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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CRAIG GRAY
Appellant No. 21 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 12, 2011
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0000072-2010
BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED January 12, 2017
Appellant, Craig Gray, appeals nunc pro tunc from the September 12,
2011 judgment of sentence in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County (“trial court”) following his negotiated guilty plea to third degree
murder and possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”).1 Appellant
challenges the voluntariness of his plea. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows.
On September 12, 2011, [Appellant] entered a negotiated
guilty plea to murder of the third degree and [PIC] before Judge
Carolyn Engel Termin. Also on September 12, 2011, he was
sentenced to a term of twenty (20) to forty (40) years
imprisonment on the murder conviction and to a concurrent term
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 907, respectively.
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of two and one-half (2½) to five (5) years on the [PIC]
conviction. [Appellant’s] guilty plea and sentencing counsel
were Assistant Defenders Roger Schrading, Esq., and Wendy
Ramos, Esq.
[Appellant’s] motion to withdraw the guilty plea was timely
filed on September 22, 2011; it was denied on September 26,
2011. No direct appeal was filed on [Appellant’s] behalf.
On September 7, 2012, [Appellant] filed a timely pro se
PCRA [p]etiton. John P. Cotter, Esquire, was subsequently
appointed to represent [Appellant]. On May 6, 2015, [Appellant]
filed a counsel[]ed [a]mended PCRA [p]etition arguing that he
was eligible for PCRA relief because his trial counsel were
ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal on his behalf
despite being instructed to do so. [Appellant] requested that his
direct appeal rights be reinstated nunc pro tunc.
On December 22, 2015, following an evidentiary hearing
on this matter, by agreement of counsel, [Appellant’s] appellate
rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc. On December 28, 2015,
[Appellant] filed a timely [n]otice of [a]ppeal [n]unc [p]ro
[t]unc.
On March 14, 2016, [the trial] court ordered counsel for
[Appellant] to file a [c]oncise [s]tatement of [m]atters
[c]omplained of on [a]ppeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. [] 1925(b).
On March 23, 2016, counsel for [Appellant] filed a [] 1925(b)
[s]tatement.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/2016, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted). The trial court
filed a 1925(a) opinion on April 13, 2016.
Appellant raises a sole issue on appeal, “[w]as [Appellant’s] guilty plea
not knowing[,] intelligent[,] and voluntary because [Appellant’s] mental
health was such that at the time of the guilty plea he did not understand
what he was doing?” Appellant’s Brief at 2.
It is well settled “that by entering a guilty plea, the defendant waives
his right to challenge on direct appeal all nonjursidictional defects except the
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legality of the sentence and the validity of the plea.” Commonwealth v.
Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “There is
no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. Broaden,
980 A.2d 124, 128 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted). The decision to
permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of
the trial court. Commonwealth v. Unangst, 71 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
In order to be granted relief, “a defendant must demonstrate that
manifest injustice would result if the court were to deny his post-sentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” Broaden, 980 A.2d at 129 (citations
omitted). “Manifest injustice may be established if the plea was not
tendered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” Id. (citations omitted).
Furthermore, “a defendant is bound by the statements made during the plea
colloquy, and a defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing the
plea that contradict statements made when he pled.” Commonwealth v.
Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v.
McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa. Super. 2001).
In the matter sub judice Appellant argues that he was being treated
with the antipsychotic drug Risperdal during his guilty plea colloquy and that
because of this medication he was unable to understand what was
happening at the time of the guilty plea. The following exchange took place
during the colloquy:
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The Court: Now, I do also have some information about your
history of mental illness, that you have never been treated for
psychosis, but that you have been treated for other types of
mental illness. And I see from this colloquy that you’re currently
taking Risperdal. Is that correct?
[Appellant]: Yes
The Court: Very well. Does that interfere in any way with your
ability to understand what’s going on around you?
[Appellant]: No.
The Court: Are you right now, other than the Risperdal, are you
under the influence of any other drugs or alcohol?
[Appellant]: No.
N.T. Guilty Plea, 9/12/2011, at 5-6. Appellant’s argument fails because he
is bound by his statements made during the plea colloquy and may not offer
contradictory reasons for withdrawing his plea. See Brown, 48 A.3d at
1277. The record is clear that Appellant was questioned about his medical
history as well as any prescription medications he was taking. Appellant
clearly responded that it did not interfere with his ability to understand what
was occurring. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/12/2017
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