Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion

,~~~EATTORNEY GENERAL OF-TEXAS PRICE DANIEL .4TTOR?awGENERAL September 22, 1952 Hon. Larry 0. Cox Executive Director Board for Texas State Hospitals and Special Schools Austin, +xas opinion. HO. V-152j Re: Construction of Texas Constitution, Article XVI, Sections 12, 33, and 40, as applied to certain employees and contractors who are receiving compensatlon~ Dear’‘iI9O Cox: from the uuited States. You have requested the opinion of this of-.. tlce~ on the following questions: . Is it In violation of the’Constitutlen to employ kd pay a art-time employee. at the Big P Spring Statue Hosplta who is also drawing pay as an enlisted man in the armed services of the United States? 2. Is it in violation of the Constitution to retain on our payroll a doctor who in no way neg- lects his duties to the State of Texas but who does after duty hours, act as an lndcpendent contractor )or the Veterans Administration (in this IdStanCe Di’. Rap C. Sloan of the Big Sprlng State Hospital)’ without monetary profit being received from the Veterans A&al& istratlon. f.or his services? 3* If your answer ‘to quest%on nQo@er two above Is In the afflr~matlvep .would 'It ‘differ. If Dr. t;yn; drew oompensatlon from the Veterans Admlnbtra- 4, I8 it In violation of the Constltutlem .” ‘.. for the Big Spring State Hospital to utlllse the aer--~ .. .,,~. vices. of an Independent contractor and pay him not as an employee but on a purchase* vouoher, when such a per- ron 18 on the yr&l$ of the Veterans Admlnlstratlon as an employee I@ e 09 Dr. Ca W. Atherton.) HOII. Lury 0, Cox, page 2 (v-1527) 5. .Is It in violation of the Constltutien ,.for the B$g ‘Spring State Hospital to utlllee the ser- vices of an independent contractor and pay him not a8 an employee but on a purchase voucher, when such a person is in private practice and 1s not an employee of the Veterans Administration but does draw compensa- tion from the Veterans Administration as an independ- ent contractor as consultant? (E@g.,Br. J. C. Banker.) 6. Is It In violation of the Constitution for the Rexla State School and Hometo retain on Its payrolL four employees who are ex-servicemen of World ‘War 11, who are attending Veterans .4dminlstratlon School at night and of course, drawing compensation from the Veterans Aiminlstratlon for such training? . 7. In construlng both Sections 33’.and~40 of Article XVI0 is it unconstitutional t6 employ any of the above categories’of persons when they are pres: ently In the Rational Guard, the Rational Guard Re- ‘ serve9. or the Organized Re.serves of the United States? .There are three se&ions of Article xVI’of the Texas Constitution which .relate to,the subjeot : matter. of these que~st1ons.a Seotlon 12 statea: “lo memberof Congress nor person holding or exercising any o!flce of profit or trust under the United States, er el- ther of .Ihem, ‘or umder amy foreign power, shall be elig%ble as a notuber of the Leg- irlature or hold er exercise any offloo of proi or trust under this 'State.n section 33 provides: “The Accounting Officers of thi.s Stats shall.rrelther draw nor pay a warrant upon the Treasury in favor OS any person for salary or comp6nsatl,oa ,a8 agent, offi- ce*. or appointee who holds at the same time any other ojflce or position of honor, *rust or profit, under this State or the unlted States, excrpt.as prescribed In this Constitution. Provided, that this restric- tion as to the drawing .aud paylmg af’ war- rants upon the Treasury shall not apply to officera of tbs National Guard of Texas, . , - Hon. Larry 0. Cox, page 3 (V-1527) the National Guard Reserve, the Offi- cersReserve Corps of the United States, nor to enlisted men ~of then National Guard, the Kational Guard Reserve, and the ‘Organized Reserves of the United States, nor to retired officers of the United States Army9 Navy? and Marine Corps, and retired ~warrant ,offlcers ,and~. retired enlisted man of ,thp ,united States Army9 Navy,’ a,dd Marine Corp~~.~’.“. 7 And Section 40 says:’ “No person shall hold or exercise, at then same time, more ‘than one Civil Office of emolument, except that of Jus- tice of Peace, County Commissioner No- tary Public and Postmaster 0 . . a JGlus the same mjlitary personnel listed in Section 33/$ unless otherwise specially provided herein. Provided,.that nothing In this Constitution-shall be construed to prohibit . 0 u itary per- sonnel listed in Section 3 from hold- ing in conjunctionwith such office any other office .or posl,tion of, honor, trust or profit 9 under ‘this State or the ., United States, or from voting at any Election; General, SpeciaJ-.or Primary in this State when otherwise qualified.” Thus Section 12 prohibits a person from holding *any~o %fice of profit or trust” ,knder the State of Texqs if thst person holds such an office under the United States,. another state oft the Ubiol$, or a foreign power; section 40 prohibits the hold- ing of. mere, than one llcivil office of’ emolument” whether in the state or” federal government, certain civil and military offices or positions of “honor trust or profit” excepted; and Section, 33 ,prohl.bl&s payments of salary or compensation from the State Treasury to agents, officers or employees of the State’who at t.he same time hold another “office or position of honor, trust or profit” under the state or federal government) certain military personnel excepted y In answer to your first rqu0stion, we call your attention to two opinions of-the Texas Supreme Hon. Larry 0. Cox, page 4 (V-1527) Court which involved the exceptions in favor of cer- tain military personnel. $ktlsenter 135 SJ&2d 562 (, _ _, euDarQ, 140 TAX. 271, 167 SiWSci In the first case, Carpenter, the Chairman and Executive Director of the Texas Unemployment Com- pensation Commission was commissioned and on active duty in the Army of ?.he United States as a result of being ordered to service as an officer of the National Guard. The Supreme Court held that he remained an OS- ficer of the National Guard within the meaning ofhi: exceptions in Sections 33 and 40 and therefore not vscated hls~~civil office; that ds mllltary’ap- pointment did not violate Section 12 of Article XVI of the Constitution$ and that mandamuswould lie to oompel payment of his salary as a state officer. The Cramer case concerned the existence of.. an off&e of temporary district judge which existence dspeti de.d on t h e status of the regdar judge. The regular judge who had ~recelved a temporary oommlsrlon and was on ackve duty In the Army of the United States, was held by the Supreme Court to have been ~onunissloned in the llOfficers Reserve Corps” within the meaning of Sections 33 and 40. For this reason the Court held t&it he was excepted from,the prohibitions of those sections, that he had not abandoned his civil offioe by accepting the commission, and that mandamuswould lie on behalf of his successor to compel payment of the successor”8 salary as temporary judge. The Court expressly pointed out that the exceptions to Seotlonsjj and 40 are not limited by but must control, Section 12: 3qbny other construction would render the amendments to Sections 33 and 40 mean- inglese, and would mean that the4r adoption by the people was an idle gesture. Then, too if it be contended that the amendmenta to Sections 33 and 40 are in conflict wlth Section 12 of Article 1.6, it must ba noted that such amended seations, Nos.,33 and !+O, are the latest expression of the will of the people, and any provision@ of the Con- stitution prevfously exlrting must, In case OS conflict, ield to them. State v. Brown- son, 94 Tex. t 36, 61 S.W. 3.143 Gillespie v’. Li htfoot 103 Tex. 359,.127 S.W. 799." (1%7 S,W.Jd at 152.) Hon. Larry 0. Coxb page 5 (V-1527) Pour opinion request and accompanying corre- spondence describe the enlisted men referred:to in your first question as llpart-tlme .emplopeeson The Assistant Auditor describes them as “part-time attendants.” We conclude that the nature of their relationship with the State is that of employment rather than a relationship in the nature of an 810ffice,a and, therefore, that none of. them hold “an office of profitTor* trustl~ or~‘“a civil office of emolument” wlthln the prohibition8 of Sec- t.ions 12 and 40 res eetively. Att’y Gen. Ops: V-303 (1947.) d-5349 f19b3vo Cf. Lowe v. Statq, 83 Tex. . Grim. i34, 201 S,W. 986 (19lm. However, each of these enlisted men receives from the State salary or conpensatlon as an employee, and this of,flce has construed the term “appolntee,8’ as used in’section 33, to ba a synonym of the term employ- * Attly Gen. 0~:. O-2607 (1940)e Therefore the pro- Elktidn of Section 33 mayyapply to these emiloyees depending on thk gnswers to two.?remaining questions~’ Is their *‘enlisted. status a ilposltkon of ?honor/: trust or profit,,. under * 0 . the United States”? If their hen- listed status is such a position, are any of these men within the exceptional categories enumerated In Sec- tion 33? There are no judiclel authorities tn point on the first question, ‘The Carnenter and’cramer, cases both concerned commissioned officers. But this office ha8 .previously held that Section 33 prohibited payment of twelve days 1’“vacation pay” to an enlisted man who was “drafted for service in the United States Army” from State employment 0 Attly Gen.Cp..G-3335 (1941). After quoting Section 33, that opinion concludes: ~~ItFrom the above It Is clear, without argument; that sunless a man falls within o*~e,$f