People v. Way

2017 IL 120023

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 120023)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. IDA WAY, Appellee.

Opinion filed April 20, 2017.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride, and Burke concurred in the judgment and
opinion.

Justice Garman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Karmeier.

OPINION

¶1 This appeal arises from the aggravated driving under the influence (DUI)
conviction (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(C) (West 2010)) of defendant, Ida
Way, following a stipulated bench trial in the circuit court of St. Clair County. The
circuit court barred defendant from introducing evidence that a medical condition
 possibly caused her to lose consciousness prior to hitting another vehicle, which
resulted in serious injury to two people. The appellate court reversed and remanded
for further proceedings. 2015 IL App (5th) 130096, ¶ 23. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse the appellate court and affirm the circuit court.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 On January 28, 2012, defendant drove over the center line of a two-lane road in
Shiloh, Illinois, and struck head-on a truck driven by Emily Wood. The accident
resulted in great bodily harm and permanent disability to Wood, who was eight
weeks pregnant at the time, and great bodily harm to Christopher Rodgers,
defendant’s 14-year-old son, who was a passenger in defendant’s vehicle.
Defendant consented to blood and urine samples on the day of the accident. The
urine test revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) metabolite, which
results from cannabis use.

¶4 Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS
5/11-501(a)(6), (d)(1)(C) (West 2010)). Section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) makes it a misdemeanor offense to drive or be in
actual physical control of any vehicle in this state while there is any amount of a
drug, substance, or compound in the person’s breath, blood, or urine resulting from
the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West
2010). Section 11-501(d)(1)(C) of the Vehicle Code elevates the misdemeanor
offense to felony aggravated DUI if the person, in committing the violation of
subsection (a), was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in great
bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another, when the violation
was a proximate cause of the injuries. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2010).

¶5 Prior to trial, both parties filed motions in limine concerning the admissibility
and relevance of evidence suggesting a medical reason other than drug use for
defendant falling asleep or losing consciousness and causing the vehicle crash. The
State argued that pursuant to People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, such evidence is
irrelevant in an aggravated DUI prosecution arising out of section 11-501(a)(6) of
the Vehicle Code. The State asserted that it need only prove that there were drugs in

-2-
 defendant’s system at the time of the accident and that her driving was the
proximate cause of the automobile accident.

¶6 Defendant acknowledged in her motion that the State was not required to show
impairment. She asserted, however, that she should be allowed to rebut the
presumption of impairment and present an alternative basis for the cause of the
accident. Specifically, she advanced that she “should be allowed to present
evidence of non-impairment along with an alternative medical explanation for [her]
loss of consciousness immediately before the accident.” No medical records were
presented to the trial court, and neither party described the nature of any medical
evidence in their motions.

¶7 The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine and denied defendant’s
motion. In a written order, the trial court stated that “[t]he State must prove that
there was an accident with the defendant driving one car” and that the injured
person was injured “as a result of the accident.” The trial court rejected defendant’s
claim “that the causal connection must be able to be rebutted.” The trial court found
that the provision of the Vehicle Code at issue indicated a legislative intent to
require “strict liability as to the accident.”

¶8 The case proceeded to a bench trial. The parties stipulated that on the evening of
January 28, 2012, defendant was driving when she crossed the center line of traffic
and collided head-on with Wood’s truck. Christopher told police that prior to the
collision, his mother “started to fall asleep and he felt the car shifting over.” He
“grabbed the wheel and jerked it back,” but his mother “was sleeping and they hit
[Wood’s] car.” Shiloh police officer Greg O’Neil arrived at the crash scene and
observed Wood sitting in the driver’s seat of a severely damaged vehicle,
complaining of a broken leg. Wood was trapped in the vehicle. He also saw
defendant sitting on the shoulder of the road with her son nearby. Officer O’Neil
observed that defendant had injuries to her arm and that her speech seemed slurred.
He located a small plastic bag of cannabis sitting on the ground near defendant’s
open purse.

¶9 A forensic scientist tested defendant’s urine specimen taken on the day of the
accident. It contained THC metabolite, which results from cannabis use. Defendant
told Officer O’Neil at the hospital that she “ ‘use[s] cannabis, Xanax, and
Perco[c]et,’ ” and that she “ ‘did two one [sic] hits earlier.’ ” Finally, the parties

-3-
 stipulated that as a result of the accident, Christopher suffered great bodily harm
and Wood suffered great bodily harm and permanent disability.

¶ 10 Defense counsel then informed the trial court that had the court ruled in her
favor, defendant would have “attempted to call Dr. Helen McDermott, who is
[defendant’s] physician,” who would have testified that defendant “has low blood
pressure and it is possible that the loss of consciousness right before the accident
was caused by this condition and not caused by any particular drug. Of course, Dr.
McDermott could not say that was the cause, simply that it was a possibility.”
Defense counsel also stated that defendant would have testified “that she was not
impaired and had not done any illegal drugs that particular day” and would have
called three lay witnesses “who saw [her] shortly before the accident to testify that
she was not impaired.”

¶ 11 The trial court found defendant guilty of all three counts of aggravated DUI.
The court noted that although there was no evidence of impairment, that was not
relevant to a determination of guilt under the charged counts. The trial court entered
judgment on one count after finding that the remaining two merged.

¶ 12 Prior to sentencing, the trial court noted defendant’s “level of impairment” as
mitigation but highlighted in aggravation that her driver’s license was revoked at
the time of the accident stemming from a prior DUI. Defendant was sentenced to 18
months in prison followed by one year of mandatory supervised release.

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant argued that she was denied her right to present a defense
because she was not allowed to present evidence that a medical condition, rather
than drug impairment, caused her to cross the center line of traffic and collide with
Wood’s vehicle. 2015 IL App (5th) 130096, ¶¶ 12, 16. In addressing this argument,
the appellate court acknowledged that, under Martin, 2011 IL 109102, a
presumption of impairment exists in aggravated DUI cases involving the presence
of a controlled substance in a defendant’s body, and the State is not required to
prove impairment in such cases. 2015 IL App (5th) 130096, ¶ 19. The appellate
court concluded, however, that Martin was of limited relevance because this court
did not address what kind of defenses a defendant may seek to introduce at trial to
establish that his or her driving did not proximately cause the accident. Id.

-4-
¶ 14 Instead, the appellate court looked to the law of proximate cause in civil cases,
noting that it presents essentially a question of foreseeability and reflects a policy
decision that limits how far a defendant’s legal responsibility should be extended
for conduct that, in fact, caused the relevant harm. Id. ¶ 16. The appellate court
further noted that in tort law, an “act of God” that renders a driver incapable of
controlling his or her car can defeat a negligence claim if it “constitutes the sole and
proximate cause of the injuries.” Id. The appellate court ultimately concluded that it
should be for the trier of fact to determine whether a sudden illness was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident and that it was not harmless error for the trial court
to bar such evidence. Id. ¶ 20. The appellate court held that defendant should be
allowed to present such evidence and the State could then attempt to discredit or
rebut defendant’s evidence. Id. ¶ 21. For these reasons, the appellate court reversed
defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 15 This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2015).

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 At issue is whether defendant should have been allowed to present evidence
from her physician that a medical condition, rather than drug impairment, led her to
lose consciousness and was the sole cause of the resulting collision with Wood’s
vehicle.

¶ 18 “Generally, evidentiary motions, such as motions in limine, are directed to the
trial court’s discretion, and reviewing courts will not disturb a trial court’s
evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.” People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368,
392 (2004). However, where the ruling on a motion in limine is based on an
interpretation of law, our review proceeds de novo. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d
365, 369 (1999).

¶ 19 The State contends that the trial court correctly barred any medical evidence
because it was irrelevant under section 11-501 of the Vehicle Code in determining
whether defendant’s physical act of driving with drugs in her system was a
proximate cause of the resulting accident and injuries to Wood and Christopher.

-5-
¶ 20 Section 11-501 of the Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part:

“(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any
vehicle within this State while:

***

(6) there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the
person’s breath, blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or
consumption of cannabis listed in the Cannabis Control Act *** .

***

(d) Aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or
drugs, or intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination
thereof.

(1) Every person convicted of committing a violation of this
Section shall be guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of
alcohol, other drug or drugs, or intoxicating compound or
compounds, or any combination thereof if:

***

(C) the person in committing a violation of subsection (a)
was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in
great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement
to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the
injuries[.]” (Emphases added.) 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West
2010).1

1
This provision of the Vehicle Code was recently amended and no longer imposes a
zero-tolerance ban on driving with cannabis in the driver’s system. Pub. Act 99-697 (eff.
July 29, 2016). The Act now prohibits driving with either 5 nanograms or more of
delta-9-THC per milliliter of whole blood or 10 nanograms or more of delta-9-THC per
milliliter of other bodily substance, as measured within two hours of driving. Id.

-6-
¶ 21 As this court has previously explained in construing this provision of the
Vehicle Code, “[s]ection 11-501 sets forth the elements of a misdemeanor offense,
then provides sentencing enhancements based upon the presence of other factors.”
Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 14. “ ‘[A]ggravated DUI occurs when an individual
commits some form of misdemeanor DUI, in violation of paragraph (a), and other
circumstances are present. The legislature added aggravating factors that change[ ]
the misdemeanor DUI to a Class 4 felony.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Quigley, 183 Ill.
2d 1, 10 (1998)). “ ‘The essential and underlying criminal act, however, remains
the same: driving while under the influence. The physical injury caused to others by
driving while under the influence produces the felony.’ ” Id. ¶ 24 (quoting Quigley,
183 Ill. 2d at 10).

¶ 22 In Martin, the defendant was found with trace amounts of methamphetamine
and amphetamine in his system after he drove across the center lane of a two-lane
highway causing a head-on collision that resulted in the death of two people. Id.
¶¶ 3-4. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the State failed to prove
him guilty of aggravated DUI because it did not prove a causal link between the
drugs in his system and the car accident in which two persons died. Id. ¶ 20.

¶ 23 In construing the statutory language and rejecting this claim, we recognized that
under the DUI statute, proof of impairment was not necessary in two types of DUI
cases: (1) when the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood or breath was above
the legal limit; or (2) when there was any amount of cannabis, controlled
substances, or methamphetamine in the defendant’s body. Id. ¶ 26 (citing 625 ILCS
5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(6) (West 2008)). We held, after viewing the statute as a whole
and considering all relevant parts, that the legislature intended these two violations
to be “strict liability” offenses as opposed to violations that required proof of
impairment. Id. ¶¶ 21, 26.

¶ 24 This court recognized that our legislature reasonably enacted an absolute ban
on driving with any amount of a controlled substance in the driver’s system because
it is not possible to determine scientifically the amount of drugs it takes to render a
driver impaired. Id. ¶ 23. “Such violations are essentially driving while presumed
impaired.” Id. ¶ 26 n.1. We ultimately held that although there was no evidence that
the drugs in the defendant’s system rendered him impaired or caused the accident,

-7-
 his driving was a proximate cause of the victims’ deaths where his car crossed the
center line and struck an oncoming vehicle. Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 25 In reaching this determination, we emphasized that when an aggravated DUI
charge is based on a violation of section 11-501(a)(6), the Vehicle Code “requires a
causal link only between the physical act of driving and another person’s death [or
serious bodily injury or permanent disability or disfigurement].” Id. ¶ 26; see also
625 ILCS 11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2010) (identical to the aggravating factor in
section 11-501(d)(1)(C) when the motor vehicle accident results in death of another
person). Therefore, the State was not required to prove that the defendant was
impaired and that the illegal substance in his system, either alone or in combination
with other factors, affected his ability to drive and was the proximate cause of the
victims’ deaths. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26.

¶ 26 Martin made plain that “the central issue at trial will be proximate cause, not
impairment. A defendant who is involved in a fatal motor vehicle accident while
violating section 11-501(a)(6) is guilty of only misdemeanor DUI, where his
driving was not a proximate cause of the death.” (Emphasis added.) Id. We reiterate
that when an aggravated DUI charge is based on a violation of section
11-501(a)(6), as in this case, section 11-501(d)(1)(C) requires a causal link only
between the defendant’s physical act of driving and another person’s great bodily
harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.

¶ 27 Subsequent to our decision in Martin, our legislature amended section 11-501
but did not change the language in sections 11-501(d)(1)(C) or (F) of the Vehicle
Code. See Pub. Act 99-697 (eff. July 29, 2016). We assume not only that the
General Assembly acts with full knowledge of previous judicial decisions but also
that its silence on an issue in the face of those decisions indicates its acquiescence
to them. In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496, ¶ 25 (citing People v. Villa,
2011 IL 110777, ¶ 36) (“the judicial construction of the statute becomes a part of
the law, and the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of the prevailing
case law and the judicial construction of the words in the prior enactment”).

¶ 28 The facts in this case are virtually identical to Martin. As the State correctly
advances, because defendant was driving with cannabis in her system—a per se
DUI offense requiring no evidence of impairment—an aggravated DUI charge
based on defendant’s involvement in an accident resulting in great bodily harm or

-8-
 permanent disability to another “requires a causal link only between [her] physical
act of driving and another person’s [injuries or] death.” Martin, 2011 IL 109102,
¶ 26. Here, as in Martin, although there was no evidence that the drugs in
defendant’s system rendered her impaired or caused the accident, her “driving [in
violation of section 11-501(a)(6)] was a proximate cause of the victims’ [great
bodily harm].” Id. ¶ 28.

¶ 29 Defendant acknowledges that “the State had sufficient evidence to show that
[she] was at fault when her car crossed the centerline” and collided head-on with
Wood’s vehicle. She asserts, however, that the trial court erred in barring her from
presenting evidence to establish that a sudden medical condition (i.e., low blood
pressure) resulted in her losing consciousness prior to hitting Wood’s vehicle and
was the sole proximate cause of the crash.

¶ 30 As before the appellate court, defendant relies upon a body of case law found in
Illinois civil cases that may preclude a defendant driver’s liability where “ ‘[a] loss
or injury is due to the act of God, when it is occasioned exclusively by natural
causes such as could not be prevented by human care, skill[,] and foresight.’ ”
Evans v. Brown, 399 Ill. App. 3d 238, 246 (2010) (quoting Wald v. Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis R.R. Co., 162 Ill. 545, 551 (1896)); see also
McClean v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 235, 246-47 (1954)
(holding that injuries are caused by an act of God when such injuries are beyond the
power of human agency to prevent); Grote v. Estate of Franklin, 214 Ill. App. 3d
261, 271 (1991) (holding an unforeseeable sudden illness that renders a defendant
incapable of controlling his or her vehicle is an act of God and can preclude liability
for a resulting collision). Defendant also cites this court’s holding that the analogies
between civil and criminal cases in which individuals are injured or killed are so
close that the principle of proximate cause applies to both classes of cases. People
v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392, 401 (2006).

¶ 31 Nothing in the statutory framework at issue prevents a defendant from raising
as an affirmative defense that a collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death
was caused solely by a sudden unforeseeable medical condition that rendered the
defendant driver incapable of controlling the vehicle. We find no basis to preclude
such an affirmative defense. See Evans, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 246 (holding “[a]
sudden illness or death that renders a driver incapable of controlling his car,

-9-
 provided that the event is unforeseeable and beyond the power of human
intervention to prevent, is an act of God”). Therefore, we hold that the trial court
erred in finding that defendant was barred, as a matter of law, from raising as an
affirmative defense that the collision was caused solely and exclusively by a
sudden unforeseeable medical condition that rendered her incapable of controlling
her vehicle.

¶ 32 A defendant who raises this affirmative defense in an aggravated DUI
prosecution, however, bears the burden of establishing that the alleged unforeseen
medical condition constitutes the sole proximate cause of the accident and the
resulting injuries. See id. In the context of this case, sole proximate cause would
mean that defendant’s sudden and unforeseeable medical condition led to her
unconsciousness and was the only cause of the resulting collision with Wood’s
vehicle to the exclusion of the presumed impairment. See Holton v. Memorial
Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95, 134 (1997).

¶ 33 It is well settled that when a defendant asserts that she has not been given the
opportunity to prove her case because the trial court improperly barred evidence,
she must provide the court of review with an adequate offer of proof as to what the
excluded evidence would have entailed. People v. Gibbs, 2016 IL App (1st)
140785, ¶ 36. “The purpose of an offer of proof is to inform the trial court,
opposing counsel, and a reviewing court of the nature and substance of the
evidence sought to be introduced.” People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 457 (1993).
This enables a reviewing court to determine whether exclusion of the evidence was
proper. People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 421 (1992). The “offer need not be a
formal elicitation of the witness’s testimony under oath, but may be informal and
consist of counsel’s representations regarding the contents of the testimony.”
Gibbs, 2016 IL App (1st) 140785, ¶ 36. An offer of proof must be “considerably
detailed and specific” (Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d at 457), and one that “merely
summarizes the witness’ testimony in a conclusory manner is inadequate”
(Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d at 421).

¶ 34 Here, in defendant’s motion in limine, which the trial court denied, she simply
asserted that she “should be allowed to present evidence of non-impairment along
with an alternative medical explanation for [her] loss of consciousness immediately
before the accident.” Thereafter, at trial, defense counsel stated that defendant

- 10 -
 would have testified that she was not impaired on that particular day and would
have called three lay witnesses who saw her shortly before the accident to testify
that she was not impaired.

¶ 35 Defense counsel further stated that, had the court ruled in defendant’s favor, she
would have attempted to call her physician, Dr. Helen McDermott, who would
have testified that defendant:

“has low blood pressure and it is possible that the loss of consciousness
right before the accident was caused by this condition and not caused by any
particular drug. Of course, Dr. McDermott could not say that was the cause,
simply that it was a possibility.”

¶ 36 A sole proximate cause defense was not appropriate in this case unless there
was evidence that the sole proximate cause, not a proximate cause, of the collision
was defendant’s sudden unforeseeable medical condition. Holton, 176 Ill. 2d at
134. Dr. McDermott, however, could not testify that defendant’s low blood
pressure was the cause of her falling asleep or losing consciousness prior to the
accident, only that it was a possibility. Based upon the offer of proof, defendant was
unable to show that her theory as to why she lost control of her vehicle was the sole
proximate cause of the resulting collision to the exclusion of the presumed
impairment. Consequently, we find defendant failed to adequately support her
claim that the trial court improperly barred her affirmative defense from
proceeding.

¶ 37 CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For these reasons, the trial court erred in finding that defendant was barred, as a
matter of law, from raising as an affirmative defense that the accident was caused
solely and exclusively by a sudden unforeseeable medical condition that rendered
defendant incapable of controlling her car. Defendant, however, failed to make an
adequate offer of proof to support this affirmative defense. Accordingly, the
judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and defendant’s conviction and
sentence for aggravated DUI are reinstated.

- 11 -
¶ 39 Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 40 Circuit court judgment affirmed.

¶ 41 JUSTICE GARMAN, specially concurring:

¶ 42 I agree with the reinstatement of defendant’s conviction and sentence for
aggravated DUI. For the reasons stated below, however, I would hold that as a
matter of law, People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, bars a defendant charged with
aggravated DUI predicated on section 11-501(a)(6) of the Illinois Vehicle Code
from raising as an affirmative defense that an accident was caused solely by a
sudden unforeseeable medical condition.

¶ 43 As the majority notes, “[a]t issue is whether defendant should have been
allowed to present evidence from her physician that a medical condition, rather
than drug impairment, led her to lose consciousness and was the sole cause of the
resulting collision with Wood’s vehicle.” (Emphases added.) Supra ¶ 17. The
majority holds that “[n]othing in the statutory framework at issue prevents a
defendant from raising as an affirmative defense that a collision resulting in serious
bodily injury or death was caused solely by a sudden unforeseeable medical
condition that rendered the defendant driver incapable of controlling the vehicle.”
(Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 31. This holding is not only inconsistent with our
precedent in Martin but also violative of legislative intent.

¶ 44 To elevate a misdemeanor DUI to an aggravated DUI requires that “the person
in committing a violation of subsection (a) was involved in a motor vehicle
accident that resulted in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement
to another, when the violation was a proximate cause of the injuries.” 625 ILCS
5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West 2010). Subsection (a) mandates that “[a] person shall not
drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while: *** (6)
there is any amount of a drug, substance, or compound in the person’s breath,
blood, or urine resulting from the unlawful use or consumption of cannabis.” 625
ILCS 5/11-501(a)(6) (West 2010).

- 12 -
¶ 45 In Martin, this court explained that the State is not required to prove
impairment in aggravated DUI cases predicated upon per se misdemeanor
violations. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26. The legislature intended violations of
sections 11-501(a)(1) and 11-501(a)(6) to be “strict liability” offenses. Id. To
discern this legislative intent, this court looked “not only [to] the statutory
language, but also the reason and necessity for the law, the problems that
lawmakers sought to remedy, and the goals that they sought to achieve.” Id. ¶ 21.
Section 11-501(a) is “ ‘intended to keep drug-impaired drivers off of the road.’ ”
Id. ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Fate, 159 Ill. 2d 267, 269 (1994)). This “flat prohibition
against driving with any amount of a controlled substance in one’s system was
considered necessary because there is no standard that one can come up with by
which, unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, one can determine whether one is ***
driving under the influence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Fate,
159 Ill. 2d at 270). Sections 11-501(a)(1) and 11-501(a)(6) “create[ ] an absolute
bar to driving after ingesting a controlled substance.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id. ¶ 23. For that reason, “the legal fiction of presumed impairment”
applies in the context of drug driving. Id. As a result, impairment was not made to
be an element of section 11-501(a)(1) or 11-501(a)(6). Id. ¶ 26 (“[W]hether proof
of impairment is necessary to sustain a conviction for aggravated DUI under
section 11-501(d)(1)(F) [or 11-501(d)(1)(C)] depends upon whether impairment is
an element of the underlying misdemeanor DUI.”). Therefore, the State need not
prove impairment because it is not an element of the offense.

¶ 46 As the majority points out, post-Martin, the Illinois legislature amended section
11-501 but did not change the language in section 11-501(d)(1)(C) or (F) of the
Vehicle Code. See Pub. Act 99-697 (eff. July 29, 2016). “We assume not only that
the General Assembly acts with full knowledge of previous judicial decisions but
also that its silence on an issue in the face of those decisions indicates its
acquiescence to them.” Supra ¶ 27 (citing In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL
113496, ¶ 25). “This is so because the judicial construction of the statute becomes a
part of the law, and the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of the
prevailing case law and the judicial construction of the words in the prior
enactment.” People v. Villa, 2011 IL 110777, ¶ 36. By declining to modify the
language in section 11-501(d)(1)(C) or (F), the legislature clearly acquiesced to this
court’s conclusion in Martin that, when a section 11-501(d)(1)(C) or (F)

- 13 -
 aggravated DUI charge is predicated on a per se misdemeanor, impairment is not at
issue because it is not an element. See Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26.

¶ 47 Therefore, when analyzing whether a defendant is guilty of aggravated DUI
predicated upon a per se misdemeanor DUI, the court is concerned only with the
causal link between defendant’s “physical act of driving [or actual physical control]
and another person’s death [or great bodily harm or permanent disability or
disfigurement].” Id. Allowing a defendant to show that an accident was caused
solely by a sudden unforeseeable medical condition is a roundabout way of arguing
that an accident was not caused by defendant’s impaired driving. Such an
affirmative defense improperly assumes that, despite the fact that the State is not
required to prove impairment because impairment is not an element, the defendant
can attempt to disprove any role that impairment may have played.

¶ 48 If defendant were allowed to show that a medical emergency solely caused her
to lose consciousness rather than the presence of drugs in her system, she would be
implicitly putting impairment at issue. The State, in rebuttal, would have to show
that defendant was impaired by the drugs in her system and that this impairment
was in fact “a” proximate cause of the accident and injuries to contest the
defendant’s “sole” proximate cause theory. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (West
2010) (“violation [of subsection (a)] was a proximate cause of the injuries.”
(emphasis added)). Such a result does not comport with the clear legislative intent
to hold a defendant strictly liable for driving with any amount of an illegal
substance in his or her system, in violation of section 11-501(a)(6), where
defendant’s driving proximately causes greatly bodily harm or permanent disability
to another. The legislative intent behind creating the two strict liability violations
was to keep people who ingested any amount of a prohibited drug from getting
behind the wheel of a car. Impairment must be strictly presumed once prohibited
drugs are found in a defendant’s system. If the legislature had wanted to make
impairment an issue, it would have drafted the statute accordingly.

¶ 49 For these reasons, I would hold that a defendant charged with aggravated DUI
predicated on section 11-501(a)(6) is barred from presenting an affirmative defense
that a collision resulting in serious bodily injury or death was caused solely by a
sudden unforeseeable medical condition that rendered the defendant driver
incapable of controlling the vehicle.

- 14 -
¶ 50 CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER joins in this special concurrence.

- 15 -