IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 74208-6-1
Respondent, )
) DIVISION ONE C"I
v. )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINIgN
RICHARD LLEWELLYN DANIELS, JR., )
) .f-
Appellant. ) FILED: March 6, 2017
)
APPELWICK, J. — The trial court imposed a $100 DNA fee on Daniels as
part of his LF0s. Daniels argues that the trial court should have inquired into his
ability to pay. He also argues that the fee violates equal protection and due
process. We affirm.
FACTS
Richard Daniels pleaded guilty to attempted residential burglary. He was
sentenced to 24.75 months of imprisonment. The trial court did not impose
discretionary legal financial obligations (LF0s) due to Daniels's inability to pay.
But, it found that the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) fee was mandatory and
imposed it against Daniels. Daniels appeals the imposition of the $100 DNA fee.
DISCUSSION
RCW 43.43.754(1)(a) requires all persons convicted of a felony to provide
a DNA sample. Relatedly, RCW 43.43.7541 requires that every felony sentence
includes a $100 DNA fee.
No. 74208-6-1/2
Daniels argues that the trial court should have inquired into his ability to
pay the DNA fee before imposing it. He contends that not inquiring into his ability
to pay violates RCW 10.01.160(3) and the holding in State v. Blazina, 182 Wn.2d
827, 344 P.3d 680 (2015). In Blazina, the Court held that trial court must inquire
into a defendant's ability to pay before imposing LF0s. Id. at 837-38. Similarly,
RCW 10.01.160(3) states that courts "shall not order a defendant to pay costs
unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them."
But, costs that are required by statute are not subject to the obligation to
inquire into the defendant's ability to pay. State v. Clark, 195 Wn. App. 868, 872,
381 P.3d 198 (2016), review granted in part on other grounds by Wn.2d ,
P.3d (2017); see also State v. Mathers, 193 Wn. App. 913, 921, 376
P.3d 1163 (2016)("Mathers asserts Blazina clearly implicates that the DNA. . .
statute should be read in conjunction with RCW 10.01.160. However, this
interpretation is overbroad. . . . Throughout the [Blazina] opinion, the court made
clear that it was reviewing only discretionary LF05."), review denied, 186 Wn.2d
1015, 380 P.3d 482 (2016). Unlike discretionary LF0s, the legislature
unequivocally requires imposition of the mandatory DNA fee without regard to
finding the ability to pay. State v. Shelton, 194 Wn. App. 660, 673-74, 378 P.3d
230 (2016), review denied, 187 Wn.2d 1002, 386 P.3d 1088 (2017). The trial
court was therefore not required to inquire into Daniels' ability to pay.
Daniels also makes constitutional arguments. He argues that refusing to
waive mandatory fees on criminal defendants violates equal protection because
civil litigants receive fee waivers in some circumstances. But, Washington courts
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No. 74208-6-1/3
have previously held that waiving court fees for civil litigation, but not waiving the
DNA fee for criminal litigants does not violate equal protection. See Mathews,
193 Wn. App. at 925-26. "[B]ecause there is a rational basis to impose the fee
for every felony sentence for the cost of collection as well as to fund the ongoing
cost to operate and maintain the DNA database, the DNA fee statute does not
violate equal protection." State v. Lewis, 194 Wn. App. 709, 720, 379 P.3d 129,
review denied, 186 Wn.2d 1025 (2016).
Daniels also argues that, in light of Blazina, imposing the $100 DNA fee
violates substantive due process. But, a due process constitutional challenge to
the DNA fee statute is not ripe for review until the State attempts to enforce
collection of the fee. Shelton, 194 Wn. App. at 672-73. The record merely
shows that the judge imposed this fee on Daniels. Nothing in the record shows
that the State has sought to collect this fee or punish Daniels for nonpayment.
This argument is therefore not ripe for review.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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