UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4118
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARTIN LOUIS JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:14-cr-00049-JKB-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: December 22, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Meghan
Skelton, Appellate Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, P. Michael
Cunningham, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Martin Louis Jenkins was convicted for possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2012), and received a sentence of 84 months of imprisonment,
which was above the Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal,
Jenkins argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the firearm found in his fiancée’s residence
and that his sentence is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
I
Jenkins argues that the United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), good-faith exception does not apply to this case because
the affidavit in support of the search warrant was “bare bones”
and did not provide adequate supporting particularized facts and
therefore it was objectively unreasonable for officers to rely
on the warrant because it was devoid of any indicia of probable
cause. Jenkins argues that the nexus between his fiancée’s
residence (“target residence”), where the firearm was found, and
the evidence sought by police was based on assumptions and
conclusory statements. Thus, insufficient evidence connected
him to the target residence.
“We review factual findings regarding [a] motion to
suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United
States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2014). When the
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district court has denied the motion, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government. United States v.
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). In cases where a
defendant challenges both probable cause and the applicability
of the good-faith exception, a court may proceed directly to the
good-faith analysis without first deciding whether the warrant
was supported by probable cause. United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d
240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994). Here, because it was objectively
reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant, we conclude
the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which protects individuals from “unreasonable searches,”
provides, that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. To deter future police
misconduct, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is generally barred from trial under the exclusionary rule.
United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2009).
However, “[u]nder the good[-]faith exception to the warrant
requirement, evidence obtained from an invalidated search
warrant will be suppressed only if the officers were dishonest
or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of
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probable cause.” United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1583
(4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926).
Our case law establishes four situations in which an
officer’s reliance on a search warrant would not be considered
reasonable:
(1) the magistrate was misled by information in an
affidavit that the officer knew was false or
would have known was false except for the
officer’s reckless disregard of the truth;
(2) the magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and
neutral judicial role;
(3) the warrant was based on an affidavit that was so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; and
(4) the warrant was so facially deficient, by failing
to particularize the place to be searched or the
things to be seized, that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923). Under any of those
circumstances, the good-faith exception does not apply, and any
evidence gathered pursuant to the deficient warrant must be
excluded from trial. Andrews, 577 F.3d at 236.
On appeal, Jenkins asserts that the good-faith exception to
the warrant requirement does not apply because the search
warrant affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render
reliance on it entirely unreasonable; and, further, the state
court judge abandoned her neutral role and merely rubber stamped
the warrant. Jenkins alleges that it was unreasonable for the
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officers to rely upon the warrant because the search warrant
affidavit allegedly failed to provide a sufficient nexus to
establish probable cause that evidence of drug trafficking could
be found inside the target residence.
An officer’s reliance on a warrant is not rendered
unreasonable even if the application fails to establish a
sufficient nexus between a target’s residence and the suspected
criminal activity. Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582. We have applied
the good-faith exception to uphold the search of a suspect’s
residence “on the basis of (1) evidence of the suspect’s
involvement in drug trafficking combined with (2) the reasonable
suspicion (whether explicitly articulated by the applying
officer or implicitly arrived at by the magistrate judge) that
drug traffickers store drug-related evidence in their homes.”
United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008).
Even assuming the affidavit failed to provide a sufficient
nexus to establish probable cause, we determine that its absence
is not so severe so as to preclude reasonable reliance on the
warrant. To the contrary, “it is reasonable to suspect that a
drug dealer stores drugs in a home to which he owns a key.”
Grossman, 400 F.3d at 218. In addition, disagreement among
judges as to the existence of probable cause indicates that an
officer’s reliance on an affidavit was objectively reasonable.
See Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 926).
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Although the district court concluded that, if the warrant
application were before it in the first instance, it may have
found that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that
evidence related to drug trafficking could be found at the
target residence, the state judge who issued the warrant
determined that the affidavit provided probable cause to search.
Given the circumstances, we conclude that it cannot be said that
the officers’ reliance on the warrant was entirely unreasonable.
Jenkins also argues that the state court judge functioned
as a rubber stamp for the police when she authorized the
warrant. An issuing official acts as a rubber stamp for police
when she approves a “bare bones” affidavit. A “bare bones”
affidavit is one that contains “wholly conclusory statements,
which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate
can independently determine probable cause.” United States v.
Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 121 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1311 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993)). An
affidavit is “bare bones” when an affiant merely recites the
conclusions of others without corroboration or independent
investigation of the facts alleged. See, e.g., Wilhelm, 80 F.3d
at 120.
However, here there is no basis for concluding that this
affidavit was “bare bones.” To the contrary, nonconclusory
information supported the affiants’ statements that Jenkins was
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involved in drug dealing. The affidavit detailed intercepted
calls and observations by officers, which supported the
detectives’ statements. Jenkins used language associated with
dealing cocaine and heroin in at least one call, his actions
with movements in and out of suspected stash houses were also
consistent, in the detectives’ experience, of drug dealing. The
affidavit further related observations of Jenkins associating
with persons whose behavior was also consistent with drug
dealing and verified by intercepted calls pointing to a likely
connection to drug trafficking.
Once the affidavit established some evidence of drug
dealing by Jenkins, the question became whether the information
in the affidavit related to the target residence was sufficient
to establish that Jenkins lived there, at least periodically.
The district court determined that the nexus to the target
residence was established by the telephone call with Baltimore
Gas and Electric, in which Jenkins identifies his address as the
target residence. He further stated during the call that the
account holder was his fiancée, a relationship that establishes
an inference that Jenkins may reside at that location
periodically.
Therefore, the affidavit, based upon the affiants’ personal
knowledge, is not “wholly conclusory,” such that a neutral
magistrate or judge could not have independently determined
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probable cause. Thus, even assuming the alleged defects in the
affidavit demonstrate an absence of probable cause, the
officers’ reliance on the warrant was in good faith. There is
no contention that the officers acted in bad faith or
intentionally misinformed the state judge about the facts. It
was not objectively unreasonable for the officers to rely on the
warrant issued by a neutral and detached judge. As such, it was
not clear error for the district court to apply the Leon
good-faith exception and deny the motion to suppress.
II
Next, Jenkins argues that the court imposed a procedurally
and substantively unreasonable upward variant sentence. He
claims procedural error because the court allegedly dismissed
the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and failed to explain
the reason for the extent of the upward variance and that the
sentence created an unwarranted sentencing disparity. He
further contends that the court placed undue weight on the need
for the sentence to provide adequate deterrence, resulting in a
sentence that was greater than necessary and therefore
substantively unreasonable. The Government counters that the
district court carefully and deliberately weighed the sentencing
factors and addressed the aspects of Jenkins’ sentence of which
Jenkins now complains and that the sentence was just and
reasonable.
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“[A]ny sentence, within or outside of the Guidelines range,
as a result of a departure or a variance, must be reviewed by
appellate courts for reasonableness pursuant to an abuse of
discretion standard.” United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d
359, 365 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350
(2007). Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed for both
procedural and substantive reasonableness. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. In determining procedural reasonableness, we consider
whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to
argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Id. at 49-51.
In evaluating a sentencing court’s explanation of a
selected sentence, this court consistently has held that,
although the district court must consider the statutory factors
and explain the sentence, “it need not robotically tick through
the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148,
153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the
same time, the district court “must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
While the “individualized assessment need not be elaborate or
lengthy, . . . it must provide a rationale tailored to the
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particular case at hand and adequate to permit meaningful
appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If a sentence is free of “significant procedural error,”
then the court reviews it for substantive reasonableness,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A substantively reasonable sentence is
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes [of sentencing].” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The fact that the court strongly emphasized the need for
specific deterrence and the need to protect the public as
sentencing factors does not render the sentence unreasonable.
See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 476 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“In Gall, the Supreme Court held it quite reasonable for the
sentencing court to have attached great weight to a single
factor . . . .” (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted)). Moreover, Jenkins’ sentence is similar to other
extensive upward variances found substantively reasonable by
this court. See, e.g., United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156,
163-65 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding no substantive error in 60-month
sentence imposed from Guidelines range of 0 to 6 months, given
court’s “thorough individualized assessment” under § 3553(a) and
extent and cruelty of dogfighting offense); United States v.
Rivera Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 106 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding 20-
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year statutory maximum sentence, above Guidelines range of 57 to
71 months, was substantively reasonable considering defendant’s
egregious criminal history, and where “decision to vary upward
to the statutory maximum reflects a thorough, individualized
assessment of [defendant’s] situation, in light of the § 3553(a)
factors”).
We conclude that the sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable. The court properly calculated the
Guidelines range, carefully considered the § 3553(a) factors,
considered the arguments presented at sentencing, and adequately
explained its reasons for varying upward and imposing an
84-month sentence. We further conclude that Jenkins’ sentence
is substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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