American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ashour

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA67

Court of Appeals No. 16CA0822
City and County of Denver District Court No. 15CV33216
Honorable Morris B. Hoffman, Judge

American Family Mutual Insurance Company,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Omar Ashour,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE LOEB
Kapelke* and Vogt*, JJ., concur

Announced May 18, 2017

Campbell Latiolais Averbach, LLC, Robyn B. Averbach, Colin C. Campbell,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Blanton Law Firm, Michael W. Blanton, Evergreen, Colorado; Gerash Steiner,
P.C., Daniel P. Gerash, Eric L. Steiner, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2016.
¶1 In this insurance coverage action for declaratory judgment,

defendant, Omar Ashour, appeals the district court’s denial of his

motion for summary judgment and its entry of summary judgment

in favor of plaintiff, American Family Mutual Insurance Company

(AFI). Ashour contends that the district court erred by ruling, as a

matter of law, that his claim for underinsured motorist (UIM)

coverage under his automobile insurance policy with AFI was

precluded because he was not legally entitled to sue his employer or

co-employee in tort for his injuries based on their immunity under

the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado (the Act). We agree

with Ashour, reverse the judgment of the district court in favor of

AFI, and remand with directions for entry of summary judgment in

favor of Ashour.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 Ashour is an employee and co-owner of Nubilt Restoration &

Construction (Nubilt). While employed with Nubilt, Ashour was

severely injured when he was pinned by a thirty-foot truck to a

nearby tractor-trailer. The accident was caused by the negligence

of his co-employee, Rebecca Peake, who failed to set the airbrake on

1
 the truck that rolled backward and pinned Ashour to the other

vehicle.1

¶3 After the accident, Ashour submitted a claim to Nubilt’s

workers’ compensation carrier and subsequently received benefits.

He also submitted a claim to Nubilt’s corporate liability insurance

provider and received a settlement for that claim based on a policy

rider that allowed for coverage of workplace injuries. Ashour then

made a claim under his personal automobile insurance policy with

AFI for UIM benefits to recover the remainder of his alleged

damages.

¶4 After receiving Ashour’s claim, AFI filed this action in district

court seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether Ashour was

owed UIM coverage when the plain language in the policy limited

UIM benefits to those situations in which the insured was “legally

entitled to recover” from the owner or operator of an uninsured or

underinsured motor vehicle. AFI alleged that the Act provided

Ashour with his exclusive remedy for damages and that, because

the Act immunized Nubilt and Peake from tort suits brought by

1 Peake was cited by the Colorado State Patrol for careless driving
resulting in bodily injury.

2
 Ashour for work-related injuries, Ashour was not “legally entitled to

recover” under the AFI UIM policy.

¶5 In his answer, Ashour alleged that the phrase “legally entitled

to recover” had been interpreted by Colorado courts to mean that

an insured must only establish fault of the party causing the injury

(the tortfeasor) and the extent of the insured’s damages, and that,

accordingly, he was not required to show that he could proceed with

a lawsuit against the tortfeasor(s). Ashour asserted as an

affirmative defense that AFI was, therefore, estopped from denying

coverage on the basis of the policy’s “legally entitled to recover”

language.

¶6 Subsequently, Ashour filed a motion for summary judgment,

relying on Borjas v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 33

P.3d 1265 (Colo. App. 2001), in which a division of this court

defined the phrase “legally entitled to recover” and ultimately

concluded that an insured was “legally entitled to recover” even

when the tortfeasor was immune from suit under the Colorado

Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). In its response to Ashour’s

motion for summary judgment, AFI distinguished Borjas and

instead relied on Continental Divide Insurance Co. v. Dickinson, 179

3
 P.3d 202 (Colo. App. 2007), in which another division of this court

concluded that an independent contractor subject to a limited

recovery provision in the Act was not entitled to claim benefits

under his employer’s UIM policy.

¶7 The district court agreed with AFI’s interpretation of Colorado

law and, in a written order, concluded that Dickinson was

dispositive of Ashour’s claim if Peake had acted within the scope

and course of her employment. At the conclusion of its order, the

district court denied Ashour’s motion for summary judgment and

allowed the case to proceed for a determination of whether Peake

had been acting within the course and scope of her employment at

the time of the accident.

¶8 Several weeks later, AFI filed its own motion for summary

judgment asserting that, as a matter of law, Peake had been acting

within the course and scope of her employment. After full briefing

by both parties, the court entered a second written order,

reaffirming its prior order on the coverage issue and concluding on

undisputed facts that Peake was acting within the course and scope

of her employment at the time of Ashour’s accident. Accordingly,

the court granted AFI’s motion for summary judgment and declared

4
 that AFI was not obligated under Ashour’s policy to pay Ashour UIM

benefits.

¶9 Ashour now appeals. Specifically, he challenges the district

court’s conclusion that he was not entitled to UIM benefits under

his own insurance policy with AFI based on the immunity provided

to Peake and Nubilt under the Act. He does not appeal the court’s

ruling that Peake was acting within the course and scope of her

employment.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 10 We review the grant of a summary judgment motion de novo.

W. Elk Ranch, L.L.C. v. United States, 65 P.3d 479, 481 (Colo. 2002).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party

is afforded all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the

allegedly undisputed facts. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas

Ass’n, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 8 (citing Bebo Constr. Co. v. Mattox & O’Brien,

P.C., 990 P.2d 78, 83 (Colo. 1999)).

¶ 11 For our review, we apply the same standard as the district

court. Id. at ¶ 9. “Thus, our task on review is to determine whether

. . . the district court correctly applied the law” when it ruled that

Ashour was barred from receiving UIM benefits from AFI because he

5
 was not legally entitled to recover against his employer or co-

employee under the Act. Id. In doing so, we review the district

court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

III. Applicable Law

¶ 12 This case involves the application and interaction of two

bodies of Colorado law: workers’ compensation and uninsured or

underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage.

A. Workers’ Compensation Law

¶ 13 The purposes of the Act are to protect employees who suffer

injuries arising from their employment and to give injured workers

a reliable source of compensation for their injuries. Engelbrecht v.

Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 680 P.2d 231, 233 (Colo. 1984).

Employers subject to the Act, including Nubilt, are required to

secure insurance to cover their employees’ claims for work-related

injury. § 8-44-101(1), C.R.S. 2016.

¶ 14 An employer who has complied with the Act

shall not be subject to the provisions of section
8-41-101; nor shall such employer or the
insurance carrier, if any, insuring the
employer’s liability under said articles be
subject to any other liability for the death of or
personal injury to any employee . . . ; and all
causes of action, actions at law, suits in

6
 equity, proceedings, and statutory and
common law rights and remedies for and on
account of such . . . personal injury to any
such employee and accruing to any person are
abolished except as provided in said articles.

§ 8-41-102, C.R.S. 2016. There is no dispute that Nubilt was in

compliance with the Act at the time of Ashour’s accident and that

Ashour has received workers’ compensation benefits as a result of

the accident.

¶ 15 Similarly, when an employer complies with the Act, such

compliance is construed as

a surrender by the employer, such employer’s
insurance carrier, and the employee of their
rights to any method, form, or amount of
compensation or determination thereof or to
any cause of action, action at law, suit in
equity, or statutory or common-law right,
remedy, or proceeding for or on account of
such personal injuries . . . of such employee
other than as provided in said articles, and
shall be an acceptance of all the provisions of
said articles, and shall bind the employee
personally.

§ 8-41-104, C.R.S. 2016. Thus, Nubilt and its workers’

compensation insurance carrier are immune from suit by Ashour

for his injuries sustained in the course and scope of his

employment.

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¶ 16 By extension, co-employees are also immune from suit for

injuries to a fellow employee arising out of the scope of employment.

Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1304-05 (Colo. 1982). Thus, here,

Peake is also immune from suit.

¶ 17 The immunity from suit provided by the Act is often referred to

as the exclusivity provisions because the Act has been interpreted

to provide the exclusive remedy to a covered employee for injuries

sustained while the employee is performing services arising in the

course of his or her employment. Horodyskyj v. Karanian, 32 P.3d

470, 474 (Colo. 2001) (“The exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act

bar civil actions in tort against an employer for injuries that are

compensable under the Act.” (citing §§ 8-41-102, -104)). However,

this exclusive remedy is limited to suits by an injured employee

against his or her employer or co-employee; an injured employee

may receive workers’ compensation benefits and bring suit against

a third-party tortfeasor. See § 8-41-203(1)(a), C.R.S. 2016; Frohlick

Crane Serv., Inc. v. Mack, 182 Colo. 34, 38, 510 P.2d 891, 893

(1973) (The “Act is not to shield third-party tort-feasors [sic] from

liability for damages resulting from their negligence.”); see also

Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 100 (Colo. 1995).

8
¶ 18 Thus, the Act’s exclusivity provisions can be summarized this

way: the workers’ compensation system is an agreement by

employers to provide benefits to employees, regardless of fault, and

in exchange for assuming that burden, the employer is immunized

from tort claims for injuries to its employees. § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S.

2016 (“[T]he workers’ compensation system in Colorado is based on

a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by

employers and employees alike.”); People v. Oliver, 2016 COA 180M,

¶ 22.

B. UM/UIM Law

¶ 19 Colorado law requires that all automobile insurance policies

insuring against loss resulting from bodily injury or death must

provide UM/UIM coverage. § 10-4-609(1)(a), C.R.S. 2016. The

statute sets out specific requirements for UM/UIM insurance

policies, and if a policy violates those mandatory coverage

requirements, courts will read those requirements into the policy.

McMichael, 906 P.2d at 101.

¶ 20 Specifically, UIM coverage is intended to cover the difference, if

any, between the amount of the limits of a tortfeasor’s legal liability

coverage and the amount of the damages sustained by the injured

9
 party, up to the policy limits. § 10-4-609(1)(c). A division of this

court has interpreted this subsection to mean that an insurer’s

obligation to pay UIM benefits is “triggered by exhaustion of the

tortfeasor’s ‘limits of . . . legal liability coverage,’ not necessarily any

payment from or judgment against the tortfeasor.” Jordan v. Safeco

Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 2013 COA 47, ¶ 29 (alteration in original)

(citation omitted).

¶ 21 As relevant here, Colorado law limits UM/UIM coverage to

“protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to

recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor

vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including

death, resulting therefrom.” § 10-4-609(1)(a) (emphasis added).

The statute also provides for payment of benefits when the party at

fault is underinsured:

Uninsured motorist coverage shall include
coverage for damage for bodily injury or death
that an insured is legally entitled to collect from
the owner or driver of an underinsured motor
vehicle. An underinsured motor vehicle is a
land motor vehicle, the ownership,
maintenance, or use of which is insured or
bonded for bodily injury or death at the time of
the accident.

10
 § 10-4-609(4) (emphasis added).2 AFI’s policy tracks the “legally

entitled to recover” language of the statute and explicitly provides

coverage for underinsured vehicles: “We will pay compensatory

damages for bodily injury which an insured person is legally

entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor

vehicle or an underinsured motor vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 22 At issue in this case is the phrase “legally entitled to recover.”

Colorado courts have considered the meaning of “legally entitled”

language in the past, albeit not under the precise circumstances at

issue in this case. For example, in Newton v. Nationwide Mutual

Fire Insurance Co., in the context of deciding whether the insurer

was entitled to reduce the UIM benefits paid to the insured by the

amount of personal injury protection benefits paid out under the

same policy, the supreme court stated that “[u]ninsured motorist

recovery is available only to persons ‘legally entitled to recover

2 While the statutory language in subsections (1)(a) and (4) varies
slightly, we conclude there is no legally significant difference
between the phrase “legally entitled to recover” and “legally entitled
to collect.” See Borjas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33 P.3d
1265, 1267 (Colo. App. 2001) (analyzing a policy with language
“legally entitled to collect” against a statutory provision with the
phrase “legally entitled to recover” without distinguishing between
those phrases); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Slusher,
325 S.W.3d 318, 324 n.12 (Ky. 2010).

11
 damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.’”

197 Colo. 462, 465, 594 P.2d 1042, 1043 (1979) (citation omitted).

“Thus a claimant may not obtain payment under uninsured

motorist coverage without first establishing that the uninsured

motorist’s fault, normally negligence, caused the collision.” Id.

(emphasis added). This fault-based concept was again articulated

in DeHerrera v. Sentry Insurance Co., 30 P.3d 167, 173-74 (Colo.

2001), in which the supreme court, in analyzing section 10-4-

609(1)(a), interpreted subsection (1)(a) to mean that “an insured is

entitled to recover UM/UIM benefits when a person who is at fault

in an accident does not have any liability insurance” or is

underinsured.

C. Interaction Between the Act and UIM Coverage

¶ 23 The “legally entitled to recover” requirement is central to this

case because of the immunity provided to employers and co-

employees under the exclusivity provisions of the Act. The precise

question before us is whether Ashour is “legally entitled to recover”

under the meaning of the UM/UIM statute when he cannot sue

Nubilt or Peake, the tortfeasors, due to their immunity under the

Act.

12
¶ 24 Colorado courts have considered the interaction between the

Act and the UM/UIM statute in very few instances. In a basic

sense, courts have noted that claims for UM/UIM benefits and

claims for workers’ compensation benefits are independent of one

another. Benson v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 624, 626 (Colo.

App. 1994) (“We conclude that the trial court is the proper forum for

resolution of plaintiff’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits and

that this claim is independent of any workers’ compensation

claim.”).

¶ 25 In McMichael, where an employee was injured on the job by a

third-party tortfeasor who was underinsured, the Colorado

Supreme Court held that the injured employee was entitled to

benefits under both workers’ compensation and his employer’s UIM

policy because “[t]he [UIM] benefits do not constitute workers’

compensation benefits and do not result because of a suit brought

by McMichael against [his employer].” McMichael, 906 P.2d at 100.

That case, however, did not involve a claim for UIM benefits under

the injured worker’s personal UIM policy.

¶ 26 Colorado courts have also tended to be protective of the

benefits provided by UM/UIM coverage. For example, an insurance

13
 policy provision for the reduction of UIM benefits by the amount

paid by workers’ compensation is void. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Hillyer, 32 Colo. App. 163, 165, 509 P.2d 810, 811 (1973).

Colorado law also does not allow UIM benefits to be offset by any

other coverage, including workers’ compensation benefits. § 10-4-

609(1)(c); see also Adamscheck v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F.3d

576, 583-84 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Hillyer, 32 Colo. App. at 165,

509 P.2d at 811) (compiling Colorado cases allowing recovery in

addition to workers’ compensation benefits without offset).

D. Borjas: UM/UIM Coverage and Sovereign Immunity

¶ 27 We now turn to an analysis of Borjas, the case relied on by

Ashour and distinguished by AFI and the district court.

¶ 28 In Borjas, a division of this court concluded that a tortfeasor’s

immunity under the CGIA did not bar an injured party from

recovering UM/UIM benefits from her own insurer because the

phrase “legally entitled to recover damages,” as used in section 10-

4-609, simply “means that the insured must be able to establish

that the fault of the uninsured motorist gave rise to damages and

the extent of those damages.” Borjas, 33 P.3d at 1269. The

14
 immunity of the uninsured tortfeasor under the CGIA was, thus,

irrelevant for purposes of UM/UIM coverage.

¶ 29 Borjas was injured in a car accident when her personal vehicle

was hit by a police car driven by an Alamosa police officer

responding to an emergency. Id. at 1266.3

¶ 30 To recover damages, Borjas first attempted to sue the officer

and the City of Alamosa, but her case was dismissed because the

officer and the City were both immune from suit under the CGIA.

Id. at 1266-67. Borjas then made a claim under her own insurance

policy for UM benefits. Id. at 1267. State Farm denied the claim,

and Borjas sued to enforce payment of benefits under her insurance

policy. Id. The insurance policy, similar to the one here, restricted

UM/UIM benefits to situations in which the insured was “legally

entitled to collect” from the driver of an uninsured vehicle. Id. The

district court dismissed the action because the officer and the City

were immune under the CGIA, “and therefore [Borjas] was not

legally entitled to collect damages from them.” Id.

¶ 31 On appeal, a division of this court defined the issue as:

“whether § 10-4-609 requires coverage when an injured motorist

3 Workers’ compensation was not at issue in that case.

15
 cannot collect damages from a negligent motorist because the

tortfeasor is immune from liability pursuant to the CGIA . . . .” Id.

at 1268.

¶ 32 The division determined that the insurance company’s

interpretation of the policy to deny coverage when the tortfeasor

was immune from suit under the CGIA violated public policy. Id. at

1267, 1268. Citing the policies underlying the UM/UIM statute, the

division concluded that “[i]t is entirely consistent with this public

policy to construe § 10-4-609 to require that UM insurance

coverage apply even though the tortfeasor is immune from liability

under the CGIA.” Id. at 1268. The court reasoned that, from the

perspective of the injured party, the lack of legal responsibility had

the same effect as being injured by an uninsured driver. Id.

¶ 33 The division in Borjas acknowledged a split in cases from other

jurisdictions that had addressed the issue of UM/UIM coverage

where the tortfeasor was protected from liability by some form of

governmental immunity. Nevertheless, the division supported its

outcome as follows:

The courts that have held that UM coverage
was mandated where the tortfeasor is
protected by some form of governmental

16
 immunity have all found that interpretation
consistent with the purposes of their UM
statutes, i.e., to provide that motorists may
purchase insurance to protect themselves from
negligent motorists who cannot or will not pay
for the damages they have caused. The UM
statutes discussed in these cases all have
language similar to § 10-4-609. Thus, we find
the holdings in these cases consistent with the
purpose of § 10-4-609 described above.

The contrary line of cases all give a strict
interpretation to the statutory language
“legally entitled to recover” that we find
inconsistent with the public policy expressed
in § 10-4-609.

Id. at 1269.

¶ 34 The division also found further support for providing coverage

in a prominent treatise on UM/UIM coverage, and it summarized

the following three reasons why a

tortfeasor’s immunity should not preclude a
UM claim: (1) while tort immunity protects the
tortfeasor as intended, it should have no effect
on an insurance company providing first party
UM insurance coverage; (2) it is consistent
with the strong public policy of providing
insurance coverage to protect drivers when no
compensation is available from the negligent
tortfeasor; and (3) tort immunities are personal
to the tortfeasor and therefore cannot be raised
by an insurer.

17
 Id. (citing 1 Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist

Insurance § 7.14, at 388-90 (2d ed. 2001)).

¶ 35 Importantly, the division also specifically noted that its

conclusion did not contravene the public policy expressed in the

CGIA because “[t]hose persons and entities who are immune from

liability under the CGIA are unaffected by this holding.” Id.

¶ 36 In succinct terms, the court held

that the phrase “legally entitled to recover
damages,” as used in § 10-4-609, means that
the insured must be able to establish that the
fault of the uninsured motorist gave rise to
damages and the extent of those damages. We
further conclude that the public policy
expressed in § 10-4-609 requires that UM
insurance policies must provide coverage for
the protection of a motorist injured by the
negligence of a driver who is immune from
liability under the CGIA.

Id. (citation omitted).

E. Dickinson: UM/UIM Coverage and Independent Contractors
Under the Act

¶ 37 Next, we turn to an analysis of Dickinson, the case relied on by

AFI and found to be controlling by the district court.

¶ 38 Several years after Borjas, a division of this court was

presented with the novel issue of determining whether an

18
 independent contractor subject to capped tort damages from his

employer by section 8-41-401(3), C.R.S. 2016, of the Act could

recover on his claim for additional benefits from his employer’s

UM/UIM policy. Dickinson, 179 P.3d at 203-04.

¶ 39 While on the job, Dickinson sustained injuries when he fell

from a truck driven by his co-employee. Id. at 203. Dickinson was

an independent contractor working for United Technical Services

(UTS), and the co-employee/tortfeasor was an employee of UTS. Id.

¶ 40 An administrative law judge rejected Dickinson’s workers’

compensation claim against UTS because he was an independent

contractor, not an employee of UTS, and, therefore, was not

protected under the Act. Id. To recover damages for his injuries,

Dickinson then sued UTS and his co-employee in tort. Id. The trial

court ruled that Dickinson’s recovery against his employer and co-

employee was limited to $15,000 by section 8-41-401(3) of the Act

because he elected in writing not to be covered by UTS’s workers’

compensation policy and did not purchase his own workers’

compensation insurance. Dickinson settled the tort case for

$15,000. Id. at 204.

19
¶ 41 To recover his damages in excess of $15,000, Dickinson then

filed a claim under UTS’s UM/UIM auto insurance policy, claiming

that the $15,000 statutory limit to his tort recovery rendered UTS

and its employee underinsured. Id.

¶ 42 UTS’s auto insurer brought a declaratory action to determine

whether Dickinson’s claim was precluded because of the limitation

in section 8-41-401(3). Id. On cross-motions for summary

judgment, the district court ruled in favor of the insurer. Id.

¶ 43 On appeal to this court, the division’s analysis focused on

section 8-41-401(3) of the Act. As a matter of first impression, the

division defined the issue as “whether the Act’s $15,000 limitation

on certain tort claims precludes recovery against a UM/UIM insurer

of an employer for damages suffered in a work-related accident in

which the tortfeasor is in the same employ as the claimant.” Id.

¶ 44 As part of its analysis, the division broadly stated that “[t]he

majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue hold that

‘an insured is not “legally entitled to recover” under the uninsured

motorist provisions of an insurance policy if the exclusivity

provisions of the workers’ compensation statute would bar an

action against the tortfeasor.’” Id. (quoting Matarese v. N.H. Mun.

20
 Ass’n Prop.-Liab. Ins. Tr., Inc., 791 A.2d 175, 180-81 (N.H. 2002)).

The division agreed with this view and stated it was consistent with

Colorado statutes. Id. at 205.

¶ 45 In considering the policy behind section 10-4-609, the division

found that the statute recognizes that injured parties have the right

to recover for losses caused by uninsured motorists in the same

manner as if the motorist were insured. Id. “But because here the

tortfeasor and UTS were insured, Dickinson’s public policy

argument for avoiding the $15,000 limitation would place him in a

better position. . . . Hence, we discern no absurdity in giving effect

to the limitation in § 8-41-401(3), notwithstanding § 10-4-609(1),

when the tortfeasor enjoys this immunity.” Id. at 206. Again, the

division’s analysis focused on the recovery limitation and limited

immunity in section 8-41-401(3).

¶ 46 Dickinson also specifically distinguished Borjas in three ways.

First, the division noted that some of the out-of-state cases cited in

Borjas reached different outcomes when workers’ compensation

immunity was at issue rather than sovereign immunity. Id. at 206-

07.

21
¶ 47 Second, the division explained that Borjas allowed recovery by

an insured who had purchased the statutorily mandated UM/UIM

coverage and would have otherwise remained uncompensated if

CGIA immunity had defeated coverage of such benefits. The

division contrasted that scenario with the plaintiff in Dickinson, who

could have protected himself from the $15,000 cap but chose not do

so. Id. at 207.

¶ 48 Third, the division in Dickinson determined that while the

public policies of the CGIA and the UM/UIM statute at issue in

Borjas were not at odds with each other, the policies behind section

8-41-401(3) and the exclusivity provisions of the Act were at odds

with each other under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 208.

To allow Dickinson to recover above the cap in section 8-41-401(3)

through the employer’s UM/UIM insurance would, in the division’s

view, “undercut” the policy of encouraging independent contractors

to obtain workers’ compensation coverage, while unjustly burdening

an employer or co-employee with additional liability based on an

independent contractor’s choice to forego workers’ compensation

coverage. Id. at 207. The division thus reasoned that it would be

unjust to allow Dickinson to recover money from his employer

22
 above the $15,000 cap through the employer’s insurance policy

when that employer enjoyed immunity for any damages above

$15,000 under section 8-41-401(3).

¶ 49 The division summarized its holding as follows:

In sum, we hold that where an independent
contractor fails to obtain his own workers’
compensation insurance and does not dispute
that he could have done so, § 8-41-401(3)
precludes the independent contractor from
recovering more than $15,000 in damages
from the UM/UIM insurer of the employer of a
tortfeasor who is in the same employ as the
independent contractor.

Id. at 208. As pertinent here, the division expressly recognized the

narrow application of its holding and specifically noted that it might

not be applicable to a claim for benefits by an injured independent

contractor against his or her own UIM insurer: “Nevertheless, we

acknowledge that the statutory policies which we have reconciled

may interact differently if a claimant subject to § 8-41-401(3) sought

UM/UIM benefits from the claimant’s own insurance carrier, and we

express no opinion on such a scenario.” Id. (emphasis added.)

IV. Discussion

¶ 50 Ashour contends that the district court erred as a matter of

law by applying the very narrow and limited holding in Dickinson to

23
 this case to preclude his claim for coverage of UM/UIM benefits

from AFI. We agree and, for the reasons below, conclude that the

district court misapplied the law in concluding that Dickinson

should control the outcome of the case. Rather, we conclude that

the holding and reasoning in Borjas are applicable here and should

be extended to allow UM/UIM coverage to Ashour under his policy

with AFI.

A. Dickinson is not Applicable to the Circumstances in this Case

¶ 51 Factually, Dickinson is not analogous to this case in several

key respects.

 Dickinson was not an employee, but an independent

contractor without benefits under the Act. Dickinson,

179 P.3d at 203.

 Dickinson sought recovery of UIM benefits from his

employer’s policy, not his own personal policy. Id. at

204.

 Dickinson made the choice not to be covered by his

employer’s workers’ compensation policy and not to

protect himself with his own workers’ compensation

insurance. Id. at 203-04

24
 In contrast, Ashour was an employee who was injured on the job,

was fully covered under the Act, and opted to receive the protection

of UM/UIM benefits through his personal auto insurance policy.

¶ 52 In our view, the fact that Ashour sought recovery of benefits

under his own insurance policy is critical for two reasons. First,

Ashour did not seek to recover additional damages from the

immune parties in this case — his employer and co-employee. And,

second, Dickinson expressly acknowledged that the outcome may be

different where the injured party (in that case an independent

contractor) made a claim with his or her own insurer, and the

division, accordingly, expressed no opinion on the applicability of its

holding to the situation present in this case. Id. at 208.

¶ 53 Analytically, Dickinson is also distinguishable because it did

not consider the meaning of “legally entitled to recover” under

section 10-4-609. Instead, it considered only the recovery cap for

independent contractors provided in section 8-41-401(3). Id.

Indeed, the division limited its holding to the circumstances where

an independent contractor had chosen not to be covered by the Act

and was subject to the recovery cap in section 8-41-401(3). Id.

Section 8-41-401(3) is not relevant here because Ashour is not an

25
 independent contractor, but rather an employee of Nubilt. The

issue and holding in Dickinson were limited by three factors that

were present in that case: the applicability of section 8-41-401(3) to

the injured party; the request by the injured party for coverage

under an employer’s UM/UIM insurer; and the presence of a co-

employee tortfeasor. The only one of those factors present here is

that Ashour was also injured by a co-employee. Thus, contrary to

the district court’s conclusion, much of Dickinson’s reasoning does

not apply to the circumstances of this case.

¶ 54 Dickinson is also distinguishable from a policy standpoint. As

noted by the division in Dickinson, the policy behind section 8-41-

401(3) is to encourage independent contractors to choose workers’

compensation coverage under their employer’s policy or in a

personal policy by capping tort recovery at $15,000. Id. at 207.

That statutory cap and the policy underlying it are simply not

relevant to Ashour’s case. Moreover, the division in Dickinson

emphasized that the employer and co-employee were subject to

immunity from damages exceeding $15,000 and that it would have

been unjust to subject them to additional liability (i.e., a payout by

the employer’s insurance company) based on Dickinson’s election

26
 not to obtain coverage. Id. That concern also has no bearing here

because Ashour sought recovery of benefits from his own insurer,

which would not subject his employer or co-employee to further

liability.4

¶ 55 We therefore conclude that Dickinson is not applicable to

Ashour’s case. Hence, we also conclude that the district court

misapplied the law when it found Dickinson controlling.

B. Borjas is Analogous to the Circumstances Here

¶ 56 In contrast to Dickinson, the reasoning and holding in Borjas

have a broader application. We start, again, with a basic

comparison between the facts in this case and those in Borjas.

 Both Ashour and Borjas sought to recover benefits

under their personal UM/UIM insurance policies and

thus chose to protect themselves from otherwise

unrecoverable damages. Borjas, 33 P.3d at 1266.

4 Our analysis also leads us to reject AFI’s assertions that the
exclusivity provisions of the Act are broad enough to preclude any
compensation to an injured employee from other sources in excess
of those provided by the formulas under the Act. As discussed
above, Colorado law allows injured employees to receive workers’
compensation benefits and benefits or payouts from sources other
than their employer or co-employee. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 100 (Colo. 1995); Benson v. Colo. Comp.
Ins. Auth., 870 P.2d 624, 626 (Colo. App. 1994).

27
  The tortfeasor in each case was cloaked in immunity

from tort, one under the CGIA and the other through

the exclusivity provisions of the Act. Id. at 1267.

 Both cases required the court to interpret the phrase

“legally entitled to recover” in section 10-4-609(1)(a).

Id. at 1268.

¶ 57 From a policy standpoint, Borjas focused on the policies

behind the UM/UIM statute and the immunity provided under the

CGIA. While the CGIA is not at issue here, we discern that the

reasoning in Borjas is nonetheless applicable because both the

CGIA and the Act provide complete immunity from tort actions.

Thus, AFI’s argument that Borjas is distinguishable because it did

not address the exclusivity provisions of the Act (i.e., employer and

co-employee immunity) simply misses the mark.

¶ 58 AFI also attempts to distinguish Borjas because the immunity

provided by the CGIA left the plaintiff in that case with no means of

recovery (as if the tortfeasor were uninsured), whereas here, even

though Nubilt and Peake were immune from suit, Ashour received

benefits from Nubilt’s workers’ compensation insurer. We are not

persuaded. This argument ignores the fact that the language of

28
 AFI’s UM/UIM policy, consistent with section 10-4-609, provides

coverage where the tortfeasor is underinsured. The statute defines

underinsured tortfeasors simply and broadly as those who are

covered by insurance at the time of the accident. § 10-4-609(4).

Thus, Nubilt and Peake are effectively underinsured in that Ashour

received benefits up to Nubilt’s workers’ compensation insurance

limits but still has additional damages from his workplace injury. It

is the exhaustion of Nubilt’s and Peake’s limits of liability coverage

(i.e., workers’ compensation insurance) that triggers AFI’s obligation

to pay UM/UIM benefits. Jordan, ¶ 29. From the “perspective of

the injured innocent” employee, “the lack of legal responsibility has

the same effect” as that of an underinsured driver. Borjas, 33 P.3d

at 1268.

C. Analysis and Application of Borjas

¶ 59 Although we conclude Borjas is guiding and instructive here,

we recognize that it is not directly on point because it does not

address workers’ compensation or the issue of co-employee

tortfeasors. Hence, the question to be resolved is whether the

immunity provided to government employees by the CGIA is

somehow distinguishable from the immunity provided to employers

29
 and co-employees under the Act. We conclude there is no such

meaningful distinction. We agree with Borjas’s broad interpretation

of the phrase “legally entitled to recover,” because it is consistent

with the underlying policies of both the Act and the UM/UIM

statute, and, thus, we conclude that immunity under the Act, like

immunity under the CGIA, does not bar an injured employee’s

recovery of UM/UIM benefits from his or her personal insurer.

¶ 60 As a threshold matter, we consider AFI’s basic argument that

its UM/UIM policy language is unambiguous and consistent with

the UM/UIM statute, and that a plain reading of that language

results in an insured such as Ashour falling outside of the policy’s

UM/UIM coverage because he is not “legally entitled to recover”

from Peake, the tortfeasor. AFI, however, concedes that no

Colorado case law is directly on point under the circumstances of

this case and, accordingly, relies on out-of-state case law that

purportedly represents the “majority view.” We acknowledge this

argument but are unpersuaded.

¶ 61 We give the words of an insurance contract their plain

meanings, avoiding strained and technical interpretations.

Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 148

30
 P.3d 470, 474 (Colo. App. 2006). However, in the context of

UM/UIM coverage, if a UM/UIM policy violates the statutory

coverage requirements, courts will read those requirements into the

policy. McMichael, 906 P.2d at 101. Similarly, Colorado courts

have required UM/UIM coverage in instances where the insurance

carrier’s interpretation of its UM/UIM policy denying coverage

violated the public policy behind the UM/UIM statute. Borjas, 33

P.3d at 1267, 1268; see also Huizar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 952 P.2d

342, 344 (Colo. 1998) (stating that courts have a “heightened

responsibility” to scrutinize insurance policies that unduly

compromise the insured’s interests; any provision of an insurance

policy that violates public policy is unenforceable).

¶ 62 As AFI points out, and as we discuss in more detail below,

some out-of-state cases have concluded that the phrase “legally

entitled to recover” is unambiguous and means more than simply

showing that the uninsured/underinsured motorist was “at fault.”

However, we choose to adopt the Borjas interpretation of that

phrase because it is consistent with the policies underlying the

UM/UIM statute, the purpose of which is to compensate the injured

party “for injuries received at the hands of one from whom damages

31
 cannot be recovered.” Borjas, 33 P.3d at 1267 (quoting Farmers

Ins. Exch. v. McDermott, 34 Colo. App. 305, 308-09, 527 P.2d 918,

920 (1974)).

¶ 63 Specifically, the division in Borjas held that “legally entitled to

recover” under section 10-4-609(1)(a) “means that the insured must

be able to establish that the fault of the uninsured motorist gave

rise to damages and the extent of those damages.” Id. at 1269. The

division did not limit its interpretation of that language or tie its

interpretation to situations where the injured party has no other

means of recovery.

¶ 64 It necessarily followed from Borjas’s fault-based approach that

“the public policy expressed in § 10-4-609 requires that [UM/UIM]

insurance policies must provide coverage for the protection of a

motorist injured by the negligence of a driver who is immune from

liability.” Id. And, of course, the immunity at issue in that case

was that provided under the CGIA.

¶ 65 Thus, we must consider whether the policy considerations

articulated in Borjas are equally applicable where, as here, the

plaintiff was injured by the negligence of parties who are immune

under the Act. We conclude that the policies underlying the Act’s

32
 exclusivity provisions and the UM/UIM statute do not conflict and

that, therefore, Ashour is entitled to make a claim for UM/UIM

benefits against AFI, his personal auto insurer.

¶ 66 The essential purpose of the Act is to protect employees who

sustain injuries arising out of their employment. Bellendir v. Kezer,

648 P.2d 645, 647 (Colo. 1982). The Act is intended to provide a

reliable and speedy source of compensation, and consequently, it

does not require proof of fault before the worker can recover

benefits. Id.

¶ 67 “In order to effectuate the Act’s basic goals of speedy and

reliable compensation of injured workers, the General Assembly has

enacted a formula which calculates awards to an injured worker

based on loss of earning power at the time of injury.” Id. For

example, the temporary benefits Ashour was awarded were

calculated as sixty-six and two-thirds percent of his average weekly

wage while he was working at Nubilt. § 8-42-105(1), C.R.S. 2016.

There are also caps and limits on the amount of disability benefits

provided each year. § 8-42-107.5, C.R.S. 2016. Thus, the district

court accurately stated in its order that the “General Assembly has

made the decision to exchange a comprehensive, prompt, fault-free

33
 and largely determinate compensation system for the vagaries of the

common law’s fault-based tort system, at the price of sometimes

undercompensating injured parties.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 68 The UM/UIM statutory scheme implicates other compelling

policy considerations. The UM/UIM statute was enacted in 1965 to

ensure adequate compensation to victims injured in vehicular

accidents. See Ch. 91, sec. 2, § 72-12-19, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws

333-34. Since then, Colorado courts have consistently concluded

that the prime concern of the UM/UIM statute is the “need to

compensate the innocent driver for injuries received at the hands of

one from whom damages cannot be recovered.” Borjas, 33 P.3d at

1267 (quoting McDermott, 34 Colo. App. at 308-09, 527 P.2d at

920). This “legislative purpose is satisfied when an insurance policy

provides coverage for injury caused by an uninsured [or

underinsured] motorist to the same extent as for injury caused by

an insured motorist.” Peterman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

961 P.2d 487, 492 (Colo. 1998).

¶ 69 Concisely stated, “the public policy of Colorado requires that

insurance coverage be available to protect motorists from losses

caused by other negligent drivers who cannot or will not pay for the

34
 damages they have caused.” Borjas, 33 P.3d at 1268; see also Ch.

91, sec. 1, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 333.

¶ 70 The division in Borjas explained that the strict interpretation

of “legally entitled to recover” advocated by the insurance company

was not consistent with the public policy of section 10-4-609 as

outlined above.5 33 P.3d at 1269. The division further reasoned

that the policies behind section 10-4-609 did not adversely affect

the immunity provided under the CGIA because “[t]hose persons

and entities who are immune from liability under the CGIA are

unaffected by this holding.” Id.

5 We assume that the General Assembly is cognizant of the
division’s 2001 decision in Borjas and that the division’s
interpretation of section 10-4-609(1)(a), C.R.S. 2016, in that case
was approved by the legislature because the statute has been
amended twice since that decision and subsection (1)(a) has
remained unchanged. Ch. 413, secs. 1, 2, § 10-4-609(1)(c), (2), (4),
(5), 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws. 1921-22; Ch. 196, sec. 1, § 10-4-609(6),
(7), 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws. 845-46; People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA
57, ¶ 36 (“The General Assembly is presumed cognizant of relevant
judicial precedent when it enacts legislation in a particular area.
And, when a statute is amended, the judicial construction
previously placed upon that statute is deemed approved by the
General Assembly to the extent the provision remains unchanged.”
(quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar., Inc. v. Kourlis, 868 P.2d 1158, 1162-63
(Colo. App. 1994))); see also Jordan v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., Inc.,
2013 COA 47, ¶ 28.

35
¶ 71 Similar to the analysis in Borjas, the policies behind the Act

and behind the UIM statute are not in conflict. To preclude Ashour

from claiming benefits from his own insurance carrier under his

UM/UIM policy would effectively deny him the full protection for

injuries caused by underinsured negligent drivers contrary to the

intent of the General Assembly. Moreover, allowing him to claim

benefits from his own insurance carrier would not in any way affect

the immunity provided to his employer and co-employee by the Act.

Unlike the plaintiff in Dickinson, Ashour did not seek to recover

additional damages from his immune employer or co-employee;

instead, he sought only to enforce the terms of his insurance policy

and recover benefits from his own insurer.

¶ 72 In addition, the policies behind the Act are focused on the

protection of the injured worker (here, Ashour), not the protection of

a third-party auto insurance company. Similarly, the UM/UIM

statute is focused on protecting injured motorists, not the

insurance companies who are statutorily required to offer the

coverage. In our view, AFI should not be allowed to deny coverage

to Ashour when the purpose of the UM/UIM statutory mandate is to

protect those with coverage from the financial burdens imposed by

36
 tortfeasors who are unable to pay for the full scope of damages they

cause.

¶ 73 In sum, we conclude that Ashour’s claim for UIM benefits

under his policy with AFI is not barred by the exclusivity provisions

of the Act, or by the “legally entitled to recover” language of the

policy.

D. Out-of-State Authority

¶ 74 Both parties discuss non-Colorado case law in their briefs on

appeal, and, in addition, both Borjas and Dickinson cite foreign

cases in support of their respective holdings. Indeed, AFI even

urges us to adopt what it perceives to be the “majority rule” that

workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions are a bar to recovery

of UM/UIM benefits where the tortfeasor is a co-employee.6 Thus,

we address some of the out-of-state cases pertinent to our analysis.

6 Based on our review of non-Colorado authority, we are skeptical
that the “majority rule” is that articulated by AFI. In that regard,
we note that while courts in various jurisdictions are split on this
issue, the opinions and reasoning in most cases are very nuanced,
such that we are unable to discern a clear majority; the facts and
analyses vary so widely that they do not lend themselves to a
straight comparison. Thus, we disagree with Continental Divide
Insurance Co. v. Dickinson, 179 P.3d 202, 204 (Colo. App. 2007), to
the extent it stands for the proposition that denying UM/UIM

37
¶ 75 Courts in a number of states have found no bar to recovery of

UM/UIM benefits, and in so holding, they have used the same fault-

based definition of the phrase “legally entitled to recover”

articulated in Borjas. For example, as in the case here, in Barfield

v. Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Okla. 1987), an employee was

injured by a co-employee during the course and in the scope of

their employment and then applied for UM/UIM benefits from his

personal auto insurer. The insurer argued that UM/UIM coverage

was not available to the injured employee because the alleged

tortfeasor was immune from tort liability under Oklahoma’s

workers’ compensation statute, and the insured was, therefore, not

“legally entitled to recover.” Id. at 1111. The court in Barfield relied

on existing Oklahoma precedent to determine that the phrase

“legally entitled to recover” meant that the insured “must be able to

establish fault on the part of the uninsured motorist which gives

rise to damages and prove the extent of those damages.” Id. at

1112 (quoting Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., 662 P.2d 681, 685 (Okla.

1983)). The Barfield court explicitly stated that the phrase did not

coverage to employees covered by workers’ compensation who are
injured by a co-employee is the “majority” view.

38
 mean “that an insured must be able to proceed against an

uninsured/underinsured in tort in order to collect uninsured

motorist benefits.” Id. The Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently

extended its decision in Barfield by reaffirming the fault-based

definition of “legally entitled to recover” and determining that there

was no distinction between an employee who sought to recover from

his own policy or his employer’s UM/UIM policy. Torres v. Kan. City

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 407, 411 (Okla. 1993).

¶ 76 Similarly, in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v.

Pettie, 924 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Hettel v.

Rye, 475 S.W.2d 536, 537-38 (Ark. 1972)), the court noted that the

phrase “legally entitled to recover” only requires “a showing of fault

on the part of the uninsured motorist.” Accordingly, the court held

that the exclusive remedy provision of the Arkansas workers’

compensation statutes did not bar the injured worker from being

“legally entitled to recover” UM/UIM benefits. Id. at 832; see also

Jenkins v. City of Elkins, 738 S.E.2d 1, 12-14 (W. Va. 2012)

(identifying Borjas as a leading case that illustrated the majority

interpretation of the phrase “legally entitled to recover,” and holding

such phrase to mean that an insured is entitled to UM/UIM

39
 coverage merely by establishing fault on the part of the tortfeasor

and the amount of the insured’s damages).

¶ 77 We are persuaded by these cases because they are consistent

with the reasoning and holding in Borjas and with the public

policies articulated in Colorado’s UM/UIM statutory framework.

¶ 78 In contrast, those courts in other states that have found the

workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions to be a bar to

UM/UIM coverage have relied on a much stricter definition of

“legally entitled to recover.” For example, in Wachtler v. State Farm

Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 835 So. 2d 23, 26 (Miss. 2003),

the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the Mississippi workers’

compensation exclusivity provision barred an injured employee

from recovering UM benefits under the employee’s own insurance

policy based on its determination in a prior case that the phrase

“legally entitled to recover” meant “those instances where the

insured would be entitled at the time of the injury to recover through

legal action.” Id. (emphasis added). The court distinguished

Barfield, in part, on the grounds that its holding was contrary to

already existing Mississippi precedent interpreting the phrase

“legally entitled to recover.” Id. at 27; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v.

40
 Boynton, 486 So. 2d 552, 555-56 (Fla. 1986) (relying on a definition

of “legally entitled to recover” requiring that the case against the

tortfeasor be able to be “reduced to judgment”); State Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. Co. v. Slusher, 325 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Ky. 2010)

(distinguishing prior cases that determined that “legally entitled to

recover” required proof of fault and damages and deciding that the

phrase was not ambiguous under the circumstances of Slusher’s

case).

¶ 79 We are simply not persuaded by the analysis in cases such as

Wachtler7 because they are not consistent with the policies

underlying Colorado’s UM/UIM statute or the division’s analysis in

Borjas.

V. Conclusion

¶ 80 The district court’s judgment is reversed. The case is

remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of

Ashour, declaring, as a matter of law, that AFI must provide

coverage of UM/UIM benefits to Ashour upon his proof that Peake

7Indeed, we are much more persuaded by the dissenting opinion in
Wachtler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 835 So. 2d
23, 28-29 (Miss. 2003) (Diaz, J., dissenting), based on its emphasis
of the importance of the public policies and purposes of UM/UIM
coverage.

41
was at fault for causing his injuries and of the extent of his

damages in excess of the coverage offered him under the Act.

JUDGE KAPELKE and JUDGE VOGT concur.

42