NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5901-13T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDGAR TORRES, a/k/a TORRES EDGAR and
TORRES C# 245239 EDGAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted March 22, 2017 – Decided May 31, 2017
Before Judges Accurso and Lisa.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment
No. 12-09-1539.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Monica
do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Edgar Torres was charged in a single superseding
indictment with five armed bank robberies on different dates
between 2006 and 2011. His motion to exclude statements to the
police he made on February 25 and March 11, 2011 was denied.
But his motion to sever and try separately each armed robbery
was granted in part, with the court ordering the three armed
robberies occurring in 2010 and 2011 severed and tried
separately from the two robberies in 2006 and 2009.
The more recent bank robberies were tried first. Defendant
was convicted of all three robberies and sentenced in the
aggregate to an extended term of forty years in State prison
subject to the periods of parole ineligibility and supervision
required by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
We affirmed, rejecting defendant's arguments that the court
erred in denying his motions to exclude his statements to police
and to sever and try each armed robbery standing alone. State
v. Torres, No. A-3096-12 (App. Div. May 7, 2015) (slip op. at 6-
7, 14-16). The Supreme Court subsequently denied defendant's
petition for certification. State v. Torres, 223 N.J. 556
(2015).
In the second trial, a jury convicted defendant of first-
degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, and second-degree possession
2 A-5901-13T4
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, in
connection with the 2006 bank robbery; and second-degree robbery
in connection with the 2009 robbery, acquitting him of the
attendant weapons offense. The same judge presided over both
trials and sentenced defendant on these convictions, after
merger, to a twenty-year NERA term on the first-degree robbery
and to a consecutive ten-year NERA term on the second-degree
robbery, consecutive to the forty-year, extended-term sentence
defendant is already serving in connection with the first three
robberies.
Defendant appeals, raising the following issues through
counsel.
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO
REVISIT THE DECISIONS ON THE MIRANDA
AND SEVERANCE OF OFFENSES MOTIONS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO REDACT
FROM DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT TO POLICE
REFERENCES TO HIS DRUG USE DENIED
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING
DEFENDANT'S JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL AND
NEW TRIAL MOTIONS.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE USE OF
THE VIDEO PORTION OF DEFENDANT'S
STATEMENT TO POLICE CHILLED HIS RIGHT
TO TESTIFY ON HIS OWN BEHALF.
V. DEFENDANT RECEIVED AN EXCESSIVE
SENTENCE.
3 A-5901-13T4
He adds the following issues in his pro se supplemental brief.
Point 1
The Trial Court error in dismissing the
original presentation from May 9, 2011.
Point 2
The presentation of May 23, 2011 should have
been dismissed as defective because the
State failed to present sufficient evidence
of one or more elements of each charged
offense.
Point 3
The presentation from May 23, 2011 was
defective because the prosecutor infringed
upon the grand jury's decision making
process.
Point 4
The Trial Court error in not granting
defendant motion to dismiss indictment based
on prosecutorial misconduct.
Point 5
The Trial Court error in granting the
State's superseding indictment based on a
decision that had no merit on the motion at
hand.
Point 6
The prosecutor gave the Trial Court
misrepresentation by stating that in the
second grand jury presentation on May 23,
2011 that, that grand jury re-voted to
indict defendant on first degree armed
robbery.
4 A-5901-13T4
Point 7
The prosecutor sought a superseding
indictment that increased the punishment
after defendant invoked his right to a jury
trial.
Point 8
The State gave misrepresentation to the
Trial Court that the initial indictment was
a first degree armed robbery and second
degree possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose. By doing so the State
misinformed the Trial Court to the facts.
Point 9
The State sought a superseding indictment in
retaliation because defendant informed the
Trial Court that defendant was not indicted
to a first degree crime as it was drafted in
the initial indictment.
Point 10
The Trial Court erred in allowing the State
to seek a superseding indictment based on
the same facts that were presented on the
initial indictment to obtain a higher degree
then the original indictment and "up the
ante."
Because our review of the record convinces us the judge did
not err in ruling on any of the motions defendant challenges,
and his pro se arguments as to the indictment are without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R.
2:11-3(e)(2), we affirm his convictions. For reasons explained
below, however, we remand for a new sentencing hearing.
5 A-5901-13T4
The State presented the testimony of two bank tellers, each
of whom testified they were robbed, one in 2006 and the other in
2009, by a man of medium build, average height, who approached
their stations with a plastic bag and a black gun and demanded
large bills. Although a witness saw a man he had earlier seen
get out of a red car, run from the bank following the 2006
robbery, and police recovered the plastic bag the robber carried
and a pellet gun in pieces near a dumpster behind the bank,
investigators made no headway in identifying the perpetrator of
either heist.
Both crimes went unsolved until 2011, when defendant was
arrested in connection with the later three robberies.
Following defendant's February 25, 2011 statement, in which he
confessed to the three robberies in 2010 and 2011 while armed
with a pellet gun, investigators decided to question him about
other unsolved robberies, including the one from 2006. On March
11, 2011, defendant gave another statement in which he again
confessed to the three robberies in 2010 and 2011 and also
confessed to the 2006 and 2009 robberies.
In his second statement, defendant advised the
investigators he was aware they had already talked to the person
who owned the red car he borrowed for the 2006 robbery. He
admitted having his girlfriend drive and wait for him while he
6 A-5901-13T4
robbed both banks but insisted "she had no clue what . . . was
going on." Defendant claimed he "told her[,] . . . look I'm
picking [up] some dope, just, we got to meet him over here."
When the detective sought to clarify that defendant's girlfriend
had no involvement in the robberies and, instead believed she
was driving defendant to pick up drugs, defendant replied:
That was the whole thing...I never wanted
her involved in anything I was doing. I
didn't want her to have any knowledge of
what I was doing so I would lie to her and
tell her, yo I'm gonna go pick up, I need
you to drive cause I don't feel good to be
driving. . . . I don't need to get pulled
over.
Defendant also claimed that while he could not remember
whether he was armed when he committed the 2009 robbery, he
allowed he "probably had [a gun]" but could not say he "flashed
it." When the detective asked what kind of gun would he have
been carrying, defendant replied, "Been a pellet gun. Never,
never, never, anything I've ever done was actually with an
actual gun." Defendant claimed he did not carry a real gun
because "I don't need a trigger to go off and somebody getting
accidently killed." "My intentions was solely one thing[,] get
the money[,] get the fuck out, go get high[,] . . . see what
tomorrow brings."
7 A-5901-13T4
In advance of defendant's second trial, new counsel moved
to revisit the court's prior rulings on the admissibility of
defendant's confessions and severance. Counsel argued the March
11 statement was taken in violation of State v. Tucker, 137 N.J.
259 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1090, 115 S. Ct. 751, 130 L.
Ed. 2d 651 (1995), because defendant was in custody and had
already been assigned counsel on the 2010-2011 armed robbery
charges and thus should not have been questioned without counsel
present. As to severance, defendant claimed there was no
connection between the 2006 and 2009 robberies, and the only
direct evidence linking defendant to the 2009 robbery was his
confession. Counsel argued trying the two crimes together
risked the jury convicting defendant of the 2009 robbery because
it believed him guilty of the 2006 heist.
After hearing argument, the court declined to revisit
either ruling. The judge noted he had considered defendant's
motion to exclude his confessions before ruling on his severance
motion, and thus considered both confessions as they related to
all five robberies. The judge concluded both rulings were the
law of the case, and that defendant had not offered a persuasive
reason for the court to reconsider either decision.
Defendant also moved to redact his March 11 confession to
remove any references to his drug use and that he was a heroin
8 A-5901-13T4
addict. The court ordered several references to drugs removed,
but agreed with the prosecutor that defendant's statements
regarding the lies he told his girlfriend to avoid her learning
that he intended to rob a bank did not relate to "prior bad
acts. It's his statement of what occurred that day, why and how
it occurred." Accordingly, those statements were not redacted
but included in the recording of the confession played for the
jury.
Finally, defendant moved to prohibit the State from playing
the video portion of the March 11 confession because he was
arrayed in prison garb. The court granted the motion, but
noted:
If the defendant gets on the stand, and
attempts to come up with the same story
he came up with the in the first trial,
which the jury did not believe, which is
that the detectives were riding him around
force-feeding him facts, then I will with
a curative instruction permit the State to
use the video of this confession on rebuttal.
Because it does clearly show the defendant's
demeanor, and the manner of delivery of his
statements, and the confession.
Although defendant did not object at the time, he moved
several days later for the judge to recuse himself pursuant to
Rule 1:12-1(d), for having expressed a view of the proofs in the
first trial. Defendant claimed the court's statements as to
defendant's credibility could affect defendant's theory in the
9 A-5901-13T4
second trial and compromise his right to testify in his own
defense.
In denying the motion, the judge stood by his assessment of
the proofs in the first trial, but noted the cases were
"[c]ompletley different, that's why they're severed." The judge
reiterated his ruling that the video portion of the March 11
confession would be excluded at defendant's request. But should
defendant contend at trial that his confession was coerced, the
video would become "evidential" as depicting his demeanor and
the manner in which he made the statement to the police.
Following the guilty verdict, defendant filed a motion for
judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
He argued the State failed to present legally sufficient
evidence to corroborate his confessions; that he should have
been afforded a new suppression hearing to determine whether the
police engaged in an impermissible "question-first, warn-later"
interrogation; that his March 11 statement should have been
excluded on Sixth Amendment grounds; and that the court should
have reconsidered its prior ruling, granting his motion to sever
and try separately the 2006 and 2009 robberies.
The court denied the motions. The judge found the State
provided additional evidence beyond defendant's own confession
as to both the 2006 and 2009 robberies, and thus any
10 A-5901-13T4
inconsistencies between the confession and the State's other
evidence were properly submitted for the jury's consideration.
The judge again determined his prior ruling to exclude
defendant's statements was the law of the case and given the
absence of any "new or overriding circumstance," defendant was
not entitled to a second hearing to determine whether the police
engaged in an impermissible "question-first, warn-later"
interrogation. The court further found defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel regarding the 2006 and 2009 robberies
had not attached at the time of his March 11 statement because
those crimes were not the same offenses for which defendant was
then in jail, nor based on the same facts.
Finally, the judge found defendant was not entitled to re-
litigate the court's decision to sever the counts of the
indictment relating to the five robberies for two trials
corresponding to his two separate confessions to the crimes.
The judge found defendant had "failed to set forth any new
evidence, circumstances, or controlling authority," or otherwise
demonstrate that the initial ruling was clearly erroneous or
contributed to a manifest injustice.
Subsequent to the court's ruling on the post-trial motions,
we affirmed its decisions to admit defendant's statements and to
sever the counts of the indictment for two trials. Torres,
11 A-5901-13T4
supra, slip op. at 6-7, 14-16. Accordingly, defendant's
arguments regarding the involuntariness of his March 11
statement as having been the product of an impermissible
"question-first, warn-later" interrogation,1 and the failure to
try the 2006 and 2009 robberies separately, are barred both by
collateral estoppel and the law of the case doctrine because
another panel of this court rejected them on the merits in
defendant's prior appeal. See State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266,
276-78 (2015) (distinguishing between collateral estoppel and
law of the case); see also Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 539-
40 (2011) (explaining application of the law of the case
doctrine in connection with appellate proceedings); State v.
Myers, 239 N.J. Super. 158, 164 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127
N.J. 323 (1990); State v. Hale, 127 N.J. Super. 407, 410 (App.
Div. 1974) ("'Law of the case' most commonly applies to the
binding nature of appellate decisions upon a trial court if the
matter is remanded for further proceedings, or upon a different
1
As we have available to us the brief defendant filed in support
of his appeal from the first trial, we have confirmed he argued
at length that State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148 (2007), condemning
the two-step "question-first, warn-later" interrogation
technique, should have rendered his "formal statements"
inadmissible and that "the trial court erred in failing to sever
the five bank robbery counts and order separate trials for each"
because of the likelihood "the jury would conclude he was guilty
of all the crimes than had separate trials been held."
12 A-5901-13T4
appellate panel which may be asked to reconsider the same issue
in a subsequent appeal.").
As to the new issue defendant raised regarding his March 11
statement, that because he had already been assigned counsel on
the 2010-2011 robbery charges, he should not have been
questioned on the 2006 and 2009 robberies without counsel
present, we agree with the trial court that defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights were not violated. Although there is no
question but that defendant's right to assistance of counsel in
connection with the 2010-2011 robberies had already attached at
the time of his March 11 statement, Sixth Amendment protection
"is 'offense specific' in its attachment." State v. Harris, 181
N.J. 391, 435 (2004) (quoting Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164,
121 S. Ct. 1335, 1338, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321, 326 (2001)), cert.
denied, 545 U.S. 1145, 125 S. Ct. 2973, 162 L. Ed. 2d 898
(2005).
Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not
attached to the 2006 and 2009 bank robberies at the time of his
March 11 statement simply because he had been charged with other
bank robberies committed in 2010 and 2011. The interrogation
makes clear the detectives questioning defendant were not even
aware of the 2009 robbery when defendant confessed to it.
Because the 2006 and 2009 robberies were committed well before
13 A-5901-13T4
the offenses with which defendant had been charged, occurred in
different towns, involved a different car and apparently a
different gun, we agree with the trial judge that they were not
so factually related to the charged offenses as to bar
defendant's interrogation on the unsolved 2006 and 2009
robberies. See Harris, supra, 181 N.J. at 435-36.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
decision to permit limited references to defendant's drug use to
remain in his March 11 statement played for the jury. See State
v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 157 (2011). Although the trial judge at
one point referred to those unredacted references as evidence of
motive, which would make them inadmissible, see State v. J.M.,
Jr., 438 N.J. Super. 215, 223 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd as
modified, 225 N.J. 146, 151 (2016), he quickly corrected the
error. The judge subsequently made plain in ruling on
defendant's application to strike the references, that he would
not redact those statements in which defendant explained how he
tricked his girlfriend into driving the getaway car by telling
her he was meeting his drug dealer because they related to "what
occurred that day."
The unredacted statements explain defendant's scheme to
keep his girlfriend in the dark in order to get to and from the
robberies, which facilitated his commission of the crime.
14 A-5901-13T4
Indeed, defendant told his interrogators he chose the banks to
boost the credibility of his story, as they were on the route he
traveled to buy drugs. Thus we conclude the references were
properly admitted as intrinsic evidence of the crimes and were
not unduly prejudicial to him. See Rose, supra, 206 N.J. at
177-78, 180-82 (explaining that "uncharged acts performed
contemporaneously with the charged crime may be termed intrinsic
if they facilitate the commission of the charged crime" (quoting
United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2010))).
As we have already explained why the trial court did not
err in refusing to revisit its prior rulings on the
admissibility of defendant's confessions and severance, the only
two grounds raised in the motion for new trial, it requires no
further discussion. We turn to defendant's motion for
acquittal, based on the State's failure to adequately
corroborate his confession.
To avoid the danger of convicting a defendant solely on the
basis of his or her own words, the State must introduce
independent proof of facts and circumstances that strengthen or
bolster a confession and tend to generate a belief in its
trustworthiness, plus independent proof of loss or injury.
State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 617-18 (2004). The Supreme
Court has instructed, however, that trial courts should deny a
15 A-5901-13T4
motion for acquittal on such grounds if the State introduces
"any legal evidence, apart from the confession of facts and
circumstances, from which the jury might draw an inference that
the confession is trustworthy." Id. at 617 (quoting State v.
Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 62 (1959)).
Applying that standard here, we are satisfied defendant's
motion for acquittal was properly denied. The testimony of the
tellers established the facts of the robberies and proof of
loss. The State produced additional evidence of the 2006
robbery in the form of the borrowed red car, driven by a woman
matching the description of defendant's girlfriend, the witness
who saw a man exit the red car and run from the bank minutes
later, as well as the plastic bag and pellet gun recovered from
the scene. The corroborating evidence of the 2009 robbery was
less extensive, but the State established that a bank located in
the exact location defendant described was robbed "about a year
and a half" before defendant's March 11, 2011 confession by a
man of defendant's build who carried a gun and a plastic grocery
bag and demanded large bills. Nothing more was required.
Missing details, speculation or discrepancies in the evidence
were fact questions going to its weight and sufficiency, which
were properly resolved by the jury. See State v. DiFrisco, 118
16 A-5901-13T4
N.J. 253, 271-72 (1990), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S. Ct.
949, 133 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1996).
Defendant's argument as to the chilling effect of the
court's ruling on the use of the video portion of his March 11
statement requires only brief comment. A defendant's right to
testify in his own behalf is protected by the constitution.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 2708, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 37, 46 (1987). But the decision is a strategic one, to
be made with advice of counsel. State v. Cordero, 438 N.J.
Super. 472, 488 (App. Div. 2014), certif. denied, 221 N.J. 287
(2015). "[A] defendant who elects to testify . . . is subject
to the same credibility attacks as any other witness" because
"defendants who testify are obligated to tell the truth like all
other witnesses." State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 97 (2004).
"Indeed, the right to testify is neither a license to commit
perjury nor a shield against contradiction." Ibid. To that
end, statements and physical evidence which have been suppressed
may be utilized to impeach false statements made by a defendant.
See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27, 100
S. Ct. 1912, 1916, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559, 565-66 (1980); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26, 91 S. Ct. 643, 645-46, 28 L. Ed.
2d 1, 4-5 (1971).
17 A-5901-13T4
Having presided over defendant's first trial, in which he
took the stand, the judge was in a unique position to address
the use of the video portion of the March 11 statement to
impeach defendant's credibility. We accordingly view his advice
to defendant about the potential use of the video portion of the
statement to impeach his credibility as no more than fair
warning. The ruling both protected defendant from the jury
viewing him in prison garb, and cautioned him as to the limits
of that ruling. It thus struck a fair balance between competing
interests and did not impinge on defendant's right to testify if
he so chose.
We turn now to defendant's sentence, which we find more
problematic than the issues he raises as to his conviction.
As previously noted, we affirmed the extended-term sentence
of forty years defendant is currently serving following his
conviction of three of the five robberies charged in the single
superseding indictment. See infra at 2. Following defendant's
conviction of the remaining two robberies, the trial judge
sentenced him, after merger, to the top of the range on both the
first- and second-degree convictions and ran them consecutively
to each other and to the forty-year sentence defendant is
currently serving. The judge, however, offered no explanation
for the consecutive sentences other than to note "that the
18 A-5901-13T4
robberies of which this defendant was convicted both in the
first trial and the second trial apply all the Yarbough2
standards. These are clearly separate offenses and he will be
sentenced accordingly."
It is axiomatic that our review of a trial judge's
sentencing determination is deferential. See State v. Fuentes,
217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). Thus a sentencing court's decision to
impose consecutive sentences will not be disturbed on appeal, so
long as the judge has properly evaluated the Yarbough factors in
light of the record. State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 182
(2009).
But evaluation of those factors is critical. Here,
defendant was forty-six years old at the time of sentencing and
was already serving a forty-year NERA term on other counts of
the same indictment. Following a six-day trial in which
defendant was convicted of a lesser-included offense with regard
to the 2009 robbery and acquitted of an attendant weapons
charge, the judge imposed a thirty-year consecutive sentence
without articulating his consideration of either the Yarbough
factors or the real-time consequences of the NERA terms. See
2
State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193, 89 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1986).
19 A-5901-13T4
State v. Hernandez, 208 N.J. 24, 50 (2011). We would ordinarily
in this circumstance, remand for the judge to articulate his
reasons for the sentence with specific reference to the Yarbough
factors. See State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 514-15 (2005).
The trial judge's retirement, however, makes that course
impossible. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for
a new sentencing hearing.
Defendant's convictions are affirmed and the matter
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
20 A-5901-13T4