Conservation Law Foundation v. Public Utilities Commission

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2017 ME 109
Docket: PUC-16-353
Argued: April 11, 2017
Decided: June 1, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

CONSERVATION LAW FOUNDATION

v.

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.

MEAD, J.

[¶1] The Conservation Law Foundation appeals from an order of the

Maine Public Utilities Commission approving a stipulation regarding Efficiency

Maine Trust’s Third Triennial Plan for energy efficiency. CLF contends that the

Commission’s order and the terms of the stipulation disregard statutory

mandates set forth in the Efficiency Maine Trust Act. See 35-A M.R.S.

§§ 10101-10123 (2015).1 With respect to electric energy efficiency programs,

CLF argues that the Commission did not “make use of best practices across the

region” when calculating avoided energy costs and selecting a discount rate,

1 Provisions of the Efficiency Maine Trust Act have amendments that became effective after the

entering of the order underlying this appeal, though the amendments are not relevant in the present
case. See P.L. 2015, ch. 498, §§ 1, 2 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 35-A M.R.S. § 10109(3-A), (4)
(2016)); P.L. 2015, ch. 425, §§ 1-3 (effective July 29, 2016) (codified at 35-A M.R.S. § 10111(2), (2-A)
(2016)).
2

and that it failed to “consider gross efficiency savings for the purpose of

determining savings that are cost-effective, reliable and achievable” as required

by 35-A M.R.S. § 10110(4-A). With respect to natural gas efficiency programs,

CLF asserts that the Commission failed to identify and fund all cost-effective,

reliable, and achievable natural gas energy efficiency measures as required by

35-A M.R.S. §§ 10104(4) and 10111(2). We discern no error in the

Commission’s interpretation and application of these statutes and affirm its

order.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Background

[¶2] In 2009, the Legislature established the Efficiency Maine Trust “for

the purposes of developing, planning, coordinating and implementing energy

efficiency and alternative energy resources programs in the State,” to, inter alia,

promote investment in energy efficiency measures and reduce the cost of

energy for Maine residents. 35-A M.R.S. § 10103(1), (1)(B)(1), (1)(D); see

generally 35-A M.R.S. §§ 10101-10123. To help achieve these goals, the Trust

develops a detailed energy efficiency plan every three years to identify the

maximum achievable cost-effective energy efficiency savings (commonly

referred to by the Commission as “MACE”) and programs to achieve those
 3

savings. See 35-A M.R.S. § 10104(4).

[¶3] The Commission is tasked with reviewing the plan and opening an

adjudicatory proceeding, after which it must issue an order approving the plan

or rejecting elements of the plan.2 35-A M.R.S. § 10104(4)(D). The Commission

“shall approve all elements of the triennial plan it determines to be [MACE]”

and adjust gas utility and transmission and distribution (T&D) rates to provide

revenue for procurement of the energy efficiency resources identified by the

triennial plan. Id.

[¶4] The Efficiency Maine Trust Act sets forth specific standards for the

Commission’s review and approval of electric energy and natural gas efficiency

programs. With respect to electric energy,

[w]hen determining the amount of cost-effective electric energy
efficiency resources to be procured under this subsection, the
[C]ommission shall:

2 The Legislature bestowed this authority to the Commission through numerous amendments to

the Efficiency Maine Trust Act through enactment of the Omnibus Energy Act. See generally
P.L. 2013, ch. 369 (varying effective dates). Prior to these amendments, the Legislature set the
minimum budget for electric and natural gas efficiency programs and directed the Commission to
determine whether additional funding was appropriate; if the Commission recommended an
increase, it was subject to the Legislature’s approval. See 35-A M.R.S. § 10110(4) (2014), repealed by
P.L. 2013, ch. 369, § A-19 (effective July 1, 2015); 35-A M.R.S. §§ 10110(5) (2012), repealed by
P.L. 2013, ch. 369, § A-21 (emergency, effective June 26, 2013); see also 35-A M.R.S. 10111(2) (2012),
amended by P.L. 2013, ch. 369, § A-25 (emergency, effective June 26, 2013) (codified at 35-A M.R.S.
§ 10111(2) (2013)).

4

A. Consider electric energy efficiency resources that are
reasonably foreseeable to be acquired by the trust using all
other sources of revenue . . . ;

B. Ensure that calculations of avoided energy costs and the
budget identified by the trust in its triennial plan as needed
to capture all cost-effective electric energy efficiency
resources are reasonable, based on sound evidence and
make use of best practices across the region; and

C. Maximize total electricity savings for all ratepayers.

The [C]ommission shall consider gross efficiency savings for the
purpose of determining savings that are cost-effective, reliable and
achievable and shall consider both net and gross efficiency savings
for the purpose of determining the appropriateness of the amount
identified by the trust in its triennial plan as needed to capture all
cost-effective electric energy efficiency resources.

35-A M.R.S. § 10110(4-A).

[¶5] With respect to natural gas, the Commission “shall assess each gas

utility, in accordance with the triennial plan, an amount necessary to capture

all [MACE].” 35-A M.R.S. § 10111(2).

B. The Third Triennial Plan

[¶6] On December 17, 2015, the Trust submitted to the Commission its

petition for approval of the Triennial Plan for Fiscal Years 2017-2019. For

purposes of determining the cost-effectiveness of proposed energy efficiency

measures, the Trust relied on the Avoided Energy Supply Costs in New England:
 5

2015 Report (“AESC report”) to calculate avoided energy costs3 and to select a

discount rate.4

[¶7] Following the plan’s submission, the Commission granted eleven

petitions to intervene.5 Discovery commenced in January 2016, and over the

next several weeks the Commission convened a technical conference and

entered protective orders for proprietary information, and the parties

responded to data requests and submitted testimony.

[¶8] On February 24, 2016, the Commission staff filed a bench analysis6

outlining its review of the Third Triennial Plan and its analysis of the

cost-effectiveness of the efficiency measures identified by the Trust. The staff

conducted its analysis using the Trust’s MACE study and models, but adjusted

3 “Avoided energy costs” refers to costs that are not incurred as a result of the implementation of

electric and natural gas efficiency programs.

4 Discount rates account for the time value of money when energy efficiency benefits accrue over

time. A high discount rate reflects the policy that short-term costs and benefits are valued more than
long-term costs and benefits, whereas a low discount rate reflects the policy that long-term costs and
benefits are valued more than short-term costs and benefits.

5 The intervenors were the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF); the Office of the Public Advocate

(OPA); Natural Resources Council of Maine (NRCM); Northern Utilities, Inc. d/b/a Unitil;
Central Maine Power Company; Summit Natural Gas of Maine, Inc.; Bangor Gas Company, LLC;
Industrial Energy Consumer Group (IECG); Maine Natural Gas Corporation; Calpine Corporation; and
Emera Maine. Calpine Corporation later withdrew as an intervenor.

6 The bench analysis is “not a recommendation,” but rather information “that the staff believe

would be helpful to the Commission to have in the record.”

6

“certain assumptions and methodological approaches” that had been used by

the Trust. In particular, the staff’s calculation of avoided costs used energy

price forecasts from a June 2015 report that had been prepared by its

consultant, London Economics International (LEI), for use in a different,

unrelated Commission proceeding. The staff used the LEI forecast for its

analysis because it determined that the AESC report was premised on outdated

data, and that energy prices had dropped since the AESC report was released.

[¶9] The bench analysis also utilized a different discount rate than did

the Trust. Though the Trust had selected a discount rate of 4.36% in the

Triennial Plan, the staff used a discount rate of 8.5% (comprising a real discount

rate of 6.62% and the same inflation rate of 1.88% used by the Trust). The staff

based this decision on the Commission’s order on the Second Triennial Plan,

which explained that it was more appropriate to use a discount rate in the range

of 7-10% because that was the rate the Commission typically used to evaluate

benefits over long periods of time when ratepayers bear the costs of the

transaction. See Efficiency Maine Trust, Request for Approval of Second

Triennial Plan, No. 2012-449, Order at 39 (Me. P.U.C. Mar. 6, 2013).

[¶10] Another technical conference was held on March 2, 2016. Later

that month, CLF and Natural Resources Council of Maine (NRCM) filed joint
 7

rebuttal testimony, and the Trust filed rebuttal and supplemental rebuttal

testimony. A hearing was held over two days in March and April 2016;

meanwhile, from March to early May, the parties participated in settlement

conferences. On May 25, the Trust filed a proposed stipulation regarding the

Triennial Plan that was signed by the Trust; the Office of the Public Advocate

(OPA); Central Maine Power Company; Emera Maine; Northern Utilities, Inc.

d/b/a Unitil; Summit Natural Gas of Maine; and NRCM. Maine Natural Gas and

Bangor Gas Company, LLC, did not sign the stipulation but did not oppose it.

CLF and the Industrial Energy Consumer Group (IECG) were the only parties to

oppose the stipulation. The stipulation addressed issues pertaining to, among

other things, “the methodology and assumptions for determining the measures

and amounts of energy efficiency that are [MACE]” for electric energy and

natural gas conservation programs. It adopted figures and methodology from

the bench analysis and reduced the total budget for energy efficiency programs.

[¶11] CLF and IECG filed oppositions to the stipulation, ultimately

objecting to the reduction in the triennial budget for energy efficiency

programs. IECG argued that the Commission should not have based its

calculation of avoided costs on the LEI forecasts, which it asserted were flawed

and not subject to discovery or cross-examination, and so reliance on the
8

forecasts was unreasonable. CLF asserted that the terms of the stipulation are

contrary to statutory mandates because the plan’s discount rate and avoided

costs calculations did not reflect regional best practices, the plan failed to

determine MACE on a gross basis, and the plan’s natural gas savings fell

substantially below the MACE potential. The Trust and OPA filed responses

asserting that the content of the stipulation was consistent with applicable

statutes. In June, the Commission heard oral argument concerning the

competing positions.

[¶12] On July 6, 2016, the Commission issued an order approving the

stipulation. The Commission found IECG’s argument “unpersuasive” because

the LEI forecasts were available for discovery and cross-examination.

Responding to CLF’s concern that the terms of the stipulation did not use

regional best practices, the Commission explained: “Energy market conditions

change regularly and can be volatile, and prices are difficult to predict with

accuracy. For these reasons, it is important to consider the most current and

available forecasts, particularly in times of rapid change in markets.” It

continued, “No single report . . . can claim the title of regional best practice

under statute, and the Commission’s decision is more reasonably informed by

a variety of market information set forth in the record, including, for example[,]
 9

the more current LEI forecasts.” The Commission determined that “reliance on

the AESC would ignore recent material changes in energy prices and would

overstate the benefits associated with energy efficient investments,” and

therefore the stipulation was not flawed for its reliance on, “among other

things, the LEI forecasts for the purpose of calculating avoided costs.”

[¶13] Regarding the stipulation’s agreement on a blended discount rate,

comprising a rate of 8.5% for funds received directly from ratepayers and a rate

of 4.36% for funds received from other sources, the Commission explained that

CLF “has not provided any support for why the discount rate developed for the

AESC constitutes a regional best practice.” Furthermore, it determined that

“the discount rates utilized by various New England states show[] that the

states take a varied approach, and the blended rate used by the [s]tipulation

falls within the varied range of discount rates utilized in the New England

region.” It continued, “A fully litigated case may have landed on different

discount rates, but the overall result here is reasonable, in keeping with the

Commission’s prior findings and conclusions regarding appropriate discount

rates in application to ratepayer funds, and otherwise consistent with

35-A M.R.S. § 10110(4-A).”
10

[¶14] Concerning net versus gross cost screening, the Commission

determined that the stipulation comported with the statute because the statute

“directs the Commission to not only consider gross savings, but also to consider

net savings to account for the effects of free-ridership and spillover.”7

[¶15] Finally, regarding natural gas, the Commission concluded that CLF

relied on an outdated study that “is not current and would overstate potential

savings due to changes in both price and load growth expectations,” and

explained that the approach taken in the stipulation “is reasonable, and is likely

to more accurately reflect [local distribution company (LDC)] growth, which

has been affected by the relatively low oil prices.” The Commission also noted

that the stipulation results in an overall funding level that is “robust,” and

would produce “a diverse portfolio of efficiency programs made available to a

range of customer groups and geographic areas.”

[¶16] CLF timely appealed the Commission’s order approving the

stipulation. See 35-A M.R.S. § 1320 (2016); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3), 22(a).

7 “Gross savings” are all savings that would result from implementation of an efficiency measure,

whereas “net savings” adjusts for outside influences such as, for example, savings derived from
free-riders, who would utilize an efficiency measure even without the conservation program in place.

 11

II. DISCUSSION

[¶17] “We review decisions of the Commission with great deference only

to determine whether the agency’s conclusions are unreasonable, unjust or

unlawful in light of the record.” Taylor v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2016 ME 71, ¶ 5,

138 A.3d 1214 (quotation marks omitted). We will overturn an order of the

Commission only when it “abuses the discretion entrusted to it, or fails to follow

the mandate of the [L]egislature, or to be bound by the prohibitions of the

constitution.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). It is the appellant’s burden to

establish that the Commission has violated one of these standards. Id.

[¶18] When we review the Commission’s interpretation of a statute that

it administers and that is within its expertise, “we apply a two-part inquiry.”

Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2014 ME 56, ¶ 18, 90 A.3d 451

(quotation marks omitted). First, we “determine de novo whether the statute

is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations and therefore

ambiguous.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Second, “we either review the

Commission’s construction of the ambiguous statute for reasonableness or

plainly construe the unambiguous statute.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We

are not bound by the Commission’s interpretation of a statute, but “such an

interpretation is entitled to deference and should be upheld unless the statute
12

plainly compels a contrary result.” Office of the Pub. Advocate v. Pub. Utils.

Comm'n, 2003 ME 23, ¶ 19, 816 A.2d 833 (quotation marks omitted). We have,

however, overturned Commission orders that violate legislative mandates.

See id. ¶¶ 1, 29.

A. Statutory Mandates for Electric Energy Efficiency

1. Mandate to “Make Use of Best Practices Across the Region”

[¶19] CLF argues that the terms of the stipulation and the Commission’s

order approving the stipulation violate a statutory mandate to make use of

regional best practices when calculating avoided energy costs and setting a

discount rate for purposes of determining electric MACE.

[¶20] Title 35-A M.R.S. § 10110(4-A) provides, in relevant part:

When determining the amount of cost-effective electric energy
efficiency resources to be procured under this subsection, the
[C]ommission shall:

. . . .

Ensure that calculations of avoided energy costs and the budget
identified by the trust in its triennial plan as needed to capture all
cost-effective efficiency resources are reasonable, based on sound
evidence and make use of best practices across the region.

[¶21] CLF argues that the AESC study sets forth the regional best practice

to calculate avoided energy costs and set a discount rate, which is integral to
 13

the determination of cost-effectiveness and, as a result, MACE.8 CLF points to

record evidence that the AESC report was developed in collaboration with

stakeholders from other New England states, is used by all other energy

efficiency program administrators in New England, and is considered by CLF’s

consultant to be “extremely credible, given the contributions made to the

report from all of the relevant stakeholders in New England.”

[¶22] The Commission counters that it was not required to rely

exclusively on a single “best” practice because the statute effectively creates a

“three-part, conjunctive test,” requiring avoided energy cost calculations and

the discount rate to (1) be “reasonable,” (2) be “based on sound evidence,” and

(3) “make use of best practices across the region.” See 35-A M.R.S.

§ 10110(4-A)(B). Accordingly, “[r]elying wholesale on the AESC would have

been inconsistent with the other requirements of section 10110(4-A).”

Further, the Commission asserts that even if the AESC were established to be a

8 CLF also argues that the discount rate conflicts with the Trust’s rules, which provide:

The discount rate used for present value calculations shall be the current yield of
long-term (10 years or longer) U.S. Treasury securities, adjusted for inflation. The
Commission may consider an alternative discount rate when characteristics of a
program are inconsistent with use of long-term U.S. Treasury securities.

12 C.M.R. 95 648 380-2 § 4(A)(3) (2010). Compliance with this rule was not addressed in the order
approving the stipulation. However, considering the discretion granted to the Commission by
12 C.M.R. 95 648 380-2 § 4(A)(3), we discern no violation of the rule.
14

regional best practice, it is more reasonably viewed as setting forth a

methodology used to estimate avoided energy costs rather than establishing a

set of specific forecast figures.

[¶23] In analyzing this issue, we first determine whether the statute is

ambiguous. See Cent. Me. Power Co., 2014 ME 56, ¶ 18, 90 A.3d 451. Looking to

the plain language of section 10110(4-A), the requirement that the Commission

ensure that avoided energy costs and the budget identified by the Trust in the

triennial plan “make use of best practices across the region” is reasonably

susceptible to more than one interpretation because it is unclear precisely how

the Commission must “make use of” such practices. It could mean, as CLF

asserts, that the Commission must employ the specific practices deemed the

“best” in the region; alternatively, the Commission could “make use of” best

regional practices by considering them in conjunction with other factors

relevant to its analysis. The statute is therefore ambiguous, and the

Commission’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to significant deference.

Houlton Water Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2014 ME 38, ¶ 24, 87 A.3d 749.

[¶24] Next, we determine whether the Commission’s interpretation of

the statute is reasonable. Id. The Commission’s view of the statute as requiring

a three-prong, blended analysis finds support in principles of statutory
 15

construction, as the statute requires the Commission to ensure that calculations

of avoided energy costs and the budget “are reasonable, based on sound

evidence and make use of best practices across the region.” 35-A M.R.S.

§ 10110(4-A) (emphasis added). To interpret the statute as mandating reliance

solely on a regional best practice would render superfluous the requirements

that calculations be reasonable and based on sound evidence. See Blue Yonder,

LLC v. State Tax Assessor, 2011 ME 49, ¶ 10, 17 A.3d 667 (“Words in a statute

must be given meaning and not treated as meaningless and superfluous.”

(quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, if a particular practice was the “best

practice across the region,” but the Commission determined that it was not

reasonable or based on sound evidence, it would be illogical to interpret the

statute as requiring the Commission to use that practice nonetheless. See

Competitive Energy Servs., LLC v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2003 ME 12, ¶ 18,

818 A.2d 1039 (“[W]e avoid statutory constructions that create absurd, illogical

or inconsistent results.” (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶25] The approach taken in the stipulation adopts the avoided costs

predictions from the bench analysis, which used the LEI forecasts to calculate

avoided costs. The record reflects that the Commission considered the AESC

report, but ultimately determined that its decision was “more reasonably
16

informed by a variety of market information set forth in the record,” including

the “more current LEI forecasts,” because the AESC does not account for recent

energy price changes and would thus overstate energy efficiency investment

benefits. The Commission’s analysis was reasonable and in accordance with

section 10110(4-A), and therefore we will not disturb its conclusion.

[¶26] The Commission contends that the same three-prong test applies

to its selection of a discount rate. The stipulation applies a blended discount

rate comprising a discount rate of 8.5% for funds collected by the utilities from

ratepayers and 4.36% for funds received from other sources. In the order

approving the stipulation, the Commission noted that New England states take

“a varied approach” to discount rates and concluded that this blended rate was

reasonable “in keeping with the Commission’s prior findings and conclusions

regarding appropriate discount rates,” and consistent with the requirements of

section 10110(4-A). In its order, the Commission found that there was no

support for CLF’s contention that the discount rate developed for the AESC

constitutes a best regional practice, and it noted that the blended discount rate

falls within the range of other New England states.9

9 The Commission had evidence that other New England states’ discount rates are as follows:

Connecticut, 7.43%; New Hampshire, 2.46%; Rhode Island, 1.15%; Massachusetts, 0.55%; and
Vermont, 3.00%.
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[¶27] Here also, the Commission’s interpretation and application of the

statute with respect to the determination of the discount rate were reasonable.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission did not violate a statutory

mandate when it approved the stipulation.

2. Mandate to Consider Gross Efficiency Savings

[¶28] The stipulation provides that in determining electric MACE,

“[b]enefit-to-cost ratios will be determined on a net basis.” CLF argues that this

conflicts with 35 M.R.S. § 10110(4-A), which provides:

The [C]ommission shall consider gross efficiency savings for the
purpose of determining savings that are cost-effective, reliable and
achievable and shall consider both net and gross efficiency savings
for the purpose of determining the appropriateness of the amount
identified by the trust in its triennial plan as needed to capture all
cost-effective electric energy efficiency resources.

This statute, CLF argues, “unambiguously directs the Commission to make two

separate and distinct determinations, first with respect to what constitutes

electric MACE, and second regarding the surcharge on ratepayers needed to

fund the capture of electric MACE.” The Commission argues that the terms of

the stipulation are not contrary to the statute because they are consistent with

the Commission’s approach to determine MACE on a net basis for setting the

level of ratepayer funding and on a gross basis for allowing the Trust to pursue

savings that are not funded with ratepayer money.
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[¶29] We again begin by determining whether section 10110(4-A) is

ambiguous and, if it is, whether the Commission’s interpretation of the statute

was reasonable. See Cent. Me. Power Co., 2014 ME 56, ¶ 18, 90 A.3d 451. The

plain language of the statute does not specify how the Commission must

“consider” gross savings in determining MACE. However, both the Commission

and CLF assert that section 10110(4-A) effectively codified the Commission’s

approach from its order regarding the Second Triennial Plan, where the

Commission noted that the Trust had calculated benefit-cost ratios and made

MACE determinations using gross savings figures but used net savings figures

to determine what measures and programs would be a cost-effective use of

ratepayer funds. See Efficiency Maine Trust, Request for Approval of Second

Triennial Plan, No. 2012-449, Order at 41-44 (Me. P.U.C. Mar. 6, 2013).

[¶30] Based on the statute’s language, we conclude that it is ambiguous.

The statute is not clear as to how or to what extent that the Commission must

“consider” gross savings for the purpose of determining MACE, and the statute

could be reasonably construed to have more than one interpretation. We thus

consider whether the Commission’s interpretation of the statute was

reasonable, “according great deference to [its] interpretation.” Houlton Water

Co., 2014 ME 38, ¶ 24, 87 A.3d 749 (quotation marks omitted).
 19

[¶31] In the order approving the stipulation, the Commission explained

that the stipulation complies with the statute, “which directs the Commission

to not only consider gross savings, but also to consider net savings to account

for the effects of free-ridership and spillover.” It noted that the Legislature

“effectively codifie[d] how, in its order approving the Second Triennial Plan, the

Commission treated the question of whether to screen for cost-effectiveness on

a net or gross basis,” which was to “screen[] measures to be funded with

ratepayer dollars on a net basis.” See Efficiency Maine Trust, Request for

Approval of Second Triennial Plan, No. 2012-449, Order at 41-44

(Me. P.U.C. Mar. 6, 2013).

[¶32] The Commission’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable.

Determining benefit-to-cost ratios on a net basis is consistent with the

Commission’s past approach and with the requirements of section 10110(4-A).

See Office of the Pub. Advocate, 2003 ME 23, ¶ 19, 816 A.2d 833. The

Commission considered calculations of gross savings to determine MACE;

however, the language of the statute does not require that the Commission

make an independent calculation of MACE based exclusively on gross savings,

separate and apart from its determination of the appropriateness of the amount
20

needed to capture all MACE. Accordingly, this aspect of the stipulation is not

contrary to the statute.

B. Mandate to Capture All Natural Gas MACE

[¶33] Title 35-A M.R.S. § 10111(2) provides that the Commission “shall

assess each gas utility, in accordance with the triennial plan, an amount

necessary to capture all [MACE].” See also 35-A M.R.S. § 10104(4)(D) (stating

that the Commission shall “approve all elements of the triennial plan it

determines to be [MACE]”). CLF argues that the Commission erroneously relied

on historic data instead of projections of natural gas MACE, and that the

approach taken in the stipulation falls short of funding all natural gas MACE as

required by the statute. CLF urges that the Commission should have relied on

a study prepared in 2014 by a consultant for the Trust to investigate natural

gas energy efficiency opportunities in Maine.

[¶34] In its order, the Commission explained that the study relied on by

the Trust was “dated” and “would overstate potential savings due to changes in

both price and load growth expectations since 2014.” It concluded that the

approach taken in the stipulation regarding natural gas MACE “is reasonable,

and is likely to more accurately reflect LDC growth, which has been affected by

the relatively low oil prices.”
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[¶35] The Commission has discretion to approve what it determines to

be MACE, and we defer to the Commission’s technical expertise. See 35-A M.R.S.

§ 10104(4); Office of the Pub. Advocate v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2015 ME 113, ¶ 15,

122 A.3d 959. Although the Trust had a different projection of what constituted

natural gas MACE, the Commission expressed valid concerns about the study

relied upon by the Trust and determined that the approach taken in the

stipulation, which reflected recent market changes, was superior.

Furthermore, the terms of the stipulation provide that the natural gas budget is

adjustable each year depending on increased customer and load growth.

[¶36] We conclude that it was not erroneous for the Commission to base

its determination of natural gas MACE on historical data rather than on future

projections, and that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by approving

the stipulation.

The entry is:

Judgment affirmed.

22

Emily K. Green, Esq. (orally), Sean Mahoney, Esq. and Greg Cunningham, Esq.,
Conservation Law Foundation, Portland, for appellant Conservation Law
Foundation

Amy B. Mills, Esq. (orally), and Mitchell M. Tannenbaum, Esq., Maine Public
Utilities Commission, Augusta, for appellee Public Utilities Commission

Catherine R. Connors, Esq., and Liam J. Paskvan, Esq., Pierce Atwood, LLP,
Portland, and Patrick Taylor, Esq., Unitil Service Corp., Hampton, New
Hampshire, for appellee Northern Utilities, Inc.

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Christopher C. Taub, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Efficiency Maine Trust

Public Utilities Commission docket number 2015-00175
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY