J-S58039-16
2016 PA Super 271
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHANNON LEMOR WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 1895 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order October 9, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0002349-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BOWES, J., and PLATT, J.*
OPINION BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED DECEMBER 02, 2016
Appellant, Shannon Lemor Williams, appeals from the order entered in
York County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion to dismiss the
charge of persons not to possess a firearm.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of
this case as follows:
The Commonwealth alleges that on March 19, 2014,
[Appellant] physically assaulted the victim…and threatened
her with a gun. The Commonwealth has charged
[Appellant] with, inter alia, person[s] not to possess a
firearm, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), stemming
from the March 19, 2014 incident, which occurred in York
County. [Appellant] was also indicted in federal court on
one count of possession of a firearm by a person
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
_____________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S58039-16
previously convicted of crime punishable by imprisonment
to a term exceeding one year, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1), based on the same incident. On April 7, 2015,
[Appellant] was found not guilty of the federal charge
following a jury trial. On July 13, 2015, [Appellant] filed
the instant Motion to Dismiss the § 6105(a)(1) state
charge [pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111,] due to his federal
acquittal.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed October 9, 2015, at 1-2). The court denied
Appellant’s motion to dismiss on October 9, 2015. Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal on October 27, 2015.2 The court ordered Appellant to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),
and Appellant timely complied.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING…APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO 18
PA.C.S. [§] 111?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Appellant argues the Pennsylvania and federal charges stemmed from
the same incident. Appellant concedes the Pennsylvania and federal
statutes in question each require proof of a fact not required by the other.
Appellant contends, however, that the statutes are designed to prevent
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2
A defendant is entitled to an immediate interlocutory appeal as of right
from an order denying a non-frivolous motion to dismiss pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 111. Commonwealth v. Savage, 566 A.2d 272 (Pa.Super.
1989). Here, the court found Appellant’s motion was not frivolous as it
presented a good faith argument requiring statutory analysis. Therefore, we
have jurisdiction over Appellant’s interlocutory appeal. See id.
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substantially similar harms or evils, i.e., possession of firearms by people
who have been convicted of serious crimes. Appellant concludes his
acquittal of the federal charge of unlawful acts compelled dismissal of the
Commonwealth’s charge of persons not to possess a firearm. We disagree.
The issue of whether a criminal charge is barred under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
111 presents a question of law subject to plenary review. Commonwealth
v. Calloway, 675 A.2d 743 (Pa.Super. 1996). Section 111 provides in
relevant part:
§ 111. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution in another jurisdiction
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent
jurisdiction of this Commonwealth and of the United States
or another state, a prosecution in any such other
jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this
Commonwealth under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in
a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title
(relating to when prosecution barred by former
prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent
prosecution is based on the same conduct unless:
(i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly
convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he
is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a
fact not required by the other and the law defining
each of such offenses is intended to prevent a
substantially different harm or evil[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111(1)(i). The application of Section 111(1)(i) involves a
three-step analysis:
The first inquiry is whether…the prosecution which the
Commonwealth proposes to undertake involves the same
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conduct for which the individual was prosecuted by the
other jurisdiction. If the answer to this question is yes,
then we must determine whether each prosecution
requires proof of a fact not required by the other, and
whether the law defining the Commonwealth offense is
designed to prevent a substantially different harm or evil
from the law defining the other jurisdiction’s offense. If
the Commonwealth cannot satisfy both of these requisites,
then the prosecution may not proceed.
Calloway, supra at 747. “[W]hen a defendant raises a non-frivolous prima
facie claim that a prosecution may be barred under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111, the
prosecution bears a burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
either that the ‘same conduct’ is not involved, or that a statutory exception
to the statutory bar on reprosecution applies.” Commonwealth v. Wetton,
591 A.2d 1067, 1070 (Pa.Super. 1991) (emphasis removed).
Section 6105(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act states:
§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture,
control, sell or transfer firearms
(a) Offense defined.—
(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense
enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this
Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or
whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall
not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture
or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell,
transfer or manufacture a firearm in this
Commonwealth.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
The federal “unlawful acts” statute provides in relevant part:
§ 922. Unlawful acts
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* * *
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year;
* * *
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Instantly, the Pennsylvania and federal charges were both based on
the same conduct of Appellant. Therefore, to prosecute Appellant for a
violation of Section 6105(a)(1), the Commonwealth had to establish (1) the
Pennsylvania and federal charges each require proof of a fact not required
by the other; and (2) the law defining each offense is intended to prevent a
substantially different harm or evil. See Calloway, supra. The federal
“unlawful acts” statute requires proof that the defendant (1) possessed or
transported a firearm or ammunition; (2) possessed or transported the
firearm or ammunition in a manner that affected interstate/foreign
commerce; and (2) has been convicted of any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
By contrast, the Pennsylvania statute requires proof that the defendant (1)
possessed, used, controlled, sold, transferred, or manufactured a firearm (or
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obtained a license to do any of the foregoing activities); and (2) has been
convicted of a specific type of offense listed in Section 6105(b) or 6105(c),
or meets one of the miscellaneous conditions set forth in Section 6105(c). 3
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). Thus, each statute requires proof of a fact
not required by the other. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 111(1)(i). Appellant
concedes this first element of proof.
With respect to the harms which the statutes are intended to prevent,
the trial court reasoned:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the purpose of
18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 in Commonwealth v. Gillespie[, 573
Pa. 100, 105, 821 A.2d 1221, 1224 (2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 972, 124 S.Ct. 442, 157 L.Ed.2d 320 (2003)],
when it stated, “[t]he current version of [Section] 6105
also expanded the class of convictions from “crime[s] of
violence” to include certain potentially violent crimes. …
The clear purpose of [Section] 6105 is to protect the public
from convicted criminals who possess firearms, regardless
of whether the previous crimes were actually violent….”
In support of the intent for the federal offense, the
Commonwealth cites to section 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) for
evidence of what harm the statute was intended to
[prevent]. Section 922(q) addresses crime as being a
“pervasive, nationwide problem” that is exacerbated at the
local level “by the interstate movement of drugs, guns,
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3
Appellant was previously convicted of possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance, which meets the criteria of Section 6105(c)(2). See
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(2) (applying prohibition on firearm possession to: “A
person who has been convicted of an offense under the act of April 14, 1972
(P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and
Cosmetic Act, or any equivalent Federal statute or equivalent statute of any
other state, that may be punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding
two years”).
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and criminal gangs.” The statute heavily addresses the
impact that interstate movement of firearms has on
schools around the country. It explicitly states that the
“occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in
a decline in the quality of education in our country,” and
that Congress has the power to “ensure the integrity and
safety of the Nation’s schools by enactment of this
subsection.” The [c]ourt finds that the federal offense is
broader in scope with reference to the intent to control the
interstate movement of firearms at a national level, with a
special focus on protecting the safety of those around
school zones.
The federal statute also discusses the problem of the ease
of firearm movement through interstate commerce and the
fearful effect it can produce in citizens to travel through
certain areas due to violent crime and gun violence. The
federal prohibition applies regardless of the type of offense
as long as the offense is punishable by a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year. The state offense is
also concerned with public safety but enumerates
particular offenses that are intended to target individuals
who have violent or potentially violent prior offenses.
While both statutes enshrine the general recognition that
guns in the hands of convicted criminals can lead to crime,
the state statute is focused principally upon locally denying
access to persons who have committed potentially violent
offenses as well as actual violent offenses in order to
minimize future physical harms to citizens within the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The federal statute focuses more broadly and seeks to
prevent much broader national social and economic harms,
including the adverse impact upon the nation’s educational
system and the chilling effect upon interstate commerce.
As such, the state and federal laws, while generally
seeking to reduce crime, intend to prevent substantially
different harms of a different scope.
(Trial Court Opinion at 4-6) (footnotes omitted). We agree with the court’s
analysis. The Pennsylvania statute and the federal statute each (1) requires
proof of a fact the other does not; and (2) targets harms that differ
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substantially in scope. Therefore, the court properly denied Appellant’s
motion to dismiss. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 111(1)(i); Calloway, supra.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/2016
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