The Honorable Dolph Briscoe Opinion No. H- 118
Governor of the State of Texas
Capitol Building Re: Questions relating to
Austin, Texas 78711 iniquiries into “ethni-
city” of a State employee,
under $ 6 of House Bill 6
(Ads 1973, 63rd Leg.,
ch. 424, p.1112; Article
Dear Governor Briscoe: 6252-17a, V. T. C. S. )
In your opinion request you state:
“The Governor’s Office is compiling information
necessary to comply with the provisions of House Bill
6 of the 63rd Legislature.
“Section Six of that act states ‘the following
categories of information are specifically made public
information . . . .
“(2) the names, sex, ethnicity, salaries,
title, and dates of employment of all employees
and officers of governmental bodies. ’
I’ The statute in question does not define ethnicity.
Ethnicity is defined in Webster’s Third International
Dictionary Unabridged (1965) as ‘ethnic quality of affi-
liation, t and ethnic is defined as ‘having or originating
from racial, linguistic, and cultural ties with a specific
group, 1 and an example is given as ‘Negroes, Irish,
Italians, Germans, Poles, and other groups. ’
p. 566
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The Honorable Dolph Briscoe, page 2 (H-118)
“Section Three of House Bill 6 declares that cer-
tain information shall not be made public and included
therein in subsection (2) is the following . , . ‘informa-
tion in personnel files, the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. ’
“This office would appreciate knowing your inter-
pretation of the term ‘ethnicity, ’ and whether or not the
securing of this information and the public dissemination
of it constitutes an invasion of privacy.of the employee. ”
The word “ethnicity” is very broad and refers, as the Webster’s Dic-
tionary definition you provide indicates, to race, national origin, linguistic
and cultural background and, in addition, to religion. (See the Random House
Dictionary of the English Language, unabridged edition).
In construing a statute and determining the legislative intent, it is our
duty to give effect to each word and, unless otherwise defined, to give words
their commonly understood meanings. 53 Tex. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § $119, et
seq; Article 5429b-2, $ 2. 01, V.T. C. S. We must conclude that “ethnicity, ‘I
as used in $ 6 of House Bill 6 includes all of the commonly understood elements
of that term, e. g., race, religion, linguistic and cultural background, and
national origin.
Section 3(a) of the Act makes “All information collected, assembled,
or maintained by governmental bodies pursuant to law or ordinance or in
connection with the transaction of official business” public information subject
to disclosure. It then states exceptions, one of which you have quoted in your
letter. Another found in subsection 3(a)(l) excepts confidential information.
See Attorney General Opinion H-90 (1973).
Section 6. in designating materials which “are specifically made public
information, ” qualifies its effect by stating it is made, “Without limiting the
meaning of other sections of this Act. . . . ” indicating we believe, that the
list of materials found in § 6 is only illustrative, but not exhaustively so, of
the types of information reached by $ 3.
p. 567
.
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I,
,
The Honorable Dolph Briscoe, ‘page 3 (H-118)
\
The Legislature apparently did not expect that inquiries into “eth-
nicity” would constitute a “clearly unwarrant.ed invasion of personal
privacy. ” Otherwise, it would not have used such information as illus-
tration of information made public under $ 6. For the same reason, it
is clear that the Legis,lature assumed the disclosure of such information
would not violate the confidentiality of “information deemed confidential
by law, either Constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision;” [as
excepted under 5 3(a)(2)]. In any event, we believe the intent of the
Legislature was that the specific exceptions found in $ 3 would control.
It could not have been intended that “ethnicity” information, for instance,
should be divulged even though such information were deemed confiden-
tial by constitutional law. It will not be assumed that the Legislature
intended an unconstitutional result. 53 Tex. Jur. 2d, Statutes, $182.
We are aware of no constitutional,provision, statute, or judicial
decision which makes “ethnicity” information intrinsically confidential,
without regard to the factual context. Each questionable case will turn
on facts, but 5 6 creates a presumption that “ethnicity” information is not
per se confidential. Unless there is reason to believe some specific ex-
ception applies [as, for instance, if the only available information regard-
ing an employee’s ethnic origin is contained in birth records specifically
excepted by $ 3(15)1, ethnic information should be made available upon
request. If there is doubt, the question should be referred to the Attorney
General pursuant to $ 7 of this Act. See Attorney General Opinion H-90
(1973).
SUMMARY
As used in House Bill 6, 63rd Legislature
(Article 6252-17a, V. T. C. S. ) the word “ethnicity”
includes all the commonly understood elements of
that term, e. g., race, religion, iultural background
and national origin. Ethnicity information concerning
governmental employees is to be -considered public
information unless, in the particular context involved,
@. 568
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f ..
The Honorable Dolph Briacoe, page 4 (H-118)
one or more of the exceptions to publicity found
in $ 3 of the Act is applicable.
Very truly yours,
Attorney General of Texas
APPROYED:
Opinion Committee
p. 569