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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RONMEL WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 1224 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order April 5, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0003755-2009
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2017
Ronmel Williams appeals from the April 5, 2016 order entered by the
Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We
affirm.
On June 15, 2010, Williams pled guilty to two counts of criminal
attempt (homicide).1 On August 17, 2010, the trial court sentenced Williams
to two concurrent terms of 15 to 30 years’ incarceration. On August 24,
2010, he filed a post-sentence motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial
court denied on August 27, 2010. On September 8, 2010, Williams filed a
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 901.
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direct appeal, challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. On May
11, 2011, this Court denied Williams’ petition for allowance of appeal from
the discretionary aspects of his sentence and allowed counsel to withdraw.
On May 27, 2011, Williams filed a pro se “petition for review” in the
trial court. The trial court denied Williams’ petition. On June 29, 2011,
Williams filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order. On March 7,
2012, this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded with directions
that the petition be considered Williams’ first PCRA petition and that counsel
be appointed to represent Williams. After a hearing on May 11, 2012, the
PCRA court dismissed Williams’ petition and granted his PCRA counsel’s
request to withdraw. Williams appealed, and this Court affirmed on May 8,
2013.
On September 16, 2014, Williams filed a “Motion to Correct
Patent/Obvious Error Nunc Pro Tunc.” The PCRA court considered the
motion as Williams’ second PCRA petition, which it dismissed on November
21, 2014. Williams appealed, and this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s order
on August 12, 2015.
On March 4, 2016, Williams filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his
third. On March 8, 2016, the PCRA court sent Williams notice of its intent to
dismiss his petition without a hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 907. On March 31, 2016, Williams responded to the
PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss. On April 5, 2016, the PCRA court
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dismissed Williams’ petition. On April 19, 2016, Williams timely filed a
notice of appeal.
Williams raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Did sentencing court err in Sentencing Appellant to a
15-30 years sentence for an Attempted Homicide Where
Serious Bodily Injury (SBI) was never found clearly
violates Title 18 PaC.S. § 1102(c)?
2. Did trial court err in not holding Appellant’s PCRA claims
in the fashion of an illegal and unconstitutional sentence?
Williams’ Br. at 6.
Before addressing the merits of Williams’ PCRA petition, we must first
determine whether his petition was timely.
It is well settled that “the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a
jurisdictional requisite.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 175
(Pa.Super. 2015), app. denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015). A PCRA petition
“including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of
the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A
judgment is final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking [] review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3).
Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a
judgment of sentence became final only if the petitioner alleges and proves
one of the following three statutory exceptions:
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the
presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); see Brown, 111 A.3d at 175. In addition,
when invoking an exception to the PCRA time bar, the petition must “be filed
within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(2).
Williams’ judgment of sentence became final on June 10, 2011, when
the time to seek review in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expired.2 He
had one year from that date, that is, until June 10, 2012, to file a timely
PCRA petition. His current petition, filed on March 4, 2016, is therefore
facially untimely. Williams’ petition remains untimely unless it alleges and
proves a PCRA time-bar exception.
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2
Williams did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with our
Supreme Court within 30 days after this Court affirmed his sentence on May
10, 2011. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (“[A] petition for allowance of appeal shall
be filed with the Prothonotary of the Supreme Court within 30 days after the
entry of the order of the Superior Court . . . sought to be reviewed.”).
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Williams appears to argue that his petition is timely under the newly
recognized constitutional right exception to the PCRA time bar. 3 He
contends that his PCRA petition was timely because he filed it within 60 days
of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016). Williams’ Br. at 8-9. In Montgomery,
the Supreme Court held that Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012),
created a substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 732. In Miller, the Supreme Court held
that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the
time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel
and unusual punishments.’” 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (emphasis added).
Although Williams filed the instant PCRA petition within 60 days of the
Montgomery decision, neither Montgomery nor Miller provides Williams
with relief. First, Williams was 24 years old at the time he committed his
crimes, and the Miller rule is limited to those who were under the age of 18.
Second, Williams was sentenced to two concurrent 15- to 30-year
sentences, not a life sentence without parole; Montgomery did not extend
Miller’s ruling to non-life sentences.
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3
“The Constitutionality in Montgomery, where Substantive Due
Process applies to Appellant and the new ruling gives Appellant 60 days to
file under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)[(1)](iii).” Petition for Post Conviction
Relief Act, 3/4/16, at 6.
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To the extent Williams argues that he is entitled to present PCRA
claims pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013), and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), he failed to file his petition
within 60 days of both of these decisions as required by section 9545(b)(2).
Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that Alleyne does not apply
retroactively to cases pending on collateral review. Commonwealth v.
Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016).
Because Williams has neither alleged nor proven any exception to the
one-year time bar, the instant PCRA petition is untimely. Accordingly, the
PCRA court properly dismissed the petition.4
Order affirmed.
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4
The PCRA court dismissed Williams’ petition without an evidentiary
hearing. “We review the PCRA court’s decision dismissing a petition without
a hearing for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d
988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014). We note that the right to an evidentiary hearing
on a PCRA petition is not absolute. Id. “[A] PCRA court may decline to hold
a hearing on [a] petition if petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous or lacks
support from either the record or other evidence.” Commonwealth v.
duPont, 860 A.2d 525, 530 (Pa.Super. 2004). Here, the PCRA court did not
abuse its discretion by dismissing Williams’ PCRA petition without an
evidentiary hearing, as it found that the petition was without merit. Order,
4/5/16, at 1.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/21/2017
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