UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4327
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JARRED BARCLAY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, Chief
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00044-GMG-RWT-3)
Submitted: November 17, 2016 Decided: November 21, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Kristen M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellant. Shawn Michael Adkins, Assistant
United States Attorney, Anna Zartler Krasinski, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jarred Barclay appeals from the order revoking his
supervised release and imposing a 14-month sentence. Counsel
has filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) brief
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether Barclay’s sentence was plainly unreasonable.
The Government has declined to file a brief and Barclay was
notified of his right to file a pro se informal brief, but he
has not done so. We affirm.
We discern no error in the district court’s decision to
impose a 14-month sentence. This court will affirm a sentence
imposed after revocation of supervised release if it is within
the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006).
While a district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. B, and
the statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation
sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012), the district court ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke supervised release and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at
438-39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court considered the Chapter 7
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advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors it is
permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation case.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is found
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will this court “then
decide whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at
439 (emphasis omitted).
We have carefully reviewed the record and Anders brief and
conclude that Barclay’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment order. This
court requires that counsel inform Barclay, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Barclay requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Barclay. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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