In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐3625
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANGLIN,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 14‐cr‐3 — C.N. Clevert, Jr., Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 7, 2016 — DECIDED JANUARY 25, 2017
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
FEINERMAN, District Judge.*
FEINERMAN, District Judge. A jury found Michael Anglin
guilty of Hobbs Act robbery, discharging a firearm in fur‐
therance of a crime of violence (the Hobbs Act robbery) un‐
der 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and related offenses. The district court
* Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
2 No. 15‐3625
sentenced him to 230 months’ imprisonment, followed by
three years of supervised release.
Anglin appeals, pressing three challenges. First, he con‐
tends that the police arrested him without probable cause in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression
of the arrest’s fruits. Second, he contends that his § 924(c)
conviction was improper because Hobbs Act robbery is not a
qualifying crime of violence. Third, he contends that his sen‐
tence is improper in various respects. Except for his chal‐
lenge to the supervised release conditions, Anglin’s argu‐
ments are without merit, so we affirm in large part and va‐
cate and remand only as to that component of his sentence.
I. Background
On December 9, 2013, three men robbed an automobile
repair shop in Milwaukee: our defendant, Michael Anglin
(“Anglin”); his brother, Dave Anglin (“Dave”); and Michael
Green, an associate of theirs who at all relevant times lived at
the same federal halfway house as Dave. During the robbery,
Anglin shot a repair shop employee in the abdomen.
The next day, Green turned informant. He called the fed‐
eral Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(“ATF”), identified himself, and reported that the Anglin
brothers were plotting to commit robberies and wanted him
to join them. ATF registered Green as a “confidential inform‐
ant” and assigned Special Agent Rick Hankins to lead its in‐
vestigation.
Hankins met with Green three days later, on December
13. Green reported that he had befriended Dave at the half‐
way house and become a trusted confidant of both Anglins.
Green said that the Anglins recently invited him to commit
No. 15‐3625 3
robberies with them. According to Green, Dave needed cash
and was impatient to commit “any kind of robbery.” Green
said that he had ridden in Anglin’s SUV several times, once
accompanying the brothers to Anglin’s residence. Green also
said that on December 7 or 8, the Anglins showed him two
assault rifles and a pistol inside the SUV.
For informing on the Anglins, Green sought early termi‐
nation of his supervised release and/or moving expenses for
his family, but he received no promises of either. Green did
not tell Hankins about the December 9 robbery that he and
the Anglins committed. Hankins asked Green to tell the An‐
glins that he knew somebody who could help identify a tar‐
get, so that ATF could insinuate an undercover agent into the
group.
During this initial conversation, Green provided cell
phone numbers for both Anglins, a description of Anglin’s
car (“a silver or grey crossover SUV”), the general wherea‐
bouts of Anglin’s residence (“on the edge of town”), the race
and nickname of Dave’s girlfriend (“a black female named
‘Star’”), and a description of her car (a white Escalade). He
also referred to the Anglins as “convicted felons.”
Hankins and his colleagues corroborated most of those
details. They discovered that the Anglins’ mother was the
registered owner of a silver Acura MDX SUV and lived just
inside Milwaukee’s western border. While monitoring Dave’s
comings and goings at the halfway house, they saw him en‐
ter a white Escalade registered to Starmiqua Broom. They
verified that Dave was serving a federal prison sentence for
bank robbery and that Anglin had a state felony conviction
for gun possession.
4 No. 15‐3625
Hankins and Green met again on December 16. Green
reported that the Anglins, wary of outsiders, preferred not to
add a fourth participant and intended to select a robbery
target themselves. They also intended to act quickly; their
plan was to rob “something” within the next several days.
Green also revised one aspect of his December 13 statement:
the Anglins showed him two guns, not three, in the SUV on
December 7 or 8—an assault rifle and a pistol.
Hankins showed Green a photo of the apartment com‐
plex where the Anglins’ mother lived and a generic image of
a silver Acura MDX from the same model year as hers.
Green confirmed that the former depicted the residence he
visited with the Anglins and that the latter matched the ap‐
pearance of Anglin’s SUV. Before departing, Hankins gave
Green a digital recorder to surreptitiously capture future
conversations with the Anglins.
At 5:00 a.m. the next morning, Hankins noticed a text
message from Green: “They trying to do something in the
morning what I do.” Hankins immediately called Green.
Green reported that the Anglins had planned an armed rob‐
bery, to be carried out by the trio sometime after 8:00 a.m.,
which was the earliest that Dave and Green could leave the
halfway house. Hankins told Green to go along with the
plan and keep ATF apprised of the Anglins’ movements.
Hankins and another agent went to the mother’s resi‐
dence. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., they saw Anglin leave the res‐
idence and drive off in the Acura, which was parked outside.
A short while later, Green called Hankins to report that Dave
left the halfway house just after 8:00. According to Green, the
plan was for Anglin to pick up Green at or near the halfway
house, and then meet Dave “out on the street.” Green re‐
No. 15‐3625 5
layed further information about the planned robbery: the
target was a drug house somewhere near 74th Street and
Capitol Drive, about three miles from the halfway house.
Green did not know the exact address.
Green further reported that Dave told him to look out for
a black Dodge Charger parked near the halfway house that
looked like a “fed.” Green later called Dave and told him
that the Charger appeared to be watching a different house
down the street. To be safe, the Anglins and Green changed
Green’s pickup location from the halfway house itself to the
corner of Center Street and Fond du Lac Avenue, a few
blocks away. This, too, Green told the agents.
At some point, the team tailing Anglin lost track of him
in the Acura. Hankins, meanwhile, joined federal agents and
Milwaukee police officers in unmarked cars near the new
rendezvous point. At 8:40 a.m., Hankins observed Green
standing on the north side of Center near Fond du Lac.
Hankins contacted Green and instructed him to turn on his
recorder.
At 8:48 a.m., the Acura approached Green from the east
and pulled up to the curb, with Anglin behind the wheel.
Green got into the passenger seat. The Acura then turned
right on Fond du Lac, heading northwest in the general di‐
rection of 74th and Capitol. Hankins and the rest of the sur‐
veillance team followed the Acura at an inconspicuous dis‐
tance for several minutes, but found it difficult to stay close
in rush hour traffic. Concerned about the threat to public
safety that an armed robbery might pose if the Acura eluded
them, Hankins asked city police to pull over the vehicle. A
marked Milwaukee Police Department squad car was sum‐
moned, pulled behind the Acura, and activated its lights and
6 No. 15‐3625
sirens. Anglin did not stop; instead, he made a U‐turn and
headed back southeast on Fond du Lac. The Acura stopped
only once a second police vehicle blocked its path. Anglin
and Green were taken into custody.
At approximately 10:15 a.m., police located Dave at
Broom’s house and arrested him. The Acura was impounded
and searched pursuant to a warrant, yielding a nine‐
millimeter pistol under the passenger seat. Agents also
searched the Anglins’ mother’s residence, finding a box of
ammunition among Anglin’s personal effects. Over the
course of several debriefing interviews, Green admitted to
having committed other robberies while at the halfway
house, including the December 9 repair shop robbery, in
which he implicated the Anglins.
Anglin was initially charged only with being a felon in
possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the evidence
obtained as a result of his arrest (presumably the gun found
in the Acura, though he did not specify), arguing that the of‐
ficers who pulled over the Acura lacked probable cause to
arrest him. The magistrate judge recommended suppression,
and then reaffirmed that recommendation after the district
judge requested further consideration in light of Navarette v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). The district judge rejected
the magistrate judge’s recommendation, holding that there
was probable cause to arrest Anglin based on Green’s tip,
and denied his motion.
A grand jury returned a five‐count superseding indict‐
ment against Anglin, charging him with: (1) Hobbs Act rob‐
bery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (2) discharging a
firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii); (3) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act rob‐
No. 15‐3625 7
bery; (4) being a felon in possession of a firearm; and (5) be‐
ing a felon in possession of ammunition. A jury found An‐
glin guilty on all counts in April 2015. His post‐trial motions
were denied—including, as relevant here, a renewed motion
to suppress and a motion to dismiss the § 924(c) charge in
light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which
was decided after the verdict.
At sentencing, Anglin faced a 120‐month mandatory min‐
imum term on the § 924(c) count, to be followed by consecu‐
tive sentence for the other counts, which carried an advisory
guidelines range of 110 to 137 months’ imprisonment. The
government asked for a sentence at the high end of the
guidelines range (257 months in total), pointing to Anglin’s
criminal record, his lack of remorse, and lasting harms to the
person he shot.
Defense counsel sought a sentence well below the guide‐
lines range. Noting that during plea negotiations the two
sides memorialized an agreement that seven to ten years
would be an appropriate total sentence, he argued that the
government’s 257‐month recommendation penalized him for
going to trial. The district judge interjected, telling counsel
he “can rest assured that there will be no additional pun‐
ishment imposed in this case just because your client went to
trial,” and stating that he does not “take into account any
negotiations between the government and the defendant that
do not result in a recommendation that is jointly urged upon
the Court.” Defense counsel next argued that, because An‐
glin would be 35 years old by the time the ten‐year mini‐
mum term expired, the court should sentence him far below
the guidelines range on the remaining counts. He explained:
8 No. 15‐3625
The 924(c) here means that you’re not punish‐
ing a 25‐year‐old man who doesn’t get it.
You’re punishing a 35‐year‐old man. And
you’re punishing that 35‐year‐old man each
additional year. And you’re saying we have no
hope for you at 36 you’re gonna make it; at 37
you’re gonna do a better job; 38 I don’t know if
I can trust you. …
And when this court considers what’s suffi‐
cient but not greater than necessary, what’s ap‐
propriate under all the circumstances, I’m look‐
ing at a 35‐year old man. I’m looking at some‐
one who has just done 10 years in prison, who
has hopefully gotten all of the benefits of it.
The court imposed a 230‐month sentence—the 120‐
month mandatory minimum for the § 924(c) count, plus a
consecutive term of 110 months, the low end of the guide‐
lines range for the remaining offenses. In justifying the sen‐
tence, the court cited the “long‐lasting” effect on the shoot‐
ing victim and the need to deter others “looking to make a
quick buck,” while also emphasizing the need not to “overly
punish.” In particular, the court said that it would “take into
account that there is a mandatory minimum sentence” as
“was underscored in the arguments of” defense counsel, and
that it “will not and should not penalize a defendant for go‐
ing to trial.” The judge added that defense counsel’s argu‐
ments “reminded [him] of a recent book written by Professor
Michelle Alexander which is called ‘The New Jim Crow.’
And so this court does not approach sentencing blindly or
without due regard for the consequences of substantial in‐
No. 15‐3625 9
carceration, particularly in a case like this with a young man
age 25.”
The presentence report recommended a supervised re‐
lease term and proposed numerous supervised release con‐
ditions. Neither side addressed supervised release in its
briefs or otherwise objected to the proposed conditions. At
the sentencing hearing, the government asked for four to
five years of supervised release. Defense counsel did not dis‐
cuss supervised release in his arguments.
The court imposed a three‐year term of supervised re‐
lease, explaining as follows:
[THE COURT:] With regard to supervision, the
Court is imposing the mandatory terms of su‐
pervision as discussed in the presentence re‐
port for the reasons discussed in the presen‐
tence report.
The Court is likewise imposing conditions over
and above those—the additional conditions of
supervision as discussed in the presentence re‐
port except as follows:
With regard to paragraph 3 in part B of the
presentence report, the defendant shall follow
the instructions of his probation officer and an‐
swer truthfully all inquiries by the probation
officer subject to his right under the Fifth
Amendment against self‐incrimination.
The Court does believe that supervision in this
case is warranted particularly in light of the de‐
fendant’s criminal history and failure to suc‐
10 No. 15‐3625
cessfully complete state supervision prior to
committing the crime in this case.
Is there any reason to articulate these grounds
for supervision any further?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
[THE GOVERNMENT]: No, Your Honor.
The court closed the hearing by asking, “Is there any‐
thing else or any argument that you believe the Court has
not taken into account fully, [defense counsel]?” Defense
counsel answered, “I can’t think of any right now, Your
Honor.”
II. Discussion
A. Probable Cause to Arrest
We first consider whether there was probable cause to ar‐
rest Anglin. Our review is de novo. See United States v. Shields,
789 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2015).
Probable cause determinations are exercises in holistic,
commonsense decisionmaking. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 230–32 (1983). “Police officers have probable cause to
arrest when the totality of the facts and circumstances within
their knowledge at the time of the arrest would warrant a
reasonable person in believing the person has committed a
crime.” Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015).
“Probable cause is a fluid concept that relies on the common‐
sense judgment of the officers based on the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600, 603 (7th
Cir. 2006). Additionally, “[p]robable cause only requires that
a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity exists;
it does not require the existence of criminal activity to be
No. 15‐3625 11
more likely true than not true.” Mucha v. Vill. of Oak Brook,
650 F.3d 1053, 1056–57 (7th Cir. 2011).
In determining whether the officers had probable cause
to arrest Anglin, we do not write on a blank slate: this court
already found probable cause to arrest Dave on essentially
the same facts when his appeal—Dave and Anglin were
prosecuted separately—was before us. See United States v.
Dave Anglin, 626 F. App’x 181, 185 (7th Cir. 2015). In Dave’s
case, too, the challenged seizure was predicated primarily on
Green’s tip, which we found sufficient. “[A]lthough the of‐
ficers were unable to corroborate allegations of criminal ac‐
tivity until after the stop,” we explained, “they were able to
corroborate numerous innocuous details, including the vehi‐
cle driven by [Dave] Anglin’s girlfriend, the residence of
[Michael Anglin], and [Dave] Anglin’s criminal history.” Id.
at 184. We further noted that Green “disclosed details that
only someone close to [the Anglins] would know,” such as
their phone numbers, and that “the officers corroborated in‐
formation about Anglin’s future actions—including the
brothers’ locations on the morning of the planned robbery.”
Id. at 184–85. Finally, we noted that Green “made himself ac‐
countable if the tip turned out to be false” by giving his iden‐
tity and agreeing to record his conversations with the An‐
glins. Ibid. These facts, we held, gave the officers reasonable
suspicion to briefly detain Dave and pat him down; signifi‐
cantly, we added that “the same information that supported
the officers’ reasonable suspicion”—i.e., Green’s state‐
ments—“also gave them probable cause to arrest.” Ibid.
Although our order in Dave’s case is not precedential, see
Cir. R. 32.1(b), our holding was correct, and we see no reason
to reach a different conclusion here. Anglin argues that
12 No. 15‐3625
probable cause was absent because Green was untested and
untrustworthy. But the facts known to the agents at the time
of Anglin’s arrest established Green’s credibility well enough
for his tips to supply probable cause, even though they
could not yet know with certainty whether he was telling the
truth.
For starters, the agents had confirmed most of the details
Green provided: the fact that both Anglins had felony rec‐
ords, the identity of Dave’s girlfriend, the make and model
of her car, the location of Anglin’s residence, and the descrip‐
tion of Anglin’s car. Green would not have known these
things if he did not have some genuine familiarity with the
Anglins. See United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 606, 609 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that corroboration of an informant’s
statements regarding the suspect’s residence, vehicle, and
criminal history helped establish probable cause based on
the informant’s tip); United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1259,
1263 (7th Cir. 1995) (similar). In particular, Green’s accurate
(if somewhat imprecise) descriptions of Anglin’s car and the
location of his residence were consistent with his claim to
have spent time with the Anglin brothers away from the
halfway house. Cf. United States v. Peck, 317 F.3d 754, 756 (7th
Cir. 2003) (holding that the officers lacked probable cause
where, “even though [the informant] stated that she was
Peck’s girlfriend, she was unable to give any information re‐
garding Peck other than that he was a black male”). Moreo‐
ver, the agents observed Anglin following the itinerary that
Green relayed, to the point of watching him pick Green up
and drive off with him. After that, there could be no doubt
that Green knew the Anglins personally, was familiar
enough with their affairs to accurately predict their behavior,
and—crucially—was in fact personally involved with what‐
No. 15‐3625 13
ever they were up to that morning. See Gates, 462 U.S. at
245–46 (holding that specific predictions of the defendants’
future movements, later proven accurate, bolstered an anon‐
ymous tip’s credibility because they established the tipster’s
bona fides as a confidant of the defendants); United States v.
Huebner, 356 F.3d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Consistent with
the informant’s predictions, on the day of the controlled buy,
agents observed Huebner leaving his residence and stopping
at another location very close to his home. Insofar as Hueb‐
ner’s actions mirrored [the informant’s] prediction of this
event, it became clear that [the informant] indeed possessed
‘inside information,’ further establishing his reliability.”).
The agents had another reason to regard Green as gener‐
ally credible. Green was under federal sentence and there‐
fore faced serious consequences if caught lying to federal in‐
vestigators. The agents knew his name and where he lived: a
halfway house where he was obliged to spend every night. If
Green lied, he would be easy to find. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct.
at 1689 (holding that using 911 to make a report is an “indi‐
cator of veracity” because it has “features that allow for
identifying and tracing callers”).
Finally, Green’s key assertions, if fabricated, could and
likely would have been exposed as falsehoods. Green told
agents the approximate time and location of an imminent
armed robbery, enabled them to tail the Acura in order to
observe the crime unfolding, and said that he was recording
his conversations in the SUV. If this were an elaborate ruse,
that would have become apparent soon enough. Under the
circumstances, it was reasonable for the agents to conclude
that Green was being honest with them.
14 No. 15‐3625
Anglin argues that Green’s account of the planned rob‐
bery was vague, shifting, and therefore dubious, but Green’s
imprecision was consistent with the rest of what he told the
agents. The Anglins led the operation and were parsimoni‐
ous with details, so it was no surprise that Green could not
give a specific address for the planned robbery or a detailed
account of how it would transpire. See United States v. Booker,
612 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that an informant’s
inability “to predict many aspects of” a planned drug trans‐
action did not defeat probable cause). That is especially true
where, as here, Green promptly relayed additional details
about the plan as he learned them.
Anglin identifies two specific inconsistencies that he be‐
lieves should have given the agents pause. First, on Decem‐
ber 13, Green said the Anglins showed him three guns, but
on December 16, he revised that to two guns. That minor
discrepancy hardly compelled the conclusion that Green was
untrustworthy. If anything, the agents could reasonably have
seen it as a sign of good faith that he went out of his way to
set the record straight on an unverifiable detail.
Second, Anglin asserts that Green did not accurately pre‐
dict how the morning in question would unfold. This argu‐
ment relies on the inaccurate premise that Green told the
agents that he and Anglin would pick up Dave from his girl‐
friend’s house, which was in the opposite direction from the
robbery’s location. But Hankins was clear on this point: even
though Dave was headed to his girlfriend’s house when he
left the halfway house, Green told agents that the plan was
for Dave to meet Anglin and Green somewhere “out on the
street,” not at her house. Doc. 34–4 at 620. Driving in the
No. 15‐3625 15
general direction of the robbery target was consistent with
that plan.
Although unnecessary, it bears mention that the agents
had one final data point by the time of the arrest, and it de‐
rived not from Green’s say‐so, but from direct observation of
Anglin. A traffic stop of Anglin’s vehicle required only rea‐
sonable suspicion. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530,
536 (2014); Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687. Anglin concedes that
Green’s tips sufficed for that purpose. Doc. 18 at 17, 24. But
by the time the officers arrested Anglin, which required prob‐
able cause, they had seen him respond to the attempted traf‐
fic stop by making a U‐turn and traveling some distance in
the opposite direction, not stopping until a second police ve‐
hicle blocked his path. That evasive conduct was an addi‐
tional factor supporting probable cause. See Shields, 789 F.3d
at 746 (“[T]he officers had at least reasonable suspicion at the
time of their initial encounter with Mr. Shields and acquired
additional bases for probable cause when Mr. Shields fled
and removed the firearm from his pocket.”).
Given the totality of the circumstances, the officers had
ample probable cause to arrest Anglin. It follows that the
district court properly denied his motion to suppress.
B. Conviction Under § 924(c)
Anglin next challenges his § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) conviction
for possessing and discharging a firearm during a crime of
violence, contending that Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime
of violence” within the meaning of the statute.
Section 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) prohibits discharging a firearm
“during and in relation to any crime of violence.” Section
924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” to include any felony
16 No. 15‐3625
that either “(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or prop‐
erty of another” (the elements clause, also known as the
force clause), or “(B) by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another
may be used” (the residual clause). Anglin was convicted of
Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), for the December 9
repair shop robbery, during which he discharged his gun.
The question, then, is whether a Hobbs Act robbery convic‐
tion can serve as a predicate “crime of violence” under either
prong of § 924(c)(3).
Anglin argues that the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is in‐
valid under Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551. In this, he is right. See
United States v. Cardena, 842 F.3d 959, 996 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“[W]e hold that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(B) is … unconstitutionally vague.”). That leaves
the question whether Hobbs Act robbery falls within the
§ 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause. We recently found it unneces‐
sary to decide that issue, see Davila v. United States, 843 F.3d
729, 731 (7th Cir. 2016), but here we must confront it.
The Hobbs Act defines robbery, in relevant part, as the
taking of personal property “by means of actual or threat‐
ened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future,
to his person or property.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). Commit‐
ting such an act necessarily requires using or threatening
force. Pressing the opposite view, Anglin asserts that a rob‐
ber hypothetically could put his victim in “fear of injury”
without using or threatening force. This argument is contra‐
ry to our precedents.
In United States v. Armour, 840 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2016), we
considered whether the § 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause en‐
No. 15‐3625 17
compassed federal attempted armed bank robbery as de‐
fined by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)—which can be accomplished
“by intimidation” or by “assault,” with “assault” defined as
“an intentional attempt to inflict or threat to inflict, bodily
injury … that creates in the victim a reasonable fear or ap‐
prehension of bodily harm” and that “may be committed
without actually touching, striking, or injuring the other per‐
son.” Id. at 908–09. We answered yes, reasoning that a “vic‐
tim’s fear of bodily harm is necessarily fear of violent physi‐
cal force.” Id. at 909.
We also held in Armour that Indiana robbery, which simi‐
larly can be accomplished by “putting any person in fear,”
satisfied the identical “use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force” requirement in § 4B1.2(a)(1) of the Sen‐
tencing Guidelines. 840 F.3d at 907. In so holding, we reject‐
ed the argument that Anglin makes here, that “‘putting any
person in fear’ does not necessarily involve ‘the use, at‐
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another.’” Ibid. And we rejected similar arguments
in United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“In the ordinary case, robbery by placing a person in fear of
bodily injury under Indiana law involves an explicit or im‐
plicit threat of physical force and therefore qualifies as a vio‐
lent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).”), and in United States v.
Lewis, 405 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2005) (equating “the use, at‐
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force” with “put‐
ting any person in fear” of physical injury).
For these reasons, Hobbs Act robbery is a “crime of vio‐
lence” within the meaning of § 923(c)(3)(A). In so holding,
we join the unbroken consensus of other circuits to have re‐
solved this question. See United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135,
18 No. 15‐3625
140–44 (2d Cir. 2016); In re St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th
Cir. 2016); United States v. Howard, 650 F. App’x 466, 468 (9th
Cir. 2016); cf. United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141–44
(3d Cir. 2016) (holding that Hobbs Act robbery may consti‐
tute a § 924(c) “crime of violence” where, as here, the two
crimes are contemporaneous, but not deciding whether
Hobbs Act robbery categorically fits the elements clause); id.
at 150–51 (Fuentes, J., concurring) (concluding that Hobbs
Act robbery categorically fits the elements clause). And be‐
cause Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3)’s elements clause, it was a valid predicate for An‐
glin’s § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) conviction.
C. Sentencing
Anglin argues that the district court committed a variety
of sentencing errors.
1. Custodial Sentence
First, Anglin asserts that the district court erred by failing
to address his argument that the government’s recommend‐
ed 257‐month sentence unfairly punished him for going to
trial. That is wrong, as the court did address the argument.
At the hearing, Anglin’s counsel reiterated at some length
the argument from his sentencing brief that the govern‐
ment’s recommendation sought to impose a “trial penalty.”
The court responded, cutting in after several minutes:
“[T]his court does not enhance a defendant’s sentence mere‐
ly because he or she has asked for a trial. I never have and I
never will. So you can rest assured that there will be no addi‐
tional punishment imposed in this case just because your cli‐
ent went to trial.” That promise acknowledged—indeed,
No. 15‐3625 19
agreed with—the thrust of Anglin’s argument, and the judge
later reiterated it in announcing and justifying the sentence.
As proof that the district court refused to consider his ar‐
gument, Anglin points to the judge’s explanation of how he
would ensure that the sentence did not reflect a trial penalty:
“I don’t take into account any negotiations between the gov‐
ernment and the defendant that do not result in a recom‐
mendation that is jointly urged upon the Court.” Anglin
would have preferred that the judge take a different tack,
heeding his request that the court consider the inchoate plea
agreement (which, as noted, would have recommended an
overall sentence of seven to ten years) and discount the gov‐
ernment’s recommendation. But that goes to the substantive
merit of the judge’s response, not its procedural adequacy—
which is all Anglin challenges here. The fact that Anglin did
not get the answer he sought does not mean the judge re‐
fused to consider his argument. See United States v. Lott, 468
F. App’x 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A review of the sentencing
transcript shows that the judge did consider Lottʹs family
circumstances argument, and his reason for rejecting it is
clear.”); United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 794 (7th Cir.
2008) (“[T]he sentencing transcript reveals that the district
court did consider this factor; unfortunately for Jackson, it
happens to cut against him in this case.”).
Next, Anglin contends that the district judge failed to
consider his “diminishing returns” argument, which posited
that additional years beyond Anglin’s proposed twelve‐ or
thirteen‐year sentence would have limited marginal value,
given that Anglin would be in his late thirties by the time he
served them. The parties dispute whether Anglin preserved
20 No. 15‐3625
this objection, a question we need not resolve because here,
too, the judge adequately engaged with the argument.
Anglin’s argument for leniency on the non‐§ 924(c)
counts boiled down to a generic point about the diminishing
marginal returns of long prison sentences—a “stock” argu‐
ment that virtually all defendants can make in some form or
another. Sentencing courts “need not explicitly discuss”
stock arguments. United States v. Eberts, 829 F.3d 882, 885 (7th
Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Garcia‐Oliveros, 639 F.3d
380, 382 (7th Cir. 2011) (“We have recognized that the need
for explanation typically is diminished … when the argu‐
ments in mitigation are obviously without merit or so rou‐
tine as to be ‘stock.’”); United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660,
667 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court may pass over, without
discussion, arguments that are made as a matter of rou‐
tine.”); United States v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“The other [arguments] are nothing more than stock argu‐
ments that sentencing courts see routinely: things like Tah‐
zib’s family ties, how his criminal history category over‐
represents the seriousness of his prior conviction, and the
extent to which he accepted responsibility. They are the type
of argument that a sentencing court is certainly free to reject
without discussion.”).
In any event, a fair reading of the transcript shows that
the judge did address this argument, albeit somewhat
obliquely. See United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440, 456 (7th
Cir. 2014) (“[W]e will not find a sentence to be procedurally
unreasonable as long as the totality of the record establishes
that the district judge considered the arguments in mitiga‐
tion, even if implicitly and imprecisely.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Citing Professor Alexander’s seminal work
No. 15‐3625 21
on mass incarceration, the judge assured Anglin that he
“does not approach sentencing blindly or without due re‐
gard for the consequences of substantial incarceration, par‐
ticularly in a case like this with a young man age 25.” In the
next breath, the judge acknowledged his obligation under
§ 3553(a) to impose a sentence that is “no greater than neces‐
sary.” That level of engagement with Anglin’s generic argu‐
ment was plenty, especially given that he received a guide‐
lines sentence—indeed, at the bottom end of the range. See
United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 864 (7th Cir. 2015)
(“[L]ess explanation is typically needed when a district court
sentences within an advisory guidelines range.”).
2. Supervised Release
Anglin also challenges the supervised release conditions,
which he contends were substantively unreasonable and
procedurally defective. Because Anglin did not raise his con‐
cerns before the district court, we must first determine
whether he waived or merely forfeited his challenges.
“A waived claim … is one that a party has knowingly and
intelligently relinquished; a forfeited plea is one that a party
has merely failed to preserve.” Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct.
1826, 1832 n.4 (2012); see also United States v. Wesley, 422 F.3d
509, 520 (7th Cir. 2005) (“A forfeiture is basically an over‐
sight; a waiver is a deliberate decision not to present a
ground for relief that might be available in the law.”). If An‐
glin merely forfeited his objections to the supervised release
conditions, we review for plain error, but if he waived them,
then the waiver “leaves no error for us to correct on appeal.”
Wesley, 422 F.3d at 520; see also United States v. Burns, 843
F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Waiver … precludes judicial
22 No. 15‐3625
review by extinguishing the error.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Our decisions set forth the line between waiver and for‐
feiture in this context. In United States v. Lewis, 823 F.3d 1075
(7th Cir. 2016), we held that the defendant waived his objec‐
tion to the supervised release conditions where the court
asked, “Counsel, do you have any legal objection to the sen‐
tence I have proposed or request any further elaboration of
my reasons under Section 3553(a) both as to the term of im‐
prisonment or the conditions of supervised release?” and
defense counsel responded, “no.” Id. at 1083. Likewise, in
United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014), the de‐
fendant argued that the judge failed to address a key argu‐
ment in mitigation. Id. at 937. We disagreed, noting that the
judge “closed the sentencing hearing by asking counsel
whether they had any objection to the sentence or required
‘any further elaboration’ of the judge’s reasons,” and holding
that defense counsel’s failure to object to the sufficiency of
the judge’s explanation was a waiver. Id. at 939, 941.
Lewis and Donelli reflect the settled principle that, when
the judge invites counsel to raise objections on a particular
topic and counsel declines the invitation, appellate review is
waived. See United States v. Ortiz, 843 F.3d 294, 297 (7th Cir.
2016) (“[T]hough Ortiz was told by the district judge at the
hearing that this was Ortiz’s chance to question the condi‐
tions of supervised release, Ortiz did not do so. So he waived
objections to the conditions … .”); United States v. Raney, 842
F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016) (“When the district court al‐
lows the defendant an opportunity to challenge conditions
of supervised release, the defendant waives any objection to
conditions to which he fails to object.”); United States v. Ga‐
No. 15‐3625 23
briel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding waiver where
the district judge “warn[ed] the parties in writing that failure
to object to conditions recommended in the presentence re‐
port could be treated as waiver,” and “later the lawyer said
no when asked if she had ‘any objections to those condi‐
tions’”); United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873–74 (7th Cir.
2016) (finding waiver as to all but one of the supervised re‐
lease conditions where the defendant was given the oppor‐
tunity to review the proposed conditions before the hearing,
had a chance to object to them, and objected to only one);
Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1079 (“Before sentence was actually im‐
posed, the court expressly invited objections and requests
for further findings or elaboration. The defense expressly
declined the invitation. That was waiver.”); United States v.
Maxfield, 812 F.3d 1127, 1130 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen the
court asked counsel if any argument in mitigation had been
overlooked, counsel said no. Having passed up the chance
for elaboration, Maxfield waived the argument, and cannot
now argue that the court’s explanation was inadequate.”);
United States v. Rodgers, 610 F.3d 975, 979 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Rodgers filed no objections to the factual findings in the
[presentence report]. When asked on the record at sentenc‐
ing if he had any such objections, his counsel stated, ‘No, we
do not.’ This amounts to the intentional relinquishment of a
known right which extinguishes any error and precludes
appellate review.”); cf. United States v. O’Malley, 739 F.3d
1001, 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding waiver where the de‐
fendant “affirmatively stated that he had ‘no objection’ to” a
proposed jury instruction).
By contrast, we have cautioned that giving the same re‐
sponse to a general question like “anything else?” effects no
waiver, is merely a forfeiture, and thus allows for plain error
24 No. 15‐3625
review. See United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th Cir.
2016) (“In the context of supervised release, a defendant’s
response to a general inquiry at the end of sentencing, unac‐
companied by either (1) an explicit approval of the condition
or (2) a strategic reason to forgo the argument at the hearing,
does not constitute waiver.”); Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1083 (“The
judge’s inquiry here was not a vague ‘anything else?’”); Unit‐
ed States v. Speed, 811 F.3d 854, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding
no waiver where the district court simply asked if there was
“anything unclear or confusing”).
In our case, the district judge stated that he was “impos‐
ing the mandatory terms of supervision as discussed in the
presentence report for the reasons discussed in the presen‐
tence report” and “the additional conditions of supervision
as discussed in the presentence report,” but modified one of
the conditions to read, “the defendant shall follow the in‐
structions of his probation officer and answer truthfully all
inquiries by the probation officer subject to his right under
the Fifth Amendment against self‐incrimination.” The judge
explained that he “believe[d] that supervision in this case is
warranted particularly in light of the defendant’s criminal
history and failure to successfully complete state supervision
prior to committing the crime in this case.” The judge then
asked, “Is there any reason to articulate these grounds for
supervision any further?” to which defense counsel an‐
swered, “No, Your Honor.”
Anglin complains that the judge did not orally pro‐
nounce each supervised release condition, and instead (with
one exception) incorporated by reference the probation of‐
fice’s proposed conditions. Our decisions teach that the sen‐
tencing judge must “orally pronounce” each supervised re‐
No. 15‐3625 25
lease condition “from the bench.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 862; see
also United States v. Orozco‐Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 847–48 (7th
Cir. 2016). There is an exception, however, where the de‐
fendant “had a chance [before sentencing] to review the
[proposed] supervised release conditions as well as the rea‐
sons for imposing them,” he “was given a meaningful op‐
portunity to object,” the judge “incorporated those proposed
conditions by reference during its oral pronouncement,” and
“the oral pronouncement and written judgment do not con‐
flict.” Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872. In Bloch, the district court circu‐
lated its own proposed conditions before sentencing, but the
exception also applies where the proposed conditions and
grounds are circulated by the probation office. After all, if
the probation office proposes supervised release conditions
and the grounds therefor, the defendant is on ample notice
that the judge will consider each of those conditions. See
United States v. Thomas, 840 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2016) (in
applying Bloch, treating “written notice … prepared by the
probation office” as the equivalent of the judge’s own writ‐
ten notice); United States v. Siegel, 753 F.3d 705, 710 (7th Cir.
2014) (observing that “most judges, in deciding what condi‐
tions of supervised release to impose, rely heavily on the
recommendations of the federal probation service”).
The Bloch exception does not quite apply here. True, An‐
glin does not argue that the supervised release conditions
proposed in writing by the probation office and then orally
incorporated by reference by the judge conflict with the con‐
ditions set forth in the written judgment. But the judge did
not give Anglin “a meaningful opportunity to object” to the
conditions he imposed. Bloch, 825 F.3d at 872. Asking defense
counsel whether there was “any reason to articulate these
grounds for supervision any further” is best understood as
26 No. 15‐3625
offering to elaborate on the justifications for the conditions,
not as an invitation to substantively object to the conditions
themselves. Given this, counsel’s failure to ask the judge to
orally pronounce each supervised release condition forfeits,
not waives, the issue, and the judge’s failure to make that
oral pronouncement or to invite substantive objections to the
conditions was plain error, warranting a remand. See United
States v. Sweeney, 821 F.3d 893, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The
district court neither stated all the conditions orally nor ob‐
tained a waiver for doing so, and did not provide any expla‐
nation for many of the conditions. In addition, some of the
specific conditions imposed here have been found too vague
or otherwise improper … . Based on the logic of our recent
cases, we must remand the case.”).
That said, it is important not to make a fetish of orally
pronouncing each supervised release condition, at least un‐
der the circumstances that prevailed in Bloch. A federal sen‐
tencing is the worst day of most defendants’ lives, and the
judge’s announcement of the custodial sentence—
particularly where the sentence is substantial—is the worst
individual moment of the experience. The judge of course
must turn to the supervised release conditions after an‐
nouncing the custodial sentence. But if all the judge plans to
do is to impose the supervised release conditions that have
already been circulated (by the court or the probation office)
and reviewed by the defendant, and if the judge gives the
defendant a meaningful opportunity to make substantive
objections, it can be gratuitously cruel to then make the de‐
fendant sit (or stand) through a five‐, ten‐, or at times fifteen‐
minute recitation of and justification for those conditions. If
the defendant or his counsel wants that recitation, so be it,
but otherwise, what possibly could be the point? After An‐
No. 15‐3625 27
glin had just heard and was in the initial stages of coming to
terms with the stark and awful reality of his 230‐month cus‐
todial sentence, we very much doubt that he cared to endure
the judge’s taking several minutes to tell him what he already
knew, which is that that, upon his release in the early 2030s,
he will have 72 hours to inform his probation officer of any
change in his place of residence, or that he will have to sub‐
mit to a drug test within fifteen days of his release and two
tests within the following year, or that he will be unable to
leave the judicial district without the court’s or the probation
officer’s permission, or (unless he really loves irony) that he
will need the court’s permission before entering into any
agreement to act as an informer or special agent of a law en‐
forcement agency.
Having presented and prevailed on this issue at the ap‐
pellate level, Anglin will have the opportunity to hear the
judge orally recite the supervised release conditions, unless
he chooses to waive it. And because we are vacating the su‐
pervised release conditions, there is no need to resolve An‐
glins’ substantive challenges to them. See United States v. Pla‐
da, 628 F. App’x 443, 444 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding it unneces‐
sary, when remanding because of procedural errors, to ad‐
dress substantive challenges to the supervised release condi‐
tions). To provide guidance on remand, however, we offer
the following observations. See United States v. Sainz, 827
F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2016) (after remanding to fix two im‐
proper supervised release conditions, discussing problems
with a third defective condition); United States v. Ortiz, 817
F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[S]ince … the case has to be
remanded because of errors in some of the conditions that
were challenged, we’ll address errors in [unchallenged con‐
28 No. 15‐3625
ditions] as well in order to prevent confusion in the district
court on remand.”).
One challenged condition required Anglin to “notify the
probation officer at least 10 days prior to any change in his
place of residence or in his place of employment.” We have
held that this condition “fails to indicate whether change in
employment means changing employers or also includes
changing from one position to another for the same employ‐
er.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks omit‐
ted). In its stead, the judge might consider a condition re‐
quiring Anglin to “notify Probation at least ten days prior to
or as soon as you know about any changes in residence and
any time you leave a job or accept a job.” United States v. Pou‐
lin, 809 F.3d 924, 933 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Another challenged condition required Anglin, at the
probation officer’s direction, to “notify third parties of risks
that may be occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal
history or characteristics.” We have held that this condition
impermissibly gives “no indication of what is meant by ‘per‐
sonal history’ and ‘characteristics’ or what ‘risks’ must be
disclosed to which ‘third parties.’” Id. at 934 (internal quota‐
tion marks omitted); see also United States v. Bickart, 825 F.3d
832, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that this condition is
“impermissibly vague”). In its stead, the district judge might
consider imposing a condition that “specif[ies] limitations,”
such as the parties to be notified and the risks to be dis‐
closed, “such that it is sufficiently clear to [Anglin] what
conduct is allowed and disallowed.” Poulin, 809 F.3d at 934.
Or, the judge could craft a condition that simply requires
Anglin to permit the probation officer to provide notification
No. 15‐3625 29
to third parties. See United States v. Miller, 829 F.3d 519, 528
(7th Cir. 2016).
The other challenged conditions are satisfactory. The
condition requiring Anglin to “report to the probation officer
in a manner and frequency as directed by the court or proba‐
tion officer” is acceptable. See Ortiz, 843 F.3d at 297 (holding
that this condition was “vague, to be sure, but given that it
will be years before Ortiz is released from prison, it is im‐
possible to be more specific”); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 932 (ap‐
proving that condition); United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859,
868 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). Although it is important that the
manner and frequency of the required reporting be “reason‐
able,” see United States v. Hill, 818 F.3d 342, 344 (7th Cir.
2016), routine administrative conditions like this one are
“necessary incidents of supervision” that we may “fairly
presume” the probation officer will implement “in a reason‐
able manner.” United States v. Warren, 843 F.3d 275, 281 (7th
Cir. 2016). The same is true of the condition that Anglin
“shall follow the instructions of the probation officer.” If
during the supervised release term Anglin believes that the
probation officer is issuing unreasonable instructions, he can
bring the matter to the district court. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at
857–58 (“[I]f a particular probation officer exercises his or
her discretion in an unreasonable manner, this exercise will
be subject to review by the district court.”).
The final challenged condition, that Anglin “use his best
efforts to find and hold lawful employment, unless excused
by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other ac‐
ceptable reasons (e.g., childcare, eldercare, disability, age, or
serious health condition),” also passes muster. The condition
does not require Anglin to work despite an inability to do so,
30 No. 15‐3625
see Hill, 818 F.3d at 345; it merely requires him to use his best
efforts, unless excused for any number of reasons.
The question remains whether we should vacate the en‐
tire sentence and remand for a complete resentencing, or va‐
cate only the supervised release conditions and limit the re‐
mand to modifying and orally pronouncing those condi‐
tions. We believe the better course is to vacate and remand
only as to the supervised release conditions. See United States
v. Ray, 831 F.3d 431, 439 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Sometimes it is sen‐
sible to fix problems in the supervised release portion of the
sentence and let the rest stand. Whether to proceed that way
is a decision committed to this court, applying the principles
we have developed in our precedents.”) (citations omitted);
Sainz, 827 F.3d at 604 (“We affirm the restitution order, but
we order a limited remand to correct some issues of vague‐
ness and overbreadth in the conditions of supervised re‐
lease.”); Poulin, 809 F.3d at 936 (vacating the defendant’s su‐
pervised release conditions in light of flaws with some of
them, and remanding for resentencing as to supervised re‐
lease conditions only); Siegel, 753 F.3d at 717 (“So the prison
sentences in both our cases stand, but the cases must be re‐
manded for reconsideration of the conditions of supervised
release that we have determined to be inappropriate … .”).
Anglin argues that vacatur of the supervised release con‐
ditions warrants a complete resentencing. We disagree. We
do not think it plausible that orally pronouncing the condi‐
tions and slightly modifying some of them would induce the
district judge to reconfigure other aspects of the sentence,
particularly the imprisonment term. We remand for full re‐
sentencing only when such cross‐cutting effects are within
the realm of possibility. See Kappes, 782 F.3d at 867 (remand‐
No. 15‐3625 31
ing for a complete resentencing where “the balance struck by
the sentencing judge might be disrupted [by the vacated su‐
pervised release conditions] to a degree where the judge
would wish to alter the prison term and/or other condi‐
tions”); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 382 (7th Cir.
2015) (remanding four cases for complete resentencing
where reconsideration of certain conditions “may conceiva‐
bly induce one or more of the judges to alter the prison sen‐
tence that he imposed”). They are not here.
III. Conclusion
The district court’s judgment is affirmed, with the excep‐
tion of the supervised release conditions, which are vacated.
We remand for the limited purpose of amending and orally
pronouncing the supervised release conditions.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.