly, no evidence was introduced which would support a holding that it would be improper to reassign an ROTC teacher to one of the positions referred to by the district. Under the circumstances, it is concluded that the school district unconditionally offered Petitioner a position in the "same professional capacity" for the 1983-84 school year and that Petitioner rejected that offer. Petitioner was, therefore, not employed by the district during the 1983-84 school year by choice, and he has no cognizable claim against the district for correctly noting, on March 28, 1983, that he was not then employed by the district, and for advising him that it did not 'intend to employ him during the 1984-85 school year. (Emphasis added) As shown above, the Commissioner's interpretation of the Legislature's intent is supported by the legislative history. As the bill went through the Legislature more flexibility was granted to school districts. The Commissioner held that the first question to be asked to determine whether a reassignment is in the same professional capacity is 043-RI0-1211 10 whether the district could have contracted with the teacher for that position. This results in several conclusions. An administrator cannot be reassigned as a classroom teacher. A classroom teacher cannot be reassigned as a counselor. A counselor cannot be reassigned as a nurse. A nurse cannot be reassigned as a librarian. It should be noted that as the TCNA then read, classroom teacher and counselor were listed as such in the definition of "teacher" found at Texas Education Code section 21.201(1): "Teacher" means a superintendent, principal, supervisor, classroom teacher, counselor or other full-time professional employee, except paraprofessional personnel, who is required to hold a valid certificate or permit. Administrator, nurse, and librarian were not listed as such in the definition of "teacher" found at Texas Education Code section 21.201(1). From the first substantive decision made in the first year the issue could be addressed by the Commissioner, the named positions found at Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) were not held to be professional capacities as the Commissioner used the term "administrator" that is not listed to include superintendents and assistant principals. The Commissioner goes on to find that employing one in the same professional category is not sufficient to constitute same professional capacity in some instances. While a superintendent and an assistant elementary school principal might be in the same professional category of administrator they are not in the same professional capacity because of major distinctions in authority, duties, and salary. The Commissioner acknowledges that other factors could be considered. As to the issue directly presented in Barich, it was found that reassigning an ROTC teacher to another teaching position was valid because the positions were in the same professional capacity. Hester Decided just months after Barich, Hester v. Canadian Independent School District, Docket No. 106-R1-585 (Comm'r Educ. 1985) further sets out what is meant by "same professional capacity." Hester was employed under contract for the position ': 043-RIO-1211 11 teacher/coach. The Commissioner found that Hester was employed in the professional capacity of teacher/coach and that since there was not substantial evidence to support the nonrenewal of his contract that Respondent was required to employ Hester in the same professional of teacher/coach for the next school year. It should be noted that coach was not listed as such in the definition of "teacher" found at Texas Education Code section 21.201 (1). Nonetheless, the Commissioner found that by contract the district had made teacher/coach Hester's professional capacity. How a teacher's contract defines the teacher's professional capacity is significant but not necessarily dispositive. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School District, Docket No. 247-R3-491 (Comm'r Educ. 1991). The Commissioner has held in several cases that a school district is bound by professional capacities such as teacher/coach and teacher/dean that it creates in its contractual relationships. If a school district hires a teacher under a term contract in a particular capacity, even if such capacity is not specifically listed in the definition of "teacher" in the TCNA, the district must rehire the teacher in that capacity for the next school year if the district does not nonrenew the teacher's contract. Progeny of Barich Through the years SInce 1985, the Commissioner has consistently applied the principles enunciated in Barich. Contracted to be a teacher or a coach, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of middle school teacher and high school coach to the position of physical education teacher with scheduling and budgeting responsibilities. Lieberman v. Eagle Mountain-Saginaw Independent School District, Docket No. 192-R3-785 (Comm'r Educ. 1985). Contracted to be Teacher/Coach Football (Head football coach), the district improperly reassigned the employee to a teaching position. Grounds v. Tolar Independent School District, Docket No. 340-R3- 786 (Comm'r Educ. 1986). Contracted to be a teacher and head coach for duties as assigned, the district properly reassigned the employee from teacher and head coach for football, basketball, and track to the position of teacher and head coach for boys' 043-R10-1211 12 basketball. Reyes v. Culberson County Independent School District, Docket No. 229-R3- 787 (Comm'r Educ. 1987). Contracted to be a teacher/coach, the district properly reassigned the employee from being a teacher and football coach to being a teacher and baseball coach. Satcher v. Florence Independent School District, Docket No. 363-R3- 786 (Comm'r Educ. 1987). Contracted to be teachers/deans, the district improperly reassigned the employees from teacher/dean positions to teacher positions. Abbott et al. v. Ector County Independent School District, Docket No. 081-R3-1287, 105-R3-288 (Comm'r Educ. 1991). Contracted for 220 duty days, the district properly reduced duty days to 188 days for the following school year. Marshall v. Seguin Independent School District, Docket No. 177-R1-690 (Comm'r Educ. 1991). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the district wide position of Science Support Specialist to the position of high school assistant principal. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School District, Docket No. 247-R3-491 (Comm'r Educ. 1991). The di strict properly reassigned employee from the position of high school assistant principal to the position of middle school assistant principal. Andrews v. Houston Independent School District, Docket No. 236-RI-897 (Comm'r Educ. 1997). Contracted as a professional employee 7, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of athletic director to the position of teacher/assistant principal. Keith v. Tarkington Independent School District, Docket No. 459-R3-891(Comm'r Educ. 1992). Contracted as teachers, the district's reduction in salary by itself did not place the teachers in different professional capacities. Goedeke v. Smyer Independent School District, Docket No. l11-R3-1292 (Comm'r Educ. 1997). Contracted as teacher/assistant band director, the district improperly reassigned the employee' to a teaching position. Salinas v. Roma Independent School District, Docket No. 058-R3-1196 (Comm'r Educ. 1997). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from 7 Keith does not discuss whether "professional employee" is a legitimate professional capacity. It does not conclude that because the two positions at issue were professional that the reassignment is allowable. Keith simply mentions what the contract at issue states. 043-RI0-1211 13 principal of an independent middle school campus to the position of principal or assistant principal for grades 7 to 9 at a unified junior high/high school campus. Underwood v. Rusk Independent School District, Docket No. 062-R3-198 (Comm'r Educ. 1998). Contracted as a teacher/coach, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of varsity coach and teacher to the position of junior high school coach and teacher. Young v. Leggett Independent School District, Docket No. 17S-R3-898 (Comm'r Educ. 1999). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the district wide position of attendance coordinator to the position of middle school assistant principal. Veliz v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No. OII-R3-999 (Comm'r Educ. 2000). The district properly transferred the employee from one principal position to another. Yturralde v. El Paso Independent School District, Docket No. 001-RIO-900 (Comm'r Educ. 2002). The district properly transferred the employee from the position of high school principal to the position of elementary principal. Ramos v. El Paso Independent School District, Docket No. 002-RI0-900 (Comm'r Educ. 2002). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of high school principal to the position of middle school assistant principal. Pasqua v. Fort Stockton Independent School District, Docket No. 011-R3-1102 (Comm'r Educ. 2004). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from a district-wide Director of Even Start to the position middle school assistant principal. Perales v. Robstown Independent School District, Docket Nos. OS2-RIO-I04, 084-R3-604 (Comm'r Educ. 2006). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from a central office position to an assistant principal position. Sanchez v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No. 075-RIO-60S (Comm'r Educ. 2007). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employees from a central office position to an assistant principal position. Gonzalez v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No. 074-RIO-605 (Comm'r Educ. 2007). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned 043-RIO-1211 14 the employee from a central office position to an assistant principal position. Perez v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No. 086-Rl-705 (Comm'r Educ. 2007). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of Executive Director of Special Education to the position of elementary school assistant principal. Lehr v. Ector County Independent School District, Docket No. 003- R3-0908 (Comm'r Educ. 2011). Contracted as professional employee, the district improperly reassigned the employee from the position of assistant principal to the position of classroom teacher. Wheeler v. Austin Independent School District, Docket No. 008-R3-1108 (Comm'r Educ. 2011). Contracted as a professional employee, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of middle school principal to the position of Human Resources Coordinator. Murillo v. Laredo Independent School District, Docket No. 027-R3-0l08 (Comm'r Educ. 2012). The district properly reassigned the employee from the position of elementary school principal to the position of Program Specialist II. Montgomery v. Richardson Independent School District, Docket No. 007-RlO-1008 (Comm'r Educ. 2012). Contracted as a professional employee, the district improperly reassigned the employee from the position of Career Specialist to the position of teacher. Tuck v. Alief Independent School District, Docket No. 008-RIO-I007 (Comm'r Educ. 2012). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of principal to the position of assistant principal. McCoy v. Kermit Independent School District, Docket No. 004-R3- 0908 (Comm'r Educ. 2012). Administrators As can be seen from the above, a great many of the same professional capacity cases involved administrators. In Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School District, Docket No. 247-R3-491 (Comm'r Educ. 1991) the Commissioner held: The question presented by this appeal is the scope and reach of the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, Texas Education Code section 21.204(b), in the context of the 043-RIO-1211 15 reassignment of those school district personnel coming under its protections. Petitioner would have the Commissioner of Education hold that the phrase "same professional capacity" as used in the TCNA is either defined by or in some way informed by the definition of "teacher" found in § 21.20 I (I) of that Act. I do not believe the statutory language can permit of such an interpretation. Rather, this phrase is left undefined by the statute, and therefore its meaning is a matter for interpretation by the Commissioner, in the first instance, and by the courts. The decisions of the Commissioner (and the courts) have consistently looked to the language of the employment contract itself and attempted to give the parties the benefit of their bargain. In this case, the contract between the parties provides that the position to which Petitioner was entitled was that of a generic "administrator." Petitioner has not proven that hers was a contract of adhesion, which would clearly change the result in this case. It is true that the Commissioner has held that § 21.204(b) limits the right of the district to transfer a term contract teacher. Barich v. San Felipe-Del Rio C1.S.D., Docket No. I 17-Rla-484 (Comm'r Educ. May 1985). It is possible to imagine situations where the transfer clause of an employment contract would be held to be unenforceable under § 21.204(b) 8. However, this is not such a case. It has been the consistent view of the Commissioner that the TCNA balanced its grant of limited tenure rights against the considerable personnel management problems it might cause if imposed int1exibly. Districts have responded to this law by creating broad classes within which transfers do not implicate the TCNA. If taken to extremes, this tactic would be against public policy as expressed in the TCNA, but I cannot make such a finding in this case. The need for flexibility in making personnel changes is strongest, and the argument for a rigid tenure system weakest, at the administrative level. In short, I find the generic "administrator" position before me consistent with the policies of the TCNA. Administrators can often be reassigned to different administrator positions, but that does not mean that they may be assigned to any administrator positions. Districts ,can by contract establish broad professional capacities. However, professional capacities that are too broad will not be allowed. Tuck v. Alief Independent School District, Docket No. 008-RIO-I007 (Comm'r Educ. 2012). Deference If the Commissioner were to decide to issue a new interpretation of "same professional capacity" it would seem to be because his long standing interpretation was incorrect. To determine whether the Commissioner's interpretation is correct, some 8 The old Texas Education Code section 21.204 is the predecessor of the current Texas Education Code section 21 .206. 043-RI0-1211 16 cannons of statutory interpretation will be considered. The standards for deferring to an agency's interpretation have been set by the Texas Supreme Court: If there is vagueness, ambiguity, or room for policy determinations in a statute or regulation, as there is here, we normally defer to the agency's interpretation unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the statute, regulation, or rule. See Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Gulf States Uti/so Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1991); Stanfordv. Butler, 142 Tex. 692,181 S.W.2d 269, 273 (Tex. 1944). TGS-NOPEC Geophysical v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). There is ambiguity about what the phrase "same professional capacity" means. The phrase is not defined in statute and is susceptible to multiple interpretations. The Commissioner's interpretation should be deferred to. Further, as the Commissioner's interpretation is a long standing interpretation, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence applies: If an ambiguous statute that has been interpreted by a court of last resort or given a longstanding construction by a proper administrative officer is re-enacted without substantial change, the Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with that interpretation and to have adopted it. See Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v. Md. Lloyds Ins. Co., 35 S.W.3d 1, 5,43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1086 (Tex. 2000) (Once the Texas Supreme Court and courts of appeals "construe a statute and the Legislature re-enacts or codifies that statute without substantial change, we presume that the Legislature has adopted the judicial interpretation. "); Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 248, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 652 (Tex. 1991) ("'[A] statute of doubtful meaning that has been construed by the proper administrative officers, when re-enacted without any substantial change in verbiage, will ordinarily receive the same construction. I This rule is only applicable where there has been an affirmative long-standing administrative policy.") (quoting Humble Oil & Ref Co. v. Calvert, 414 S.W.2d 172, 180, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 254 (Tex. 1967)); Tex. Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 196 S.W.2d 390,395 (Tex. 1946) ("There is another well-settled rule to guide us in the construction of a statute which is uncertain and ambiguous ... : 'Where a statute which has been construed, either by a court of last resort or by executive officers, is re-enacted without any substantial change of verbiage, it will continue to receive the same construction. III) 043-RI0-1211 17 Tex. Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Services v. Mage Child Care, 145 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Tex. 2004). The Commissioner's interpretation is long standing. It goes back over one-quarter century. It has been repeatedly affirmed. The statute at issue has been amended multiple times since the Commissioner has issued his interpretation. The TCNA has been amended by the Legislature in 1990, 1995, 2003 , and 2011. Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, 71 51 Leg. 61h C.S ., ch. 1 § 3.14, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (allowing the hearing to be heard by a board designated impartial hearing officer); Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, 74th Leg. R.S., ch. 260 ch. 21 subch. E and F, 1995 Tex. Gen. Law 2207 (making many changes including modifying the definition of "teacher" and allowing boards to use the Independent Hearing Examiner Process); Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, 78 th Leg R.S., ch. 484 § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1749 (concerning distribution of district employment policies); 82 nd Leg. 15t C.S., ch. 8 §§ 8-11 , 2011 Tex. Gen Laws 5463 (allowing districts to hire their own hearing examiners and making several changes concerning notice). The Legislature has acquiesced in the Commissioner's interpretation of the phrase "same professional capacity. " Must Principal be a Professional Capacity? Petitioner contends that her theory that a principal may only be reassigned to another principal position is compatible with Barich although she does recognize that it would require overruling other Commissioner's Decisions. Petitioner's theory rests on the premise that because the definition of "teacher" found in the TCNA references the position "principal" that "principal" is a professional capacity. Petitioner's theory is not compatibie with Barich. Under Barich, the first question is could the teacher contract for the position at issue. A principal can contract for an assistant principal position as a principal certificate is needed for either a principal or assistant principal position. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 241(d). The next question is that even if the position could be contracted for are differences in authority, duties, salary and 043-RIO-1211 18 other factors so great that the reassignment is actually in another professional capacity. This second consideration is set out right after the issue of reassigning a superintendent to the position of assistant elementary principal is raised. Texas Education Code section 21.201 (1) in the original TCNA read as follows: "Teacher" means a superintendent, principal, supervisor, classroom teacher, counselor or other full-time professional employee, except paraprofessional personnel, who is required to hold a valid certificate or permit. If Petitioner's theory was compatible with Barich, the Commissioner would have said the determination of whether a superintendent may be reassigned to the position of elementary school assistant principal is a simple issue, not an issue that is "not. .. so clear." Under Petitioner's theory, since "superintendent" is found in the definition of 21.201 (l), "superintendent" is a professional capacity. The result would be that a superintendent cannot be reassigned to any position that is not a superintendent position. There would be no reason to apply the standards set out in Barich to determine whether a superintendent could be reassigned to an assistant principal position. Petitioner's theory does have the virtue of simplicity. If a position is named in the definition of "teacher" any reassignment would have to be in that same position. However, it would be just as simple to apply the rule that if one holds an administrator's position one can be reassigned to any administrator's position. The Commissioner's solution is more complex than Petitioner's theory, but is more faithful to the statute at issue. If the Legislature intended "same professional capacity" to mean any position listed in the definition of "teacher," the Legislature would have said so. Instead, the Legislature used an undefined phrase that it intended the Commissioner to interpret using his experience in how schools operate. The Commissioner has consistently done so since the first opportunity to interpret the phrase at issue. 043-RlO-1211 19 Like a Superintendent? There are no Commissioner's Decisions that directly address whether a superintendent may be reassigned to another position. There is no Commissioner's Decision that finds that a superintendent was improperly reassigned. While Barich holds that a superintendent cannot be reassigned to the position of assistant elementary school principal, Barich was not a superintendent and was not reassigned to an assistant principal position. There is a pre-TCNA case, Board of Trustees of Crystal City Independent School District v. Briggs, 486 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e), which determined that a reassignment from superintendent to teacher was not allowed: Briggs was hired as superintendent of the public schools; under the statute, it is clear that there is a vast difference in the position of superintendent of a district answerable only to the Board of Trustees and that of a teacher in the schools. §§ 16.07, 16.08 Education Code. The court in Briggs found the fact that a superintendent was only answerable to the board of trustees to be highly significant. In the recent case of Lehr v. Ector County Independent School District, Docket No. 003-R3-0908 (Comm'r Educ. 2011), the issue was raised whether it was appropriate to reassign the Executive Director of Special Education to the position of assistant principal. The Commissioner held: The change in positions is unlike the move from superintendent to assistant principal described in Barich. A superintendent according to statute is "the educational leader and chief executive officer of the school district." TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.201(a). The position of superintendent is sui generis. There is no administrator position that compares to it. The position of Executive Director of Special Education is not mentioned in the Texas Education Code. In fact, the certification mentioned in the job description for the position is "midmanagement/supervisor" is no longer awarded. 9 Currently, the only 9 Hence, it is a good thing that the job description allows for alternative qualifications. While those who received midmanagement and supervisor certifications retain them, it is not perhaps wise to limit employment to those who have achieved a certification that is no longer issued. 043-RIO-1211 20 certifications for administrator are superintendent and principal. lO There is no certification that an Executive Director of Special Education is required to hold under the Texas Education Code or the rules adopted under the code. Here like in Briggs, the Commissioner noted that the position of superintendent is unique. A superintendent is the chief executive officer of a school district. It almost goes without saying that a superintendent is answerable only to the board of trustees. Only the board of trustees has the authority to direct a superintendent. It is not the fact that the Texas Education Code specifies many of the superintendent's duties and creates unique procedures to nonrenew a superintendent's contract that makes the superintendent's role sui generis. TEX. EDUC. CODE §§ 11.201, 21.212. It is instead the fact the superintendent is only answerable to the school board as the chief executive officer of the school district that makes the office of superintendent sui generis. Petitioner is correct that principals have many duties spelled out in the Texas Education Code. This does not make the position of principal sui generis. That the Texas Education Code defines many duties of a principal makes the principal position a well defined species. It does not make the principal position a genus all to itself. A principal is answerable to the superintendent and often to other high administrators such as deputy and assistant superintendents. A principal is answerable to the school board as the school board can nonrenewal or terminate a principal's contract. Further, while there is a principal certification, it is required for both being a principal and an assistant principal. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 241 (d). That the same training is required to be either a principal or an assistant principal is a further indication that the position of principal is not sui generis. It is true that one who holds a superintendent' s certificate also is qualified to hold the positions of principal and assistant principal. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 242.1 (d). It is not surprising that the training required to be a superintendent would also prepare one to a principal or an assistant principal. But a superintendent is required to have more than a principal's certificate. 10 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ch . 241 and 242. All other administrator certifications were not issued after 2000 . 043-R10-1211 21 One who holds only a principal's certificate is not qualified to be a superintendent. A superintendent's certificate requires significantly more training than a principal's certificate. When a principal is reassigned, a school district is not limited to assigning the principal to another principal position. Underwood v. Rusk Independent School District, Docket No. 062-R3-l98 (Comm'r Educ. 1998), Pasqua v. Fort Stockton Independent School District, Docket No. 011-R3-1102 (Comm'r Educ. 2004), Murillo v. Laredo Independent School District, Docket No. 027-R3-0108 (Comm'r Educ. 2012), Montgomery v. Richardson Independent School District, Docket No. 007-R10-l008 (Comm'r Educ. 2012), and McCoy v. Kermit Independent School District, Docket No. 004-R3-0908 (Comm'r Educ. 2012). Present Reassignment In the present case, Petitioner was reassigned from the position of principal of an intermediate school to the position of assistant principal of a high school. There is little in the record that indicates what duties Petitioner had at those two positions. The record does not demonstrate that applying the Commissioner's precedent as to what is the "same professional capacity" results in a conclusion that the two positions were in different professional capacities. However, Petitioner has not raised this issue. Petitioner's claim is not that in her particular circumstance, comparing authority, duties, compensation and other relevant factors, the two positions were in separate professional capacities. Petitioner's claim is that a principal may only be reassigned to another principal position. This is not the law. As the two positions are not shown to be in different professional capacities, Respondent did not violate Texas Education Code section 21.206. Possible Consequences Petitioner contends that if the Commissioner does not to change his interpretation of "same professional capacity" this could lead to a situation where a school district could reassign a principal to a position that does not require a chapter 21 contract and then make the principal an at-will employee for the following school year. It should be noted 043-Rl0-1211 22 that this is not the situation the Commissioner is presented with in this case. After her reassignment Petitioner retains a chapter 21 contract. But assuming without finding that this issue was properly raised, there are at least two major problems with this claim. Petitioner chose not to contest her reassignment under Commissioner's precedent but instead to solely argue that she could only be reassigned to a principal's position. Whether or not Respondent reassignment meets the Commissioner's standards has not been contested or ruled upon. Not contesting a reassignment based on the standards previously established by the Commissioner could result in not receiving a Chapter 21 contract, but the fault would not be with the Commissioner's interpretation of Chapter 21. Further, the case Petitioner relies on Harris v. Royse City Independent School District, Docket No. OS7-R1-0S06 (Comm. Educ. 2009) had a very different fact situation. Harris began his employment with Royse City Independent School District by signing a contract for a non-certified administrator position that provided for renewal or nonrenewal under chapter 21 of the Texas Education Code. This is not the type of contract that Petitioner holds. Petitioner in her original assignment and her reassignment was required to hold a principal's certificate. Conclusion The Petition for Review should be dismissed in part and denied in part. In many cases, principals may be assigned to other administrative positions. In the present case, it is determined that Petitioner was properly reassigned in the same professional capacity. Conclusions of Law After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed, and the foregoing Findings of Fact, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education, I make the following Conclusions of Law: 1. The Commissioner, under Texas Education Code section 7.0S7(a)(2)(A), has jurisdiction over the claims that Respondent violated Texas Education Code section 043-RIO-1211 23 21.206(b) and based on such a violation also violated Texas Education Code section 11.20 and 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 150.1021. 2. The Commissioner, under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(A), lacks jurisdiction over violations of school district policies. 3. The Commissioner, under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(A), lacks jurisdiction over the claim Respondent violated its policy FN(LOCAL). 4. A superintendent does not violate Texas Education Code 11.20 1(d) when a superintendent poorly exercises an authority granted by this section. 5. The Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over the claim that Respondent's superintendent arbitrarily and capriciously reassigned her in violation of Texas Education Code section 11.201(d) TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(a)(2)(A). 6. If a school district fails to timely give a teacher notice of proposed nonrenewal when the teacher's contract is about to expire, the school district is required to employ the teacher in the "same professional capacity" for the following school year. A requirement to employ a teacher in the "same professional capacity" for the following school year is triggered only when a contract is about to expire and timely notice of proposed nonrenewal is not given. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.206(b). 7. Petitioner's claim that Respondent failed to employ her in the same professional capacity is ripe only as to the 2011-2012 school year. 8. One can be entitled to the protections of Texas Education Code Chapter 21, subchapter E based solely on a contract or district policy. One does not need to hold a position described in the first sentence of Texas Education Code section 2l.20 1(1) to be entitled to a Chapter 21 term contract. 9. The positions described in the first sentence of Texas Education Code section 2l.201(1) mayor may not be professional capacities for purposes of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b). 043-RI0-1211 24 10. The fact that the position of "principal" is listed in the first sentence of Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) does not mean that if one is employed by a school district as a principal under a term contract that one is employed under the professional capacity of principal. TEX. Eouc. CODE § 21.206(b). 11. A contract can establish a teacher's professional capacity under Texas Education Code section 21.206(b) if the professional capacity is not impermissibly broad. Whether a professional capacity is impermissibly broad is determined by comparing differences in authority, duties, and salary and other relevant factors. In many cases, a professional capacity of "administrator" will not be impermissibly broad for a reassignment. 12. Petitioner's professional capacity under Texas Education Code section 21.206(b) is administrator. 13. As Petitioner did not contest that her contractual professional capacity of administrator is impermissibly broad under the standards set out in Conclusion of Law No. 11, Petitioner has not raised this issue. 14. As the fact that a term contract employee is employed in a principal position does not make the employee's professional capacity "principal," Respondent did not improperly reassign Petitioner to a non-principal position in violation of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b). 15. Respondent did not reassign Petitioner in violation of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b) 16. The Petition for Review should be denied in part and dismissed in part. 043-RIO-1211 25 After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed and the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in my capacity as Commissioner of Edcuation, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petitioner's appeal be, and is hereby, denied in part and dismissed in part. I nft--- (1 SIGNED AND ISSUED this ~ day of~ , 2013. 043-RlO-1211 26 Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 2 CAUSE NO. D-I-GN-14-006I9 HERMENIA JENKINS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, § § v. § TRA VIS COUNTY, TEXAS CROSBY INDEPENDENT § § ofiravl 5 DIstrIct court flied In ~hOcounty, jellallcd SCHOOL DISTRlCT and § fr.S 26 20\5 MICHAEL 1. WILLIAMS § /Ojl..o bJI.. THE STATE COMMISSIONER § At_ -O\strict Clerk Vel~a L. Price, OF EDUCA nON, § Defendants. § 200'h JUDICIAL DISTRICT FINAL JUDGMENT On December 4, 2014, came to be heard and considered the cause of Plaintiffs suit for judicial review of an administrative decision of the Texas Commissioner of Education issued in Texas Education Agency Docket No. 043-RlO-1211. Having considered the administrative record, pleadings, briefs, and arguments of counsel, the Court affinns the Commissioner's decision. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision is affinned. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all taxable costs of court are assessed against the party who incurred them; that all remedies not specifically granted herein are denied; and that this judgment disposes of all claims and all parties and is final and appealable. SIGNED on this 7jJ;~ of fv\oiW.otl~ ,2015. THE~ARKMEACHUM Page I of2 Approved as to fonn: Kevin F. Lungwitz State Bar No. 12698790 The Lungwitz Law Firn" p.e. 3005 S. Lamar Blvd., Suite 0·109-362 Austin, Texas 78704-4785 Phone: (512) 461-0J 88 Fax: (866) 739·7138 kcvin(~lllng'vitzlnw.conl FOR PLAINTIFF HERMENIA JENKINS Davf;A~/~ State Bar No. 09775530 - Rebecca B. Weimer Slate Bar No. 24062597 Thompson & Horton LLP 3200 Southwest Freeway, Suite 2000 Houston. Texas 77027 Phone: (713) 554-6745 Fax: (713) 583-824S dhl)dginsqljlhompsonhurtun.cuill rwcill1erlf:lj.lhllmpS(~nhorlon.cl\ln FOR DEFENDANT CROSS Y ISD ~~ndrew lutostanski Assistant Attorney General State Bar No. 24072217 Office of the Attorney General of Texas Administrative Law Division P.O. Box J2548. Austin. Texas 78711-2548 Phone: (5 t2) 475-4200 Fax: (512) 320-0167 . :1ndrcw.lutostunski@lcxasatlorncygcncrul.gov FOR DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER Pae:e 2 of:2. Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 3 DOCKET NO. 027·R3·0108 l~m . DA MURILLO * § BEfORE THE § § v. § COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION § § LAREDO § IN DEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STJI TE or TEXAS DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER Statement or the Case Petitioner, Imelda Murillo. complains of actions and decisions of Respondent , Laredo Independent School District. Christopher Maska is the Admi nistrati ve Law Judge appoi nted by the Commissioner of Education to preside over this cause. Petitioner' is represented by Mark W. Robinett. I\((011lcy at Law, Austin, Texas. Respondent is represented by .I. hancisco Tamez, AU-orney at Law, Laredo. Texas. The Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommendin g, Ibm Petitioner's appeal be dismissed in part and denied in pan. Exceptions and replies were timely HIed and considered. Findings of Fact After due consideration of the record and maHer:; officially noticed, it is concluded that the following Find ings of Fact arc supported by substantial evidence and arc the Findings of' Fact that best support Respondent's decision I. I. Petitioner was employed under a chapter 21, subchapter E term contract lor the 2006-2007 sc hool year. Petitioner was employed as a midd le schoo l principal fur thc lirS! pari of the 2()06·2007 school year. 2. On Apri l \7, 2007, Petitioner signed a chapter 21. subchapter E term contract with Respondent for the 2007-2008 school year. This was a 12-mol1lh contract '!! 19 TEx. Al:lMIN. (()DE § 157. 107 J(h); BOlWlJrlh I SC II. [(W Cemyal'ndependl1n1 School D i.l"fricl. Docket N(1 090-R I -M03 (Comm'r Edu~ . 2003). 1l27·R3·0t08 Tf.o..SB with a beginning date of July 2, 2007, 'Ilte contract states that il is "For Professional Employee" but docs nol f1ll1her specify what Petitioner's duties will be . 3. On June 21. 2007, Petitioner was informed that effective immediately shl.· was reassigned to the position of Human Resources Coordinator, This event occurred during the 2007·2008 school year. 4. June 27. 2007, Petitioner requested a Level I conference on her grievance which included claims thai Respondent changed her professional captlcity in violatioll of Texas Edllcation Code section 21.206 and demoted her. Discussion Petitioner contends that Respondent changed her professional capacity In violation of'Texas Education Code seclion 21.206 and demoted her. Change of Professional Capacity Petitioner contends that Respondellt changed her professiollal capacity from principal 10 Human Resources Coordinator in violation of Texas Educafion Codc section 21.206; (a) Not later than the 45th day before the last day of instruction in a school year, the board of trustees shall notify in writing each teacher whose contract is about to expire whether the board proposes to renew or not renew the contract. (b) The board's failure to give the notice required by Subsection (a) within the time speci tied constitutes an election to employ the teacher in tbe same pro fessional capacity for the following school year. Petitioner had a term contract for the 2006·2007 school year. Petitioner was not proposed for nonrcnewal at the end of the 2006·2007 school year . Therefore, Respondent was required to employ Petitioner during the 2007-2008 school year in same pmfessional capacity as she was employed during the 2006-2007 school year. During the 2006·2007 school year Petitioner was employed both a<; a middle school principal and as the Human Resources Coordinator. Petitioner contends that Respondent had to cmploy her as a principal for the 2007·2008 school ycar. 027·RJ·OI08 2 TASS The basis fo r the claim that Respondent wo uld have to employ Petitioner for the 2007·2008 school year in only one of the positions Pet itioner held under her 2006-2007 contract is no! clea r. A sc.:hool dist rict docs nOl violate Texas Educati on Code section 21 .206 when a term contract expires wi thout notice of proposed nonrenewa l and the di:-;Iricr empl oys the teac her in a position lor the next school year that Ihc= teacher held undcr the contract during the prev ious schoo l year. If a teacher holds the same position in both school years. the teacher's proressional capacity has not c hanged. Because Respondent employed Pet iti oner lor the 2007-2008 school in ft position that Petitio ner held under her 2006·2007 contract, Respondent did not violate Texas Ed uca tion Code st:ction 21.206. Oemotion Pt:titioner con tends that she was demoted. The Texas Education Code does O{lt generally prohibit districts from demoting teachers. But the Commissioner may hllve jurisdiction over a claim that a school has demoted a teacher in violation of the teacher's written contract. TEX . EDUC. CODE § 7.057(a)(2)(B). However, violations of some sections or the Texas Education Codc could also rcsult in a demotio n. for exampl e. if mid-year a d istrict decided to pay teachers less than required by Texas Education Code ~cction 21.402. the Minimum Salary Schedule, this could be both a vio lation of school laws of th is state clOd a demotion in vio lati on of a contract. Since, Petitioner rai ls to cite lu a statute that may have been violated as to hcr clai m or demotion . the issue fur the Commissioner to decide is whether a demotion occurred that violated Pe titione r's written employmen t coni rae\. As noted above, Petitioner's cbange in positions occurred during the 2006-2007 school year. Pet itioner's 2006-2007 contract is not io thc record nor is thc re signi fi ca nt discussion of the contract. Petitioner has failed to indicate in pleading and brieling what provision of Pctit ioner's 2006-2007 contract may have been vioh\ted. Whi le the 2007. 2008 contract is in the record, Petitioner ha.o; fai led to indieale in pleading and briefing 027-KJ ·OI OR J TASS which provision or this contract may have been violated. As Petitioner has fuiled to specify which provision or Petitioner' s contract that Respondent may have violated , the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's demotion claim. Conclusion Respondent did not violate Texas Education Code section 21.206. Th~ Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's demotion claim. Conclusions of La\¥ Aller duc consideration of the record, mailers officially noticed , and the foregoing Findings of Pact, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education, I make the following Conclusions ofl.aw: I. The Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over this cause under Texas Education Code section 7.0S7{a)(2)(A). 2. 'l'hc Commissioner of Education lacks jurisdiction over this cause under Tcxas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(B). J. A demotion claim is normally brought under Texas Education Code sl.!ction 7.057(a)(2)(8) because there is no general prohibition to demotions under the school laws ofthis state. 4. Petitioner's demotion claim is a contract claim. 5. Because Petitioner has lailed the identify a potential violation of her written employment contract that causcs or would cause monetary harnl in connection with hcr demotion claim, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner' s dcmotion Claim. fi. Texas Education Code section 21.206 requires a school district that docs not propose the nonrcncwal of an expiring term contract to employ the teacher ill the same professional capacity for the following school year. 017· RJ·0 I08 4 7. A school district does nOl violate Texas Education Code section 21.206 whcn a term contract expircs without notice of proposcd nonrenewal and the district employs the tcacher in a position for the next school year that {he teacher held under the contract during tbe previous schoo l year. 8. Because Respondent emp loyed Petitioner for the 2007~2008 school year in a position that Petitioner held undcr her 2006·2007 contract, Responden! did not vio late Texas Education Code section 21.206. 9. The Pl:tition for Review should be dismissed in part and denied in part. A ner due consideration of the record. matters officially noticed and the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education, it is hercby ORDERED that the Petitioner's appeal be. and is hereby, dismissed in part and denied in part. ,.-rl'h SIGNED AND ISSUED this ~Cday of ~ , 2012. ROBERTscon COMM ISSIONER OF EDUCA nON 027-RJ-U I OR 5 Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 4 DOCKET NO. 093-R8-805 TAJUANA HOLMAN § BEFORE TflE V. ~§ COMMISS IONER OF EDUCATION § ARP INDEPENDENT § SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STATE OF TEXAS DECISION OF THE DESIGNEE OF THE COMMISIONER Statement of the Case Petitioner, Tajuann Holman. appeals the action of Respondent, Arp Independent School District, concerning her grievance. Christopher Maska is the Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Commissioner of Education. Petitioner appeared pro se, Respondent is represented by John C. Hardy, Attorney at Law, Tyler, Texas. The Administrative Law Judge issu~d a Proposal for Decision recommending that Petitioner's appeal be dismissed. No exceptions were filed. Findings of Fact The foHowi ng Findings of Fact are not disputed: 1. Respondent has established a uniform policy only for its middle school. 2. None of Petitioner's children are currently attending Respondent's middle school. Petitioner contends that Respondent should grant an exception to the school uniform policy. Respondent maintains thar the issue is not ripe. Ripeness Respondent has adopted a school uniform policy under Texas Education Code section 11 .162 for its middle school. This provision of the Education Code allows parents to opt oul of a uniform requirement if the parent states a bona fide religious or philosophical objection to uniforms. TEX. Eouc. CODE § 11.162(c). Petitioner has no N093-RS-S05 -\- TASS children al the Arp Middle School Ihis year bUI next year it is likely that one of her children may attend Arp Middle SchooL A case is ripe if there is a concrete injury, a remote injury is not sufficient. Waco Indcp. Sell. Di.r/. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 85 1- 852 (Tex. 2000). Ripeness is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. Jd. This case is not ripe because it is uncertain whether Arp Middle School will have a uniform policy next year and it is not certain that Respondent' s child will be attending Arp Middle School next year. Although it is likely that the chi ld will be attending the middle school, such events as Ihe family moving out of district could occur. For these reasons, this case is not ripe. Conclusion This case should be dismissed because it is not ripe. Conclusions of Law After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed. and the foregoing Findings of Fact, in my capacity as designee of the Commissioner of Education, I make the following Conclusions of Law: 1. TIle Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to hear this cause under Texas Education Code section 7.057. 2. Ripeness is a component of subject matter jurisdiction. 3. Because Petitioner's children are I\ot currently affected by Respondent's uniform policy. this case is not ripe. 4, This case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 19 TEX. Am.iIN. CooE§ 157.1056(0}. #093-RS-S05 -2- TASS ORDER After due consideration of the record. matters officially noticed and the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. in my capacity as designee of the Commissioner, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner's appeal be, and is hereby. DISMISSED. SIGNED AND ISSUED this..2I1Jl 'doy of ;\0.11'1 ...... ,2007. ROBERT SCOTT CHIEF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BY DESIGNATION N093-R8-805 -3- TASS Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 5 DOCKET NO. 113-Rl0-0812 PEGGY GUSTAPSON BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION CANUTILLO § INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STATE OF TEXAS DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER Statement of the Case Petitioner, Peggy Gustafson, appeals the denial of her grievance by Respondent, Canutillo Independent School District. Christopher Maska is the Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Commissioner of Education to preside over this cause, Petitioner is represented by Jorge Luis Rivas, Jr., Attorney at Law. El Paso, Texas. Respondent is represented by Steven J. Blanco and Jerry R. Wallace, Attorneys at Law, El Paso, Texas. The Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommending thar Petitioner’s appeal be denied in part and dismissed in part. Exceptions and replies were timely filed and considered. Findina of Fact After due consideration of the record and matters officially noticed, it is concluded that the following Findings of Fact are supported by substantial evidence and are the Findings of Fact that best support Respondent’s decision’. 1. Petitioner was employed by Respondent under a two year term contract for the 2011-2012 through the 2012-2013 school years for an administrator position. 2. Petitioner served as the principal of the Northwest Early College High School from January 2008 until June, 7,2011. 3, On June 7, 2011, Petitioner was reassigned as assistant principal for the Canutillo Elementary School. See 19 TEX. ADMIN, CoDE 157.1073(h): Bosworrh i’. East Central Independent School District, Docket No. 090-Ri-803 (Comm’r Ethic. 2003). 113-R3-0812 4. Petitioner earned the same salary for the 2011-2012 school year as she had earned for the 2010-201 1 school year. which was $78,600. However, under Respondent’s salary schedule Petitioner’s salary for the 201 1-2012 school year should have been S68,40&84. Discussion Petitioner asserts that Respondent improperly reassigned her and demoted her. Petitioner makes three claims: that she was not reassigned in the same professional capacity, that she was transferred from a principal to an assistant principal position and that the position had a lesser pay, and that the transfer violates certain statutes. Respondent contends that Petitioner’s new position is in the same professional capacity, Respondent also contends that the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over some of Petitioner’s claims. Jurisdiction The Petition for Review alleges that Respondent violated the Texas Whistleblower Act and Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2) the Commissioner has jurisdiction over violations of the “school laws of this state” and violations of certain written employment contracts. The “school laws of this state” are defined as the first two titles of the Texas Education Code and the rules adopted under those titles, TEx. Eouc, CoDE § 7,057(fX2). The Texas Whistleblower Act and the Texas Labor Code do not meet the definition of the “school laws of this state.” The Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over the Texas \Vhistleblower Act and the Texas Labor Code under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(A). In many cases, statutes existing when contracts are entered into are incorporated into the contracts. C’eniral Education Agency v. George West Indep. Sch. Dist. 783 S .W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1989). However, as the Commissioner held in Barborak v. Oalcwood Independent School District, Docket No. 224-R3-797 (Comm’r Educ, 1999), when a statute is incorporated into a contract, the whoLe statute including the enforcement mechanism is incorporated. That enforcement mechanism must be exhausted before a case I 13-R10-0812 can be brought to the Commissioner. As Petitioner has not exhausted the statutory enforcement mechanisms, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(B) over Petitioner’s claims under the Texas Whistleblower Act and the Texas Labor Code. Same Professional Capacity As a practical matter, it is very likely that if one is transferred from a principal position to an assistant principal position. that under the school district’s salary schedule one will be earning a lesser salary. So while this case cannot be viewed as solely asserting that a principal cannot be transferred to an assistant principal position, it is very similar to such a case. Must Principals Remain Principals Petitioner argues that if a principal’s contract is not nonrenewed. that a school district is limited to reassigning a principal to another principal position for the next school year. Petitioner does not argue that comparing the particular duties and responsibilities of the two positions leads to the conclusion that the two positions are not in the same professional capacity. Petitioner argues that the only position that is in the same professional capacity of a principal is the position of principal. Petitioner’s argument would require Commissioner’s precedent to be overturned. Precedent should not be lightly overturned. Teachers and school districts base important decisions in reliance on Commissioner’s Decisions. But the fundamental principle of statutory construction is to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. If the Commissioner’s long standing interpretation of the statute is in conflict with the intention of the Legislature. the Commissioner’s interpretation should change. TCNA I 13-RIO-0812 The Term Contract Nonrenewal Act 2 (“TCNA”) was passed by the 67 th Legislature in 1981g. Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, th 67 Leg., R.S,, ch, 765, 1981 Tex. Gen Laws. This law fundamentally changed teacher 4 contracts. Before the TCNA many districts hired teachers and administrators on one-year contracts. When the contract term expired, the district was not required to offer a contract for the new school year. Seferr i Lingleville Indep. Sc/i. Dist., 692 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Tex. 1985). Prior to the passage of the TCNA, school districts were not required to establish policy reasons for ending a contractual relationship, to give teachers the reasons why ending the contractual relationship was proposed, and to provide teachers with the opportunity for a hearing where the administration had the burden of proof to show that the teacher’s contract should be nonrenewed. A key passage of the TC?’A, that was then numbered section 21.204, required a district that did not nonrenew a teacher’s contract to hire the teacher for the next school year: Hearing (a) In the event the board of trustees receives a recommendation for nonrenewal. the board after consideration of written evaluations required by Section 21.202 of this subchapter and the reasons for the recommendation, shall in its sole discretion, either reject the recommendation or shall give the teacher written notice of the proposed nonrenewal on or before April 1 proceeding the end of the employment fixed in the contract. (b, In the event offailure to give such notice ofproposed nonrene wa! within the time herein specUied, the board shall thereby elect to employ such employee in the same professional capacityfor the succeeding school year. (c) The notice of proposed nonrenewal required in this Section shall contain a statement of all the reasons for such proposed action. (Emphasis added). If a teacher’s contract was not nonrenewed. the school board was not only required to hire the teacher for the next school year but also to employ the teacher in 2 Section 1 of SB 341 itself provided that “this act shall be known as “The Term Contract Nonreriewal Act. ’ 4 The TCNA became effective on August 31, 1981. However, because most contracts for the 1981-1982 school year had already been signed by that date, the TCNA really became operational for the 1982-1983 school year. That makes the 1984-1985 school year, the first time the issue of whether a teacher was rehired in the same professional capacity could actually be raised. From the beginning, the TCNA has used an expansive definition of “teacher” that includes many who are not normally referred to as teachers. 1 13-R1O-0812 4 the same professional capacity for the next school year. The fundamental dispute in this case is over the meaning of the phrase “same professional capacity.” Legislative History The legislative history of the TCNA 5 sheds some light on the meaning of the phrase “same professional capacity. Senate Bill 341 created the TCNA. As originally filed SB 341 was far more ambitious than the TCNA which became law. Under SB 341 as filed, a term or continuing contract could only be ended for “just cause.” The contract could only be ended after the teacher was given written notice of deficiencies, assistance, and reasonable time for improvement. Evidence against a teacher could only be used if it was promptly brought to the teacher’s attention. The hearing was to be held before an attorney selected by both parties. The hearing examiner’s decision was final in that there was no appeal to the board or the Commissioner, but the hearing examiner’s decision was appealable to district court under the Administrative Procedures and Texas Register Act. More to the point of the current controversy, SB 341 as filed defined “demotion” in an expansive manner: an involuntary reduction of a teacher to a position of lesser rank. responsibility, or compensation. or the reassignment of a teacher outside the scope of the teacher’s teaching certificate or major or minor field of study. Any loss of rank, responsibility, or compensation constituted a demotion. All of the procedures for ending a contract described in the preceding paragraph also applied when a teacher was proposed for demotion. Demotion could only occur after just cause was proved at a hearing. SB 341 made it through the Senate in substantially the same form as it was filed. In the House, SB 341 became the TCNA. The House Education Committee passed its substitute for SB 341 with the following language in Section 21.204(b). The relevant legislative history may be found at the website for the Legislative Reference Library of Texas. h//vywJrLtate.tx.usiindex.cfrn. ll3-RlOO8l2 In the event of failure to give such notice of proposed nonrenewal within the time herein specified, the board of trustees shall thereby elect to employ such employee in the same capacity for the succeeding school year. The meaning of the phrase “same capacity” is not defined in the Committee Substitute. “Same capacity” could perhaps be interpreted broadly to mean in a particular case: the fifth grade English teacher at Davis Elementary School. It could perhaps be interpreted strictly to mean any classroom teaching position. When SB 341 was heard by the House on Second Reading an amendment was made to include the word “professional” between the words “same” and “capacity.” No definition was added for the phrase “same professional capacity” Bunch The Commissioner has on numerous occasions ruled on the issue of whether a particular assignment was in the same professional capacity. There being no statutory definition of “same professional capacity,” the Commissioner has described the meaning of the term. The seminal case as to the meaning of the phrase “same professional capacity” is Bunch v. San Feiipe-Del Rio Consolidated Independent School District, Docket No. I 17-Rla-484 (Comm’r Educ. 1985): Petitioner argues that he did not receive an offer of employment in the ‘same professional capacity,” because he was never offered the same position he had held during the 1982-83 school year; i.e., ROTC teacher. It would not be reasonable, however, to conclude that the legislature intended that every teacher who does not receive notice of his or her proposed nonrenewal by April I is entitled to be employed in the exact same position the following school year. Such a holding would require a school district to actually begin nonrenewal proceedings by April 1 against every teacher it might conceivably wish to assign to a different position the following year, or face a nonrenewal claim with any reassignment effected after April 1. It is more reasonable to conclude that the legislature, by using the term “same professional capacity” ünstead of “the exact same position ‘), intended to allow school dLctricts to be flexible in their personnel assignments while discouraging the abuse of the district’s inherent or contraclual reassignment authority, In other words, the district may place a teacher whose employment has been renewed by operation of law in a position dftrent from that to which the 113-RIO-0812 6 teacher was assigned the previous year, as long as the position is one to which the district could have reassigned the teacher had the parties voluntarily eiitc’red into a contract for the following year. In some instances, the validity of a particular placement will be clear. For example, an administrator who does not receive the required notice by April 1 may not be placed in the capacity ofa classroom teacher; a classroom teacher may not be placed in the capacity ofa counselor; a counselor may not be placed in the capacity of a nurse; a nurse may not be placed in the capacity ofa librarian; etc. In other instances, the validity of a particular placement might not be so clear. For example, a placement might be to another position within the same professional category (e.g., administrcilorj, but nevertheless, be invalid (e.g., from superintendent to assistant elementwy school princmal,). Factors to be considered in determining the validity of such ci placement include, but are not necessarily limited to, differences in au(hority, duties, and sala,y, In the present case, Petitioner was employed during the 1982-83 school year as an ROTC teacher, The district’s offers of employment ranged from the general (i.e., a statement that the district would comply with the Commissioner’s Order and that Petitioner should “report to work’ at once) to the relatively - though not - completely - - specific (i.e.. references to teaching an elementary grade, eighth grade social science. high school psychology, or high school industrial arts). Nevertheless, it is clear and Petitioner concedes (Tr. 77-79) that, although the - - - - district at no time offered to reinstate Petitioner as ROTC teacher, it did offer to place him in a teaching position of some sort. Further, the uncontested testimony is that Petitioner would not suffer any loss of salary due to the placement. (See Finding of Fact No. 4). In his Post-Hearing Brief, Petitioner asserts that the other positions “are substantially different, involve different responsibilities, and require different skiIls. (p. 3). However, Petitioner introduced no evidence which would support this contention. More importantly, no evidence was introduced which would support a holding that it would be improper to reassign an ROTC teacher to one of the positions referred to by the district. Under the circumstances, it is concluded that the school district unconditionally offered Petitioner a position in the “same professional capacity” for the 1983-84 school year and that Petitioner rejected that offer. Petitioner was. therefore, not employed by the district during the 1983-84 school year by choice, and he has no cognizable claim against the district for correctly noting, on March 28. 1983, that he was not then employed by the district, and for advising him that it did not intend to employ him during the 1984-85 school year. (Emphasis added) As shown above, the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Legislature’s intent is supported by the legislative history. As the bill went through the Legislature, more flexibility was granted to school districts. The Commissioner held that the first question to be asked to determine whether a reassignment is in the same professional capacity is 113-R1O-0812 7 whether the district could have contracted with the teacher for that position. This results in several conclusions. An administrator cannot be reassigned as a classroom teacher. A classroom teacher cannot be reassigned as a counselor. A counselor cannot be reassigned as a nurse. A nurse cannot be reassigned as a librarian, it should be noted that as the TCNA then read, classroom teacher and counselor were listed as such in the definition of “teacher” found at Texas Education Code section 21.201(1): “Teacher” means a superintendent, principal, supervisor, classroom teacher. counselor or other full-time professional employee, except paraprofessional personnel, who is required to hold a valid certificate or permit. Administrator, nurse, and librarian were not listed as such in the definition of “teacher” found at Texas Education Code section 21.201(1), From the first substantive decision made in the first year the issue could he addressed by the Commissioner, the named positions found at Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) were not held to be professional capacities as the Commissioner used the term “administrator” that is not a listed term to include superintendents and assistant principals. The Commissioner goes on to find that employing one in the same professional category is not sufficient to constitute same professional capacity in some instances. While a superintendent and an assistant elementary school principal might be in the same professional category of administrator, they are not in the same professional capacity because of major distinctions in authority, duties, and salary. The Commissioner acknowledges that other factors could be considered. As to the issue directly presented in Barich, it was found that reassigning an ROTC teacher to another teaching position was valid because the positions were in the same professional capacity. Hester Decided just months after Barich, I-fester v. Canadian Independent School District, Docket No. 106-Rl-585 (Comm’r Educ. 1985) further sets out what is meant by “same professional capacity.” Hester was employed under contract for the position teacher/coach. 113-RIO-0812 8 The Commissioner found that Hester was employed in the professional capacity of teacher/coach and that since there was not substantial evidence to support the nonrenewal of his contract that Respondent was required to employ Hester in the same professional of teacher/coach for the next school year. It should be noted that “coach” was not listed as such in the definition of “teacher” found at Texas Education Code section 2L201(l). Nonetheless, the Commissioner found that by contract the district had made teacher/coach Hester’s professional capacity. I-low a teacher’s contract defines the teacher’s professional capacity is significant but not necessarily dispositive. Carpenter v, Wichita Falls Independent School District, Docket No. 247-R3-491 (Comm’r Educ. 1991). The Commissioner has held in numerous cases that a school district is bound by professional capacities such as teacher/coach and teacher/dean that it creates in its contractual relationships, if a school district hires a teacher under a term contract in a particular capacity, even if such capacity is not specifically listed in the definition of “teacher” in the TCNA, the district must rehire the teacher in that capacity for the next school year if the district does not nonrenew the teacher’s contract. Prouenv of Barich Through the years since 1 985, the Commissioner has consistently applied the principles enunciated in Barich, Contracted to be a teacher or a coach, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of middle school teacher and high school coach to the position of physical education teacher with scheduling and budgeting responsibilities. Lieberman v, Eagle Mountain-Saginaw Independent School District, Docket No. 192-R3-785 (Comm’r Educ. 1985). Contracted to be Teacher/Coach Football (Head football coach), the district improperly reassigned the employee to a teaching position. Ground v. Tolar Independent School DIstrict, Docket No. 340-R3-786 (Comm’r Educ. 1986). Contracted to be a teacher and head coach for duties as assigned. the district properly reassigned the employee from teacher and head coach for football, basketball, and track to the position of teacher and head coach for boys’ basketball. Reyes v. Culberson 113-RiO-0812 9 county Independent School District, Docket No, 229-R3-787 (Comm’r Educ. 1987). Contracted to be a teacher/coach, the district properly reassigned the employee from being a teacher and football coach to being a teacher and baseball coach. Satcher v. Florence Independent School District, Docket No. 363-R3-786 (Comm’r Educ. 1987). Contracted to be teachers/deans, the district improperly reassigned the employees from teacher/dean positions to teacher positions. Abbott ci al. v. Ector county Independent School District, Docket No. 081-R3-1287. 105-R3-288 (Comm’r Educ, 1991). Contracted for 220 duty days, the district properly reduced duty days to 188 days. Marshall v. Seguin Independent School District, Docket No. 177-R1-690 (Comm’r Educ. 1991). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the district wide position of Science Support Specialist to the position of high school assistant principal. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School District. Docket No. 247-R3-491 (Comm’r Educ. 1991). The district properly reassigned employee from the position of high school assistant principal to the position of middle school assistant principal. Andrews v. Houston Independent School District, Docket No. 236-Rl-897 (Comm’r Educ. 1997). Contracted as a professional employee , the district properly reassigned the employee from the position 6 of athletic director to the position of teacher/assistant principal. Keith v. Tarkingron Independent School District, Docket No. 4594U-891(Comm’r Educ. 1992). Contracted as teachers, the district’s reduction in salary by itself did not place the teachers in different professionat capacities. Goedeke v. Smyer Independent School District, Docket No. 111- R3-1292 (Comm’r Educ. 1997). Contracted as teacher/assistant band director, the district improperly reassigned the employee to a teaching position. Salinas v, Roma Independent School District, Docket No. 058-R3-1196 (Comm’r Educ. 1997). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from principal of an independent middle school campus to the position of principal for grades 7 to 9 at a unified Keith does not discuss whether “professional employee” is a legitimate professional capacity. It does not conclude that because the two positions at issue were professional that the reassignment is allowable. Keith simply mentions what the contract at issue states. 113-Rl0-0812 10 junior highlhigh school campus. Underwood v. Rusk Independent School District, Docket No. 062-R3- 198 (Comm’r Educ. 1998). Contracted as a teacher/coach, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of from varsity coach and teacher to the position of junior high school coach and teacher, Young v Leggett Independent School District, Docket No. I 75-R3-898 (Comm’r Edue. 1999). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the district wide position of attendance coordinator to the position of middle school assistant principal. Veliz v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No. 011 -R3-999 (Comm’r Educ. 2000). The district properly transferred the employee from one principal position to another. Yturralde v. El Paso Independent School District, Docket No. 001-R10-900 (Comm’r Educ. 2002). The district properly transferred the employee from the position of high school principal to the position of elementary principal. Ramos v. El Paso Independent School District, Docket No. 002- R10-900 (Comm’r Educ. 2002). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of high school principal to the position of middle school assistant principal. Pasqua v. Fort Stockton Independent School District, Docket No. 01 l-R3-1102 (Comm’r Educ. 2004). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from a district-wide Director ofEven Start to the position of middle school assistant principal. Perales v. Robstown independent School District, Docket Nos. 052-R10-104, 084-R3-604 (Comm’r Educ. 2006). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from a central office position to an assistant principal position. Sanchez v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No. 075-R10-605 (Comm’r Educ. 2007). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from a central office position to an assistant principal position. Gonzalez v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No. 074-R10-605 (Comm’r Educ, 2007). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from a central office position to an assistant principal position. Perez v. Donna Independent School District, Docket No, 086-Rl-705 (Comm’r Educ. 2007). Contracted 1I3R1Q-Q812 II as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of Executive Director of Special Education to the position of elementary school assistant principal. Lehr v. Ector county Independent School District, Docket No, 003-R3-0908 (Comm’r Educ. 201 1). Contracted as a professional employee, the district improperly reassigned the employee from the position of assistant principal to the position of classroom teacher. Wheeler v. Austin Independent School District, Docket No. 008-R3- 1108 (Comm’r Educ. 2011). Contracted as a professional employee, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of middle school principal to the position of Human Resources Coordinator. Murillo v. Laredo Independent School District, Docket No. 027-R3-0108 (Cornm’r Educ. 2012). The district properly reassigned the employee from the position of elementary school principal to the position of Program Specialist 11. Montgorneiy i Richardson Independent School District, Docket No. 007-Ri 0-1008 (Comm’r Educ. 2012). Contracted as a professional employee, the district improperly reassigned the employee from the position of Career Specialist to the position of teacher. Tuck V. Alief Independent School District, Docket No. 008-R10-1007 (Comm’r Educ. 20 12). Contracted as an administrator, the district properly reassigned the employee from the position of principal to the position of assistant principal. McCoy v. Kermit Independent School District, Docket No. 004-R3-0908 (Comm’r Educ. 2012). Administrators As can be seen from the above, a great many of the same professional capacity cases involved administrators. In Carpenwr V. Wichita Falls Independent School District, Docket No. 247-R3-491 (Comm’r Educ. 1991) the Commissioner held: The question presented by this appeal is the scope and reach of the Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, Texas Education Code section 21.204(b), in the context of the reassignment of those school district personnel coming under its protections. Petitioner would have the Commissioner of Education hold that the phrase “same professional capacity” as used in the TCNA is either defined by or in some way informed by the definition of ‘teacher’ found in § 21.201(1) of that Act. I do not believe the statutory language can permit of such an interpretation. Rather, this 113-R1Q-0812 12 phrase is left undefined by the statute, and therefore its meaning is a matter for interpretation by the Commissioner, in the first instance, and by the courts. The decisions of the Commissioner (and the courts) have consistently looked to the language of the employment contract itself and attempted to give the parties the benefit of their bargain. In this case, the contract between the parties provides that the position to which Petitioner was entitled was that of a generic 4 administrator, Petitioner has not proven that hers was a contract of adhesion, which would clearly change the result in this case. It is true that the Commissioner has held that § 21 .204(b) limits the right of the district to transfer a term contract teacher. Barich v. San Felipe-Del Rio .J.S.D., Docket No. 1 17-Rla-484 (Comm’r Educ. May 1985). It is possible to imagine situations where the transfer clause of an employment contract would be held to be unenforceable under § 21.204(b) . However, this is not such a case. It has been the consistent view of the Commissioner that the TCNA balanced its grant of limited tenure rights against the considerable personnel management problems it might cause if imposed inflexibly. Districts have responded to this law by creating broad classes within which transfers do not implicate the TCNA. If taken to extremes, this tactic would be against public policy as expressed in the TCNA, but I cannot make such a finding in this case. The need for flexibility in making personnel changes is strongest, and the argument for a rigid tenure system weakest, at the administrative level. In short, I find the generic “administrator” position before me consistent with the policies of the TCNA. Administrators can often be reassigned to different administrator positions, but that does not mean that they ma be assigned to any administrator positions. Districts can by contract establish broad professional capacities. However, professional capacities that are too broad will not be allowed. Tuck V. AliefIndependent School District. Docket No. 008-R1 0-1007 (Comm’r Educ. 2012). Deference If the Commissioner were to decide to issue a new interpretation of “same professional capacity” it would seem to be because his long standing interpretation was incorrect. To determine whether the Commissioner’s interpretation is correct, some cannons of statutory interpretation will be considered. The standards for deferring to an agency’s interpretation have been set by the Texas Supreme Court: The old Texas Education Code section 2 I .204 is the predecessor of the current Texas Education Code section 21.206. 113-Rl0-0812 13 If there is vagueness, ambiguity, or room for policy determinations in a statute or regulation, as there is here, we normally defer to the agency’s interpretation unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the statute, regulation, or rule. See Pub. Ulil. Comm’n v. GulfStares Utils. Co.. 809 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 199fl; Stanjbrdv. Butler, 142 Tex, 692. 181 S.W.2d 269. 273 (Tex. 1944). TGS-NOPEC Geophysical v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). There is ambiguity about what the phrase “same professional capacity” means. The phrase is not defined in statute and is susceptible to multiple interpretations. The Commissioner’s interpretation should be deferred to. Further, as the Commissioner’s interpretation is a long standing interpretation, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence applies: If an ambiguous statute that has been interpreted by a court of last resort or given a longstanding construction by a proper administrative officer is re-enacted without substantial change, the Legislature is presumed to have been familiar with that interpretation and to have adopted it. See Grapevine Excavation, Inc. v.Md. Lloyds Ins. Co., 35 S.W.3d 1. 5. 43 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1086 (Tex. 2000) (Once the Texas Supreme Court and courts of appeals “construe a statute and the Legislature re enacts or codifies that statute without substantial change, we presume that the Legislature has adopted the judicial interpretation,”); Sharp v. House ofLloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245,248.34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 652 (Tex. 1991) (“[A] statute of doubtful meaning that has been construed by the proper administrative officers, when re enacted without any substantial change in verbiage, will ordinarily receive the same construction.’ This rule is only applicable where there has been an affirmative long standing administrative poticy.”) (quoting Humble Oil & Ref Co. v. Calve,’!, 414 S.W,2d 172, 180, 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 254 (Tex. 1967)); Tex. Employers’lns. Ass’n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158, 196 S.W.2c1 390, 395 (Tex. 1946) (“There is another well- settled rule to guide us in the construction of a statute which is uncertain and ambiguous.. .: ‘Where a statute which has been construed, either by a court of last resort or by executive officers, is re-enacted without any substantial change of verbiage, it will continue to receive the same construction.”) Tex. Dept. of Protective and Regilatoiy Services v. Megs Child Care, 145 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Tex. 2004). The Commissioner’s interpretation is long standing. It goes back over one-quarter century. It has been repeatedly affirmed. The statute at issue has been amended multiple times since the Commissioner has issued his interpretation. The TCNA has been amended by the Legislature in 1990, 1995. 2003, and 2011. Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, 71st Leg. t6 h C.S., cli. I § 3.14, 1990 Tex. 113-RIO-0812 14 Gen. Laws I (Allowing the hearing to be heard by a board designated impartial hearing officer); Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, th 74 Leg. R.S.. ch. 260 ch. 21 subch. E and F, 1995 Tex. Gen. Law 2207 (Making many changes including modifying the definition of “teacher” and allowing boards to use the Independent Hearing Examiner Process); Term Contract Nonrenewal Act, th 78 Leg R.S., ch. 484 § 1, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1749 (Concerning distribution of district employment policies); 82 Leg. 1 CS., ch, 8 § 8-il, 2011 Tex. Gen Laws 5463 (Allowing districts to hire their own hearing examiners and making several changes concerning notice). The Legislature has acquiesced in the Commissioner’s interpretation of the phrase “same professional capacity.’ Must Principal be a Professional Capacity? It could be argued that the theory that a principal may only be reassigned to another principal position is compatible with Barich. Such a theory rests on the premise that because the definition of “teacher” found in the TCNA references the position “principal”, that “principal” is a professional capacity. This theory is not compatible with Barich. Under Bunch, the first question is could the teacher contract for the position at issue. The next question is that even if the position could be contracted for are differences in authority, duties, salary and other factors so great that the reassignment is actually in another professional capacity. This second consideration is set out right after the issue of reassigning a superintendent to the position of assistant elementary principal is raised. Texas Education Code section 21.201(l) in the original TCNA read as follows: “Teacher” means a superintendent, principal, supervisor, classroom teacher, counselor or other full-time professional employee, except paraprofessional personnel, who is required to hold a valid certificate or permit. If this theory were compatible with Barich, the Commissioner would have said the determination of whether a superintendent may be reassigned to the position of elementary school assistant principal is a simple issue, not an issue that is “not . . . so clear.” Under 1 13-R1O-0812 this theory. since “superintendent” is found in the definition of “teacher” in section 2L201(1). “superintendent” is a professional capacity. The result would be that a superintendent cannot be reassigned to any position that is not a superintendent position. There would be no reason to apply the standards set out in Barich to determine whether a superintendent could be reassigned to an assistant principal position. This theory does have the virtue of simplicity. If a position is named in the definition of “teacher” any reassignment would have to be in that same position. However. it would be just as simple to apply the rule that if one holds an administrator’s position one can be reassigned to any administrator’s position. The Commissioner’s solution is more complex than the alternative theory, but is more faithful to the statute at issue. If the Legislature intended that “same professional capacity” means any position listed in the definition of “teacher,” the Legislature would have said so. Instead, the Legislature used an undefined phrase that it intended the Commissioner to interpret using his experience in how schools operate. The Commissioner has consistently done so since the first opportunity to interpret the phrase at issue. Like a Superintendent? There are no Commissioner’s Decisions that directly address whether a superintendent may be reassigned to another position. There is no Commissioner’s Decision that finds that a superintendent was improperly reassigned. While Barieh holds that a superintendent cannot be reassigned to the position of assistant elementary school principal, Barich was not a superintendent and was not reassigned to an assistant principal position. There is a pre TCNA case, Board of Trustees of Crystal City Independent School District v, Briggs, 486 S.W.2d 829 (Tex, App. Beaumont 1972, writ ref d n.r.e), which determined that a reassignment from superintendent to teacher was not allowed: Briggs was hired as superintendent of the public schools; under the statute, it is clear that there is a vast difference in the position of superintendent of a district 113-RIO-0812 16 answerable only to the Board of Trustees and that of a teacher in the schools, § 16.07, 16.08 Education Code. The court in Briggs found the fact that a superintendent was only answerable to the board of trustees highly significant. In the recent case of Lehr v. Ector County Independent School District, Docket No. 003-R3O908 (Comm’r Educ, 2011), the issue was raised whether it was appropriate to reassign the Executive Director of Special Education to the position of assistant principal. The Commissioner held: The change in positions is unlike the move from superintendent to assistant principal described in Barich. A superintendent according to statute is “the educational leader and chief executive officer of the school district.” TEx. EDuc. CODE § 11.201(a). The position of superintendent is sui generis. There is no administrator position that compares to it. The position of Executive Director of Special Education is not mentioned in the Texas Education Code. In fact, the certification mentioned in the job description for the position is “midmanagement/supervisor” is no longer awarded. 8 Currently, the only certifications for administrator are superintendent and principal. 9 There is no certification that an Executive Director of Special Education is required to hold under the Texas Education Code or the rules adopted under the code. Here like in Briggs. the Commissioner noted that the position of superintendent is unique. A superintendent is the chief executive officer of a school district. It goes without saying that a superintendent is answerable to the board of trustees. It is not the fact that the Education Code specifies many of the superintendent’s duties and creates unique procedures to nonrenew a superintendent’s contract that makes the superintendent’s role suigeneris. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 11.201. 21.212. It is instead the fact the superintendent is only answerable to the school board as the chief executive officer of the school district that makes the office of superintendent sni generis. While it is correct that principals have many duties spelled out in the Texas Education Code, this does not make the position of principal sui generis. Because the Hence, it is a good thing that the job description allows for alternative qualifications. While those who received midmanagement and supervisor certifications retain them, it is not perhaps wise to limit employment to those who have achieved a certification that is no longer issued, 19 TEx, ADMIN. CODE cli. 241 and 242. All other administrator certifications were not issued after 2000. I 13-Rl0-0812 Texas Education Code defines many duties of a principal, the principal position is a well defined species. It does not make the principal position a genus all to itself. A principal is answerable to the superintendent and often to other high administrators such as deputy and assistant superintendents. A principal is answerable to the school board as the school board can nonrenewal or terminate a principal’s contract. Further, while there is a principal certification it is required for both being a principal and an assistant principal. 19 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 241(d). That the same training is required to be either a principal or an assistant principal is a further indication that the position of principal is not sni generis. It is true that one who holds a superintendent’s certificate also is qualified to hold the positions of principal and assistant principal. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 242.1(d). It is not surprising that the training required to be a superintendent would also prepare one to a principal or an assistant principal. But a superintendent is required to have more than a principal’s certificate, A superintendent’s certificate requires significantly more training than a principal’s certificate. When a principal is reassigned, a school district is not limited to assigning the principal to another principal position. Fasqua v. Fort Stockton Independent School District, Docket No. 011- R3-l 102 (Comrn’r Educ. 2004). Present Reassignment In the present case, Petitioner was reassigned from the position of high school principal to the position of elementary school assistant principal. The only arguments that Petitioner makes in her briefing is that she could not be assigned to an assistant principal position with a salary reduction. Before the school board, Petitioner had the burden of proof. It was Petitioner’s responsibility to show that the reassignment was not in the same professional capacity. Before the Commissioner it is Petitioner’s job to show that the board of trustees’ decision is not supported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, capricious or unlawful. Petitioner has not chosen to argue that comparing differences in authority, duties, and any other relevant factors that the two positions are not in the same professional 1I3R1OO812 18 capacity, with the exception that Petitioner argues that her salary was reduced. Because the issue of the authority and responsibilities was not raised, the size of the two schools and just what Petitioner was doing in those two jobs is unknown. An assistant principal does not have particular statutory duties, but may be assigned a great range of duties. Because the issue was not raised, it is concluded that there was no significant difference in actual authority and responsibilities between the two positions. Change iny As a principal and for her first year as an assistant principal, Petitioner earned $78,600. According to the salary schedule, for her first year as an assistant principal Petitioner should have earned $68,406.84. The difference between the two salaries is $10,193.16. The question becomes whether this change in pay, along with the change from principal to assistant principal, is sufficient to amount to a change in professional capacity. The change is salary is not insignificant. It no doubt would be felt by Petitioner. However, the change in salary is not such that it indicates a change in professional capacities. Again it should be pointed out that Petitioner had the burden of proof before the school board. There is no evidence in the record of what range of salaries principal receive at Respondent or in other school districts across the state. It would not be surprising to find that some principals in Texas receive less than $68,406.84 per year. But unless such salary evidence is presented. it cannot be determined that the change in salary, along with the change from being a principal to the position of assistant principal, is sufficient to prove a change in professional capacity. No violation of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b) occurred. Demotion Petitioner citing Young v. Leggeu Independent School District, Docket No, 175- R3-898 (Comm’r Educ. 1999) contends that the change in pay and position constitute a demotion. 1-lowever, there can only be a demotion case that the Commissioner has jurisdiction over if there is a violation of a written employment contract that causes or would cause monetary harm. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(A)(2)(B). Petitioner makes such 113-R1O-0812 19 a claim, but also admits that the change in position was permissible under the explicit terms of contract . See Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Claims for Relief, p. 3. Hence, the 10 demotion would have to be shown to be a violation of statute that was incorporated into the contract for Petitioner to prevail. As shown above, the only statutory claim that the Commissioner has jurisdiction over is resolved against Petitioner. The TCNA does not prohibit Petitioner’s transfer. If a transfer, which includes a change in title and a decrease in pay, is allowable under a contract and statutes incorporated into the contract, there is no unlawful demotion. If neither contract nor statute prohibits a change in position and salary’, no unlawful demotion has occurred. Petitioner was not demoted. Conclusion The Petition for Review should be denied, In many cases, principals may be assigned to other administrative positions. In the present case, it is determined that Petitioner was properly reassigned in the same professional capacity. Conclusions of Law After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed, and the foregoing Findings of Fact, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education. I make the following Conclusions of Law: 1. The Commissioner has jurisdiction over this case under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2) except for the claims that Respondent violated the Texas Whistleblower Act and the Texas Labor Code. 2. Under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2) the Commissioner has jurisdiction over violations of the “school laws of this state” and violations of written employment contracts. The “school laws of this state” are defined as the first two titles of the Texas Education Code and the rules adopted under those titles, TEx, EDuc. CoDE § 7.057(0(2). H) The contract did not state a particular salary for each year of the contract but staled the salary would be , set by the school board. ]l3-R10O2l2 20 3. The Texas Whistleblower Act and the Texas Labor Code do not meet the definition of the “school laws of this state.” The Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over the Texas Whistleblower Act and the Texas Labor Code under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(A). 4. In many cases, statutes existing when contracts are entered into are incorporated into the contracts. However, when a statute is incorporated into a contract, the whole statute including the enforcement mechanism is incorporated. That enforcement mechanism must be exhausted before a case can be brought to the Commissioner. As Petitioner has not exhausted the statutory enforcement mechanisms, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(B) over Petitioner’s claims under the Texas Whistleblower Act and the Texas Labor Code. 5. One can be entitled to the protections of Texas Education Code Chapter 21, subchapter E based solely on a contract or district policy. One does not need to hold a position described in the first sentence of Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) to be entitled to a Chapter 21 term contract. 6. The positions described in the first sentence of Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) may or may not be professional capacities for purposes of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b). 7. The fact that the position of “principal” is listed in the first sentence of Texas Education Code section 21.201(1) does not mean that if one is employed by a school district as a principal under a term contract that one is employed under the professional capacity of principal. TEx. EDUC. CODE § 21.206(b). 8. A contract can establish a teacher’s professional capacity under Texas Education Code section 2 1.206(b) if the professional capacity is not impermissibly broad. Whether a professional capacity is impermissibly broad is determined by comparing differences in authority, duties, and salary and other relevant factors. In many cases, a fl3-RIO-0812 21 professional capacity of “administrator” will not be impermissibly broad for a reassignment. 9. Petitioner’s professional capacity under Texas Education Code section 21.206(b) is administrator. 10, As Petitioner did not contest that her contractual professional capacity of administrator is impermissibly broad under the standards set out in Barich and its progeny. Petitioner has not raised this issue. 11. The mere fact that a term contract employee is employed in a principal position does not make the employee’s professional capacity “principal,” 12. In determining whether a transfer is permissible for one employed in the professional capacity of administrator, one must compare responsibilities, authority, salary, and other relevant facts between the two positions. 13. Respondent did not improperly reassign Petitioner to a non-principal position in violation of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b). 14. Respondent did not reassign Petitioner in violation of Texas Education Code section 21.206(b). 15. There can only be a demotion case that the Commissioner has jurisdiction over if there is a violation of a written employment contract that causes or would cause monetary harm. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 7.057(A)(2)(B). 16. If a transfer, which includes a change in title and a decrease in pay, is allowable under a contract and statutes incorporated into the contract, there is no unlawful demotion. If neither contract nor statute prohibits a change in position and salary, no unlawful demotion has occurred. Petitioner was not demoted. 17. The Petition for Review should be denied in part and dismissed in part. I 13-RIO-0812 _____ Order After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed and the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petitioner’s appeal be. and is hereby, denied in part and dismissed in part. SIGNED AND ISSUED this day of 2014. COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION I 13-R1O-0812 23 Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 6 • ELCORAMOS v. DOCKET NO. 002-R 10-900 § § § BEFORE THE § COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION § EL PASO INDEPENDENT § SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STATE OF TEXAS DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER Petitioner, Elco Ramos, appeals the decision of Respondent, EI Paso Independent School District, concerning his grievance. Margaret E. Baker is the Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Commissioner of Education. Ramos is represented by Karl Tiger Hanner o f Austin, Texas. EPISD is represented by S. Anthony 8afi of El Paso, Texas. The Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommending that Petitioner's appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for • which relief can be granted. No exceptions were filed. Findings of Fact The following Findings of Fact are supported by substantial evidence: 1. EPISD employed Ramos Wlder a term contract during the 1999-2000 school year and assigned him as the principal of the Jefferson/Silva High School. 2. EPISD reassigned Ramos to the position of principal of Houston Elementary School prior to the beginning of the 2000-200 1 school year. 3. Ramos has not received any decrease in salary as a result of the reassignment. Ramos's salary for the 2001-2002 school year has not been set. 4. Ramos has not alleged that the two principal positions are radically di fferent. 5. Ramos filed a grievance regarding his reassignment. The board of trustees denied his grievance on July 18,2000. • 6. Ramos timely filed this appeal. • Discussion Ramos asserts that the Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over this appeal under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2). Ramos contends that EPISD has changed his professional capacity andlor has demoted him and thereby violated section 2 1.206 of the Texas Education Code and his employment contract. EPJSD argues that the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over this case because Ramos's reassignment did not violate any school law or contract provision and did not cause any monetary harm. Monetary Harm Texas Education Code section 7.0S7(a)(2)(B) grants jurisdiction over violations of written employment contracts that cause or would cause monetary harm. In the present case, Ramos has been transferred from a position that receives a high school principal's salary to a position that normally receives an elementary school principal's salary. • Ramos, however, is to receive the same salary for the current year that he previously received when he was a high school principal. Ramos's salary for the 2001 -2002 schoo l year has not yet been determined. Ramos has not suffered any monetary harm, Furthermore, any financial loss in the future is too specu lative to invoke the Commissioner's jwisdiction. 1 In fact, Ramos concedes in his brief on the merits that any appeal WIder section 7,057(a)(2)(B) could not arise until EPISD takes action that will cause him monetary hann. Therefore, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over Ramos ' s claim that his reassignment breached his contract and caused him monetary hann. Change of Professional Capacity Ramos also alleges that EPISD violated a school law of the state. He asserts that EPISD elected to employ him in the same professional capacity when it failed to provide him with notice of a proposed nonrenewal as required by section 21.206 of the Texas Education Code and then violated the statute by changing his professional capacity or • demoting him by reassigning him. It is well-established that school districts have broad 1 Comerv. Dickinson I,SD., Dkt. No. 117-R 10-698 (Comm'r Educ. 1999). #OO2-R 10-900 -2- -,- • discretion when it comes to transferring administrators. 2 Ramos does not allege that his duties as a high school principal and an elementary school principal differ radically. Ramos's transfer from one principal position to another does not violate the requirement that a teacher who is not nonrenewed must be employed in the same professional capacity. Therefore, it is concluded that Ramos has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Conclusion The Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over Ramos's claim that his contract was breached causing him monetary hann because he has not suffered any monetary hann and any financial loss in the future is too speculative to invoke the Commissioner's jurisdiction. Furthermore, Ramos has failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted with respect to his contention that EPJSD violated section 21.206 because he has • not alleged that the duties of a high school principal and an elementary school principal differ significantly. Conclusions of Law After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed, and the forego ing Findings of Fact. in my capacity as Commissioner of Education. I make the fo llowing Conclusions of Law: I. The Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to hear Ramos's claim under Texas Education Code section 7.057(a)(2)(8) because Ramos has not suffered any monetary harm and future lost earnings capacity is too speculat ive to invoke the Commissioner' s jurisdiction. 2. The Commissioner has jurisdiction over Ramos's claim of a violation of Texas Education Code section 2 1.206; however, Ramos has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted because he has not alleged that the duties of the two • principal positions differ significantly. 19 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 157.1056. 2 Young\'. Leggett I.SD., Dkt No. 175·R3· 898 (Comm'r Educ. 1999). H002-R 10-900 -3- r . • 3. This case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. ORDER After due consideration of the record. matters officially noticed and the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner' s appeal be, and is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted . SIGNED AND ISSUED this !l!!!....- . ::;bku.to.llt day of ~ .~) ,2002 . ELSON MISSIONER OF EDUCATION • • #OO2-R10-900 -4- Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 7 ..' . . .. • DOCKET NO. Oll-R3-1 102 PAUL PASQUA § BEFORE THE § § v. § COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION § FORT STOCKTON INDEPENDENT § SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STATE OF TEXAS DECISION OF THE DESIGNEE OF THE CQMMISSIONER Statement of the Case Petitioner, Paul Pasqua, appeals the action of Respondent, Fort Stockton Independent School District. concerning his grievance. Joan Stewart was initially appointed as me Administrative Law Judge to preside over this cause. Subsequently, Christopher Maska was appointed substitute Administrative Law Judge. Petitioner is • represented by Sam D . Sparks , Attorney at Law. San Angelo, Texas. Respondent is represented by Shellie Hoffman Crow. Attorney at Law. Austin, Texas. The Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommending that Petitioner's appeal be denied. No exceptions were filed. Findings of Fact After due consideration of the record and matters officially noticed, it is concluded that the following Findings of Fact are supported by substantial evidence and are tbe Findings of Fact that can best support Respondent's decision: 1. For eleven years, Petitioner, Paul Pasqua, served as a high school principal for Respondent. Fort Stockton Independent School District. 2. On April 8, 2002. Petitioner received a two-year contract. The contract was entitled "Two-Year Term Contract for Certified Administrator Position as Assigned." The contract provides: • #OIl-R3-1102 -1- ... .. • 2. The board will pay Employee in twelve installments an annual salary according to the compensation plan adopted by the Board, but in no event less than the 200112002 annual salary. 4. Employee shall be subject (0 assignment and reassignment of positions or duties, additional duties. changes in responsibilities or work. transfers, or reclassification at any time during the contract term . 3. On August 19, 2002, after the completion of the first day of the 2002· ZOO3 school year, Petitioner was called to the Superintendent's office and was assigned to the position of assistant middle sc hool principal. 4. Petitioner filled the position of assistant middle school principal until his resignation on November 6, 2002. 5. Petitioner received full compensation until he resigned. 6. Board members did not conduct a meeting without posting notice to decide whether Petitioner should be reassigned. 7. Petitioner did not file a timely grievance concerning the lack of • evaluations. 8. Petitioner failed to raise a constructive discharge argument before the board of trustees. Discussion Petitioner contends that Respondent demoted him by reassigning him from high school principal to assistant middle school principal. constructively tenninated his contract. failed to evaluate him, and violated the Open Meetings Act. Respondent denies these allegations. alleges that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. and argues that the case is moot. Mootness Respondent contends that this case is moot because Petitioner has resigned from his contract. However, Petitioner alleges that Respondent1s ' actions amount to • IOIl·R)·\ \02 ·2· .. • constructive discharge. If Petitioner were correct as to the constructive discharge claim. relief could be granted. Based on this allegation. the case is not moot. Contract Petitioner contends that his reassignment from high school principal to assistant middle school principal was a demotion which resulted in constructive discharge. Petitio,ner also contends that his property rights in his comraci were violated. The Commissioner's jurisdiction over such claims must be based upon Texas Education Code section 7.057 (a): (2) actions or decisions of any school district board of U1Jstees that violate: (8) a provision of a wrinen employment contract between the school district and a school district employee, if a violation causes or would cause monetary harm . Petitioner had a property interest in his term contract during the contract's term. The • issues are whether the comract was violated and did this result or would it result in monetary hann. For eleven years, Petitioner served as a high school principal for Respondent. On April 8, 2002. Petitioner received a two·year contract. The contract was entitled "Two-Year Term Contract tor Certified Administrator Position as Assigned." The contract provides: 2. The board will pay Employee in twelve installments an annual salary according to the compensation plan adopted by the Board. but in no event less than the 200 112002 annual salary. 4. Employee shall be subject to assignment and reassigrunent of positions or duties, additional duties. changes in responsibilities or work, transfers, or reclassification at any time during the contract tenn . On August 19, 2002, after the completion of the first day of the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner was called the Superintendent's office and was assigned to the • (0 #01l-R3-1l02 -3- . .. • position of assistant middle school principal. November 6, 2002, when he resigned. Property RighI Petitioner filled this position until Petitioner's contract is not a contract for the position of high school principal. (t is a contract for a certified administrator position as assigned. Assistant middle school principal is a certified administrator position. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ch. 241. The Commissioner has held that the professional capacity of administrator is to be broadly interpreted for reassignment purposes. Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dis/ricl, Docket No. 247-R3-491 (Camm'r Educ. 1993), While Petitioner was not assigned to the assistant principal position until after he had completed his first day of the new school year as a high school principal, the contract itself allows Petitioner to be reassigned as long as compensation is not reduced from that in the 2001-2002 school year. Petitioner did not Jose any compensation. Petitioner's reassignment did nO[ • violate his contract. Good Faith Petitioner contends that the timing of the reassignment was unfair and that he should have been given a chance to remediate if his performance were questioned. Petitioner alleges that if Respondent had notified him at the begilUling of the summer that he would be reassigned for the next school year that he could have sought other high school principal positions. During that time frame, districts would still be looking to filt principal positions and Petitioner could still represent that his position with Respondent was high school prinCipal. Petitioner's argument is that Respondent owed Petitioner a duty of good faith and fair dealing. However, in Texas there is no duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context. Ciry of Midland v. 0 'Bryanr, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000). Further, even if a cause of action for good faith and . fair dealing existed, the only damages in the present case would be lost earnings • capacity or loss of reputation. NOII·R3·1I02 The Commissioner lacks Nrisdiction over an • employment contract case based on such damages. Smith v. Nelson, 53 S.W.3d 792, 795(Te •. App.·Austin 2001, pel. denied). Constructive Discharge It has been held that "A constructive discharge occurs when the employer makes conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would. have felt compelled to resign." lett v. DaLlas Indep. Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748, 755 (5- Cir. 1986) arrd in part 109 S.CI. 2702 (1989). Petitioner has railed to exhaust administrative remedies as to Ihis issue. Petitioner did not make a constructive discharge argument before the board of trustees. This is not surprising because the board hearing occurred on October 28, 2002 and Petitioner did not resign until November 6, 2002. But even assuming that Petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies he would not prevail. The record does not support a finding that Respondent made Petitioner's working conditions intolerable. While Petitioner's anger at being • reassigned is understandable. being assigned to position of less prestige does not by itself constitute constructive discharge. Evaluations Petitioner notes that he was not formally evaluated during the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 school years. While this could be related to a violation of Texas Education Code sections 21.354 and 39.054, Petitioner should have brought a grievance as to those events under the district's grievance policy. Wittman v. Nelson, 100 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App.·San Antonio 2002 pel. denied). Respondent limited Petitioner', presentation concerning evaluations to arguments as to how he exhausted local remedies. TR, 4. Even if Petitioner were correct that the failure to provide evaluations violated the school laws of this state, the Commissioner could not as a result order the requested relief of reinstatement and back pay. • NO 11 ·R3· I 102 ·5· .. • Open Meetings Act Petitioner contends that board members violated the Open Meetings Act by agreeing to the reassignment of Petitioner outside of a properly called meeting. TEX . Gov'T CODE § 55J.041. The record is scant as to this issue . Petitioner's representative's allegations taken alone do not constitute a violation of the Open Meetings Act. Tr. 16·17. However, the superintendent's testimony was that he made the decision himself without board approval. Tf. 24. The record does not suppon a finding that a violation occurred. Even if a violation occurred it would not result in the vote on Petitioner's grievance being overturned. A discussion that was not properly conducted according to the Open Meetings Act does not result in voiding a vote at a properly called meeting on the same subject. Hill v. Palestine Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 S.W.3d l4. 17 (Tex. App .-Tyler 2000, pet denied). Conclusion • Respondent did not violate Petitioner'S contract by reassigning Petitioner. Petitioner's contract allowed for the reassignment. Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his constructive tennination and evaluation claims. Respondent did not violate the Open Meetings Act. Petitioner's appeal should be denied. Conclusions of Law After due consideration of the record. matters officially noticed, and the foregoing Findings of Fact, in my capacity as Designee of the Commissioner of Education, ] make the following Conclusions of Law: 1. The Commissioner has jurisdiction to hear this cause under Texas Education Code section 7.057 except as specified in Conclusions of Law Nos. 2, 6-8. 2. Because Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to his constructive discharge and evaluation claims, the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction over • these claims. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §l57.1056(a). NOIt-R3-It02 -6- .. , • 3. 4. As pled, this case is nO[ moot. Assistant middle school principal is a certified administrator position. 19 TEX. ADMIN . CODE ch. 241. 5. Petitioner's reassignment did not violate his contract. 6. There is not a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment law context. 7. The Commissioner Jacks jurisdiction over Petitioner' s good faith and fair dealing claim . 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §157 . !056(a). 8. Even if there were a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context, jurisdiction would not exist under Texas Education Code section 7.057(3)(2)(8) because the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction on a claim of. lost earnings capacity or loss of reputation. 19 TEX . ADMIN . CODE §lS7. 1056(a). 9. Members of Respondent's board of trustees did not violate the Open • Meetings Act as they did not preapprove Petitioner's reassignment outside of a properly called meeting. TEX. GoV'T CODE § 551.041 10. Even if members of Respondent's board of trustees had violated the Open Meetings Act by preapproving Petitioner's reassignment outside of a properly called meeting. this does not result in the board's vote to deny Petitioner's grievance being declared void. 11. Petitioner's appeal should be denied. QJUli..R After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed and the . foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of l..a.w, in my capacity as Designee of the Commissioner of Education, it is hereby • #011·R3·1102 ·7· .. " '.. ~ . • ORDERED that Petitioner's appeal ~ and~bY' DENIED . SIGNED AND ISSUED this".(? day 0 me. <' .2004. R ~+~~ 0 CHIEF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER BY DESIGNATION • • NOlI-RJ-II02 -8- Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 8 I, • JANIS K. UNDERWOOD DOCKET NO. 062-R3-198 § § BEFORE THE § V. § COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION § WEST RUSK COUNTY § CONSOUDATEDINDEPENDENT § SCHOOL DISTRICT § THE STATE OF TEXAS DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER Statement of the Case Petitioner, Janis K. Underwood, appeals the denial of her grievance concerning her reassigrunent from junior high school principal to either prinCipal of the seventh through ninth grades or to assistant high school principal by Respondent, West Rusk County Consolidated Independent School District, subsequent to the merger of the • junior and senior high school campuses. The Administrative Law Judge appointed by the Commissioner of Education is Paula Hamje . Petitioner is represented by Kevin F. Lungwitz, Attorney at Law. Austin , Texas . Respondent is represented by John C. Hardy. Attorney at Law, Tyler. Texas. On February 17, 1998 , the Administrative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommending that Petitioner's appeal be denied. Exceptions and replies were timely filed and considered. Findings It is detennined that the following rtodings are supported by substantial evidence: 1. Petitioner, Janis K. Underwood, was employed by Respondent, West • Rusk County Consolidated Independent School District, as West Rusk Junior High principal for six years prior to filing her appeal to the Conunissioner. TAsa • 2. A proposed merger of the West Rusk Junior High and High School resulted in Respondent's notice, on or about September 30, 1997, to Petitioner of a reassignment from her position as junior high principal under the immediate supervision of Superintendent of schools to "seventh through ninth grade principal" or to assistant high school principal under the immediate supervision of the high school principal. 3. On February 18, 1997, Petitioner and Respondent entered into a written contract pertaining to Petitioner's employment with Respondent in the position of "administrator" for the term of July I, 1997 to June 30, 1999. At the time of the appeal, the contract remained in effect. The contract provides that Petitioner is subject to reassignment of positions or duties. additional duties, changes in responsibilities or work, transfers, or reclassification at any time during the term of the contract. • 4. The reassigned pOSition includes responsibility for more students and teachers, but with similar duties as Petitioner's previous position. As a result of the reassignment, Petitioner's salary remains the same, her professional responsibilities are not lessened, and the degree of skill required is not lessened. 5. Petitioner remains an administrator after the reassignment and continues to function in that same professional capacity at the merged junior and senior high schools. Djscussion Petitioner seeks reinstatement as head principal of West Rusk Junior High School, reporting directly to the superintendent of schools, and seeks an award of compensation for actual or potential economic and other losses . Relief is sought due to her reassignment to either "seventh through ninth grade principal" or to assistant high school principal at the newly merged junior and senior high school in West Rusk CISD. • Petitioner argues that the reassignment is a demotion and breach of her employment contract. [n addition, she argues that the reassignment will have a negative impact on .". • her furore earning potential; however, no evidence was offered in support of that argument. Petitioner has a written contract with Respondent for employment as an administrator which is not intended to mean she always retains the "exact same position" she occupied prior to the reassigrunent. Barich v. San Felipe~De/ Rio Consolidated Independent School District, Docket No.117-Rla-484 (Comm'r Educ.1985). The reassigned position is very similar to the previous position with regard to duties and responsibilities. Petitioner is expected to function as principal to seventh, eighth and ninth grade students instead of seventh and eighth grades only. Petitioner's salary does not change. Petitioner's written contract provides in paragraph "2" that Petitioner is subject to .. ...reassignment of positions or duties, additional duties. cbanges in responsibilities or work ... at any time during the contract tenn ." • Respondent has acted within the parameters of Petitioner's contract while attempting to accomplish the merger of two school campuses . There is no evidence that Respondent intended to demote Petitioner. and Petitioner suffered no reduction in pay, responsibilities , or required skills, all important elements to consider in determining whether a reassignment constitutes a demotion. Reyes v. Culberson County Independent School District, Docket No. 229-R3-787 (Comm'r &luc. 1989) and Cody v. Graham Independent School District, Docket No. 247-R3-787 (Comm' r. &luc. 1989). Petitioner remains an administrator at the same pay . Respondent considered the needs of the district in the decision to reassign Petitioner. There was no evidence presented that Respondent failed to consider criteria for personnel decisions set out in its local board policies as asserted by Petitioner; therefore , there is no need to address the issue of whether local board policy is a school law as defined by statute. Petitioner argues that Respondent violated the Texas • &lucation Cnde §21.206 which requires a school district to employ an employee in the #062-R3-1QR -. • same professional capacity from one year to the next. Pertinent portions of the rule read as follows: (a) Not later than the 45" day before the last day of instruction a school year. the board of trustees shall notify in writing each teacher whose contract is about to expire whether the board proposes to renew or not renew the contract. (b) The board's failure to give the notice required by Subsection (a) within the time specified constitutes an election to employ the teacher in the same professional capacity for the following school year. This case does not concern renewal or nonrenewal of a contract; therefore the above provision does not appear applicable. In addition, Petitioner is retained in her same professional capacity as previously addressed in this proposal. • Conclusions of Law After due consideration of the record. matters officially noticed , and the foregoing Findings, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education, I make the foIlowing Conclusions of Law: 1, The Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction over the instant matter pursuant to Tex. Educ. Code §7.057. 2, Respondent's reassignment of Petitioner to an administrator position in the newly merged junior and senior high school was not a violation of the school laws of this state, 3, Respondent's reassignment of Petitioner was not a demotion and was not in violation of any provision of her written employment contract with Respondent that caused or would cause monetary hanD to Petitioner, 4. Petitioner's appeal should be DENIED. • TAsa #062-RJ-198 . , "- " . , • • ORDER After due consideration of the record, matters officially noticed , and the foregoing Findings and Conclusions of Law, in my capacity as Commissioner of Education, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner's appeal be, and is hereby , DENIED. SIGNED AND ISSUED this ?II! day of -' "a""''fi+-<-- - - - 7?f'-'-f 1998. MIKE MOSES COMMISSIONER OF EDUCA nON • • T~S8 #062·R3-198 Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 9 DOCKET NO. 004-Rl-0908 HOI .I.V McCOY ~ HEFORE THE § § v. § COMMISS ION ER OF EDUCATION § KERMIT INDEPENDENT § SCIIOOL DISTRlCT § TH E STATE OF TIOXAS DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER Statement of the Case Pet itioner, Ho lly McCoy, appeals the action of Respondent, Kennil tndependent School Di strict , com:crni ng her grievance . Christopher Maska is the Ad mi nistrati ve Law ludge appoi nted hy the Commissioner of Education. Petitione r is represented by Mark W. Robinett. Attorney at Law, Austin, Texas. Respondent is represen ted by Chri stine Badillo. Attorney at Law, Austin, Texas. The Adm ini strative Law Judge issued a Proposal for Decision recommending thai Petit ioner's appeal be dismissed in part and denied in parI. Findings ofFaet Arter dllC co n:sitleralion of the record and matters officially noticed , it is concluded that the fo llowing Findings of Fact arc supponed by substantial ev idence and are the Findings orr-act that best support Respondent' s decision I, I. Petitioner WilS employed by Respondent under a term contract for the 2007-2008 school year in the position of principal. Th is contrllct exp ired at the end of the 2007-2008 school year. 2. for the ::!008 -2 009 school years, Petitioner signed a term contract with Respondent. The contract is en titled "For Certified Admini stra tor." - - - - _.._- I St! FOR CAUSH. NOlhi.g i. Ihis s.boheplor shen prohibil a l30ard of tR:lstees :frOAl diseRargmg 8 teaeRer for oause during the teR'fl of tRe eORt:raet. [S.olio. 21.211] Section 21.210. EXEMPTIONS. This subchapter does not apply to teachers who are employed under the provisions of the probationary or continuing contract law as set out in Subchapter C of Chapter 13 of this code. SECTION 5. The importance of this legislation and the crowded condition of the calendars in both houses create an emergency and an imperative public necessity that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three several days in each house be suspended, and this rule is hereby suspended. Crosby ISD’s Appendix TAB 11 ~ffite of t~e attornep .enerlll 6tate Df G:exu DAN MORALES AT'fOIlNIY GDlU.AL June 4, 1991 Honorable Ernestine V. Glossbrenner Opinioo No. DM- 27 Cbairman Public Education Committee Re: Whether section 13.3S2(d) of the Texas House of Representatives Texas Education Code authorizes a P. O. Box 2910 principal of a public school to reject Austin, Texas 78768-2910 leacbers wbo are transferred by the school district, or voluntarily tran&fer, 10 his school; and whether the principal's approval authority extends 10 all sebool staff (RQ-39) Dear Ms. Glossbrenner: You bave requesled clarification of section 13.3S2(d) of the Texas Education Code, which provides the followiJJB: (d) EadI principal sball: (1) approve a11leacher and staff appoinbnents for thaI principal's campus from a pool of applicants selected by the district or of applicants wbo meel the hiring requirements establisbed by the district, based on crileria developed by Ibe principal after informal consultation with the faculty. You explain thaI school districts are divided about the interpretation of this provision. "Some districts believe it to mean the principal must approve only newly hired teachers and thaI the law does nol give the principal authority to reject (1) leachers wbo are tranSferred to his/her campus by the school district administration or (2) teachers wbom the district approves for volunlary transfer to his/her campus." You also ask wbether the provision extends 10 tbe "assignment of all campus staff (including sucb positions as h'bnirian, counselor, nurse, custodian)" or whether il applies only 10 instructional stalf. p . 124 Honorable Ernestine V. Glossbrenner - Page 2 (DII-27) Section 13.352(d) was amended 10 its presenl form in 1990. A comparison of the pre- and post- amendmenl ..,rslons indicales thai the purpose of the amendmenl was 10 aWe principals more control over their campuses with a view 10 grealer principal accountability for campus conditions and studenl achievement. S« Glso Bill Analysis 8.8.1, 71st I.eI-, 6th C.S. (1990) "Accounlabillty and Incentive Elements" (Campus Performance Objectives); Senale Edue. Comm. Synopsis of S.D. 1, ACCOIIIftQ/)iIity Q1JIJ lru:enIive EkmenlS of SmIlIe BiI11 SMh CIIIJed Session (Principals) (1990) al 3; HOUSE REsEARCH ORGANIZATION, WRAP UP OF TIlE 1990 SPEOAL SEssIONS ON PUBUc EDUCATION, al 36-47 (July 31, 1990). Before amendment, section 13.352(d) merely authorized principals 10 "participale in the selection of leachers for thai principal's campus." Nothing in the Ianauaae of the statute suggests thai the principal's authority 10 approve the appointmenl of a teacher 10 his campus Is restricted to teachers newly bired by the district or thai the principal is bound by transfer decisions of the dislrict administration. Furthermore, the statute reoognires the principal's authority 10 make selection decisions based on crileria "developed by the principal after informal consultation with the faculty," i.e, criteria unique to the particular campus. The principal's authority 10 shape his campus through application of unique criteria would be diminished in derogation of section 13.352(d) if the school district could mandale the principal's a=ptance of transferred teachers. We therefore find that the approval authority granted by the provision extends 10 teachers transferrina within the district. We bell..., that the language and history of section 13.352(d) also answer your second question. Prior 10 the 1990 amendment, the principal's role in the selection process for his campus extended only 10 the selection of teachers. The provision now eslablishes the principal's authority over "all teacher and staff appointments." This is clear authority for the principal 10 exercise his discretion in selecting individuals 10 fill staff as well as instructional positions on his campus. SUMMARY Section 13.352(d) of the Texas EducatiOn Code grants authority to public school principals 10 approve all teacher and staff appointments on their p. 125 Honorable Ernestine V. Glossbrenner - Page 3 (DM-27) c:ampu5OS. They are therefore not required to accept teache" approved for transfer to their campuses by the school district administration. DAN MORALES Attorney General of Texas WUJ..PRYOR First Assistant Attorney General MARYKEI1ER &ecutive Assistant Attorney General JUDGE ZOUlE STEAKLEY (Ret.) Special Assistant Attorney General RENEAIDCKS Special Assistant Attorney General Madeleine B. Johnson Chair, Opinion Committee Prepared by Faith Steinberg Assistant Attorney General p . :.126