UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4322
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEVIN REEVES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:07-cr-00206-1)
Submitted: November 18, 2016 Decided: November 29, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Research & Writing Specialist, David R. Bungard, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Carol A. Casto, United States Attorney, Joshua C.
Hanks, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Reeves pled guilty in 2008 to one count of possession
with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine,
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012), and was sentenced to 60 months’
imprisonment, followed by 60 months of supervised release. He
began his term of supervised release in November 2015. In April
2016, a petition to revoke Reeves’ supervised release was filed.
After a hearing, the district court found that Reeves had
violated the terms of his supervised release by: (1) driving a
motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, (2)
failing to comply with a direction of the probation officer that
he attend substance abuse counseling; and (3) failing to
complete a four-month program at a halfway house, Dismas
Charities.
The court revoked Reeves’ supervised release and imposed a
within-Guidelines sentence of four months’ imprisonment,
followed by 35 months of supervised release, including a special
condition that Reeves serve five months in a community
confinement center, or “halfway house.” He appeals, claiming
that the district court erred by imposing the five-month term of
confinement in a halfway house. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.”
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).
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Accordingly, in examining a revocation sentence, this court
“takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, because Reeves did not object, review is limited to
plain error. United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700, 711 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2911 (2015); Fed. R. Crim. P.
52(b).
We will affirm a revocation sentence that falls within the
statutory maximum, unless we find that the sentence is “plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th
Cir. 2006). In reviewing a revocation sentence, we must first
determine “whether the sentence is unreasonable,” using the same
general analysis employed to review original sentences. Id. at
438. Only if we find a sentence to be procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will this court determine whether the
sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439. A district court may
impose community confinement as a condition of supervised
release, though it is recommended that such a term not exceed
six months. See USSG § 5F1.1 cmt. n.2.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court has considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors and the policy statements contained in Chapter
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Seven of the Guidelines. Id. The district court also must
provide an explanation for its chosen sentence, although this
explanation “need not be as detailed or specific” as is required
for an original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d
544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court states a proper
basis for concluding that the defendant should receive the
sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Here, the district court ordered the community housing
condition to assure that Reeves receive drug abuse counseling
and treatment. The court noted that Reeves’ conduct underlying
the revocation of his supervised release involved possession of
marijuana, operating a vehicle while under the influence of a
controlled substance, and failure to participate in drug abuse
counseling sessions as directed by his probation officer.
Accordingly, the special condition addressed Reeves’ need for
medical care and treatment as contemplated by § 3553(a)(2)(D).
Because the district court properly considered the
applicable § 3553(a) factors and Chapter 7 policy statements,
provided an explanation of the sentence it imposed, and was
authorized to impose the special condition of supervised
release, we conclude that Reeves’ sentence was reasonable.
Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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