This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1939
In the Matter of the Risk Level Determination of A. D. S.-H.
Filed October 17, 2016
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
ALJ
Office of Administrative Hearings
File No. 68-1100-32788
A.D.S.-H., Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and
Bjorkman, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges the dismissal of his administrative appeal of his risk-level
determination as moot. Because appellant has not demonstrated that he will suffer direct
and personal harm as a result of the determination, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant A.D.S.-H. has been civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender
Treatment Program (MSOP) since 1996. During this period, A.D.S.-H. has committed a
number of criminal offenses. He was incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility
at Rush City following his most recent fraud conviction. In anticipation of his release,
but before he was transferred back to MSOP, the End-of-Confinement Review
Committee (ECRC) conducted a risk-level determination as required by Minn. Stat.
§ 244.052, subd. 3 (2014). The ECRC assigned A.D.S.-H. a risk level of three.
A.D.S.-H. appealed, and the ECRC moved to dismiss the matter as moot because
A.D.S.-H. is not being released into the community and his risk level will be reassessed
before he is released from MSOP. The administrative-law judge (ALJ) granted the
ECRC’s motion. A.D.S.-H. appeals by a writ of certiorari.
DECISION
A.D.S.-H. argues that the ALJ erred in dismissing his request for administrative
review of his risk-level determination as moot. This argument presents a question of law
that we review de novo. Isaacs v. Am. Iron & Steel Co., 690 N.W.2d 373, 376 (Minn.
App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Apr. 4, 2005); see also Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v.
Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1984) (stating appellate courts
give no deference to an agency’s legal determinations).
Courts may only exercise jurisdiction over matters involving a justiciable
controversy. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005). A controversy is
justiciable if it implicates definite rights; “[m]erely possible or hypothetical injury will
not satisfy this standard.” Id. The mootness doctrine requires courts to dismiss cases in
which effective relief is not possible. Id. To avoid dismissal, a party must demonstrate a
personal interest in the form of “a direct and personal harm.” In re Risk Level
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Determination of J.V., 741 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotation omitted),
review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008). The mootness doctrine applies to administrative
review hearings conducted under Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 6 (2014). Id.
A.D.S.-H. argues that his appeal is not moot because he has demonstrated direct
and personal harm occasioned by the ECRC’s risk-level determination. We disagree for
three reasons. First, A.D.S.-H.’s risk level will not be disclosed to the community. As
we stated in J.V., because MSOP is a “residential facility” under Minn. Stat. § 244.052,
subd. 1(4) (2014), the state is prohibited from notifying the community when A.D.S.-H.
is released from prison back to MSOP. Minn. Stat. § 244.052, subd. 4(b)(3) (2014).
Accordingly, A.D.S.-H. will not suffer direct and personal harm because there will be no
community notification. See J.V., 741 N.W.2d at 616 (holding that “relator’s request for
administrative review of an end-of-confinement risk-level determination is moot because
he is civilly committed and not subject to community notification and, therefore, lacks
the requisite personal interest in the outcome of the litigation”).
Second, A.D.S.-H. forfeited his argument that he will be subject to new
supervised-release conditions as a collateral consequence of his level-three risk
determination. The only evidence he cites is a document that the ALJ did not consider
because it was outside of the record. Because we generally do not consider issues that
were not previously decided, A.D.S.-H.’s second argument fails. Roby v. State, 547
N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996).
Third, A.D.S.-H. cites no authority for his bald assertion that being labeled a
“Level Three Predatory Offender” creates a stigma that will be used against him when he
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petitions for a reduction in custody. This court rejected similar unsupported arguments in
J.V. as speculative and without merit. J.V., 741 N.W.2d at 615; see also Isaacs, 690
N.W.2d at 376 (stating “the doctrine of mootness looks towards actual occurrences, not
mere speculation on events that could have happened”).
In sum, because A.D.S.-H. has not established the requisite “personal harm arising
out of his risk-level determination,” J.V., 741 N.W.2d at 615, his appeal is moot.
Affirmed.
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