[Cite as Winn v. Wilson, 2016-Ohio-7545.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STACEY WINN, :
Petitioner-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2016-03-066
: OPINION
- vs - 10/31/2016
:
EDWIN WILSON, :
Respondent-Appellant. :
APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Case No. DV15060419
Repper, Pagan, Cook, Ltd., Melynda W. Cook, 1501 First Avenue, Middletown, Ohio 45044,
for petitioner-appellee
Lampe Law Office, Adam C. Gedling, 1248 Nilles Road, Suite 7, Fairfield, Ohio 45014, for
respondent-appellant
RINGLAND, J.
{¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, Edwin Wilson ("Father"), appeals the decision of the
Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, denying his request for
attorney fees. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm.
{¶ 2} Father and Stacey Winn ("Mother") are the parents of E.W. (born February 22,
2005) and B.W. (born March 20, 2002). Father and Mother divorced in 2008 and have a
Butler CA2016-03-066
shared parenting plan providing equal parenting time.
{¶ 3} During the week of May 16, 2015, the children stayed with Father. That
weekend, Father's autistic, adult brother, Jimmy, came for an overnight visit. During the day
on Saturday, Jimmy became extremely intoxicated at a neighbor's house and returned to
Father's house to lay down on the couch. According to E.W. and B.W., they observed Father
become irate at Jimmy. Testimony provided by the children indicated that Father lifted
Jimmy from the couch, placed him in a chokehold, and punched him several times in the
back of the head. The children testified that they heard the violent altercation and feared for
their own safety based on prior displays of Father's aggression.
{¶ 4} As a result of the incident, the children's Paternal Grandfather, Jimmy's legal
guardian, filed a petition for a Civil Protection Order ("CPO") on Jimmy's behalf. On the date
of the hearing, the children appeared at the courthouse to testify in support of the CPO and
provide details of the altercation. Paternal Grandfather, acting pro se, chose not to call
Jimmy or the children to testify at the hearing. The trial court ultimately denied that CPO
petition.
{¶ 5} Following the hearing, the children expressed concern to Mother, indicating that
they were afraid to see Father because he now knew that the children had informed others
about the altercation with Jimmy. Mother informed authorities of her concerns and was
advised that she could seek a Domestic Violence Civil Protection Order ("DVCPO") in favor
of the children against Father. Mother subsequently filed a DVCPO, and following the
testimony of the children at an ex parte hearing, the trial court granted a temporary DVCPO.
{¶ 6} A final hearing on the DVCPO was held in which the children and Father
testified. The children testified about the incident with Jimmy, prior perceived instances
where Father abused their animals, and other instances of aggression. The children
indicated that they were afraid of Father and were in counseling to help them understand
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their feelings. Father, in his testimony, denied any wrongdoing in his altercation with Jimmy.
Instead, Father claimed that he had merely placed Jimmy in a "fireman's hold" to get him
downstairs due to Jimmy's extreme alcohol impairment. After taking the matter under
advisement, the magistrate found the evidence was not sufficient to support the issuance of a
DVCPO.
{¶ 7} Father subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees, claiming that the filing of
the DVCPO was frivolous. Following a hearing, the magistrate awarded Father attorney fees
of $9,727.50. Mother filed objections to the award of attorney fees. After reviewing the
record, the trial court overruled the magistrate's decision and denied Father's motion for
attorney fees. Father now appeals, raising a single assignment of error for review.
{¶ 8} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING
PETITIONER DID NOT ENGAGE IN FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT WHEN PETITIONER
PROVIDED NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HER CLAIM THAT THE CHILDREN SUFFERED
A MENTAL INJURY.
{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, Father argues the trial court erred by overruling
the magistrate's decision and denying his motion for attorney fees. We find Father's
argument to be without merit.
{¶ 10} R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) provides that a court may award costs, reasonable attorney
fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with a civil action to a party
adversely affected by frivolous conduct. As relevant here, "frivolous conduct" includes
conduct that satisfies the following:
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure
another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another
improper purpose, including, but not limited to, causing
unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of litigation.
(ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by
a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
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of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument
for the establishment of new law.
(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual
contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that
are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified,
are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.
{¶ 11} Review of a trial court's decision regarding frivolous conduct involves mixed
questions of law and fact. In re A.D.B., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-10-180, 2016-Ohio-
7186, ¶ 35. The trial court's factual determinations are accorded a degree of deference and
will not be disturbed on appeal if there is competent, credible evidence in the record to
support them. Judd v. Meszaroz, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1189, 2011-Ohio-4983, ¶ 18.
"However, we review legal questions de novo, such as whether a party's conduct satisfies the
statutory definition of frivolous conduct." In re A.D.B. at ¶ 35; Slye v. London Police Dept.,
12th Dist. Madison No. CA2009-12-027, 2010-Ohio-2824, ¶ 25. "When an inquiry is purely a
question of law, an appellate court need not defer to the judgment of the trial court." Id.
{¶ 12} As noted above, the magistrate initially granted Father's motion for attorney
fees. The trial court reversed the magistrate's decision and found that Mother's petition for a
DVCPO was not frivolous. In so doing, the trial court found:
In the case at hand, this court has carefully reviewed the
transcripts from the final CPO hearing as well as the hearing held
October 5, 2015 regarding attorney fees. After thorough review
of the transcript(s), this Court finds the record is replete with
testimony from minor children, [E.W.] and [B.W.], Uncle Jimmy,
[and Mother] describing the events. [E.W.] and [B.W.] both
asserted their fears and reported the need for counseling. The
magistrate was not persuaded and found [Mother] failed to
establish, by the requisite preponderance of the evidence, that
[Father] engaged in acts and behaviors that constitute domestic
violence directed toward the minor children. This Court affirmed
the finding that [Mother] failed to provide sufficient evidence.
The insufficiency of the evidence does not rise to the level of
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frivolous conduct. The record does not support a finding
[Mother's] motives or conduct served to harass or maliciously
injure [Father] nor does the record support the allegations in the
petition have no evidentiary support. As outlined above, the
evidence existed but merely not persuasive enough to support a
finding.
{¶ 13} Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court and concur
with its findings. Mother presented evidence detailing significant concerns with Father's
conduct and its impact on the children. The testimony of the children indicates that they were
"terrified" of Father because they informed others about the incident involving Jimmy and
were willing to testify at the CPO hearing. While Mother was ultimately unable to meet the
burden of proof required to grant a DVCPO, Father was not entitled to an award of attorney
fees. It is well-established that "[s]anctions are not warranted under R.C. 2323.51 merely
because Mother was unable to persuade the trial court to grant her motion after it weighed
the evidence." Eastwood v. Eastwood, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25310, 2010-Ohio-6492, ¶ 15,
citing Callahan v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24434 and 24436, 2009-Ohio-
5148, ¶ 45. Here, there was conflicting evidence in the record regarding an appropriate issue
for judicial resolution and the trial court did not err by denying Father's request for attorney
fees. Accordingly, we find Father's sole assignment of error to be without merit and it is
hereby overruled.
{¶ 14} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.
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