J. A15010/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: E.V. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.V. : No. 1261 EDA 2015
:
:
Appeal from the Dispositional Order, April 7, 2015,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No. CP-51-JV-0000135-2015
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING STATEMENT BY DUBOW, J.:
FILED DECEMBER 16, 2016
Although I agree with the Majority that the trial court did not err in
denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress, I respectfully dissent from the
conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction of False
Identification to Law Enforcement.1
Appellant avers that the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction of False Identification to Law Enforcement because
the Commonwealth failed to present testimony that officers advised
Appellant that he was the subject of an official police investigation prior to
when Appellant provided them with a fake name. Appellant’s Brief at 26-28.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a).
J. A15010/16
This claim of error requires us to interpret 18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a) which
provides:
A person commits an offense if he furnishes law
enforcement authorities with false information about his
identity after being informed by a law enforcement officer
who is in uniform or who has identified himself as a law
enforcement officer that the person is the subject of an
official investigation of a violation of law.
18 Pa.C.S. § 4914(a).
In In re: D.S., 39 A.3d 968 (Pa. 2012), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered the language of Section 4914(a) and held that, in order to
sustain a conviction of False Identification to Law Enforcement, the
Commonwealth must present evidence that a law enforcement officer
affirmatively informed an individual that he is the subject of an official police
investigation. See Id. at 974-75. There, the Commonwealth argued that
circumstantial inferences should be included as a way in which a person may
be informed that he is the subject of an official investigation. Our Supreme
Court rejected that argument, concluding that there is “no language in the
statute to suggest that the General Assembly intended that an individual’s
knowledge [that he is the subject of an official police investigation] could be
derived from the surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 975.
In the instant case, the Commonwealth does not aver that officers
actually informed Appellant that he was the subject of an official police
investigation. Instead, the Commonwealth, the trial court, and the Majority
all find that the instant surrounding circumstances made it so obvious that
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J. A15010/16
Appellant was the subject of an investigation that sufficient notification can
be found.
I agree with the Majority that, were there ever a case where
surrounding circumstances alone could suffice, the instant case would meet
the notice requirement. However, our review of the Notes of Testimony
confirms that the Commonwealth did not present testimony or evidence that
officers advised Appellant that he was the subject of an official police
investigation.
Our Supreme Court’s holding in In re: D.S. dictates that the language
of Section 4914(a) clearly and unambiguously required officers to inform
Appellant explicitly that he was the subject of an official police investigation.
See id. The fact there were a great many surrounding circumstances in the
instant case indicative of an official investigation does not relieve the
Commonwealth of its burden under Section 4914(a).
I, therefore, agree with Appellant that the Commonwealth presented
insufficient evidence to sustain this charge.
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