COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA48
Court of Appeals No. 13CA2318
City and County of Denver District Court No. 11CR3951
Honorable John W. Madden IV, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Hector Toby Sifuentes,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
Taubman, J., concurs
Graham, J., dissents
Announced April 20, 2017
Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Patricia R. Van Horn, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, James S. Hardy, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Hector Toby Sifuentes, appeals the district court’s
order denying his petition for postconviction relief under Crim. P.
35(c). Sifuentes claims that the court erred by concluding that he
did not show prejudice from his counsel’s erroneous advice about
the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. To address his
claim, we identify factors pertinent to the prejudice analysis in this
context. Considering those factors, we agree with Sifuentes, reverse
the order, and remand with directions.
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. Defendant’s Background, the Criminal Charges, and the
Ensuing Plea Agreement
¶2 Defendant was born in Mexico in 1970. He moved to the
United States when he was two years of age and became a lawful
permanent resident in 1988. He also has significant other ties to
the United States, including four United States-citizen children,
several siblings living lawfully in the country, and a disabled mother
(also a lawful permanent resident) for whom he had been acting as
caretaker while sharing a home in Denver. He has committed
several traffic offenses and misdemeanors but no felonies prior to
the charges in this case. None of his prior convictions involved
1
distribution of drugs. Defendant has been receiving medical
treatment for sclerosis of the liver, kidney stones, and class one
diabetes, which has rendered him insulin dependent. He has no
ties — familial or otherwise — to Mexico.
¶3 In 2011, the prosecution charged defendant with distributing
and conspiring to distribute a controlled substance, class three
felonies. He allegedly sold the substance to a confidential informant
in a transaction that was audio- and video-recorded by police.
Defendant later pleaded guilty to an added count of distribution of a
schedule III controlled substance as a class four felony, in exchange
for dismissal of the original charges. The plea agreement did not
include sentencing concessions.
¶4 After conducting a providency hearing and accepting the guilty
plea, the trial court sentenced defendant to Community Corrections
(Comcor) for five years. Comcor, however, rejected defendant when
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) placed him on an
immigration detainer following his conviction. The trial court
therefore resentenced defendant to forty-two months in prison
followed by three years of mandatory parole. Unbeknownst to
defendant and defense counsel, the conviction triggered automatic
2
mandatory deportation (known as removal) under federal law, along
with mandatory detention throughout the ensuing deportation
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (2012).
B. Postconviction Proceedings
¶5 Defendant filed a Crim. P. 35(c) petition for postconviction
relief seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground of ineffective
assistance of his plea counsel. Defendant claimed that his plea
counsel failed to advise him of a clear and unavoidable immigration
consequence flowing directly from his guilty plea — he would be
deported automatically. Instead, his plea counsel advised him that,
in light of his strong ties to this country, he might be able to remain
here even after he pleaded guilty. Defendant maintained that, if he
had been properly advised, he would have rejected the plea
agreement and insisted on proceeding to trial.
¶6 The postconviction court held a two-day evidentiary hearing.
Defendant’s plea counsel testified that the risk of deportation
played a central motivating role in defendant’s plea deliberations.
Defendant emphasized his concern over removal from the country
the first time he spoke with plea counsel, and he repeated that
concern every time thereafter. But the prosecution offered only a
3
guilty plea to distribution of a schedule III controlled substance,
which carried a lower sentencing range than the original charges
but did not avoid the risk of deportation altogether.
¶7 Thus, before the providency hearing, plea counsel advised
defendant that a guilty plea to the reduced charge created a risk of
deportation but deportation would not be automatic and he would
still be eligible for a sentence to probation or Comcor.1 At the
resentencing hearing, plea counsel continued to inform defendant
that, even though he had been placed on an immigration detainer
after his conviction, he still had a chance of staying in the United
States based on his long residential history in the country and his
complicated health issues. As the postconviction court found, all of
this advice was erroneous.
¶8 The postconviction court also heard testimony from defendant
and his sister. His sister testified that defendant’s family resides in
the United States and that he lacks any ties to Mexico. She also
explained that defendant’s medical condition likely rendered a
1 Based on plea counsel’s testimony, the postconviction court found
that, during plea negotiations, counsel had advised defendant that
immigration authorities would consider his lawful permanent
resident status, his length of time in this country, and his family
and health concerns when deciding whether to deport him.
4
longer prison sentence in the United States preferable to faster
deportation to Mexico, where his access to medical treatment would
be uncertain. Defendant reiterated his misunderstanding of the
immigration consequences arising from his guilty plea (i.e., he
thought he would still have a chance to remain in this country). He
explained that he probably would never see his ailing mother again
if he were deported. He also confirmed his sister’s concerns about
his own medical treatment, and he told the court: “I’ll probably die
out there [in Mexico], because I have no one out there, absolutely
nobody. Everybody I have is right here in this courtroom today.”
¶9 Finally, an immigration attorney — whom defendant’s plea
counsel had consulted before his plea — testified at the
postconviction hearing. The immigration attorney explained that
defendant’s plea counsel had consulted her about immigration
issues generally, but she did not offer advice to plea counsel about
defendant’s specific situation. The immigration attorney also
testified that defendant had retained her after his guilty plea and
after ICE had placed him on an immigration detainer. Although she
explained that defendant had retained her shortly before his
resentencing hearing, she did not testify that she advised him of the
5
automatic deportation consequences of his conviction prior to the
resentencing hearing. And the immigration attorney did not
represent him at the resentencing hearing.
¶ 10 The postconviction court denied the petition in a written order.
The court first agreed with defendant that his plea counsel had
failed to properly advise him of the automatic immigration
consequences of his plea: “[I]t is clear that the plea was to an
aggravated felony which made the Defendant automatically
deportable. Further, the plea to an aggravated felony meant that
factors such as the Defendant’s time living in this country, his
health or his family situation would not protect him from
deportation.” Therefore, the court concluded that plea counsel’s
advice “constituted deficient representation.”
¶ 11 According to the court, however, defendant did not suffer
prejudice because “[d]ue to audio and video recordings [of the
offense] there was no rational basis to believe that [he] would not be
convicted at trial.” As a result, the court held that, even if
defendant had known of the correct immigration consequences of
the guilty plea, it would not have been rational for him to reject the
plea offer.
6
¶ 12 The postconviction court further concluded that, even if
defendant had established prejudice from his counsel’s advice, he
was “not entitled to relief due to the circumstances of his
providency hearing.” Specifically, he had signed a written
Crim. P. 11 advisement indicating, among many other points, that
his guilty plea would result in deportation. And, during the
colloquy with the plea court at the providency hearing, defendant
indicated generally that he understood the terms of the written
advisement and asked no questions.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 13 Defendant contends that the district court erred in
determining that his plea counsel’s deficient performance did not
prejudice him. We agree.
A. General Law and Standard of Review
¶ 14 Criminal defendants have a right to counsel, see U.S. Const.
amends. VI, XIV; see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 16, and “the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel,” McMann
v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). This right extends to
plea bargaining. People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33, ¶ 32 (citing Lafler v.
Cooper, 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012)).
7
¶ 15 Ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining may
constitute an adequate ground for postconviction relief under Crim.
P. 35(c). See People v. Hunt, 2016 COA 93, ¶ 12. To prevail on
such a claim, a defendant must establish that (1) counsel’s
performance fell below the level of reasonably competent assistance
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and (2) the deficient
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); accord Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054,
1062-63 (Colo. 2007).
¶ 16 A conclusion on either Strickland prong presents a mixed
question of law and fact. Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800, 807
(Colo. 2009). While we review a district court’s factual findings with
deference, we review the application of law to those findings de
novo. Id. at 808. That is, we independently review the ultimate
determinations on Strickland’s performance and prejudice prongs.
People v. Brown, 250 P.3d 679, 681 (Colo. App. 2010); see also
People v. Newmiller, 2014 COA 84, ¶ 18.
8
B. Analysis
1. Deficient Performance
¶ 17 Although neither party challenges the postconviction court’s
conclusion that defendant satisfied the first Strickland prong, we
explain that the law and the record support the court’s decision.
¶ 18 The offense to which defendant pleaded guilty qualified as an
“aggravated felony” under federal immigration law. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012) (“The term ‘aggravated felony’ [includes]
illicit trafficking in a controlled substance.”). As such, the
conviction not only subjected defendant to mandatory deportation
(preceded by an immigration detainer) but also precluded the
opportunity for him to defend against his removal through an
immigration proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2012). A
lawful permanent resident may ordinarily offer a defense to
deportation through a proceeding known as “cancellation of
removal.” Id. This proceeding, however, is not available where the
defendant is convicted, as here, of an “aggravated felony.” Id.
¶ 19 Yet plea counsel advised defendant that remaining in this
country would still be possible even after his guilty plea. Because
counsel’s advice ran counter to succinct, clear, and explicit
9
requirements of immigration law, counsel’s advice was deficient.
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2010); see also
United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 785-88 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding that, where deportation is virtually certain as a
consequence of the guilty plea, advising the defendant of the mere
potential for deportation is deficient performance); Hernandez v.
United States, 778 F.3d 1230, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2015) (same). We
move, therefore, to the second Strickland prong — prejudice from
the deficient performance.
2. Prejudice
¶ 20 In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong requires the
defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59
(1985); see also Corson, ¶ 34. “Reasonable probability” means a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome and
is a standard “somewhat lower” than a preponderance of the
evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Carmichael, 206
P.3d at 806-07. The standard presents an objective inquiry that
asks not whether the defendant likely would have been acquitted at
10
trial but whether counsel’s conduct affected the outcome of the plea
process. Corson, ¶ 35; People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 529 n.8 (Colo.
1987). Some objective evidence must corroborate the defendant’s
testimony that he would have made a different decision about the
plea if he had been properly advised. Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 807.
In the end, the defendant “must convince the court that a decision
to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the
circumstances.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.
¶ 21 Various factors should inform a court’s analysis of whether a
decision to reject the guilty plea would have been rational. First, a
court should consider the strength of the prosecution’s case. See,
e.g., People v. Morones-Quinonez, 2015 COA 161, ¶ 13; State v.
Tejeiro, 345 P.3d 1074, 1083 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014). Second, the
attractiveness of the plea deal and the risks of going to trial should
be analyzed. See Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 806 (recognizing that the
comparative sentencing exposure between standing trial and
accepting a plea offer may be important to the decision whether to
plead guilty).
¶ 22 Third — in the case of a noncitizen defendant who wishes to
remain in the United States — a court must take into account the
11
defendant’s ties to this country as judged against the defendant’s
ties to another country. See Morones-Quinonez, ¶ 13; People v.
Kazadi, 284 P.3d 70, 74 (Colo. App. 2011), aff’d, 2012 CO 73; see
also Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311, 316 (6th Cir.), cert. granted
580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016); DeBartolo v. United States, 790
F.3d 775, 779-80 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d
630, 644-45 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Chaidez
v. United States, 568 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013); Sasonov v.
United States, 575 F. Supp. 2d 626, 636-38 (D. N.J. 2008); Sial v.
State, 862 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Padilla v.
Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 329-30 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013);
People v. Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d 120, 129-31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012);
State v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 1021-22 (Wash. 2011); cf.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 (recognizing that preserving a noncitizen’s
right to remain in this country may be more important than any
potential jail sentence).
a. The Postconviction Court’s Reasoning
¶ 23 We address initially the postconviction court’s view that
defendant was not entitled to relief “even if [he] had established
both prongs of the Strickland test” because he was properly advised
12
by the written Rule 11 advisement. We disagree because, where a
defendant meets the two-prong test set forth in Strickland, the
defendant succeeds on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
and must be allowed to withdraw his plea. See, e.g., Carmichael,
206 P.3d at 807; Pozo, 746 P.2d at 527 n.5.
¶ 24 The postconviction court believed that People v. DiGuglielmo,
33 P.3d 1248 (Colo. App. 2001), dictates a different result. But the
DiGuglielmo division recognized that Strickland governed the
defendant’s claim that his plea counsel had provided ineffective
assistance by advising him that he would receive a deferred
judgment (he was later sentenced to probation instead). Id. at
1251. The division concluded that “because both the written Crim.
P. 11 advisement form and the trial court at the providency hearing
specifically addressed the issue of a deferred judgment,” and the
defendant did not ask clarifying questions, he could not succeed on
his ineffective assistance claim. Id.
¶ 25 As we understand the case, the DiGuglielmo division decided
that the defendant could not show prejudice from his counsel’s
advice because the plea court had correctly advised him of the
specific plea consequence that his counsel had allegedly failed to
13
mention. See also United States v. Kayode, 777 F.3d 719, 728-29
(5th Cir. 2014) (recognizing that, while judicial admonishments
during a plea colloquy have no bearing on the first Strickland prong,
they may be relevant under the second prong to assess prejudice).
In other words, the defendant could not show prejudice because he
actually knew of the true consequences of his plea.
¶ 26 Those are not the facts of this case. Although the written
Rule 11 advisement mentioned deportation as a consequence of the
guilty plea, the plea court did not. (Nor did the court recognize on
the record that defendant was not a citizen.) Indeed, the
DiGuglielmo division distinguished its decision from another case on
that very basis. See 33 P.3d at 1252 (“Rael is distinguishable
because there is no indication in that opinion whether the trial
court had advised the defendant there about the issue that was the
focus of his claim of misrepresentation.”). Furthermore, the
supreme court’s subsequent Carmichael decision illustrates that “a
proper advisement by the district court does not preclude, as a
matter of law, a finding of prejudice based on counsel’s specific,
erroneous advice.” Morones-Quinonez, ¶ 21 (discussing Carmichael,
206 P.3d at 807-09). This principle is “particularly apt in the
14
immigration context, where a general advisement about the
possibility of adverse immigration consequences may not be
sufficient to dispel a specific promise or misrepresentation by
counsel.” Id. at ¶ 22; State v. Favela, 311 P.3d 1213, 1222 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing that even a court’s unequivocal warning
may be insufficient to cure prejudice from counsel’s deficient
performance because that warning alone does not ensure that the
defendant received effective assistance in evaluating such an
advisement). And defendant here “does not contend that []he had
questions or concerns, or that []he was confused at the providency
hearing, based on irreconcilable advisements from [his] counsel and
the court, which is the situation addressed in DiGuglielmo.”
Morones-Quinonez, ¶ 24. Instead, he contends that he relied on his
counsel’s specific, erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty. Id.
¶ 27 Finally, unlike in DiGuglielmo, the premise of the
postconviction court’s analysis here was that defendant did not
know of the automatic deportation consequence of his plea,
15
regardless of the written advisement.2 Hence, the postconviction
court focused on what he would have done if he had known.
¶ 28 The postconviction court also cited People v. Chavez, 7 P.3d
1047 (Colo. App. 1999), to support its view that defendant could not
obtain relief even if he satisfied both prongs of Strickland. Because
Chavez does not concern an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
however, it sheds no light here. Consistent with our conclusion
that Chavez and DiGuglielmo are inapposite, the People do not rely
on those cases (or the written Rule 11 advisement) on appeal.
2 The dissent takes a different view, concluding that defendant
actually knew of the true consequences of his plea. The dissent
cites defendant’s prior criminal acts. Because those prior acts did
not result in immigration consequences, however, they could not
have made him aware of the immigration consequence of the guilty
plea here. On the contrary, those earlier experiences gave him
reason to believe his plea counsel’s erroneous advice that his new
conviction would not guarantee deportation either. Further, while
defendant retained an immigration attorney after his plea and
before his resentencing, neither that attorney nor defendant
testified that she had advised him of the automatic deportation
consequence of his plea before the resentencing hearing. And the
record shows that both his plea counsel and the sentencing court
(on whom defendant could be expected to rely) seemed to believe
that avoiding deportation was still possible. It is not surprising,
therefore, that he did not move to withdraw his plea before or at the
resentencing hearing. Regardless, the relevant question is what
defendant knew at the time of his plea, not at the resentencing
hearing.
16
¶ 29 We turn therefore to the postconviction court’s discussion of
what defendant would have done if he had known of the automatic
deportation consequence of his guilty plea. Defendant claimed that
he would have rejected the plea deal and gone to trial if he had been
properly advised. The postconviction court deemed his contention
“not to be credible.” Although framed as a credibility finding, the
court’s conclusion mirrors the ultimate determination of whether
defendant showed Strickland prejudice in the guilty-plea context.
As explained, such a determination is a legal conclusion that we
review de novo. See Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 807; Brown, 250 P.3d
at 681; see also Chhabra v. United States, 720 F.3d 395, 406 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“The district court’s findings as to basic, primary, or
historical fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of
review; the court’s ultimate rulings as to Strickland’s components,
and its ultimate decision as to whether counsel’s performance
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, are reviewed de
novo.”) (citations omitted).
¶ 30 Of course, where a district court’s prejudice determination
depends heavily on the court’s credibility findings or its resolution
of factual disputes, we would give the court’s findings substantial
17
deference. Here, however, the postconviction court did not base its
denial of defendant’s claim on conflicting testimony, defendant’s
demeanor, a reputation for mendacity, or any other traditional
credibility factor. On the contrary, the court credited defendant’s
testimony as to the historical facts — e.g., what he told his plea
counsel (he wanted to avoid deportation if possible) and what
counsel told him (deportation was not automatic under the plea
deal). In denying defendant’s prejudice claim nonetheless, the court
relied entirely on its view that rejecting the plea would not have
been rational even accepting defendant’s account of the facts.
Because this conclusion is intertwined with the ultimate question of
prejudice, we naturally review it de novo.
¶ 31 The postconviction court concluded that defendant’s rejecting
the plea agreement and going to trial would not have been a
rational decision because acquittal at trial was very unlikely given
the recordings of the alleged drug transaction, his failure to identify
a viable defense, and the prosecution’s refusal to offer an
immigrant-friendly plea deal. The court thus assumed that
defendant would be convicted and deported in any event and,
therefore, he faced only a decision between two to eight years in
18
prison (under the plea deal) and four to sixteen years in prison (if
convicted at trial).3
¶ 32 The postconviction court weighed some of the factors relevant
to the prejudice inquiry. But the court’s analysis did not go far
enough.
¶ 33 Neither the strength of the prosecution’s case nor the
difference in the sentencing ranges between the plea deal and a
conviction at trial are necessarily dispositive when a defendant
faces immigration consequences. Morones-Quinonez, ¶ 13; see
Orocio, 645 F.3d at 643 (noting that likely acquittal at trial is not
the “sine qua non of prejudice”). As explained, a court must
consider all relevant factors — especially the defendant’s ties to the
United States and the resulting severity of deportation — before
reaching a conclusion about prejudice. See Morones-Quinonez,
¶ 13; see also Lee, 825 F.3d at 316 (“[A] claimant’s ties to the
United States should be taken into account in evaluating, alongside
the legal merits, whether counsel’s bad advice caused prejudice.”);
Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
3The record does not reveal, however, whether defendant was
advised of the sentences he faced if convicted of the original charges
at trial.
19
court should, before reaching a conclusion as to prejudice, take into
account all relevant factors.”). Although “the strength of the State’s
case may be considered as part of a larger analysis of prejudice,”
the postconviction court’s “almost exclusive reliance on the strength
of the State’s case and the benefits of the plea was improper[.]”
Tejeiro, 345 P.3d at 1083.
¶ 34 We thus discern error in the postconviction court’s legal
analysis, and we now consider defendant’s claim in light of all
relevant factors.
b. Balancing All Relevant Factors
¶ 35 We first take heed of the Colorado Supreme Court’s
recognition that “when an alien defendant enters a guilty plea based
on erroneous representations as to deportation consequences, he or
she will in most cases be permitted to withdraw the plea.” Pozo,
746 P.2d at 527 n.5. We also recognize that, in compliance with
Carmichael, defendant here presented some objective corroborating
evidence of his prejudice claim (e.g., his plea counsel’s testimony
confirming defendant’s concerns about deportation and her
erroneous advice about deportation). See 206 P.3d at 807; see also
Hernandez, 778 F.3d at 1233-34 (recognizing that plea counsel’s
20
statement corroborated defendant’s allegations of ineffective
assistance).
¶ 36 Next, we agree with the postconviction court that the
prosecution’s case against defendant appeared to be strong. How
strong, however, is not clear. The confidential informant who
allegedly bought the drugs from defendant did not testify at the
postconviction hearing. Nor did any other prosecution witness
testify. Although the record indicates that audio and video
recordings of the alleged sale exist, neither recording was admitted
into evidence or described in detail through the testimony at the
postconviction hearing.4 Hence, the admitted evidence does not
reveal precisely how incriminating (or ambiguous) the recordings
may be. Other documents in the record briefly describe the
recordings, but they were not admitted into evidence at the hearing
either. Even if we may consider such documents, they suggest that,
4 Defendant’s plea counsel testified that, according to her memory,
the recordings captured the incident and persuaded her that this
case would be difficult to defend. She did not, however, provide any
details of what the recordings depicted. And, although defendant
initially agreed with the postconviction court’s statement that the
recordings showed him committing the crime, he later clarified that
his belief was based solely on what others had told him about the
recordings. He had never seen them. Beyond this brief exchange,
he did not admit his guilt.
21
while the audio recording contains some statements implicating
defendant, the video recording does not actually depict a drug sale.
¶ 37 Because we recognize, however, that the prosecution did not
bear the burden of proof at the hearing, we accept for our analysis
that the prosecution’s case was formidable. But we cannot
conclude on this record that a conviction would have been “the sure
thing that the government claims.” DeBartolo, 790 F.3d at 779.5
Moreover, while the apparent existence of a likely trial defense may
strengthen a defendant’s prejudice showing, establishing such a
defense is not absolutely required in cases involving counsel’s
failure to accurately advise the defendant of the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea. People v. Deltoro, 31 N.E.3d 389, 394
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015); see Zemene v. Clarke, 768 S.E.2d 684, 691 (Va.
2015) (holding that, in advancing a claim of prejudice due to
defense counsel’s failure to advise of the immigration consequences
5 Defendant’s plea counsel admitted that she did little to investigate
possible defenses at trial. She did not, for instance, seek to learn
the identity of the confidential informant. Cf. People v. McKeel, 246
P.3d 638, 642 (Colo. 2010) (recognizing that work as a confidential
informant and prior drug use are among the “potentially unsavory
details” about a witness that a jury may be entitled to hear). These
circumstances further complicate the analysis of the strength of the
prosecution’s case.
22
when entering a plea agreement, the defendant “need not
demonstrate a likelihood of acquittal at trial”). In sum, the strength
of the evidence against defendant is not as probative of rationality
as it would be in a nonimmigration case. Morones-Quinonez, ¶ 15.
¶ 38 Turning to the attractiveness of the plea deal, we first observe
that the deal did not give defendant what he repeatedly said he
wanted — a chance to stay in this country. Instead, the guilty plea
guaranteed his automatic deportation. Thus, although the evidence
against defendant was compelling, “[t]he threat of removal
provide[d] [a] powerful incentive to go to trial [where] a plea would
result in removal anyway.” Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Orocio, 645 F.3d at
645); see Keserovic v. State, 345 P.3d 1024, 1030 (Idaho Ct. App.
2015) (Given the defendant’s “asserted desire to avoid deportation”
and the virtual certainty of deportation if he pleaded guilty, “it may
well have been in [his] better interests to take his chances at trial”
even “accepting as true the State’s assertion that the evidence of
[his] guilt was overwhelming.”); see also Sasonov, 575 F. Supp. 2d
at 637; United States v. Purpura, No. 1:CR-94-171-01, 2012 WL
716149, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2012) (unpublished opinion);
23
Padilla, 381 S.W.3d at 329; Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 130-31;
Sandoval, 249 P.3d at 1022.
¶ 39 Moreover, the downside of going to trial was not immense,
which is to say that the upside of the plea deal was hardly
irresistible even assuming defendant probably would have been
convicted at trial. True, the plea deal offered a more favorable
sentencing range, two to eight years in prison versus four to sixteen
years if he were convicted at trial. But this difference is modest
when compared to the large disparities analyzed in other cases.
See, e.g., Orocio, 645 F.3d at 634 (comparing a plea deal offering
credit for time served and two years of supervised release with a
trial conviction carrying a minimum ten-year prison sentence);
Sandoval, 249 P.3d at 1021-22 (considering a plea deal of 6 to 12
months as opposed to a trial conviction carrying a minimum
sentence of 6½ to 8½ years and a maximum of life in prison); cf.
Carmichael, 206 P.3d at 807 (considering the “large disparity
between the sentence exposure as represented to Carmichael by
[defense counsel] and the actual exposure Carmichael faced by
going to trial”).
24
¶ 40 In addition, mitigating factors (such as the absence of prior
felonies and his serious health problems) could lead defendant to
reasonably believe that a sentence at the higher end of the
sentencing range and consecutive sentences were not likely if he
went to trial. (Recall that defendant originally received a Comcor
sentence and then a lower-range prison sentence after he pleaded
guilty.) In fact, the postconviction court — which had also been the
sentencing court — never mentioned consecutive sentences as a
realistic possibility at trial, nor did the prosecutor. Because
consecutive sentences were not mandatory, and because the
sentencing ranges overlapped, defendant could possibly have
received the same sentence after conviction at trial as he would
have received after pleading guilty.
¶ 41 In any event, preserving the right to stay in the United States
“may be more important to the [defendant] than any potential jail
sentence.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368. This is especially true where,
as here, the defendant is a lawful permanent resident facing
permanent banishment from a country he has lived in since he was
a toddler. See Orocio, 645 F.3d at 645 (“[Defendant] rationally
could have been more concerned about a near-certainty of multiple
25
decades of banishment from the United States than the possibility
of a single decade in prison.”). In addition, unrebutted evidence at
the postconviction hearing revealed that defendant’s serious health
problems (which require daily insulin treatment) might make a
longer prison sentence, where some medical treatment would likely
be available, preferable to earlier deportation to a place where his
ability to secure treatment is uncertain. Cf. DeBartolo, 790 F.3d at
779-80 (The defendant “might even have preferred a lengthy prison
term in the United States to a shorter prison term that would lead
more quickly to deportation, because the lengthy prison term would
at least keep him in the same country as his family, facilitating
frequent visits by family members, which is important to
prisoners.”).
¶ 42 Finally, the unrebutted evidence established defendant’s tight
connection to the United States. He has lived here for over forty
years, virtually his entire life. Defendant’s family, including his
children and ailing mother, live here too. He has no apparent ties
to Mexico. Therefore, removal from the United States would be “the
equivalent of banishment or exile” from his family and long-time
26
home. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947);
Sandoval, 249 P.3d at 1022.
¶ 43 With all this in mind, we must decide not “whether a decision
to reject a plea of guilty was the best choice, but only whether it
[was] a rational one.” Picca, 947 N.Y.S.2d at 130 (discussing Padilla
standard). For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that
rejecting the guilty plea offer and going to trial would have been a
rational decision for defendant here. Id. (recognizing that the
relevant question is whether taking “a chance, however slim, of
being acquitted after trial would have been rational”); see People v.
Chavez-Torres, 2016 COA 169M, ¶ 32 (“Chavez-Torres alleged in his
postconviction motion that rejecting the plea offer would have been
rational under the circumstances because his entire immediate
family lived in the United States and he had no family in, or
connections to, Mexico. These unrebutted allegations sufficiently
assert Strickland prejudice.”).
¶ 44 Although the People rely on People v. Campos-Corona, 2013
COA 23, the facts of that case were quite different. There, the
district court found that the defendant had desired only to avoid
prison time under the plea agreement, not to avoid deportation. Id.
27
at ¶ 15. Because his plea “advanced that goal,” the court found
that he would not have changed his plea even if he had known he
would be deported. Id. In contrast, the postconviction court here
recognized that securing a chance to stay in this country was
important to defendant. And, to the extent a chance to receive a
Comcor sentence was also important to him, the guilty plea did not
advance that goal either. Contrary to his counsel’s advice, his plea
subjected him to an immigration detainer that caused Comcor to
reject him and resulted in his resentencing to prison.
¶ 45 Because defendant has established a reasonable probability
that his plea counsel’s deficient performance affected the outcome
of the plea process, he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; Pozo, 746 P.2d at 529 n.8.
III. Conclusion and Remand Directions
¶ 46 We reverse the order denying defendant relief under Crim. P.
35(c), and we remand to the district court with directions to grant
defendant’s petition. In conjunction with that relief, the court shall
vacate defendant’s conviction, permit him to withdraw his guilty
plea, and reinstate the original charges against him.
JUDGE TAUBMAN concurs.
28
JUDGE GRAHAM dissents.
29
JUDGE GRAHAM, dissenting.
¶ 47 In my view, the majority opinion has misapplied and expanded
the prejudice test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984), and applied in Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054,
1062-63 (Colo. 2007). I also disagree that the record before us
shows prejudice to defendant as a result of his counsel’s warning to
him that his guilty plea would create the risk, but not the certainty,
of deportation.
¶ 48 I agree that effective counsel “must advise her client regarding
the risk of deportation.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367
(2010). I also agree that where counsel provides “false assurance
that his conviction would not result in his removal from this
country,” the defendant has been given ineffective assistance. Id. at
368. That is not what happened here.
¶ 49 Defendant’s counsel told him that the prosecutor was
intractable in her position that defendant would not be offered a
plea that was “immigration safe.” She warned him that there was
“a likelihood of deportation, although not a certainty.” The risk of
deportation was explained to defendant. Padilla made clear that
“[t]o satisfy [counsel’s] responsibility, we now hold that counsel
30
must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of
deportation.” Id. at 374. Measured against Padilla’s standard, it is
not certain that counsel’s advice to defendant fell below the wide
standard of competence demanded by Strickland. But I am willing
to assume, as the trial court found, that defendant’s counsel gave
him erroneous advice by telling him there was a chance he could
avoid deportation.
¶ 50 Where I part company with the majority is in the evaluation of
prejudice to defendant. The record demonstrates to me that
defendant knew the true potential consequences of his plea, not, as
the majority supposes, because of his past criminal record, but
because his counsel advised him that there was no assurance he
would not be deported. And, importantly, he acknowledged in
writing that he would be deported if he pleaded guilty to a felony.
¶ 51 Defendant is an admitted heroin dealer who is no stranger to
the criminal justice system. He has committed numerous prior
criminal acts and has failed to appear in court when charged.
Against this background, in August, 2011, a confidential informant
advised the Denver Police Department Gang Bureau that defendant
was attempting to sell heroin. Surveillance by the police, including
31
electronic video and audio equipment, observed and heard
defendant attempting to sell and selling heroin. This evidence was
detailed in an arrest affidavit and made available to counsel in
discovery.
¶ 52 In April, 2012, defendant entered a plea of guilty to a felony
distribution charge in exchange for the prosecutor dropping a
charge of conspiracy and a charge of distribution. Those charges
carry potential penalties far more severe than the felony
distribution charge to which defendant pleaded guilty. Before the
trial court would accept the plea, as part of his Crim. P. 11
advisement, defendant read and executed a petition to enter plea of
guilty and plea agreement which represented to the court that
defendant could speak, read, and understand the English language,
or that all of the documents and proceedings had been fully
explained to him in a language he could understand. He
represented that he had consulted with his lawyer and that he
recognized the potential penalty for each offense with which he was
originally charged carried a maximum penalty of sixteen years. He
also agreed to the factual basis for his charged crimes. And most
importantly, he initialed paragraph 14, which represented that he
32
understood a plea of guilty would “result in my being deported, . . .
excluded from admission to the United States, and my being
refused U.S. citizenship.” (Emphasis added.) In presenting that
petition to the district court, defendant did not seek clarification,
notwithstanding the court’s inquiry, “Is there anything more that
you want me to know or anything more you want me to
consider . . . ?” Defendant was then sentenced to Community
Corrections.
¶ 53 Soon after that plea, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
placed a hold on defendant which resulted in his disqualification
from Community Corrections. Defendant very quickly retained
immigration counsel, but did not seek to withdraw his plea. See
People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527 (Colo. 1987) (where erroneous
advice is given to an immigrant subject to deportation, he will likely
be able to withdraw his plea).
¶ 54 This factual backdrop leads me to conclude that defendant
cannot show that, but for his counsel’s advice, he would not have
known the true consequences of his plea. People v. DiGuglielmo, 33
P.3d 1248 (Colo. App. 2001), is instructive. There, the defendant,
who was sentenced to probation, argued that his plea of guilty was
33
not knowing and voluntary because he was led to believe that he
would receive a deferred sentence. The division recognized that
counsel’s promise of a sentence to be imposed might indeed
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. But, where the
defendant had received a written Crim. P. 11 advisement form that
specifically addressed the sentence, he could not claim
misrepresentation as a ground for ineffective assistance. Id. at
1251. “At the providency hearing, defendant had an affirmative
obligation to request clarification from the court if his
understanding of the plea agreement was different from the
information contained in the written plea documents and the trial
court’s colloquy with him.” Id.
¶ 55 The majority distinguishes DiGuglielmo by noting that the trial
court specifically addressed the sentence in addition to the written
Rule 11 advisement. I am aware of no case that requires a verbal
explanation of a written Rule 11 advisement. A written advisement
alone is a sufficient basis for requiring a defendant to seek
clarification. This is particularly apparent where, like here, counsel
advised defendant of the risk. If defendant was laboring under a
belief that his length of stay in the United States would be favorably
34
considered by the immigration authorities, that belief was certainly
disabused by the written document he read and signed. And too,
like in DiGuglielmo, the defendant never alleged “that his counsel’s
misrepresentation was deliberate.” Id. at 1252.
¶ 56 The majority claims that People v. Rael, 681 P.2d 530 (Colo.
App. 1984), was distinguished by DiGuglielmo in such a way as to
add emphasis to the importance of the court’s verbal explanation
during the Rule 11 advisement. I can find nothing in Rael to
support that assumption. Rael relied upon the fact that counsel
had stated that he “knew that the court would not
aggravate/increase the maximum sentence.” 681 P.2d at 532.
There was no need to address the prejudice prong of Strickland in
Rael because the division in Rael ordered a hearing on the basis of
a deliberate misrepresentation. Here there was no deliberate
misrepresentation and any confusion caused by counsel’s
statements of hope were unquestionably clarified by a written
advisement to defendant that his plea would result in his
deportation. Nor am I persuaded by the conclusion in People v.
Chavez-Torres, 2016 COA 169M, that the defendant in that case
was entitled to a hearing (as was the defendant here) when he
35
alleged sufficient excusable neglect to warrant a late filing of a
postconviction motion by asserting that he had received erroneous
immigration advice.
¶ 57 This case bears no resemblance to Chavez-Torres. Defendant
here received an accurate Rule 11 advisement that he would be
deported. Yet he did not seek to clarify that advice. It is unrealistic
to conclude that a noncitizen who was concerned enough about his
immigration status to question whether his plea would result in
deportation but did not seek to clarify a proper Rule 11 advisement
telling him that deportation was a certainty has shown the kind of
material prejudice sufficient and grave enough to undermine the
confidence in his plea. None of the cases cited by the majority
stands for the proposition that a proper written advisement
acknowledged and signed by a defendant should be disregarded
simply because the defendant is a noncitizen. Where a defendant
who is fluent in English, as is the case here, tells the judge that he
understands the matters set forth in the written Rule 11
advisement that he has personally signed, it makes little sense for
the sentencing judge to verbally go over each detail in the
advisement. See People v. Laurson, 70 P.3d 564, 566 (Colo. App.
36
2002) (“When a defendant indicates at the providency hearing that
he or she understood the matters contained in a written guilty plea
advisement form, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show
that the apparent waiver was not effective.”).
¶ 58 There are further reasons for concluding that defendant has
not shown prejudice. The majority reasons that it would have been
preferable for defendant to receive a long prison sentence than to be
deported. I disagree that any defendant, immigrant or otherwise,
would prefer the prospect of two consecutive sixteen-year sentences
to a four- or five-year sentence. Defendant was forty-one years of
age at the time of his sentencing. His purported preference for
potential consecutive sentences of up to thirty-two years at the age
of forty-one to the sentence he received (even with deportation) is
not credible. It is true that he had medical issues resulting from
his abuse of drugs and alcohol. He has sclerosis of the liver. He is
diabetic and so he must take insulin. Nothing in the record
suggests that he cannot receive medication or treatment for these
maladies outside the United States and that it would have been a
preferable choice to draw a lengthy prison term just so he could
37
have the services of a prison doctor. He was certainly coping
physically before he decided to sell heroin.
¶ 59 The majority opinion seeks to weigh factors it finds relevant to
a showing of prejudice, relying on what it deems to be the
persuasive authority of cases in foreign jurisdictions. I am
unwilling to rely on that authority. My conclusion is reached
recognizing that no Colorado case gives such an expansive
treatment of Strickland’s prejudice prong.
¶ 60 Defendant has admitted his guilt. The documentary evidence
which forms the basis for his arrest warrant shows that a finding of
guilt on the original charges is all but assured. His physical
conditions are treatable in Mexico and elsewhere; he does not deny
otherwise. He is not terminally ill. Admittedly, his ties to this
country are strong and he has family members here. One would
expect nothing else in the case of a long-term resident. However, I
am unaware of any Colorado case that requires an exception to
deportation on the basis of close ties to Colorado. He is not a
United States citizen and, based upon his felony charge, it is
unlikely that he will ever become one, even after remand.
38
¶ 61 Consequently, I am left to conclude that the district court was
correct in deciding, after an evidentiary hearing, that defendant
failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. I would affirm.
39