NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 30 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BRENT K. POLLITT, No. 15-16370
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00383-RM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CASA GRANDE UNION HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 82; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Rosemary Marquez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 18, 2017**
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Brent K. Pollitt appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his action alleging federal and state law claims relating to his termination. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Pollitt’s claim under Arizona’s
blacklisting statute because Pollitt failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-1361 (elements of blacklisting); Hebbe,
627 F.3d at 341-42 (to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face). The
district court also properly dismissed Pollitt’s conspiracy to blacklist claim, alleged
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because “a claim for violation of state law is not
cognizable under § 1983.” Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 n.3
(9th Cir. 2007).
The district court properly dismissed Pollitt’s remaining claims arising from
his termination because the state administrative proceedings had preclusive effect.
See Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999) (“In Arizona, the failure
to seek judicial review of an administrative order precludes collateral attack of the
order in a separate complaint.”).
2 15-16370
We do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 15-16370