MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Mar 03 2017, 5:49 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Earl McCoy Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
McCoy Law Office Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana
Katherine Modesitt Cooper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael D. Houser, March 3, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A05-1603-CR-638
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas H. Busch,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79C01-1502-FA-3
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Michael Houser appeals his convictions for child molesting and sexual
misconduct with a minor, challenging certain evidentiary rulings by the trial
court and the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. In the alternative, he appeals
his seventy-five-year sentence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In late 2010, Houser moved to West Lafayette with his wife Ellica, their young
son M.H., and Ellica’s daughter (Houser’s stepdaughter), K.N. K.N., who was
twelve or thirteen years old and was in sixth grade at the time, became best
friends with A.E., who at the time was eleven or twelve years old. A.E. spent a
lot of time at K.N.’s house, including many overnights.
[3] In February 2012, K.N. reported to her school counselor, Christina Morales,
that she wanted out of her house because of certain things that were happening
there. She did not allege any sexual abuse by Houser, but she was taken to
Heartford House, a forensic interview facility in Lafayette. There, she was
interviewed by Dawn Gross, an investigator with the Tippecanoe County
Prosecutor’s Office. K.N. “related two or three touching incidents” involving
Houser but did not tell Gross “everything that happened” to her because she
was “scared” that “nobody would believe me and I didn’t want them to judge
me.” Tr. pp. 288, 307. A few days later, Jacob Amberger, who at the time was
a detective with the Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s Department and who had
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watched the Heartford House interview of K.N., interviewed A.E. at the girls’
school. A.E. said “some things” but did not “make any disclosures about being
sexually molested or abused by anybody[.]” Id. at 409.
[4] Over the next year-and-a-half, K.N.’s and A.E.’s disclosures evolved. In
October 2013, K.N. claimed that Houser had molested her “[o]ver 100 times.”
Id. at 309. A.E. was ultimately interviewed approximately “4 or 5 times,” id. at
344, and in mid-to-late 2013 told both her mother and Gross that she had been
raped by Houser.
[5] In February 2015, the State charged Houser with ten felonies. The most serious
were two counts of Class A felony child molesting alleging that he had sex with
both K.N. and A.E. before they turned fourteen. The State also charged
Houser with a third count of child molesting alleging that he fondled or touched
K.N. before she turned fourteen; five counts of sexual misconduct with a minor
for conduct alleging abuse of K.N. after she turned fourteen; and one count of
child exploitation alleging that he took sexual photographs of K.N. Finally, the
State charged both Houser and Ellica with one count of neglect of a dependent.
[6] K.N. and A.E. were the State’s main witnesses at trial. K.N. testified that
Houser started abusing her “[m]aybe a few weeks” after they moved to West
Lafayette (in late 2010, when K.N. was twelve or thirteen years old), id. at 286,
and continued to do so until February 2012, which is when K.N. made a report
to her school counselor. She testified that Houser had sex with her and touched
her breasts and vagina on multiple occasions—“too many to count,” id. at
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322—both before and after her fourteenth birthday in December 2011. K.N.
also testified, over Houser’s objection, about an incident that occurred during
the summer of 2011 in which she was on a boat with Houser and Ellica, K.N.
and Ellica were naked, and Houser took photos of them while they were
holding their legs up.
[7] A.E. took the stand after K.N. and testified that Houser had raped her right
before or during her seventh grade school year (when she was twelve or thirteen
years old). One day at Houser’s house, Houser “stopped” her, picked her up,
“threw” her on a couch, “ripped off” all of her clothes, “pinned” her down, and
“penetrated” her. Id. at 340-42. She explained that it “hurt really bad” and that
she cried. Id. at 342. She also testified that Houser told her that he would
“hurt” her if she told anybody what he had done. Id. at 343. When asked why
she did not immediately report the rape, A.E. said that she was “afraid”
because she “didn’t know what would happen.” Id. at 345.
[8] Amberger testified regarding his investigation of the case. After he said that he
had information about “a cell phone and the cell phone being used to take some
photographs,” id. at 409, the prosecutor questioned him as follows:
Q: Detective Amberger you mentioned something about
pictures at any point were pictures--did you look for
pictures?
A: Yes I did.
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Q: And did you find any pictures that matched any
description that [K.N.] had provided?
A: There were some pictures found on a cell phone. It was a--
they were close up photographs of a woman’s--
Id. at 412-13. At that point Houser’s attorney objected. During the ensuing
sidebar, the attorneys discussed the fact that Amberger had found photos of
vaginas on Houser’s phone but had been unable to determine whose vaginas
were depicted. The prosecutor explained that she was “trying to get into” the
course of Amberger’s investigation, not “these actual photographs,” that she
thought Amberger may have been trying to “help our case,” and that she
thought Amberger would say “no” when she asked him if he found “any
photographs matching the description that [K.N.] provided.” Id. at 414. The
trial court sustained the defense objection and admonished the jury to
“disregard the last answer” but allowed the prosecutor to ask Amberger a
leading question to get him to say that he had not found any photos matching
K.N.’s description. Id. at 414-15. As revealed by the exchange that followed,
that plan largely failed:
Q: Detective Amberger [K.N.] described some photographs
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And just a yes or no answer, did you ever find any
photographs that match the exact description that [K.N.]
gave you?
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A: Yes. Exact description trying to remember here. I would
say yes. They were close.
Q: Specifically did you find any photographs with her and her
mother?
A: No.
Id. at 415. This prompted the court to admonish the jury, again, “that you are
to disregard the testimony about any photographs that he might have found and
that should not be part of your consideration in this case at all.” Id. at 415-16.
After a few more questions by the attorneys, the trial court asked the jury if they
had any questions for Amberger. The jurors submitted two questions, both
relating to the photos found on Houser’s phone. This resulted in a third
admonishment from the court:
I had stricken from the record any testimony about any
photographs that were found in the house you are to completely
disregard anything that you may have heard on that subject and
you are not to allow that subject to affect your deliberations in
any way whatsoever. You didn’t hear that testimony, it didn’t
exist.
Id. at 421-22.
[9] The State also called Gross as a witness. She testified that she is a child forensic
interviewer, described what a forensic interviewer does, and detailed her
qualifications to do so. She said that she has conducted “[o]ver 1500” such
interviews in her career. Id. at 430. She then testified about “disclosures” by
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children—revelations of sexual abuse, domestic violence, or witnessing a crime.
Id. Over Houser’s objection, she was allowed to testify that disclosing is “a
process,” not “a onetime thing,” and that not every interview results in a
disclosure. Id. at 430, 435. She added that children usually do not disclose
immediately, sometimes because of shame, guilt, or threats. Id. at 435. Gross
also testified that she interviewed K.N. and A.E. and that both of them made
disclosures to her. Beyond acknowledging that A.E. made disclosures
“particularly related to being raped,” id. at 444, Gross did not go into the details
of the disclosures.
[10] Before the jury began its deliberations, the State dismissed three of the five
sexual-misconduct charges and the child-exploitation charge, but the jury found
Houser guilty on the remaining six charges.1 The court ordered Houser to serve
consecutive sentences of forty years and thirty-five years for the Class A felony
child molesting of K.N. and A.E., respectively, and imposed concurrent terms
on the other convictions, for a total sentence of seventy-five years.
[11] Houser now appeals.
1
The jury found both Houser and Ellica guilty of neglect of a dependent. With regard to Houser, the trial
court “merged” that verdict into one of the child-molesting counts, so there is no conviction or sentence for
him to challenge on the neglect-of-a-dependent count. Ellica appealed her conviction, and we affirmed. See
Ellica Ann Houser v. State, No. 79A02-1603-CR-556 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2016).
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Discussion and Decision
[12] Houser raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court should
not have allowed the State to present certain evidence. Second, he asserts that
the State presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions. Third, he
challenges his seventy-five-year sentence.
I. Admission of Evidence
[13] Houser contends that the trial court should not have allowed the State to
present two pieces of testimony: Gross’ testimony about the disclosure process,
and K.N.’s testimony that Houser took photos of her while she was naked.
Generally, our trial courts enjoy broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility
of evidence, and we will reverse such a ruling only for an abuse of that
discretion. Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 675 (Ind. 2013). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id.
A. Gross’ Testimony
[14] Houser first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed
Gross to testify that it is common for “child victims to not disclose sexual abuse
until long after the abuse occurred” and for “children to fail to disclose
everything initially.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 12-13. Houser is correct that this
testimony served to bolster the credibility of K.N. and A.E., both of whom
alleged that they had been abused months or even years earlier. He is also
correct that such testimony is generally inadmissible under Evidence Rule
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704(b), which provides that “[w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning
intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations;
whether a witness has testified truthfully; or legal conclusions.” But Houser
acknowledges that our Supreme Court has held, in cases like Sampson v. State,
38 N.E.3d 985 (Ind. 2015), and Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 1995),
that such testimony becomes admissible if the defendant opens the door to it.
Here, Houser did exactly that when, as he himself puts it, he “point[ed] out the
fact that K.N. and A.E. made prior inconsistent statements” about whether
Houser had abused them. Appellant’s Br. p. 14. Therefore, we affirm the trial
court’s decision to allow the challenged testimony.2
B. K.N.’s Testimony
[15] Houser argues that the trial court should not have allowed K.N. to testify that
Houser took photos of her while she was naked.3 He contends that the only
relevance of this testimony was to show that he has a propensity to commit sex
2
Houser relies in part on Hamilton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 628 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d on reh’g, 49 N.E.3d 554
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. There, we reversed the defendant’s convictions for child molesting
because the trial court had allowed a forensic interviewer to testify that she had not observed any signs of
coaching when talking to the child accusers. In reaching this conclusion, however, we held that the
defendant had not opened the door to the testimony by asking the accusers “whether anyone had told them
what to say in court.” Id. at 634. In fact, the State did not even argue that the defendant had opened the
door. Id. Here, Houser does not deny that he opened the door to Gross’s testimony about the disclosure
process when he highlighted K.N.’s and A.E.’s inconsistent statements.
In the alternative, Houser suggests that our Supreme Court’s decisions about defendants opening the door in
this context are “dangerous and poorly reasoned.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. That is a matter for Houser to take
up with our Supreme Court.
3
The State suggests that Houser did not object to this testimony and must therefore establish fundamental
error. Having reviewed the lead-up to the testimony, we believe that Houser adequately preserved his
objection. See Tr. pp. 272-75.
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offenses, in violation of Evidence Rule 404(b). While Houser is correct that
Evidence Rule 404(b) bars “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” for the
purpose of proving “a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” the rule also
establishes that such evidence can be admitted if it is relevant for some other
purpose. Here, we agree with the State that K.N.’s testimony was relevant to
show that Houser was “grooming” K.N., that is, preparing her for further
sexual contact with him. This Court has rejected 404(b) challenges to grooming
evidence on several occasions. See, e.g., Guffey v. State, 42 N.E.3d 152, 161 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; Piercefield v. State, 877 N.E.2d 1213, 1215-17 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied; see also Ware v. State, 816 N.E.2d 1167, 1175 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he testimony that Ware took S.H. on several vacations
may have some relevance to the State's theory that Ware was “grooming” S.H.
by regaling him with vacations and other luxuries[.]”). The trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it allowed K.N.’s testimony.4
[16] In a related argument, Houser contends that even if K.N.’s testimony was
properly admitted, the jury was irreparably tainted by Amberger’s subsequent
testimony about finding photos on Houser’s phone. As described above, after
being instructed to disregard that portion of Amberger’s testimony, the jury still
sought to ask questions about the photos. Houser contends that the jury’s
4
Houser notes that “K.N. testified that Houser had already been molesting her for sometime before these
photographs were taken so this evidence does not establish ‘grooming’ by Houser.” Appellant’s Br. p. 17.
He cites no authority for the proposition that grooming can only occur pre-abuse.
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desire to do so demonstrated that it was “impossible” for the jury to ignore the
photos, that there could be “no confidence in the jury’s verdicts,” and that
therefore the trial court should have declared a mistrial. Appellant’s Br. pp. 17,
19, 32. However, Houser did not ask the court to declare a mistrial, so he
waived this issue for purposes of appeal. See Berkman v. State, 976 N.E.2d 68,
74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[17] Recognizing his waiver, Houser argues that the trial court’s failure to declare a
mistrial on its own constituted fundamental error. The doctrine of fundamental
error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule that requires the
defendant to show that the alleged error was so prejudicial to the defendant’s
rights as to make a fair trial impossible. See Gavin v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1038,
1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The defendant must show that, under the
circumstances, the trial judge erred in not raising the issue because the alleged
error (1) constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary
principles of due process and (2) presented an undeniable and substantial
potential for harm. Id.
[18] Houser has not satisfied this onerous standard. After the jury submitted
questions about the photos on Houser’s phone, the trial court admonished it, in
no uncertain terms, as follows:
I had stricken from the record any testimony about any
photographs that were found in the house you are to completely
disregard anything that you may have heard on that subject and
you are not to allow that subject to affect your deliberations in
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any way whatsoever. You didn’t hear that testimony, it didn’t
exist.
Tr. pp. 421-22. Houser acknowledges that “the law will presume that the jury
will follow the trial court’s admonishments,” Appellant’s Br. p. 18 (citing Ware,
816 N.E.2d at 1176), and he gives us no reason to think that the jury’s questions
in this case were the result of willful disregard for the court’s earlier
admonishments as opposed to uncertainty about them. The court’s final
admonishment left no doubt about the irrelevance of the photos. The trial court
did not commit fundamental error by failing to declare a mistrial.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[19] Next, Houser challenges the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. He
acknowledges that K.N. and A.E. both testified that Houser abused them and
that criminal convictions can be based solely on the uncorroborated testimony
of a victim. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). However,
he argues that his convictions should nonetheless be reversed under the
incredible dubiosity rule, which allows an appellate court to “impinge on the
jury’s responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses only when it has
confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly
uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d
749, 755 (Ind. 2015) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court recently clarified
that “the appropriate scope of the incredible dubiosity rule as utilized in Indiana
and other jurisdictions requires that there be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2)
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testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion;
and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 756.
[20] Here, Houser’s argument focuses on alleged flaws in K.N.’s and A.E.’s
testimony. But the State also presented circumstantial evidence in the form of
testimony from A.E.’s mother, who testified that Houser was “clingy” and
“controlling” with K.N., Tr. p. 376, and that A.E. developed behavioral
problems after she started spending time with K.N. and at K.N.’s house, and
from Gross, who testified about the disclosure process generally and the timing
of K.N.’s and A.E.’s disclosures specifically. Because Houser cannot satisfy the
first and third prongs of the Moore standard, we need not address the second
prong.
III. Sentencing
[21] Houser contends that even if his convictions stand, his sentence should not. He
argues that the trial court erred in its finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors and that it imposed an inappropriate sentence that we should reduce
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B).
A. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
[22] Houser disputes the trial court’s finding of aggravating and mitigating factors.
Our trial courts enjoy broad discretion in finding such factors, and we will
reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Coy v. State, 999 N.E.2d 937, 946
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
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[23] In sentencing Houser, the trial court found four aggravating circumstances: (1)
Houser was in a position having care, custody, or control of K.N.; (2) Houser
threatened to harm A.E. if she told anyone what Houser did to her; (3) the
“seriousness of the crime with multiple victims and multiple acts over a lengthy
period of time and the element of force”; and (4) Houser was in a position of
trust as to A.E. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 55. It also found two mitigating
circumstances: Houser’s “physical illness” and his “limited intelligence.” Id.
[24] Houser first argues that the trial court should have found as a mitigating factor
that his incarceration would impose an undue hardship on his “special needs
son.” Appellant’s Br. p. 25. However, he does not tell us how old his son is,
what his son’s special needs are, or why the hardship imposed by his
incarceration will be “undue.” Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion in this regard. See, e.g., Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146,
1154 (Ind. 1999) (“Many persons convicted of serious crimes have one or more
children and, absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find
that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.”).
[25] Houser also attacks two aspects of the trial court’s “seriousness of the crime”
finding: the existence of multiple victims and “the element of force.” Houser
contends that because he was separately convicted and sentenced for crimes
against both K.N. and A.E., reliance on “multiple victims” as an aggravating
fact amounts to an improper “double enhancement.” Appellant’s Br. p. 26.
We disagree. It is entirely proper for a trial court to rely on the existence of
multiple victims as a basis for imposing consecutive sentences, as the trial court
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did here. See, e.g., O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 952 (Ind. 2001). As for
the use of force, Houser argues that it should not be given aggravating weight
because “it only applied to one of the two alleged victims” (A.E.). Appellant’s
Br. p. 26. He cites no authority in support of this proposition, and we are aware
of none. And even if Houser were right about the use of force (or the multiple
victims), he says nothing about the other fact cited by the trial court: that his
acts of abuse were not isolated but were instead committed over a lengthy
period of time. For these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court abused its
discretion by finding the “seriousness of the crime” to be an aggravating factor.
B. Appropriateness
[26] Houser also asks us to exercise our authority under Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B), which provides that an appellate court “may revise a sentence authorized
by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds
that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
character of the offender.” “Whether a sentence is inappropriate ultimately
turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage
done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to light in a given case.”
Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). Because we generally defer to the
judgment of trial courts in sentencing matters, defendants have the burden of
persuading us that their sentences are inappropriate. Schaaf v. State, 54 N.E.3d
1041, 1044-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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[27] Here, Houser tells us nothing about his “character.” Regarding the nature of
his offenses, he notes only that “[t]here were no injuries to the victims” (we
assume he is referring to physical injuries), that “[t]here was no evidence of oral
sex, anal sex, toys, devices, restraints, or deviate sexual conduct of any kind,”
and that “the victims in this case were 13 or 14 years of age when the crimes
were committed,” meaning that they were “as old as any child molesting
victims could be since all child molesting cases involve children under the age
of 14.” Appellant’s Br. p. 30. All true, but the aggravating factors found by the
trial court loom large in our analysis. One of Houser’s victims was his own
stepdaughter and was in his care, custody, and control, and Houser abused that
position on multiple occasions over an extended period of time. He was also in
a position of trust with A.E., who spent a significant amount of time at his
house. He forced her to have sex with him and then threatened to harm her if
she told anyone. Houser suggests that his sentence is excessive “compared to
the fact patterns set forth in many child molesting or sex offense cases,” id., but
he does not identify any specific appellate decisions in support of that claim.
He has failed to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is
inappropriate.
[28] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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