IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D16-3630
I.D.,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed May 19, 2017.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
William Gary, Judge.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross, Assistant Attorney
General, for Appellant.
Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Archie F. Gardner, Jr., Assistant Public
Defender, for Appellee.
OSTERHAUS, J.
The State appeals the disposition of a juvenile delinquency case claiming that
the trial court erroneously deviated from the Department of Juvenile Justice’s (the
Department’s) recommended disposition without giving reasons as required by
E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009). We affirm because the court did not deviate
from the Department’s recommendation.
I.
The appellee juvenile in this case, I.D., pled no contest to a misdemeanor
battery charge, after which the trial court requested a predisposition report (PDR)
from the Department. The Department’s amended report presented a conditional
recommendation based upon section 985.441(2), Florida Statutes, that I.D. be
committed to a non-secure residential commitment program “conditioned upon the
court finding by a preponderance of the evidence ‘that the protection of the public
requires such placement or that the needs of the child would be best served by such
placement.’” § 985.441(2)(d), Fla. Stat. In the absence of such findings, the statute
provided for the court to sentence misdemeanor offenders like I.D. to a minimum-
risk, non-residential commitment program. After the disposition hearing here, the
trial court chose the latter route, committing I.D. to a minimum-risk, non-residential
commitment program, a step below non-secure residential, and ordering the
Department of Children and Families to find placement for the child.
II.
Although the trial court is permitted wide latitude in making juvenile-offender
commitment decisions, if it deviates from the commitment level recommended by
the Department in a PDR, it must give reasons for disregarding the Department’s
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assessment and recommendation. § 985.433(7)(b), Fla. Stat.; E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 635.
Here, the State appeals what it considers to be a deviation from the Department’s
recommendation without giving reasons for the departure. State v. A.C., 44 So. 3d
1240 (Fla. 5th DCA) (recognizing the State’s standing to appeal on the basis that the
trial court departed from the Department’s recommendation without making
required findings). The Department’s PDR in this case made a recommendation
straight from the statute, § 985.441(2). Tracking the statute, it recommended non-
secure residential placement for I.D. “conditioned upon” whether the trial court
made findings that public safety required the placement or that the needs of the child
were best served by the placement. See § 985.441(2)(d), Fla. Stat. By conditioning
its recommendation under this statute, the Department’s recommendation
incorporated § 985.441(2)’s directive, applicable in the absence of findings, that the
court “not commit the child for any misdemeanor offense . . . at a restrictiveness
level other than minimum-risk nonresidential.”* Because the Department
*
§ 985.441(2), Florida Statutes, states in relevant part:
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), the court having jurisdiction over
an adjudicated delinquent child whose offense is a misdemeanor, or a
child who is currently on probation for a misdemeanor, may not commit
the child for any misdemeanor offense or any probation violation that
is technical in nature and not a new violation of law at a restrictiveness
level other than minimum-risk nonresidential. However, the court may
commit such child to a nonsecure residential placement if:
* * *
(d) The court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
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conditioned its recommendation upon the trial court’s findings of fact—approving
either “a non-secure residential placement” with additional fact-finding, or
minimum-risk nonresidential without additional findings—we cannot conclude that
the trial court deviated from its recommendation. The trial court chose the latter
recommended course and didn’t need to explain its reasons as though it had deviated
from the Department’s restrictiveness level recommendation.
III.
We thus AFFIRM the trial court’s disposition because it did not deviate from
the Department’s recommendation.
WETHERELL and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
protection of the public requires such placement or that the
particular needs of the child would be best served by such
placement. Such finding must be in writing.
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