GENERAL
6, 1966
Honorable Dean Martin Opinion No. C-703
County Attorney
Grayson County RE: Authority of Grayson County
Sherman, Texas to accept a deed from the Kansas-
Oklahoma and Gulf Railroad Company
to a bridge lying between Texas
and Oklahoma spanning the Red
River about 9 miles east of Deni-
Dear Mr. Martin: son, Texas and related questions.
We have your letter in regards to the above matter.
You have posed the following questions for our con-
sideration.
"1. Would there be any legal objection
for Grayson County, Texas, and Bryan County,
Oklahoma, to accept a joint deed to the
bridge in question which lies across the Red
River?
2. If such a deed is permissible and
legal, could the Commissioners Court of Gray-
son County, Texas, authorize tax monies to
be expended for the operation and maintenance
of that part of the bridge which does not lie
in Grayson County, Texas?"
In passing on this matter, it is pertinent to mention
that the United States Supreme Court passed on the question
of the OWneFShiD of the bed of the Red River in the case of
State ofOklahoma v. State of Texas, 261 U.S. 345 (1923),
wherein it was decided that tl- State of Oklahoma owned such
part of the bed of the Red Ri& as lies north of the medial
line'of the river and "The full title and ownership of so
much of the bed of the river as lies south of its medial
line are in the United States".
Here we are concerned with ownership and maintenance
of a bridge which is not only outside the territorial limits
of the County of Grayson but also wholly outside the terri-
torial limits of the State of Texas, with the exception of
the abutment to the bridge on the Texas side, which lies in
Grayson County, Texas.
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Honorable Dean Martin, page 2 (C-703)
We assume that the road leading to the bridge, or the
road to be built is or will be a County road, and not a
State Highway. See Attorney General's Opinion O-5775 (194&),
which we enclose herewith.
Section 2, Article 11 of the State Constitution provides
as follows:
"The construction of jails, court-houses and
bridges, and the establishment of county poor
houses and farms, and the laying out, construction
and repairing of county roads shall be provided
for by general laws." (Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to' the foregoing provisions of the consti-
tution the following laws touching on the subject were
passed:
1. Article 718, Vernon's Civil Statutes, providegin
part,as follows.
"After having been authorized as provided
in Chapter One of this title, the Commissioners
Court of a county may lawfully Issue the bonds
of said county for the following purposes:
. . .
4. To purchase and construct bridges
for public purposes within the county or across
a stream that constitutes a boundary line of
the ...." (Emphasis added.)
2. Article 6796, Vernon's Civil Statutes, provides as
follows:
"Whenever any stream constitutes either in
whole or in part the boundary line between two
or more counties, or when two or more counties
are jointly interested in the construction of
a bridge, whether over a stream or elsewhere,
it shall be lawful for the counties so divided
or interested to jointly erect bridges over
such stream or over any other stream, upon such
equitable terms as the Commissioners Court of
each county interested may agree upon."
3. Article 2351, Vernon's Civil Statutes, provides, in
part,as follows:
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, 1
Honorable Dean Martin, Page 3, (c-703)
"Each commissioners court shall:
. . .
4. Build bridges and keep them in repair.
. . .II
In passing on Article 877, Vernon's Civil Statutes,
which is the predecessor of Article 718, and which has sub-
stantially the same language as Section 4 of Article 718,
supra, the Supreme Court in Bell County v. Lightfoot, Atty.
Qen., 104 T. 346, 138 S.W. 381 (1911) held:
I,
... That the authority to construct bridges
for public purposes, embraces the repair and
maintenance of such structures.'
This holding is ileo'~supportedby Aransas.Countv
v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., 108 T. 21b, 191 S.W. 553,
71917).
Touching on the point as to constitutionality of expendi-
tures for bridges crossing streams wholly outside the terri-
torial limits of the state,it is s&ted in 11 C.J.S. 1015,
Bridges, Sec. 17, as follows:
"A state has been held authorized to parti-
cipate in the construction of interstate bridges
as against the contention that the river to be
bridged did not form the boundary line where the
technical boundary was on the high portion of
the bank of such river. ...' Citing El.;~;;~orn-
mission of Texas v. Vaughn, 288 S.W.
xwCiv;App. 192b, error ref.)
In the Vaughn case, supra, the court stated:
"The contention that Texas cannot pay the
costs of any portion of the bridge beyond her
territorial limits Is also without merit.
Article 3, Section 56, Subd. 6 of the Consti-
tution, authorizes the Legislature to enact
local or special laws 'for the erection of
bridges crossing streams which form boundaries
between this and any other state.' No limlta-
tion is placed upon this grant of power either
with reference to the territory over which an
Interstate bridge might be constructed or as
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Honorable Dean Martin, page 4,(c-703)
to its cost, In fact, the makers of the funda-
mental law knew that one end of an interstate
bridge must of necessity rest within another
state, that territory of both states must be
spanned by it, that the occasion might arise
when such a bridge would be of vital necessity,
or at least of much greater value to this state
than to the other state into which it ooened,
and they left all these matters to the.Legis-
lature without any.restriction upon its authority
to construct the bridge. ... (Emphasis added.)
"In some jurisdictions by Legislative en-
actment the costs of bridges crossing boundary
streams between counties, or In some instances
between cities, are to be borne equally by the
respective counties or cities interested. ...
The broader rule was recognized by the Texas
Legislature in Article 6796, where it is pro-
vided that adjoining counties may contract to
build bridges over boundary streams 'upon such
equitable terms as the commissioners' court of
each county interested may agree upon.'"
The Vaughn case, supra, defines a boundary as follows:
"The contention that Red River is not with-
in Texas and does not form her boundary is with-
out merit with respect to the subject matter of
this suit. While the south cut bank does legally
and technically form the boundary with reference
to Texas civil and criminal jurisdiction and
ownership over the territory, still, with reference
to preventing social and commercial intercourse
with her sister state, a primary object for her
entering the Union, the river forms the barrier
separating them. A bridge on either bank of the
river will not remove the barrier. The structure
required must necessarily rest on each high bank
of the river, span the entire territory between
them including the river , with its ends opening
Into each of the states, and when this Is done
there is of course but one structure with refer-
ence tb its use. Therefore, from that viewpoint,
not only the banks, but the river and all terri-
tory necessary to be spanned by the bridge in
order to effectthe purposes of social and business
intercourse between the states, is the true
boundare." (Emphasis added.)
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Honorable Dean Martin: page 5; (C-703)
Keiser v. Union County, 156 Pa. 315, 26 A. 1066, (1893),
decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, expresses the
view upon this question as follows:
"A stream is equally the boundary line,
whether the line Is Its middle thread, or its
westernmost ripple. To find the boundary, you
must find the stream and then the part of it
defined as the line; but, wherever that is, it
is the stream, and it is the boundarv onlv be-
Therefore, it is our opinion that the County of Grayson
is legally authorized to accept the proposed deed and the
County of Grayson is authorized to expend tax monies for the
operation and maintenance of said bridge.
SUMMARY
The County of Grayson is legally authorized
to accept the proposed deed which will convey a
bridge across the Red River, and Grayson County
is authorized ?o expend tax monies for the opera-
tion and maintenance of said bridge,
Yours very truly,
WAGGONER CARR
Attorney General of Texas
DAVID LONGORIA U
Assistant Attorney General
DL/vmo
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE
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Honorable Dean Martin, page 6, (c-703)
W. V. Geppert, Chairman
Arthur Sandlln
John Banks
C. Daniel Jon@, Jr.
APPROVED FOR TIiEATTORNEY GJINERAL
BY: T. B. Wright
Enclosure
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