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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: M.R.P., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.P. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 811 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000205-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., MOULTON, J., STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2016
Appellant, M.P. (“Mother”) appeals the order of the Allegheny County
Court of Common Pleas granting the petition of the Allegheny County Office
of Children, Youth, and Families (“OCYF”) to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
parental rights to her minor, dependent daughter, M.R.P. (“Child”), pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8) and (b).1 We affirm.
In late August 2014, Mother gave birth to Child six weeks before her
scheduled due date. As Child was born with a condition in which her bowels
formed on the outside of her body, Child was hospitalized at the Children’s
Hospital of Pittsburgh (CHP) for a month. Mother rarely visited Child during
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1
The trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s
unknown father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and
(a)(8).
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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this hospitalization. Child was released into Mother’s care on October 3,
2014, after Mother was given specific instructions on Child’s aftercare.
OCYF received a report from CHP after hospital personnel could not
reach Mother to ensure that Child was gaining weight and that Mother was
properly changing the bandage and caring for Child’s incision from surgery.
The hospital later indicated that Mother did not keep Child’s follow-up
medical appointments and failed to feed her the recommended high-calorie
formula for low-weight babies. Mother continued to miss appointments with
the hospital and with OCYF.
OCYF attempted to visit Mother’s cousin’s home where Mother resided
with Child, but Mother was not there. After discovering Mother was sleeping
with Child in the same bed, OCYF provided Mother a Pack and Play as Mother
claimed she did not have a safe place for Child to sleep. Mother moved with
Child to Maternal Grandfather’s home, which OCYF felt was unsafe due to
Maternal Grandfather’s criminal record. Mother herself had been declared a
dependent child due to concerns that Maternal Grandfather had sexually
inappropriate contact with Mother when she was a child. There was also
reports of domestic violence between Mother, Maternal Grandfather, and
Maternal Grandfather’s paramour.
On October 24, 2014, OCYF sought emergency custody of Child after
she was admitted to the hospital for dehydration, malnutrition, oral thrush,
and complications from the improper care of her incision wound. Mother had
not changed the original bandage, which smelled and was stained. Child
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remained in the hospital for five days as the bandage had to be surgically
removed from her body. Upon her release, OCYF placed Child in foster care.
On January 28, 2015, the trial court adjudicated Child dependent.
OCYF created a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) for Mother defining the
following goals: Mother was required to (1) maintain visitation with Child,
(2) obtain appropriate housing, (3) attend domestic violence counseling, (4)
undergo a mental health evaluation and comply with the subsequent
recommendations, and (5) obtain a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow
the recommendations.
Mother submitted to a drug and alcohol evaluation, but failed to
comply with outpatient treatment. Although twenty-six drug screenings
were scheduled, Mother only submitted to two urine screenings, both of
which tested positive for marijuana. Mother attempted to address her
mental health goal by undergoing mental health evaluations, including one
with Dr. Beth Bliss, a licensed psychologist with Allegheny Forensic
Associates. Mother was discharged from two mental health programs for her
non-compliance and did not seek further mental health treatment. Mother
was unable to secure housing that would be adequate for Child, but instead
moved frequently between relatives’ homes. Although Mother was required
to visit Child regularly, she only attended eighteen out of forty-four
scheduled visits. On August 5, the trial court reduced Mother’s visitation due
to her non-compliance. On her last visit, Mother did not play with Child, left
an hour early, and told social workers that Child needed to be changed.
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On December 21, 2015, OCYF filed a petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights. The trial court held a termination hearing on May 6, 2016,
at which OCYF presented the testimony of Dr. Bliss and Betsy Ann McMaster,
OCYF case supervisor. Additionally, Mother testified on her own behalf. In
an order entered May 10, 2016, the trial court involuntarily terminated
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8),
and (b). On June 6, 2016, Mother, through appointed counsel, filed a notice
of appeal along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
as required by Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(2) and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
On appeal, Mother raises one issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that Allegheny County Children, Youth, and
Families met its burden of proving that termination of Birth
Mother’s parental rights would meet the needs and welfare of
the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) by clear and
convincing evidence?
Mother’s Brief, at 5.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 47 A.3d
817, 826 (2012). “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”
Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different result. Id.
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at 827. We have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the parties
spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608 Pa. 9, 27, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., T.R.M., T.J.M., T.A.M., & N.D.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d
251, 267 (2013). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations
and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-
74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports
the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support
the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394
(Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, controls
the termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis, as
follows:
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), as well as (b).
However, Mother concedes that OCYF presented sufficient grounds to show
her conduct constituted grounds for the termination of her parental rights
under Section 2511(a). Thus, we may proceed to review Mother’s argument
that termination of her parental rights does not best serve the needs and
welfare of Child pursuant to Section 2511(b), which provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
With regard to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as
follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
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physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M.
a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 122-23, 620 A.2d 481, 485
(1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791. However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds
is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-29, 71 A.3d at 267.
“[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of
the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the
particular case.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super.
2010) (citations omitted).
While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child is a
major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it
is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533–536 (Pa.Super.2008). The
mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910
(Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court's decision to terminate parents'
parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong
emotional bond against parents' inability to serve needs of
child). Rather, the orphans' court must examine the status of
the bond to determine whether its termination “would destroy an
existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption
of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa.Super. 2003). As we
explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010),
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
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and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011). When evaluating a
parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social
workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, Section
2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994
A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal citations omitted).
Upon reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion
that termination of Mother’s parental rights will clearly serve to promote the
needs and welfare of Child. The trial court emphasized that there was no
indication that an emotional bond exists between Mother and Child to the
extent that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would cause Child to
suffer extreme emotional consequences. The trial court relied on the
testimony of Dr. Bliss, who after observing Mother’s interaction with Child,
opined that “there did not seem to be a parental bond.” Notes of Testimony
(N.T.), 5/6/16, at 10. Dr. Bliss observed that Mother was very “unnatural in
her interactions” as if she was trying to impress the observers and not
seeking the Child’s attention. N.T. at 8. Dr. Bliss observed that Mother did
not understand Child’s developmental level, allowing her to put various
objects in her mouth that were choking hazards and asking Child to do tasks
that were inappropriate for her age and development. Moreover, Dr. Bliss
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did not notice any verbal or physical affection between Mother and Child. As
a result, she opined that the bond between Mother and Child could be
severed without detrimental harm to Child.
In contrast, Child has been in the care of her Foster Parents since
October 24, 2014 when she was only six weeks old. Despite her fragile
medical state upon birth, Child has thrived in Foster Parents’ care, is up to a
normal weight, and is very healthy. Foster parents demonstrate a thorough
understanding of Child’s medical needs and have followed through with all of
Child’s medical appointments and numerous developmental services
(including occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy). Dr.
Bliss observed Child interact with Foster Parents in a warm, loving manner
as they engaged in play and age-appropriate activities. Dr. Bliss opined that
the relationship between Child and Foster Parents “seemed to be more
consistent with psychological parents, the bonds that she had with them.”
N.T. at 10. Further, Dr. Bliss asserted that Child’s separation from Foster
Parents “would be pretty traumatic” for Child as she does “have a very close
and strong bond to them.” N.T. at 27. Foster parents wish to adopt Child.
Furthermore, we emphasize that for the entirety of Child’s life, Mother
has shown little interest in promoting Child’s physical, developmental, and
emotional needs. When Child was six weeks old, Child required additional
hospitalization due to Mother’s neglect in failing to follow through with
critical medical recommendations of providing Child proper nutrition and
caring for Child’s surgical incision from her abdominal surgery after birth.
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Mother repeatedly missed Child’s medical appointments after her
hospitalization and denied the significant nature of Child’s medical history.
Up to the point that OCYF filed the termination petition, Mother did not
show interest in learning to care for Child’s special needs, was not been
involved or aware of Child’s numerous therapeutic services, and did not ask
for updates on Child’s condition or progress. In discussing Child’s medical
needs, Mother could not identify Child’s birth defect as gastroschisis and the
only information she could provide about Child’s health is that Child “has to
eat certain things to be healthy.” Dr. Bliss Report, at 7. Mother knew that
Child would need surgery for a hernia, but did not know if Child has
undergone this procedure. Mother has not shown that she is able to address
Child’s ongoing medical and developmental needs.
With respect to Child’s emotional needs, Mother did not place value in
building a relationship with her as she missed twenty-six of her forty-four
scheduled visits with Child. Moreover, Mother has not shown she can offer
Child stability, as she has not obtained housing suitable for her and Child
and shows no initiative in seeking mental health or drug treatment. Thus,
as confirmed by the record, the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs of Child would best be served by the termination of Mother’s parental
rights. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and conclude that the
trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s parental rights under Sections
2511(a) and (b).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/21/2016
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